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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of a study of the role of the Russian army in Russo-Turkish 
relations from the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence to the conclusion of the 
Mohammed Ali crisis. It focuses primarily on the activities of the Russian Second 
Army - a force quartered in the southern regions of the Russia and designated to 
conduct military operations against the Ottoman Empire in Europe. Under the 
leadership of General P. D. Kiselev, the General Staff of this army conducted a 
thorough research of previous Russo-Turkish wars (1711-1812) and integrated the 
lessons of these campaigns into a new strategic and tactical doctrine. Ultimately, this 
research was to result in the formulation of an innovative new Turkish war plan which 
proposed that the Russian army, for the first time in its history, cross the Balkan 
mountain range and march on Constantinople. These issues are examined in the 
context of the development of Russian military thought and from the wider perspective 
of their impact on Russia’s foreign policy in the East. The dissertation then examines 
the conduct of the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war (in both the Balkan and Caucasian 
theatres) with particular attention to the reasons behind the failure of the 1828 Balkan 
campaign and the Russian army’s organisation and use of Balkan partisans 1828-29. 
Following the conclusion of the war in September 1829, peace negotiations are 
discussed with emphasis on the role military figures played in the negotiation of the 
Treaty of Adrianople. One of the key terms of the treaty was the Sultan’s agreement to 
the prolonged Russian occupation of the Danubian Principalities. This occupation 
(1829-34) is examined with reference to the important reforms introduced by Kiselev, 
which aimed at transforming the province into a Russian protectorate. Finally, the work 
outlines Russia’s military preparations and planning during the Mohammed Ali crisis of 
1832-33.
This dissertation is based on archival research conducted in the Russian State 
Military-History Archive (RGVTA) (Moscow), the Russian State History Archive 
(RGLA) (St Petersburg) and the Public Record Office (Kew, London).
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6A NOTE ON SPELLINGS, DATES AND TERMS
Russian proper nouns are transliterated accoring to the modified Library of 
Congress system, except for surnames of a non-Russian extraction, e.g. Diebitsch not 
Dibich.
The spelling of proper nouns connected with the Balkans presents more 
substantial difficulties. There is nation of Romania, Rumania and Roumania, the region 
of Dobruja, Dobrudja and Dobrutcha, the Danubian fortress of Widin, Widdin and 
Viddin and the Greek revolutionary leader Ipsilanti, Ypsilanti, Ipsilantis and Ypsilantis. 
It has been well stated that ‘a completely standard and uniform system is an 
impossibility’, B. Jelavich, Russia and the Formation o f  the Romanian National State, 
1821-1878 (Cambridge, 1984), p. xi. This said, I have chosen to follow the spellings 
used in the standard work in English on nineteenth-century international relations and 
the Balkans, M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 (London, 1966).
Proper nouns not found in this work are spelt according to their most common form.
Place names in the Russian Caucasus are transliterated from Russian; those in 
the Ottoman Caucasus are spelt according to Anderson.
Unless otherwise specified, the term ‘rouble’ denotes ‘paper’ roubles 
(assignatsia) not silver roubles. Where the type of rouble is not specified in the 
documents, this is taken as paper roubles.
As regards dates, the Julian calendar, then in use throughout the Russian 
Empire, is denoted by the suffix OS (Old Style). In the nineteenth century this calendar 
stood twelve days behind the Gregorian calendar of western Europe. Unless suffixed, 
statements such as ‘in March, Nicholas ordered...’, are used only where the month 
conforms to both old and new styles.
List of Terms Relating to the Ottoman Empire
Bey: Ottoman provincial ruler
Bulgaria: Black Sea coastal lands situated between the Danube and the Balkan
mountain range.
Firman: Ottoman Proclamation
Grand Vizier: First Minister of the Ottoman Empire
Hatti-Sherif: Ottoman Proclamation
Lesser Wallachia: A region situated in the south-western comer of the Principality of 
Wallachia
Rumelia: Black Sea coastal lands situated between the Balkan mountain range
and Constantinople
Pashalik/Pasha: A large territorial sub-division of the Ottoman Empire and its ruler 
Reis-Effendi: Foreign Minister of the Ottoman Empire
Seraskier: Commander of Ottoman forces
The following terms are used interchangeably: ‘Ottoman Empire’, ‘Turkish Empire’, 
‘the Porte’, ‘Turkey’.
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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this work is the examination of the role of the Russian army in the 
Russo-Turkish military and diplomatic struggle for territory and influence in the Balkans 
and the Caucasus. This struggle, known to history as the ‘Eastern Question’, had, by the 
first decades of the nineteenth century, become an established feature of European 
international relations. Its rise to prominence was caused by the two successful wars 
conducted by Catherine the Great against the Ottoman Empire (1768-74, 1787-92). These 
wars permanently altered the balance of power in the East - the Ottoman Empire was 
doomed to a stubborn, yet inexorable, decline whilst Russia was elevated to the rank of a 
first-class power.
This revolution was to have great implications for European diplomacy. Concerned 
with the growth of Russian power and the consequences of a collapse of the Sultan’s 
empire, the other European Powers became increasingly drawn into the affairs of the 
Levant. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the doctrine of the preservation of the 
independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire had acquired almost universal 
acceptance in the Foreign Ministries of Britain and Austria. Though after 1815 Russia had 
adopted a more conservative policy in the East than in the past, the challenge from the 
Western powers for influence in this region was clear and thus the foundation was laid for 
the development of the ‘Eastern Question’ in its modem form.
It is true to say that, whereas in the eighteenth century the various eastern crises 
were caused from above, by the actions of the governments, in the nineteenth century, 
crises were caused from below - by the nationalist aspirations of the Balkan Christians and 
the ambitions of the provincial Muslim rulers of the Ottoman Empire. This is particularly 
true of the period in question (1821-1834); which was dominated by the Greek War of 
Independence (1821-29) and the First Mohammed Ali crisis (1832-33). These crises 
resulted in three noteworthy events in Russo-Turkish relations - the outbreak of the Russo- 
Turkish War (1828-29) and the signature of the Russo-Turkish treaties of Adrianople 
(1829) and of Unkiar-Skelessi (1833). The net result of these events was the extension of 
Russian power in the East and the sharpening of Anglo-Russian rivalry.
Any examination of the role of the Russian army in these events must necessarily 
focus on the activities of the Second Army and the Caucasus Corps - the two units 
designated for military operations against the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and in the 
Caucasus respectively. This dissertation concentrates primarily on the former institution as 
its role is of greater interest and, indeed, importance. Prominence is given to the
development and execution of the Russian war plan of 1828, which proposed that the 
Second Army, for the first time in Russian military history, attempt a crossing of the 
Balkans and an assault on Constantinople (Chapters V-VII). The consequences that such a 
crossing held for Russian and British strategy in the East is discussed in chapter VIII. 
Significant space is also awarded to the military reforms conducted by the General Staff of 
the Second Army during the 1820s (Chapters II and IV). These reforms took two main 
directions. Firstly, the introduction of progressive measures designed to alleviate the 
excesses of the ‘reactionary’ military establishment that had developed in Russia during the 
first decades of the century. Secondly, to assign the Second Army’s General Staff the 
responsibility of researching and gathering intelligence on the Ottoman Empire and its army. 
This new role was intended to increase the autonomy of the General Staff and allow it a 
monopoly on the formulation and execution of war plans against the Ottoman Empire.
Three chapters (I, III and IX) deal with the High Command and officer corps of the Second 
Anny as socio-political organisations. They relate to their attitude to the Greek War of 
Independence and to the role of P. D. Kiselev (the Head of the General Staff of the Second 
Army) in the administration and reform of the Danubian Principalities (1828-34). The 
dissertation ends with a discussion of the army’s role in the Mohammed Ali crisis of 1832- 
33 (Chapter X).
As many of the above issues are barely understandable without reference to the 
diplomatic context, it has been judged necessary to devote a fair degree of space to the 
international relations of this period. Certain sections on diplomacy have been expanded to 
include new documentary evidence that was discovered during the course of research.
The leading military personalities discussed in the work are General (later Field 
Marshal) 1.1. Diebitsch, the Head of the General Staff of His Imperial Majesty;(l) General 
P. D. Kiselev;(2) Colonel I. P. Liprandi, the Second Army’s expert on Ottoman affairs(3) 
and General (later Field Marshal) I. F. Paskevich, the Commander of the Caucasus 
Corps.(4)
Specific points of historiographical debate will be fully dealt with in the text. At 
this stage it is sufficient to outline the main trends in English and Russian historical writings.
Historiographical Trends in English and in Russian
(i) The Eastern Question in International Relations
The undoubted spur for the Tsarist academic study of the Eastern Question was the 
publication in 1871 of N. Ia. Danilevsldi’s Rossiia i Evropa. The work was motivated by
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the growing public interest in the aims of Russian foreign policy and by a general unease at 
the conservative approach taken by Russia towards Balkan affairs in recent times. Known 
as the ‘catechism or codex of Slavophilism’(5) Danilevskii’s work argued that history 
constituted a struggle between the Slavic/Orthodox and Germano-Romantic/Catholic 
civilisations and castigated the Russian Government for failing to fulfill its historical 
mission of liberating the Slavs from Ottoman and Austrian rule. Although cloaked in 
abstraction, his underlying aim was political - to force the Russian Foreign Ministry to 
pursue a more active policy in the Balkans.
Following Danilevskii’s publication there appeared a great number of works tracing 
the evolution of Russia’s Eastern policy and the truth of the various legends that had 
accrued around it, such as the doctrine of the Third Rome, Peter the Great’s Testament and 
the ‘Greek Project’ of Catherine the Great.(6) Most agreed with Danilevskii’s thesis that 
the idea of a Russian historical mission to liberate its co-religionists was not a contemporary 
invention, but that it stood ‘on firm historical ground’ and could be traced back to the fall of 
Constantinople. Moreover, this ‘historical mission’ occupied such an important position in 
Russian national life that the ‘study of the Eastern Question is the study of the development 
of Russian national self-consciousness’.(7) Whilst the majority of Tsarist writers followed 
Danilevskii in stressing religious/cultural elements in Russia’s Eastern policy, some were 
able to penetrate the mist of obscurantism and argue that Russo-Turkish relations were 
traditionally governed by concrete strategic/economic issues such as the security of the 
Russo-Tatar border and the development of Black Sea trade. V. A. Ulianitskii’s 
Dardanelli, Bosfor i chemoe more v XVIII veke (Moscow, 1883) appears to be the first 
Russian work to assume a wholly ‘materialist’ position on the subject. The most original 
thesis, however, was that of E. Kamovich who invited the wrath of Russian literary opinion 
by arguing that the idea of liberating the Ottoman Christians came from Catholic Europe 
and was adopted by Peter the Great only as a means of integrating Russia into the European 
family of nations.(8)
Whilst the idea of liberating the Balkan Christians was seen as ‘progressive’ in 
Russian society, in Europe it was viewed as nothing other than a cover for Russian 
expansionism.. In part, this was the fault of the Russian Foreign Ministry, which since the 
late 1820s had allowed Europe’s Russophobe publicists to gain the upper hand in the battle 
for public opinion by failing to offer any official rebuttal of their extravagant claims.(9) 
During the height of the Eastern crisis of 1875-78 a semi-official Russian response was 
finally published by F. Martens, an academic attached to the Russian Foreign Ministry.(lO)
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In essence, Martens’ aim was to give a general interpretive account of Russia’s Eastern 
policy that would placate both Slavophile and Russophobe opinion. His argument was as 
follows: first, Russian policy in the East represented her ‘role historique’ - the quest for 
‘F amelioration du sort des populations chretiennes’, for which Russia had ‘le droit moral et 
juridique’; second, Russia only ever declared war on the Porte ‘au nom des mterets de 
l’humanite’ and never possessed any ‘aspirations de conquete’; finally, Russia never 
followed a unilateral Eastern policy, but acted as ‘le representant du concert europeen’. By 
way of proof of Russia’s pacific policy, Martens revealed the existence and deliberations of 
Nicholas I’s Extraordinary Committee of 4 September 1829 OS. Convened at the end of 
the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war when the Russian army was almost at the gates of 
Constantinople, the committee concluded that the benefits to Russia of the existence of the 
Ottoman Empire outweighed those of her destruction and that the preservation of her 
Eastern neighbour should be the aim of Russian policy.
It was against this theoretical background that Tsarist historiography researched and 
analysed the Eastern Crisis of 1821-33. To writers of a sceptical disposition, Russia’s 
initial hostility to the Greek revolt and subsequent conservative policy towards it was proof 
that her alleged historical mission in the East did not exist.(ll) It was argued that Russia’s 
decision to go war with the Porte in 1828 was based on a separate Russo-Turkish 
diplomatic dispute (the Porte’s infringement of the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest) and had 
nothing to do with the support of the Greek cause.(12) Other writers believed the war was 
in fact fought for the liberation of Russia’s co-religionists and blamed Russia’s passive 
Eastern policy on the influence of Mettemich and the Holy Alliance.(13) As for the 1829 
decision to preserve the Ottoman Empire and then assist the Sultan against his rebellious 
vassal Mohammed Ali, this was roundly condemned both as a betrayal of the historical 
mission and as unworkable in practice.(14)
f t * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Soviet historiography of the Eastern Question was characterised by the attempt to reconcile 
two objectives - first, to remain faithful to the views of Marx on Tsarist foreign policy; 
second, to serve the contemporary interests of the Soviet state. The initial Soviet 
inteipretation of the Eastern Question was constructed by M. N. Pokrovskii. His aim was 
to lessen the hostility of the European powers towards the Bolshevik revolution by 
discrediting Tsarism through the exposition of its predatory and imperialistic foreign 
policy.(15) Pokrovskii argued that Russian policy was fully imperialistic in the Marxist
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sense - the Tsars conducted a ‘string of aggressive wars of conquest’ against the Ottoman 
Empire in order to dominate trade routes and markets. The idea of liberating co-religionists 
was simply a facade concealing these aims.(16) Pokrovskii’s views were firmly based on 
those of Marx. The latter had become interested in Tsarist foreign policy during the 
Crimean War and was immediately gripped by the anti-Russian hysteria that had descended 
upon Europe. He accused the Russian government of pursuing an aggressive and 
expansionist foreign policy, the root of which was the quest to dominate the main trading 
route between Europe and Asia (Danube-Black Sea-Caucasus).(17)
Pokrovskii’s unrelenting opposition to all things Tsarist was a model for Soviet 
historiography until the Second World War during which there emerged a Stalinist 
rehabilitation of the Tsarist past.(18) This rehabilitation had many causes, but as far as the 
Eastern Question is concerned, it was undoubtedly prompted by the fact that after 1945 the 
Soviet Union was committed to an active and expansionist foreign policy in Eastern Europe 
and the Balkans. Soviet historians attempted to exploit the latent reservoir of respect for 
Russia that existed in the Balkan nations which were liberated from Ottoman rule by the 
Tsars during the nineteenth century. The new historiographical direction was first revealed 
during the Greek civil war (1946-49). O. V. Shparo published two articles which aimed at 
destroying the idea that Britain and George Canning were responsible for Greek 
independence and assigning instead this accomplishment to Russia.(19) More importantly 
still, Shparo inaugurated the era of the Soviet concept of the ‘objective progressive role’ of 
Tsarist policy. It was argued that despite its reactionary appearance, the latter ‘objectively* 
facilitated the independence of Balkan nations. The enemy of progress was no longer 
Russia but Britain, who in supporting the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire aimed 
at keeping the Balkan Christians under its despotic rule.(20) Thus, from 1950s onwards, a 
steady stream of Soviet works appeared devoted to the progressive role of Russia in 
liberating the Serbs, Rumanians, Greeks and Bulgarians from Ottoman rule.(21)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The historiography of the Eastern Question in English began life as an overtly political 
movement. Since the celebrated ‘Ochakov debate’ of 1791, the possible dangers of 
Russia’s expansion in the East had first begun to trouble British ruling circles.(22) Over the 
next thirty years or so, these fears gained further currency and, in the late 1820s, there 
appeared the so-called ‘Alarmist’ movement (as it was pejoratively known). It was led by 
various Russophobe publicists whose aim was to expose Russia’s aggressive Eastern policy
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and push the British Government onto an anti-Russian orientation.(23) Although many of 
their arguments were based on conjecture, they gained added credence after the capture of 
certain diplomatic documents from the Russian consulate in Poland during the Revolt of 
1830-31 .(24) The Russophobe’s main thesis - that Russia aimed to destroy the Ottoman 
Empire (and turn Persia into a protectorate) in order to capture the Straits and open up an 
invasion route to India dominated British perceptions of Russian foreign policy for many 
years.(25) A more balanced interpretation of nineteenth-century Russian policy appeared in 
the 1960s following the publication of M. S. Anderson’s Eastern Question and Grimsted’s 
pioneering study based on the Russian archives.(26) Recent standard works on Russian 
and international history have maintained this line.(27)
(ii) The Russian Army in the 1820s
Tsarist works on the Russian army in the latter years of Alexander I/first years of Nicholas I 
essentially fall into two categories - campaign histories of the 1826-28 Russo-Persian war 
and 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war(28) and biographies of leading military figures.(29)
Though much of this work was of high quality, important issues such as the administrative 
structure of the military establishment, the army’s role in foreign policy and the 
development of military thought were largely neglected.(30)
Soviet interest in Tsarist military history dates from the end of the Second World 
War. The ideological framework for Soviet research was provided by L. G. Beskrovnyi 
and E. A. Prokof ev, who in a string of works, attempted to demonstrate that there existed a 
specifically Russian school of military art. This school was said to have been formed 
during the reign of Peter the Great and successively developed by P. A. Rumiantsev, A. V. 
Suvorov, M. I. Kutuzov and the Decembrists. This ‘progressive’ Russian school was held 
in opposition to the ‘reactionary’ military system of Europe under the ancien regime.{31)
The leading Soviet work on the Russian army during the Eastern Crisis of the 1820s 
is undoubtedly A. V. Fadeev’s Rossiia i vostochnyi krizis 20-kh godov XIX  v. (Moscow, 
1958). Its importance rests not on its ‘extensive research’,(32) (for it uses predominantly 
the same archival sources as Tsarist works) but in that it gives a structured breakdown of 
the various branches of the subject and imposes a strict Soviet interpretation on each. It is 
no exaggeration to say that all subsequent Soviet works on this subject are footnotes to 
Fadeev. The guiding theme of Fadeev’s work is the struggle between the ‘reactionary’, 
Prussified Russian military establishment and the Decembrist officers of the Second Army 
and Caucasus Corps, who are deemed the source of all progressive military, political and
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social ideas in Russia as well as being proponents of ‘national’ military school. The 
struggle is bought out in all manner of issues, such as their respective attitudes towards the 
Greek War of Independence, the formulation of strategy and the debates over the conduct 
of the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war. Subsequent Soviet works expanded on the less 
developed areas of Fadeev’s work. The 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war received fuller 
treatment in V. A. Liakhov, Russkaia armiia i flot v voine s ottomanskoi Turtseiei v 1828- 
1829 godakh (IaroslavP, 1972), whilst Russia’s use of Balkan partisans has been studied by 
V. D. Konobeev and others.(33) The possible links between the Decembrists and the 
Greek revolutionary movement Hetairia has received substantial treatment in works of G.
L. Arsh and I. F. Iowa.(34) The Russian army’s occupation of the Danubian Principalities 
is covered in V. Ia. Grosul, Reform v dunaiskikh kniazhestvakh i Rossiia (20-30-e gody XIX  
v.) (Moscow, 1966).
Works in English on the Russian army between the Congress of Vienna and the beginning 
of the Crimean War remain something of a rarity. There is, of course, J. S. Curtiss, The 
Russian Army under Nicholas I  (Durham, N.C., 1965), though this work is essentially a 
compilation of printed Tsarist sources. Two important general surveys of the Russian army 
have been published,(35) but both are clearly very broad in scope and devote little space to 
the period in question. This lack of interest is, in part, certainly due to the fact that, until 
recently, Russian archives were closed to foreign historians. Also important, however, is 
the general impression (which was reinforced by Curtiss) that the period holds little of 
interest and that Nicholas I simply left in situ the sterile military establishment that had 
developed during the latter years of Alexander I. This perception has recently undergone 
significant revision with the publication F. W. Kagan’s excellent monograph, The Military 
Reforms o f Nicholas I: The Origins o f the Russian Army (London, 1999). This work, 
which is based on extensive research in the Russian archives, reveals a great deal about 
Russia’s strategic perceptions in the early years of Nicholas’ reign and highlights the impact 
of the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war on the decision to reform the military establishment. 
Kagan recasts Nicholas I as an important military reformer and makes the bold claim that, 
during his reign, Russia acquired a military system that was equal and perhaps even 
superior to the more famous Prussian/German military system that developed later in the 
century under H. Moltke.(36)
A Note on Archive Sources
This dissertation is based primarily on the manuscript collections of the Russian State 
Military-History Archive (RGVIA). The main fond [collection] used is that of the Voenno- 
uchenyi arkhiv (VUA) [Military-scientific archive]. This collection comprises the former 
archive of the Tsarist General Staff and the orderly, thematic organisation of the material 
greatly facilitated its use. For our subject, Russian historians had access to the VUA from 
the 1870s and, in Soviet times, from Fadeev onwards. Some important VUA documents 
have been published in the nineteenth-century periodicals Russkaia starina, Russkii arkhiv 
etc., though a great deal of material has remained undiscovered. Other important 
collections consulted include those of the General Staff of the Second Army (fond 14057) 
and of the chancellery of the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army (fond 14058).
Research of a more secondary nature was conducted in the Russian State History 
Archive (RGIA). The most significant material was found in the private papers of I. P. 
Liprandi (fond 673). This collection holds Liprandi’s work on military theory and his 
ground-breaking study of the Ottoman army. The existence of these works has been known 
foF many years and it is unclear why Soviet historians have made no more than a passing 
reference to them. One suspects ideological reasons, for in the 1830s and 40s Liprandi 
became one of Nicholas Fs most notorious police agents and it was perhaps considered 
prudent not to draw too much attention to his pioneering work.
Two important manuscript collections have been discovered in British archives.
The Public Record Office collection FO 97/402-04 provides significant material on the 
Russian occupation and reform of the Danubian Principalities via the reports of E. L. Blutte, 
the British consul in Bucharest. The British Library contains the papers of Lord Heytesbury 
(British ambassador to Russia, 1828-32) (Add. MSS 41557-41558). Heytesbury 
accompanied the Russian army during the 1828 Turkish campaign and left an interesting 
record of his observations. His acute understanding of Russia’s Eastern policy rivaled that 
of any foreign diplomat.
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(1) 1.1. Diebitsch (1785-1831), a Silesian German, entered the Russian service during the 
reign of Paul I. In 1810 he joined the Quartermaster Staff of His Majesty’s Suite. Two 
years later he was made General-Quartermaster of General P. Kh. Wittgenstein’s First 
Corps and in 1813 became General-Quartermaster of the combined Russo-Prussian forces. 
In 1815, Diebitsch was made Head of the General Staff of the First Army. In 1823 he 
succeeded P. M. Volkonskii as Head of the General Staff of His Imperial Majesty, at the 
time the most important non-field position in the Russian army. In 1829 Diebitsch became 
Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army and led a successful campaign against the 
Ottoman Empire. He was subsequently promoted to Field Marshal and in 1830 he led the 
Russian campaign against the Polish Revolt but soon died after contracting cholera.
(2) P. D. Kiselev (1788-1872) was from an influential, if undistinguished, non-aristocratic 
Muscovite family. Due to his father’s connections, in 1806 Kiselev entered the Chevalier- 
Guards, the most aristocratic and prestigious regiment in the Russian army. From 1807-12 
Kiselev saw service in the Napoleonic campaigns. In 1814, he was appointed aide-de-camp 
to Alexander I and accompanied the Tsar to the Congress of Vienna. For the next four 
years Kiselev fulfilled a variety of tasks - inspecting the regiments of the Second Army, 
rooting out corruption in the military establishment and accompanying the Tsar on his 
journeys. By 1819 Kiselev had achieved the rank of General-Major and in February of that 
year was appointed as Head of the General Staff of the Second Army. After the 1828-29 
Russo-Turkish war, Kiselev was appointed President of the Divans of Moldavia and 
Wallachia (the Danubian Principalities) and conducted a thorough reform of the province 
during the period of Russian occupation. In 1837 Kiselev entered the civilian service as 
Minister for State Properties. He held the post for twenty years and established himself as 
one of Russia’s most respected reformers.
(3) I  P. Liprandi (1790-1880) was one of Russia’s foremost experts on espionage 
techniques, secret societies and the Ottoman Empire. Little is known of his family’s 
background though it was certainly of foreign (probably Spanish or Italian) extraction. 
Liprandi fought in the campaigns of 1807-15 and from 1812 served in the Quartermaster 
Staff of His Majesty’s Suite. In 1813 he began service as an agent in the Russian military 
police and served in this capacity during the Russian occupation of France. On his return to 
Russia, Liprandi was attached to the General Staff of the Second Army. Here he began his 
research on the Ottoman Empire and led various intelligence-gathering missions to 
Moldavia. During the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war, Liprandi established an intelligence 
network in the Balkans and in 1829 led a corps of partisans. In the 1830s, Liprandi spent 
much of his time in the Danubian Principalities and wrote up his research on the Ottoman 
Empire. In 1840 he joined the Ministry of the Interior and became a specialist on Russia’s 
religious dissenters [raskol’niki]. From the early 1850s onwards, Liprandi devoted himself 
to the publication of over fifty historical works on various themes.
(4) I. F. Paskevich (1782-1856) was the most decorated soldier of Nicholas I’s reign. He 
fought as a divisional commander in the 1806-12 Russo-Turkish war and the Napoleonic 
campaigns of 1812-14. From 1817 to 1822 he served as aide-de-camp to Grand Duke 
Michael. In 1822-25 Paskevich served as commander of the Guards’ infantry division, 
during which time he forged his friendship with Grand Duke Nicholas. On becoming Tsar, 
Nicholas I awarded his favourite the command of the First Infantry Corps and, in August
1826, sent Paskevich to take operational control of the Caucasus Corps in the war against 
Persia (1826-28). In the Caucasus, Paskevich famously clashed with General A. P.
Ermolov and eventual succeeded him to the command of the Caucasus Corps. After leading 
the Corps to victory in the Persian and then the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish war (for which he 
was promoted to Field Marshal), Paskevich set about preparing a plan to finally subdue the 
rebellious tribes of the Caucasus. Before the plan could be enacted, Paskevich was in 1831 
despatched to Poland to quell the revolt. For his services, Paskevich was made Prince of
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Warsaw and Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army. Many years later Paskevich led the 
Russian army in the Hungarian campaign of 1849 and the Crimean War (1853-56).
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I. THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND, 1801-21
Russia entered the nineteenth century with three more or less distinct approaches to
the Eastern Question.(l) The first was of ancient lineage - to expand territorially to the
south at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. This process could involve unilateral
annexations or a partition of the Sultan’s dominions in concert with other the other
European Powers. This policy, followed with much success by Catherine the Great, had
been advocated most recently by Paul Fs foreign policy adviser F. V. Rostopchin in 1799,
who, in this instance, favoured partition in alliance with France.(2) The second, also of
long heritage, consisted of an attempt to gain influence over the domestic affairs of the
Ottoman Empire through the patronage of its Christian population. Russia’s self-
proclaimed role as patron of Orthodox Europe first met with success in the 1774 Treaty of
Kuchuk-Kainardji(3) and reached its apogee a few years later in Catherine’s ‘Greek
Project’, which envisaged the final liberation of the Ottoman Christians through the
resurrection of an independent Christian or neo-Byzantium Empire.(4) The emergence of
the national principle during the French Revolutionary Wars greatly affected this idea and,
after 1815, proposals for a unitary or confederate multi-national Balkan state competed with
those favouring the creation of independent nation states. Such ideas centred after 1816
around J. Capodistrias who, in that year, became joint Foreign Minister with K. R.
Nesselrode.(5) During the course of the nineteenth century these ideas were favoured by
the Slavophiles, the Pan Slavicists and generally by all who believed it was Russia’s
‘historical mission’ to liberate its co-religionists.
In opposition to all these approaches to the Eastern Question was the novel proposal
by V. P. Kochubei (Russian ambassador to the Porte 1792-98; Interior Minister, 1802-12,
1819-25) in 1802 of the so-called ‘weak neighbour’ policy. He argued that Russia should
formally renounce her previous expansionist designs on Turkey since:
Russia in its present expanse is no longer in need of enlargement, there 
is no neighbour more obedient than the Turk, and the preservation of 
this natural enemy of ours should really be in the future the root of our 
policy.(6)
This idea was supported by others, such as A. R. Vorontsov (Foreign Minister, 1802-05), 
who considered that even the creation of a ‘Greek Empire’ in the Balkans would be less 
advantageous to Russia that the continued existence of the decaying Ottoman Empire.(7) 
Ostensibly, the ‘weak neighbour’ policy was moderate and defensive, especially in 
the hands of a cautious Foreign Minister. However, the aim of preserving the Ottoman
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Empire in a perpetually-weakened state served also as a means of asserting Russian 
dominance at Constantinople. Russia would not destroy her neighbour, but in return, the 
latter was to do the Tsar’s bidding. The two Powers could be friends, even allies, but never 
equals. One was to be the protector, the other - the protected. The logical conclusion of 
this relationship was that the Ottoman Empire should one day become a Russian 
protectorate.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Russia’s eastern policy during the first decade or so of Alexander’s rale (1801- 
1812), was governed mostly by force of circumstance. Devoid of any firm guiding 
principle, it contained elements of all the above ideas and was inconsistent in the 
extreme.(8) Under the influence of Kochubei, the Tsar’s first action was to halt his father’s 
proposed alliance with France for the partition of the Turkish Empire and defensive treaties 
were signed with Britain and Turkey in 1805. Alexander’s attempt to reactivate his father’s 
alliance with the Sultan was, however, doomed to failure. Napoleon’s victories at Ulm and 
Austerlitz impressed the Turks who subsequently refused to ratify the Russian alliance and 
sided with Napoleon instead. Faced with the Sultan’s progressive infringement of Russo- 
Turkish treaties, Russia was compelled to declare war on its intended ally Turkey in 1806. 
In this instance, as Solov’ev argued, the ‘weak neighbour’ policy failed. The relatively 
weak Ottoman Empire had proved just, if not more, likely to fall under the influence of a 
rival power, in this case France.(9)
Once at war, Alexander fell under the influence of pro-expansionist foreign policy 
advisers such as N. P. Rumiantsev. The Tsar reverted to the grandiose annexationist aims 
of Catherine, most conspicuously in the Tilsit agreement of 1807 which raised the 
possibility of a partition of the Ottoman Empire with Napoleon. Agreement over the details 
of this partition, however, proved more difficult, with Napoleon’s intention to give Austria a 
share of the spoils and his outright refusal to give Russia Constantinople and the Straits 
proving the insurmountable barrier. From this time onwards, Russia understood that a 
dismemberment of the Sultan’s possessions between the Great Powers would give its rivals 
at least as much benefit as herself, whilst the ultimate prize of the Straits would elude her 
unless she was willing to fight a general European war. The need, after 1815, to avoid 
another costly conflict sealed the demise of the partition policy. During the Eastern Crisis 
of the 1820s it was seriously advocated by no one.(10)
The net result of the vacillations of Alexander’s early reign and the 1806-12 Russo- 
Turkish war was the compromise 1812 Treaty of Bucharest.(ll) Though hurriedly
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negotiated to free Russian troops for the impending attack of Napoleon, this treaty served as 
a signpost for the long-term governance of Russo-Turkish relations. In Europe, Russia 
limited herself to the annexation of Bessarabia (article IV) - her final major encroachment 
into the Sultan’s European Empire. By contrast, in the Caucasus, Russia made plain her 
desire for further expansion and by article VI secured important territories. As regards the 
fate of the Ottoman Christians, Russia continued her quest for an enshrinement in law of the 
power to act as their defender. By article V, Russia consolidated her influence in the 
Principalities and for the first time secured rights regarding Serbia, which, since 1804 had 
been waging its war of independence. (12) Russia had! supported the Serbian struggle and 
by article VIE of Bucharest she secured for Serbia the rights of autonomy within the 
Ottoman Empire - a precedent for Russia’s eventual policy towards the Greek Revolution.
When we add to these precedents Russian undertakings at Vienna - to support the 
continuation of Congress diplomacy and maintain the Balance of Power as established by 
the 1815 territorial settlement - together with Alexander’s quest to uphold the principle of 
legitimism (as expressed in his idea of the Holy Alliance), the main tenants of Russia’s 
post-1815 Eastern policy may be established: firstly, schemes of partition and large 
annexations were to be abandoned. Russia would demand no more territory in Europe, but 
in the right circumstance could consider the annexation of small though strategically 
significant ports and provinces in the Caucasus. Secondly, Russia would maintain and 
extend her influence over the Porte by means of her military and diplomatic power and in 
her capacity as the self-styled protector of the Ottoman Christians. Thirdly, the Tsar would, 
however, respect the Sultan as a fellow monarch and not question his ultimate suzerainty 
over his subject peoples. The political and religious rights already conferred on the 
Ottoman Christians were to be observed but, in line with Russia’s commitment to Holy 
Alliance principles, new Balkan revolutionary movements were not to be supported. 
Fourthly, although Alexander refused the Ottoman Empire’s inclusion in the Vienna system 
- mainly as a result of the Caucasian border dispute after 1812, Russia nevertheless from 
1815 onwards de facto accepted both that the Porte’s western dominions were part of the 
European Balance of Power and that crises of sufficient magnitude (such as the Greek 
Revolution) concerned all the Great Powers and could properly be regarded as Congress 
issues.(13) Finally, as regards the Straits of Constantinople, Russia accepted that their 
annexation was impossible without a major European war. The next best solution was for 
Russia to control the Straits by a unilateral agreement with the Porte. If the latter could be 
persuaded to allow Russian warships to pass the Straits whilst blocking those of other 
Powers (as had temporarily been secured in the Russo-Turkish treaties of 1799 and 1805)
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then Russia would gain a great strategic advantage over her rivals. Unfortunately, such an 
agreement would inevitably create an irreconcilable rift with Britain. The most realistic 
solution therefore was for a common agreement by which the warships of all Powers were 
to be barred from passing the Straits. Such a solution was, in fact, most advantageous to 
Russia as it protected her exposed southern coastline from the superior navies of Britain and 
France. Though de jure no such collective agreement existed until 1841, Britain had de 
facto succeeded in imposing one on Europe by her 1809 treaty with the Porte.(14) By 
article XI, the Sultan gave his formal recognition to the ‘ancient regulation’ of the Porte, 
which stated that whilst she was at peace, the Straits were to be closed to the warships of 
all foreign powers.(15) Russia understood the benefits of the treaty and after 1815 aimed at 
the preservation of the 1809 regime.(16)
This, in short, after the trials of 1801-12, became the official policy of Alexander 
and the Russian Foreign Ministry. In essence, it amounted to the formal adoption of 
Kochubei’s ‘weak neighbour’ policy. Although, as noted, this policy could contain 
aggressive implications, in the hands of Nesselrode it remained a largely passive instrument. 
More than anything, Nesselrode desired the preservation of the unity of European alliance 
forged during the Napoleonic Wars. His system was founded on the preservation of peace, 
monarchical rule, the Congress System and the territorial status quo established in 1815.
To this end, he was happy to forego a forward policy against the Porte and adopted a 
conciliatory attitude towards her in negotiations. Thus, not without reason, Nesselrode has 
been named the ‘Spokesman for the Status Quo’.(17)
At home, both in the Russian army and the Foreign Ministry, there was strong 
opposition to the ‘weak neighbour’ policy. Certain individuals followed the lead of 
Capodistrias, who opposed it outright and favoured instead ‘expansionist policies in the 
Balkans’.(18) Others, like Generals A. P. Ermolov (the Commander of the Caucasus Corps 
1816-27) and P. D. Kiselev ostensibly believed in the policy,(19) but wished for its more 
forceful application and a further weakening of the Ottoman Empire. This domestic 
opposition to Russia’s new policy was brought to the fore by two problems. One was 
concrete and essentially solvable, the other was entirely unexpected and threatened almost 
immediately to develop into an international crisis.
The first issue related to a Russo-Turkish dispute over the delimitation of the new 
Caucasian border as fixed by article VI of the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest.(20) The
circumstances behind the dispute were that, in early 1812, the Russian forces, though 
largely unsuccessful in their operations in the Balkans, were in possession of large tracts of 
territoiy in the Caucasus. The Russian commander, M. I. Kutuzov, was, however, hard 
pressed to sign a treaty in order to despatch his forces back to Russia, where they were to 
fend off Napoleon’s impending attack. Not wishing to return Russia’s hard-earned gains, 
he countered the Porte’s demand for the status quo ante bellum by phrasing article VI of 
the treaty thus: that the Russo-Turkish frontier would be ‘restored exactly to that as it was 
before the war and therefore Russia returns to the Porte...fortresses and castles laying inside 
this [Russian] border and conquered by His Imperial Majesty's arms ’ [italics added]. 
Kutuzov interpreted the highlighted phrase as meaning that Russia’s undertaking to return 
the said points ‘did not at all apply to those possessions and regions which before and 
during our last war with the Porte voluntarily joined [prisoedinilis ] the Russian 
Empire’.(21) Russia thus declared herself justified in retaining the provinces of Imeretia, 
Mingrelia, Guria, Abkhazia and the ports Sukhum-Kale, Anakliia and Redut-Kale 
(Kemkhal) but returning to the Porte Poti, Anapa and Akhalkalakli (see map A).(22)
The Porte naturally disputed this interpretation and so, in 1816, Nesselrode 
despatched G. A. Stroganov to Constantinople to seek a solution.(23) The Turks were 
insistent that Russia return the above-mentioned ports, especially Sukhum-Kale. Though 
Nesselrode believed that the letter of the treaty was on Russia’s side,(24) for the prospect 
of improving relations with the Porte, he gave Stroganov instructions in 1816 and again in 
1820 to return these ports to the Porte with certain preconditions.(25)
This decision was destined to place Nesselrode in conflict with Ermolov. The 
former was generally keen to find compromise with the Porte where possible, whilst 
Ermolov adopted a hardline position that reflected the strong anti-Ottoman bias of the 
Caucasus Corps. During the 1806-12 war, Ermolov’s predecessor General A. P. Tormasov 
had demanded sweeping territorial annexations(26) and with Russia’s eventual gains falling 
far short of this, Ermolov was not prepared to yield an inch. In 1818, he outlined his 
position thus: the possession of Abkhazia had, as yet, brought Russia no benefit 
whatsoever. Its largely Muslim population was hostile to its weak Christian leader, Georgii 
Shervashidze, was pro-Turk and undertook no form of economic activity other than trading 
in slaves. The province itself was very difficult to protect - the only permanent garrison 
being that of five hundred men stationed in Sukhum-Kale, which could not withstand a 
Turkish attack. Without Sukhum-Kale the rest of the region could not be defended. 
Defences could be improved by the building of a fortress at Gagry and occupying the
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coastline (which would cut off Abkhazia’s communications with Ottoman-held Anapa and 
the Circassians) however, this would cost 15,000 silver roubles - a sum that could be 
recovered only after a long period and based on the assumption that Abkhazia could 
provide Russia with timber.(27)
Despite all these problems, Abkhazia was, however, not to be returned to the Sultan 
for three main reasons. The first, that Russian presence was needed to stop the slave trade, 
was possibly an argument intended to appeal to the Tsar’s conscience, though the fact that 
slaves were taken from amongst Mingrelian and Imertian Christians did genuinely concern 
Ermolov. The second was that the Porte supported Georgii’s brother, the Muslim Gassan- 
Bey, as heir to the throne. The accession of the latter - a man of a ‘savage character’ would 
mean that ‘the spread of the Christian religion, which is so needed for the softening of the 
beast-like peoples will completely cease’, and the resulting terror unleashed on Christian 
converts would damage Russia’s image as defender of the faith.(28) Ermolov seems to 
have genuinely believed in the civilising power of Christianity and Russia’s responsibility as 
an Orthodox state and would often return to the subject. His third and most important point 
was that Russian rule was to a large extent based on prestige and the image of power. 
Sympathy for the Sultan was still very strong in the Muslim regions of the Caucasus and 
any sign of weakness or compromise had adverse effects on these peoples. Giving up all or 
any part of Abkhazia would ‘instil in them distrust of our promises’(29) and would allow 
Turk agents to stir up revolts in surrounding provinces.(30) He warned Nesselrode that 
should it be decided to give up the province, its execution would have to be entrusted to 
someone else as ‘I would lose much in the general opinion’.(31) Whether this can be 
counted as a threat of resignation is unclear but of his antipathy to Nesselrode’s system 
there can be no doubt. He wrote to his close friend A. A. Zakrevskii, ‘I am grateful for 
Count Nesselrode, he is a most noble man, it grieves me that I must take the offensive 
against him’.(32)
Nesselrode was, however, determined to reach a negotiated settlement with the 
Porte. Stroganov’s negotiations thus continued but were to drag on unsuccessfully for some 
years until finally they were broken off, in unexpected fashion, with the outbreak of 
Alexander Ypsilantis’ uprising in the Danubian Principalities in the Spring of 1821. The 
Greek revolt will be dealt with fully later in the text but we may make certain preliminary 
observations. TheTsar first heard of the revolt during the Congress of Laibach and his first 
instinct was to castigate Ypsilantis as a revolutionary and support the Sultan’s attempts to 
quell the revolt. Although the subsequent Turkish reprisals were noted for their outrages
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(forcing Stroganov to quit Constantinople in mid-1821), Russian policy remained 
conservative and unilateral action in favour of the Greeks was forgone. Instead, Russia 
sought a Congress solution to the crisis in the hope of averting a Russo-Turkish war and the 
alienation of the other European Powers, especially Austria and Britain, who were most 
suspicious of Russia’s intentions in the Balkans.(33)
Opposition to this cautious policy was strong within the Russian diplomatic corps. It 
centred around Capodistrias. Greek by birth and in the Russian service since 1809, 
Capodistrias had always favoured a forceful Russian policy in the Balkans. He had 
welcomed the Russian protectorate over his homeland Corfu and the other Ionian islands 
from 1800 to 1807 but was disheartened by what he saw as Russia’s retreat from the 
Balkan peninsula following the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest (which he opposed as being too 
lenient) and the decision, in 1815, to hand over the Ionian islands to Britain. When the 
Greek revolution erupted Capodistrias called for it to be supported by Russian military 
intervention. As a believer in constitutions and the right of national self-determination, 
Capodistrias had no ideologically objection to the support of the Greek rebels. Indeed, he 
openly opposed the Holy Alliance principle of legitimism as damaging to Russian interests. 
After a successful war with the Turks, Russia was to create a Greek state (possibly 
independent, possibly autonomous, but either way pro-Russian) and annex the 
Principalities.(34) When war did finally come in 1828 Capodistrias increased his demands, 
calling for the destruction of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and the creation of a pro- 
Russian Balkan confederation.(35) Capodistrias’ views found strong support amongst other 
diplomats such as G. A. Stroganov,(36) A. S. Sturdza, Pozzo di Borgo(37) and F. P. 
Fonton.(38)
The ‘opposition party’ within the Russian Foreign Ministry was supported by
important elements within the army. Here, military intervention was supported out of
philhellene and religious sentiment and, by the Caucasus Corps and Second Army in
particular, by the prospect of victory over Russia’s traditional foe and the erasing of the
memory of the largely unsuccessful 1806-12 war.
When news of the revolt first arrived, P. D. Kiselev, the Head of the General Staff
of the Second Army, exclaimed:
In what times do we live in, my dear Zakrevskii? What wonders are 
being worked and are still to be worked. Ypsilantis, in crossing the 
frontier, has already given his name to posterity. The Greeks, reading 
his proclamations, will cry and flock under his banner in jubilation.
God help them in their holy deed; to this I would like to add Russia.(39)
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Like Capodistrias, Kiselev believed that the principle of legitimism was not applicable to
the Ottoman Empire and that the opposition of the European powers should not be allowed
to prevent Russian intervention:
One must live here [in Bessarabia] to know in what degradation the 
subjects of the Turkish government find themselves and of how the so- 
called rebellion of the Greeks is lawful. We judge as private 
individuals; the politics of the [European] states judges 
differently...nevertheless the fate of our coreligionists is worthy of 
sympathy and, as a man, I sympathise sincerely.(40)
In the following months, Kiselev was to become increasingly disturbed by Russia’s policy
of non-intervention:
It appears that, without bayonets, we cannot get by. The Turks take the 
leniency of the [Russian] government as a sign of the weakening of our 
nation’s resources... With barbarians, fear alone has power; 
magnanimity is barely known to them.(41)
Kiselev favoured occupying the Principalities and arming the Serbs, but knew this was 
opposed by those of a more cautious disposition in St Petersburg. He cast the blame for 
Russia’s passivity primarily on the pervasive influence of Nesselrode and was irritated by 
the fact that the Second Army was receiving its instructions regarding the manning of the 
Russo-Turkish frontier from the Foreign Minister personally and not the relevant military 
authorities.(42)
Kiselev’s views were echoed by the High Command of the Second Army(43) and
Ermolov who wrote that he would ‘grieve together with you [Kiselev] if the Greeks’ flame
is extinguished by their own blood’.(44) Ermolov considered war both desirable and
inevitable.(45) When, a year later, war had still not come, he wrote:
I am tormented by the lot of the Greeks and it will be bitter if the savage 
actions of the Turks are not restrained. They [the Turks] will become 
used to the liberty of disrespecting our demands. I am no great 
diplomat, but it seems to me that if last year Sabaneev’s corps had 
headed for the Danube, Moldavia and Wallachia would not have been 
ravaged.(46)
All hope of a Russian declaration of war subsided for the foreseeable future in 1822 with 
the Tsar’s decision to convene a Congress over Greece. Ermolov had little faith in such a 
mechanism as ‘it could well happen that...the [Greek] people will not consider themselves 
obliged to execute the will of the Congress’.(47) Moreover, he considered the whole idea 
of a concert approach a British ploy designed to restore Russia’s diplomatic relations with 
the Porte (which had been broken off in July 1821).(48) Once ensnared in a Congress and 
negotiations at Constantinople, endless discussions would commit Russia to inactivity,
allow the Turks time to crush the revolt and thus destroy Russian prestige in the Balkans, so 
leaving ‘the Greeks, who are devoted to us, justly incensed with us’.(49)
Ermolov’s fears proved to be essentially correct, though the truth of this was not to 
be acknowledged by the Tsar and Nesselrode for many years. Political concerns - primarily 
the fear of the European Powers’ potentially hostile reaction to a Russian forward policy - 
had frustrated the aims of the army in 1821. This was a precedent destined to characterise 
much of Russian policy during the Eastern Crisis of the 1820s.
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II. INTRODUCTORY NOTES ON THE RUSSIAN ARMY AFTER 1815
With the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars and its return home from Paris, the 
Imperial army consisted of twelve infantry and five reserve cavalry corps. Unlike the other 
European powers, which adopted a system of cadres and reserves, the Russian army 
remained a huge standing force of over 800,000 men.(l) The main bulk of the active forces 
were grouped into two armies. The First Army (Infantry Corps I-V), stationed in the west 
of Russia (with headquarters at Mogilev) was by far the largest single military force and 
was designed for full-scale action against another European power. The Second Army 
(Infantry Corps VI-VII) was quartered over a huge area in the southern coastal regions with 
its headquarters at TuTchin. It had been created in late 1814 out of its predecessor, the 
Moldavskaia armiia [Moldavian Army], and retained the latter’s strategic function - to fight 
the Ottoman army in the Balkans. Administration of the Russian army as a whole was 
carried out by the War Ministry, although, as in most European states of the time, it was 
concerned primarily with budgets, supplies and the various minutiae of a bureaucratic 
institution, having no influence on operations or strategic planning. These latter functions 
were executed by the commanders of the various corps and armies and by a hierarchy of 
General Staffs, which existed at the divisional, corps and army levels. The supreme 
decision-making body was the General Staff of His Imperial Majesty (glavnyi shtab
E.I. K).(2) It acted as the sole intermediary between the Tsar and the rest of the military 
establishment and its authority was sought on all matters of importance.(3)
In line with the conservative foreign policy course adopted after the Congress of 
Vienna, the Russian army was put on a defensive footing and steps were taken to reduce its 
cost. The unpopular military colonies were extended, the active army forced to engage in 
economic activity and, generally, concern for the well-being of the military was 
overshadowed by the pressing need for domestic reform.(4) The resulting degree of 
lethargy and complaisance that set in to the military after 1815 is well known. On 
Nicholas’ tour of the army in 1816 the future Tsar kept a diary of his findings, in which, 
according to one source, ‘almost all observations related merely to the insignificant external 
appearances of military service, uniforms...marches and so forth, and did not touch on a 
single important aspect of the military establishment’. (5) On reading this comment 
Alexander II wrote, ‘this was not His fault for, from the end of the war in 1815 until His 
accession to throne, no one else thought of these things either’. (6)
The concern with ‘external appearances’ was often taken to obsessive lengths and 
ultimately resulted in what has been termed ‘paradomania’.(7) This preoccupation with
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ceremonial parades was, in part, a result of a desire to cut military expenditure.(8) More
fundamentally, however, it was an expression of the mystical conservatism that took
possession of Alexander’s mind in the latter years of his life. Fearful of the continued
presence of French revolutionary ideas, the Tsar wished to transform the army into a model
institution mirroring and reinforcing the hierarchical social structure of Russian autocracy.
More than ever, the Russian state demanded discipline and unquestioning obedience from
its subjects and these values were to be instilled into the peasant-conscript through constant
drill. This would combat the emergence of independent thought and initiative and their
inevitable descent into ‘freethinking’. The Tsar took as his model the Gatchina Guards of
Paul I, whose famed abilities for drill and the formalities of military ceremony were held up
as examples to the rest of the army.(9) As a result, disheartened generals such as Sabaneev
could fairly complain that:
Four years of experience [1816-20] in the command of my [6th Infantry] 
corps has taught me that...regimental officers, for the most part, are 
primarily concerned with external appearances: there is much concern 
for reviews but little for true service.(lO)
The picture was not, however, universally bleak, for important experiments were to 
be found in the forces of the southern regions, the Second Army and Caucasus Corps. Far 
from the watchful eye of the highest Generals in the capital and Mogilev, both institutions 
were noted for their commitment to military innovation and the enlightened treatment of 
their soldiers. As a result, these two units were to become the most popular in all of the 
Russian Empire. In 1828, the diplomat F. P. Fonton could note that, ‘the general opinion 
shows especial favouritism towards the Second Army. It commands the same popular 
appeal that Ermolov does in the Caucasus’. The popularity of the Second Army was said to 
be due to the ‘striking difference between the Tul’chin and Mogilev General Staffs’. Thus 
whereas the First Army looked upon its soldiers as ‘instruments for the precise execution of 
the duties of service’, in the Second Army ‘every man felt himself to be a person and not 
just a machine’.(11) This dichotomy between the prestigious, Prussified, Gatchina- 
schooled First Army and that of the more innovative southern forces was very real in its day 
and bears testament to the reforming abilities of their respective commanders P. D. Kiselev 
and A. P Ermolov.(12)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
P. D. Kiselev was one of the outstanding reformers of post-1815 Russia. A 
favourite of Alexander I, the young veteran of the Napoleonic wars was destined for a great
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career. In February 1819, Kiselev, possibly on the advice of Ermolov,(13) with whom he
was close, was made head of the General Staff of the Second Army at the age of thirty-one.
Known to history as something of a liberal(14) Kiselev had earned his progressive
credentials as early as 1816 by his proposal to liberate the serfs(15) and he was now keen
to introduce reforms into the army. He was immediately assisted in this task by the fact that
Field Marshal P. Kh. Wittgenstein, the Commander-in-Chief, was old and infirm, so
allowing Kiselev full rein to act as commander in all but name.(16)
On his arrival at the army headquarters at TuTchin, Kiselev did not find affairs at all
to his liking. In a report to the Tsar on the standard of the unit’s twenty-two generals, all of
whom were veterans of the late war, Kiselev wrote that only nine were fit for service. His
comments on the rest were unsparing:
Gen-Maj. F...recently graduated cadets know more about the duties 
entrusted to him. He eats much and drinks even more; Gen-Maj. U...a 
nonentity. Morally he no longer exists, and were he a soldier he would 
have been long ago discharged from military service as unfit; Gen-Maj.
I...a Colonel and no more...German; Gen-Maj. M...weak of health, 
weak of mind, weak of action; Gen-Maj. G... studied in the Cadet Corps 
and thus his stupidity is remarkable.(17)
Kiselev was likewise disturbed with the quality of other commissioned officers,
complaining that almost all noblemen of any education avoided the Second Army and
entered the Guards or other select units.(18) The NCOs were no better, for as Sabaneev
exclaimed, ‘out of every one thousand only one is decent’.(19) As regards the rank and
file, Kiselev was concerned by the detrimental effects of harsh discipline and the
preoccupation with parade drill. He saw the mutiny of the Semenovksii Guards Regiment
in 1820 not as some revolutionary conspiracy but as evidence of their officers’ inability to
command the respect of their troops. The root cause of such discontent amongst the
soldiery was said to be A. A. Arakcheev, whom Kiselev considered the ‘most harmful man
in Russia’. (20) Arakcheev’s military-bureaucratic system of unbending rules and
regulations, unquestioning obedience and severe discipline led even, the far from liberal,
Sabaneev, to complain that:
Nowhere [are there]....so many papers and ill-thought out forms and 
reports like there are here. Nothing is conceived with regard to human 
capabilities and strength. We have soldiers for ammunition as opposed 
to having ammunition for soldiers. Our soldiers cannot take a single 
step without the necessary correction.
Sabaneev warned that unless reforms were enacted the ‘black spirit of the Semenovskii 
regiment will descend upon the whole army’.(21)
Kiselev was assisted in his quest to introduce far-reaching reforms into his army by
the presence of a small, though very talented, group of officers. Drawn from the highest
echelons of the Russian aristocracy, these officer-noblemen were captivated by French
revolutionary ideas and had, prior to Kiselev’s arrival, already organised themselves into
masonic lodges and political debating societies. These organisations were eventually to
form the kernel of the Southern Decembrist movement.(22) The main ring leaders were V.
F. Raevskii, P. I. Pestel’ and M. F. Orlov. All had joined the proto-Decembrist political
organisation Soiuz Blagodenstviia in 1818-19 and they established regional divisions in
Kishinev and Tul’chin - the main quarters of the Second Army.(23) Kiselev was
immediately attracted to these Decembrists and soon filled his General Staff with them.(24)
He promoted others, notably Pestel’ and M. F. Orlov to the command of units.(25) Kiselev
brushed aside rumours from St Petersburg concerning the suspect political views of certain
of his officers, especially Pestel’, declaring to A. A. Zakrevskii in August 1821:
I do not praise the spiritual qualities of Pestel’, only the abilities of his 
mind and the usefulness which I can extract from it. Of morals I will 
not say a word.(26)
With their assistance of Pestel’ and others Kiselev embarked on a major programme of 
reform. His first concern was to address the lack of education and especially the illiteracy 
of his troops. M. F. Orlov had already experimented with Lancaster schools during his time 
as Head of the General Staff of the 4th Infantry Corps (1817-19) and following his transfer 
to the Second Army in 1820, Kiselev proposed that he introduce the system into the 16th 
Infantry Division. Orlov’s ideas for the school, however, went far beyond the spreading of 
literacy. He aimed to educate primarily NCOs and the rank and file, teaching them the 
basics of history and politics in order to spread enlightenment and transform them into 
citizens. Certain teachers in Orlov’s Lancaster schools, such as V. F. Raevskii, openly used 
their position to spread political propaganda teaching the soldiers of the need for political 
rights and a constitution.(27)
As regards the officer-corps, Kiselev based his hopes on the creation of a lycee for 
the education of Junkers. Established in 1821, probably on the advice of M. F. Orlov,(28) 
its purpose was to train a new generation of officers. Such a school was certainly required 
as:
...the sons of the nobility and commissioned officers who serve in army 
regiments as Junkers, for the most part, seek in this service a means of 
existence, and due to their lack of education differ little from the recruits 
in these regiments. This problem is felt even more in Novorossiia 
where educational institutions are very rare and the number of small 
landowners and noblemen without land is very high. Since, however,
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the source of the replenishment of officers in the regiments comes from 
Junkers (for the number of cadet graduates [from St Petersburg] is very 
insufficient), the complete lack of education begins to be sensed once 
they enter into the command of companies. Later, when they become 
staff officers, we will have produced people who received insufficient 
education within the very service itself. (29)
Another other central aspect of Kiselev’s reform programme concerned the role and 
powers of the General Staff of the Second Army. Already dominant over the Commander- 
in-Chief by the force of his energy and personality, Kiselev wished to institutionalise this 
relationship. He was assisted in this enterprise by Pestel’ who, sometime after 1822, drew 
up proposals for a restructuring of the General Staff. The existing situation was that all the 
heads of the various branches of the General Staff were equal in rank to the overall Head of 
the Staff. All had the power to report to the Commander-m-Chief and receive instructions 
from him individually. Naturally, this compromised the autonomy and corporate? identity of 
the Staff as a whole, essentially reducing it to the private chancellery of the Conamander-in- 
Chief. Pestel’s idea was essentially to unite all these branches under the head off the 
General Staff, thus greatly increasing the importance of the latter’s position and Ihopefully 
the General Staff as an institution.(30) The idea was accepted and, in March 1824, Kiselev 
duly submitted proposals requesting that all the ‘executive branches’ of the Geneeral Staff - 
the departments of the intendant-General, artillery and engineers, were all in futuire to be 
‘subordinated to the head of the General Staff, who alone is to report to and nctfive 
instructions from, the Commander-in-Chief .(31)
Parallel to these developments, Kiselev planned an ambitious reform of Hhs General 
Staff’s department of Quartermaster Staff [kvatirmeisterskaia chast ]. This htteer institution 
had appeared in European armies during the eighteenth century and was tradiiomally 
charged with the quartering of troops in the field. Its role gradually increased to* include the 
preparation of maps and the gathering of intelligence on the enemy’s fortificaioms and troop 
movements. By the nineteenth century it had, in certain armies, acquired a rde iin the 
preparation of war plans.(32) Kiselev’s idea was to assign to his Quartermaser' Staff the 
functions that are now considered to be the essential characteristics of the mcderm ‘General 
Staff:
(1) the systematic and extensive collection in time of peace of specfic? 
information which may be important to the future conduct off 
operations...(2) intellectual preparation for the future conduct off 
operations...through the elaboration of specific plans for war.(33)
Kiselev aimed to transform his General Staff into the acknowledged authorityona the Balkan 
theatre and to monopolise the formulation and execution of war plans againstthee Ottoman
Empire in this region. Specifically, in 1819, he proposed embarking on an extensive 
programme of research into the five Russo-Turkish wars fought between 1711 and 1812 
and ‘extract from previous experience the general lessons for future action’.(34) Research 
was to provide the necessary topographical, strategic and tactical information required to 
devise and execute a war plan that would deliver a more decisive victory over the Ottoman 
forces than had hitherto been possible. Kiselev also acted as patron to Colonel I. P. 
Liprandi’s monumental study Opyt slovoistolkovatelia Ottomcmskoi imperii.{35) which 
complemented the study on Russo-Turkish wars by providing detailed intelligence on the 
ethnic, religious and psychological characteristics on the various Ottoman forces.(36)
Kiselev’s endeavour to create what amounted to an empirico-historical school of 
military science was to cause resentment within the military establishment, namely, in the 
General Staffs of H.I.M. and the First Army. These Staffs (or, more precisely, their 
Quartermaster Staff divisions) had, under the direction of Baron K. F. Toll,(37) acquired 
after 1815 a virtual monopoly on the writing of military histoiy (and with it, the implications 
for tactical and strategic doctrine) and were ready to oppose any institution attempting to 
challenge their preeminent position. The resulting struggle between these staffs and that of 
Kiselev’s was not, however, purely one of an institutional power struggle, or personal 
rivalry between their respective heads. It was also a struggle for the theoretical basis of the 
study of military history and its relationship to military doctrine. The undisputed military 
authority for Toll, his close associate, the historian D. P. Buturlin and the military 
establishment generally was the (Swiss-born) French theorist A. H. Jomini. The latter’s 
theory was based on the presumed the existence of eternal, a priori and rationalistic laws of 
tactics and strategy. This was overtly threatened by Kiselev’s empirical method which 
stressed the uniqueness of each theatre and of each enemy. (38)
Once accepted that Turkish wars were essentially different from those against 
European nations, the Second Army could demand greater independence in developing, for 
example, its own special tactical formations to deal with the unique nature of Ottoman 
forces - namely their reliance on large numbers of irregular cavalry. As a result of research 
into the 1768-74 Russo-Turkish war, Kiselev’s General Staff discovered that an important 
key to Russia’s victories had been the introduction of new tactical formations by the 
Commander-in-Chief, P. A. Rumiantsev. Hitherto, the army had used ‘huge squares’, 
which were akin to ‘moving fortresses’, to protect itself against Turkish cavalry. Instead of 
relying on this somewhat passive tactic, Rumiantsev created smaller, more manoeuvrable 
infantry formations which he used for offensive purposes.(39) The study of the Turkish
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campaigns of A. S. Suvorov and M. I. Kutuzov revealed the use of more innovative tactical 
formations and battle orders. Many of these were adopted by the Second Army and 
practised in manoeuvres in 1826 and 1827.(40)
As a result of this study of previous campaigns, the general trend of the tactical 
ideas of the Second Army (which was largely under the guidance of Pestel’) was 
characterised by a move away from the official doctrine of massing troops in large 
formations and towards the far greater use of the extended or open order [rassypnoe stroe] 
and the employment of sharpshooters.(41) This was to cause great unease in the official 
military establishment which remained committed to tactics of massing troops in large 
formations. It was denied that exceptions had to be made in Turkish wars and Jomini 
argued that against Turkish and, indeed all, enemy cavalry the Russian forces should ‘form 
large squares and stand firm in a defensive manner’.(42)
The justification for this massing of troops was Jomini’s idea that war was decided 
by one general and decisive encounter. Victory in battle was decided by the concentration 
of one’s forces at the enemy’s ‘critical point’. In battle, the army was to repel the enemy’s 
shock troops (usually comprising cavalry), force him to divide his troops and then attack 
(with concentrated forces) the flank or rear of their infantry. (43) Success in this latter 
enterprise was dependent upon the ability of one’s military units to advance from various 
locations on the battle field in a coordinated manner and concentrate on the enemy’s weak 
point. One of the reasons Jomini’s ideas were so popular amongst the Gatchina school was 
that they provided the justification for the endless quest for the perfection of drill and blind 
obedience that such tactical manoeuvres required. Jomini’s emphasis on the concentration 
of firepower likewise allowed the Russian army a reason to oppose the development of light 
infantry operating in open order as sharpshooters. The problem was that light 
troops/sharpshooters were effective only if left to fight independently beyond the immediate 
supervision of their officers. Moreover, the role involved great danger and required 
qualities not usually associated with the average soldier of the time - personal initiative, 
commitment and bravery. In the European mercenary armies of the eighteenth century 
these virtues were almost entirely absent and the use of light infantry led only to 
desertion.(44) In the Russian army, it was the peasant conscript, usually drafted into 
service against his will, that the officers distrusted. The fear that, left to their own devices 
on the battlefield, they would desert or be easily routed proved too great to facilitate the 
development of proper light infantry.(45)
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It should be clear, therefore, that the Second Army’s (specifically Pestel” s) 
proposal that its entire infantry be trained in the skills of chasseur was most ambitious.(46) 
It had been possible in the French Revolutionary armies where soldiers fought willingly for 
a common cause(47) but to introduce it in autocratic Russia was an entirely different 
proposition. It was only possible if the relationship between officer and soldier was 
transformed. The traditional one, based on coercion, fear and punishment beatings, was 
obviously ill-suited to instilling in the soldiery the qualities that the role of chasseur 
required. Instead, the officers needed to gain the respect of their troops and inspire them 
through the creation of an esprit de corps. To attempt such a transformation after 1815 was 
as bold as it was dangerous.(48)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Despite a certain uneasiness and, even distrust, in many quarters regarding the 
activities of the Second Army’s General Staff, the first years of Kiselev’s tenure were to 
prove highly productive. By 1823, the various research projects were well under way, as 
was formulation of a war plan against the Ottoman Empire. In October of that year an 
imperial review of the army was completed with great success, allowing Kiselev the boast 
that the Second Army now stands ‘in competition with the very best units of the Russian 
army’.(49) However, one of the primary reasons for this success - the reliance on 
politically-suspect officers, contained the seeds of future problems.
The first warnings had come as early as 1821 when Sabaneev became increasingly 
concerned by rumblings in M. F. Orlov’s 16th division. Since his elevation to its command 
the previous year, Orlov had set himself the task of improving officer-soldier relations. He 
urged his officers to forgo their predilection for brutal and arbitrary punishments and instead 
gain the respect of the men by instilling in them ‘soldierly virtues’, giving them an ‘example 
of activity’ and fostering in them a ‘love for the nation’.(50) Orlov was more than ready to 
listen to the many grievances lodged by the troops against their officers and threatened the 
latter with court martial. The effect on the troops was electric and by the end of 1821 ‘all 
the 16th division was in a state of agitation’. Disturbances broke out in four of its 
regiments, notably in the Kamchatka regiment in December of that year.(51) Sabaneev was 
sure these disturbances were also linked to Orlov’s Lancaster schools where V. F. Raevskii 
was said to be ffatenising with the soldiers and spreading revolutionary propaganda. At 
bottom, Sabaneev believed Orlov’s and Raevskii’s activities were a result of their 
membership of masonic lodges and allegiance to Jacobinism. (52)
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In July 1821 Kiselev, probably on the demand of Sabaneev and St Petersburg, had
been forced to introduce a nadzor [surveillance] on the 16th division.(53) Within six
months enough evidence had been collected against both Raevskii and Orlov. In February
1822, the first was arrested whilst Orlov was suspended indefinitely from duty. Both were
charged with the dissemination of political propaganda through the Lancaster schools.(54)
This proved a great blow to the Second Army’s new educational establishments.
The Lancaster schools were naturally closed but, more fundamentally, the perceived
connection between education and revolutionary activity was further justified and, indeed,
strengthened in the mind of the Tsarist establishment. This was to have adverse affect the
workings of the lycee for Junkers. Alexander had never been entirely comfortable with the
idea and though he initially approved of the proposal in 1820, he was keen that the
education of young men was to be limited to subjects:
...essential for military knowledge, without entering into politics. In 
particular, there must be supervision over the teaching of history and 
geography, so that the teacher does not go into too much detail.(55)
Such preconditions were clearly unsatisfactory, for Kiselev wanted the best Junkers 
eventually to become staff officers. As members of the General Staff they were to 
contribute to the study of the Balkan theatre and Ottoman army and thus required a broader 
education than that envisaged by the Tsar. The lycee was nevertheless opened in 1821 but, 
following the problem with the Lancaster schools, St Petersburg starved the school of funds. 
Kiselev’s request for an annual grant of 150,000 roubles was ignored and the school 
operated for only two years with an yearly intake of barely ninety pupils (instead of the 
envisaged 400).(56)
Moreover, following the disturbances of 1821-22 and continuing rumours about 
Pestel’, many in the Tsarist establishment began to grow suspicious of Kiselev himself. The 
latter had dismissed Sabaneev’s reports concerning the existence of masonic lodges in the 
Second Army.(57) He considered the spread of ‘freethinking’ in the army to be a direct 
consequence of the abuses of Arakcheev’s military system and blamed the various 
disturbances in the regiments on overly harsh discipline and the severe punishments meted 
out by ill-educated officers.(58) During the investigation in the Lancaster schools he had 
openly defended Orlov, his long-time friend,(59) and from 1819 wrote a number of letters 
to the Tsar defending Pestel’.(60)
The precise nature of this seemingly very close relationship between Kiselev and the 
Southern Decembrists has attracted much scholarly attention. It is clear that Pestel’ and his 
followers cultivated relations with Kiselev in the hope that, following a revolution (which
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was to begin with the arrest of Wittgenstein), he would join them and be rewarded with the 
position of Governor-General of Moscow.(61) It has not been suggested that Kiselev knew 
of such plans, let alone agreed with them, but it is almost certain that Kiselev knew of the 
existence of so-called ‘secret societies’ in his army and allowed them to operate 
unopposed.(62) The most probable reason for this is that Kiselev considered their activities 
(which usually consisted of nothing more than the reading of censored material and 
engaging in political debates) as harmless and certainly not criminal. Moreover, he seems 
genuinely to have regarded such organisations as the symptom of a deeper cause, namely - 
Arakcheevshchina. As early as 1822, in a long letter to A. A. Zakrevskii, he concluded that 
if this system continued, the high command could only ‘delay the decisive minute’.(63)
Three years later the decisive moment did indeed arrive and in December 1825 
Pestel’ and the other Southern Decembrists were arrested on the orders of Diebitsch.(64) 
Fortunately, Kiselev was himself able to survive the investigation into the origins of 
Decembrism in the Second Army. This was partly due to the support of his friends in the 
capital, partly due to the fact that the Eastern crisis was becoming progressively more acute 
and that was Kiselev needed to fight the coming war. Nevertheless, the trust in the Second 
Army had been almost irreversibly compromised in the eyes of Nicholas and his entourage 
and the omens for its eventual disbandment were clear for all to see in 1825/26.
The Politics of the Russian Army
We close our introductory remarks by reiterating the fact that, on many questions of 
both military and foreign policy, there existed a polarisation of views between, on the one 
side, the Second Army and the Caucasus Corps and, on the other, the Tsarist establishment 
as represented by the First Army at Mogilev and the Foreign Ministry under Nesselrode. 
This division paralleled, to a large degree, the general ‘progressive versus conservative’ 
political schism that dominated Russian educated society after 1815.
One of the defining features of the ‘progressive’ elements within the army was their 
mixing of enlightened/democratic ideas with Russian nationalism. This was most notable in 
Ermolov, who traced the existence of conservative and unpopular military and foreign 
policies to the presence in the Tsar’s entourage of non-Russians, especially German 
careerists such Diebitsch, Nesselrode and the Benckendorffs.(65) This anti-German streak 
is likewise sensed in the Second Army, which came to the fore during the unsuccessful 
Turkish campaign of 1828.(66)
Great Russian nationalism was barely concealed in the foreign policy programme of 
the most ‘progressive’ elements within the army - Pestel’s Southern Decembrist movement. 
Pestel’s programme essentially amounted to Russian expansion at the expense of the 
Ottoman Empire and, at home, the complete Russification of all foreign elements within the 
Russian Empire. He thus strongly favoured militaiy intervention in favour of the Greek 
revolution and welcomed a Russo-Turkish war as an opportunity to destroy the Sultan’s 
European empire. After the war, Russia was to annex Moldavia and replace the Ottoman 
Empire with a ‘Greek Kingdom’, which essentially amounted to the traditional idea of 
creating a pro-Russian neo-Byzantium Empire.(67) In the Caucasus, he favoured the 
improvement of the existing Russo-Turkish frontier through the annexation of Circassia, 
Batum and Kars.(68) Regarding the rebellious tribes he advocated Ermolov-style heavy 
handed tactics; they were to be forcefully resettled into the interior of Russia whilst their 
own lands were to be settled by Russians.(69) In his ideal state, Pestel’ favoured the 
rentention of one of the pillars of autocracy by making ‘Greco-Russian Christian Orthodox 
faith’ the state religion. Other religions were to be allowed only if they prove themselves 
‘not contrary to Russian ecclesiastical and political laws’.(70) His solution to the nationality 
question within the Russian Empire was to enforce strict Russification - ‘all the differing 
tints are to be poured into a common mass so that the inhabitants of the whole expanse of 
the Russian [Rossiiskoe] state are all to be Russian [Russkie].(71) Pestel’ was especially 
antagonistic towards the Jews, whom he accused of having special privileges, engaging in 
dishonest trading and forming in Russia an imperium in imperio.{12) There is little in any 
of this which would distinguish Pestel from a Russian nationalist of the traditional ‘Throne 
and Altar’ variety.(73)
The opposition emanating from the Second Army and the Caucasus Corps was not 
lost on the Tsarist establishment. Indeed, in the last year of his life, Alexander had himself 
drawn up a list of politically suspect officers naming, amongst others, Ermolov, Kiselev and 
most of the Decembrist-officers of the Second Army.(74) Following the Decembrist revolt 
in 1825, Nicholas was determined to locate all the sources of the Tsarist opposition and 
thus in 1826 instructed A. Kh. Benckendorff (the head of the Third Section) to investigate 
into the political views of the army and of society as a whole. The Tsar’s orders resulted in 
the presentation of annual reports (from 1827 onwards) on ‘public opinion’ 
[obshchestvennoe mnenie] in Russia.(75)
Benckendorff s main findings (1827-30) were that there existed in Russian society 
elements strongly opposed to autocracy and, moreover, that these elements had organised
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themselves into a ‘nationalist’ or ‘Russian’ party, in which leading military figures played a
prominent role. The party defined itself by its opposition to all things of German origin and,
as Benckendorff put it, dreamt of ‘senseless reforms in the Russian spirit’.(76)
Benckendorff revealed that:
The party of Russian patriots...are very strong in terms of the number of 
their adherents. Their centre is found in Moscow. All the old 
dignitaries, idle aristocracy and half-educated youth follow their 
direction, which is made known to them via their club in St Petersburg.
There they criticise all the steps of the government...there they grumble 
about Germans, there with enthusiasm they repeat the proposals and 
speeches of Mordvinov and the words of their idol Ermolov...they shout 
at the Germans and would like to see [N. S.] Mordvinov as head of 
administrative matters and Ermolov and [N. N.] Raevskii as the heads 
of both armies.(77)
The Russian party was especially strong amongst the younger generation:
Young noblemen aged from 17 to 25, as a whole, comprise the most 
gangrenous part of the Empire. Amongst this wild rabble we see the 
germ of Jacobinism, the spirit of revolution and reform, which takes 
differing forms, but most often hides behind the mask of Russian 
patriotism.(78)
The source of liberalism, as of nationalism (which Benckendorff considered almost as
coterminous)(79) was said to be Moscow and was especially prevalent amongst the officer
corps.(80) Some discontented officers had become supporters of Ermolov and N. N.
Raevskii, others of Pestel’.(81)
The strength of the Russian party and its influence over large sections of society
was mostly clearly revealed over the Eastern Question. The Russian party was keen to
pursue Russia’s traditional policy of expansion in the East and it could count on widespread
support for a Russo-Turkish war in defence of the Greeks, ‘the fate of whom interests all
Russia’.(82) It was widely believed that Russia’s conservative policy towards the Greek
revolution was a result of the influence of Mettemich and his apparent hold over
Nesselrode.(83) The Russian party thus skillfully exploited the idea that Russia was being
held back from her national mission in the East by foreigners. With the eventual onset of
war in 1828, Benckendorff could thus state that:
Russia wished for war with Turkey not for political considerations but 
out of national feeling: she wished as much for the liberation of Greece 
as for its own liberation from the guardianship of Austria, whose policy 
she finds offensive.(84)
When the 1828 campaign failed in its objective of crossing the Balkans, the Russian party 
in the army succeeded in casting all blame on the interference of another foreigner -
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Diebitsch. As a result, Benckendorff could report that ‘the court, the nobility, Generals, 
officers...are all accusing Diebitsch of incompetence’.(85) Military failure had caused the 
whole nation to fall into a state of agitation and ‘the so-called group of patriots has not 
failed to use this mood in order to criticise everything’.(86) The latter based its hopes on 
attracting to its side the serfs and the landowners of Southern Russia. The serfs were 
considered a latent source of nationalistic opposition to autocracy(87) whilst the landowners 
had been virtually bankrupted by requisitions for the war effort and the continued closure of 
the Straits (which halted the lucrative export of grain).(88) Benckendorff believed that 
‘these are the elements that the Russian patriots consider as possible to use at the right 
moment in order to incite revolts in favour of a constitution’.(89)
During the winter of 1828-29 some attempts were made by Russia to end the war 
through a negotiated settlement but, due to the Porte’s unwillingness to treat, they proved 
unsuccessful. The British ambassador noted that this was of ‘great advantage to what is 
here called the old Russian party, a party that has ever been opposed to any concession to 
the Turks’.(90) Another campaign was thus undertaken, with Diebitsch as Commander-in- 
Chief, causing ‘the patriots’ naturally to cry ‘why don’t they take Ermolov?’.(91) To the 
surprise of many, Diebitsch’s campaign proved a success, though Benckendorff considered 
nevertheless that:
Diebitsch could never become the idol of the nation, since there exists a 
great prejudice against him and it is maintained that he does not like 
Russians and favours Germans instead.(92)
Nicholas was well aware of the popularity in Russia of wars against Turkey and was not
surprised to learn that, in 1829, the nation expected nothing less than the capture of
Constantinople.(93) Committed, however, to the continuation of his brother’s ‘weak
neighbour’ policy, Nicholas opposed the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and, from the
very beginning of the war, took steps to cool nationalist fervour. As Benckendorff
commented, ‘the war flared up [in 1828], but to the great suiprise of all, the population
[narodnaia massa] did not show the expected enthusiasm’. This was primarily due to the
wording of the declaration of war, which:
...said nothing to the heart. In it there was not a word about Greece, 
nothing about the Orthodox faith, nothing about Mother Russia. The 
whole affair was viewed as a simple dispute between two courts, which 
was to be settled by the army without the participation of the 
people.(94)
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The conservative Eastern policy of Nicholas and, before him, Alexander, did not, however, 
go unchallenged by elements within the army, who favoured a more forward and decisive 
policy. The ideas, aims and preparations of this group form the subject of the next chapter.
50
(1) Kagan, Military Reforms, pp. 11, 34-35. The twelve infantry corps consisted of the 
Guards (stationed in St Petersburg), Grenadiers (at Novgorod), Finnish, (independent) 
Lithuanian, (independent) Georgian (from 1816 Caucasus) Corps, plus seven regular 
Infantry Corps numbered I-VII. In the manner of most European armies of the time these 
corps included cavalry and artillery divisions. In addition, there was the Polish Army, 
(which, in reality, was only marginally larger than a regular infantry corps) under the 
personal command of Grand Duke Constantine. The five Reserve Cavalry Corps were 
stationed in the interior of the country as a strategic reserve, A. A. Kersnovskii, Istoriia 
russkoi armii (Moscow, 1993), II, pp. 16-19.
(2) Although glavnyi shtab has been translated as both ‘Main Staff (Kagan, Military 
Reforms, p. 18) and ‘Capital Staff (D. D. Irvine, ‘The Origin of Capital Staffs’, JMH, X, 
1938, p. 163) the more familiar ‘General Staff is used throughout this work.
(3) Kagan, Military Reforms, pp. 28-48. The period c. 1812-32 was the great age of 
General Staffs in Russia. Russia possessed a system which was roughly analogous to that 
of the more famous Prussian and later German General Staff, ibid., pp. 2-4, 20-21. The 
literature on the origins and development of General Staffs in Europe is very large, see 
especially, Glinoetskii, Russkii general ’nyi shtab v tsarstvovanii imperator Aleksandra /, 
Istoriia russkogo general 'nogo shtaba, I-II; W. Goerlitz, History o f the German General 
Staff (Boulder, 1985); D. D. Irvine, ‘Capital Staffs’, pp. 161-79, ‘The French and Prussian 
Staff Systems before 1870’, The Journal o f American Military History Foundation, II, 
1938, pp. 192-203; J. D. Hittle, The Military Staff: Its History and Development 
(Harrisburg, 1944); W. O. Shanahan, Prussian Military Reforms, 1786-1813 (New York, 
1945),
(4) Kagan, Military Reforms, pp. 12-16, 33.
(5) This comment was made by Baron Korf, the biographer of Nicholas I, quoted in N. 
Epanchin, Takticheskaia podgotovka russkoi armii peredpokhodom 1828-1829 (St. 
Petersburg, 1904), p. 1.
iff) Ibid
(7) Kagan, Military Reforms, p. 33.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Epanchin, Takticheskaia podgotovka, pp. 1-20 passim. Paul I’s Gatchina Guards were 
modeled on the well-drilled Prussian infantry regiments of Frederick the Great. For this 
reason the Soviets term the ‘reactionary’ military system that developed in Russia under 
Paul and Alexander as the ‘Prussian military school’, Prokof ev, Bor’ba, p. 202. It is also 
known as ‘Arakcheev’s system’ [Arakcheevshchina] - after the much despised A. A. 
Aracheev (1769-1834). During the 1790s, the latter served as the inspector of artillery in 
the Gatchina Guards and assisted Paul in the introduction of Prussian-style reforms into the 
Russian army. In 1808-10 Aracheev served as War Minister and after 1815 became one of 
Alexander I’s closest advisers. On his career see M. Jenkins, Arakcheev: Grand Vizier o f 
the Russian Empire (London, 1969). The continuation of this system during the reign of 
Nicholas I is blamed primarily on Generals (later Field Marshals) 1.1. Diebitsch and I. F. 
Paskevich who are presented as vain, glory-seeking martinets committed to ‘reactionary’ 
western European military doctrines, Fadeev, Krizis, pp. 196-97, 204-05, 212-13. In 
opposition to this, the Soviets herald the Russian native military tradition of P. A. 
Rumiantsev, A. V. Suvorov and M. I. Kutuzov that is said to have been continued after 
1815 by A. P. Ermolov and the Decembrists, Fadeev, Krizis, pp. 220-30; Prokof ev,
Bor’ba, pp. 182-299 passim.
(10) Quoted in Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, Kiselev, I, p. 218
(11) Fonton, Vospominaniia, I, pp. 42-45.
(12) For reasons of space, discussion of Ermolov’s military ideas must be limited to a few 
observations. Ermolov was first and foremost a Russian nationalist and saw himself as the 
continuer of the native Russian tradition in warfare. During the 1812-14 campaigns he
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openly criticised Field-Marshal P. Kh. Wittgenstein’s conduct of the war and generally 
blamed all of Russia’s reverses on the so-called ‘German party’ that surrounded the Tsar, P. 
Pogodin, Ermolov, p. 6. His later experience of colonial warfare against the rebellious 
tribes of the Caucasus only increased his distrust of non-Russian nationalities, S. Esadze, 
Istoricheskaia zapiska ob upravlenii Kavkazom (Tblisi, 1907), I, p. 35. Utterly opposed to 
the official, Prussified, Gatchina-style Russian military establishment, Ermolov used his 
command of the Caucasus Corps to prepare his forces for combat rather than parades. He 
formulated new looser tactical formations to suit mountain warfare and he dispensed with 
the need for harsh military discipline through the creation of a strong esprit de corps 
amongst his men, Fadeev, Krizis, pp. 220-30. Under Ermolov, the Caucasus Corps became 
the hive of freethinking and a centre of opposition to autocracy. Its ranks were filled by 
‘superfluous men’ searching for an escape from the boredom of daily existence as well as 
by convicted criminals, rebellious peasants and political dissidents sent to serve out their . 
sentences in ‘warm Siberia’. Following the Decembrist revolt of 1825 members of the 
disgraced Guards units were sent en masse to the Caucasus and with the subsequent 
addition of revolutionaries arrested in the Second Army, it is estimated that, by the 
beginning of 1827, some 2,700 political dissidents were serving in the Caucasus Corps, A. 
V. Fadeev, Dekabristy na Dorm i na Kavkaze (Moscow, 1950), pp. 25-26. When 
witnessed firsthand by more conservative Generals arriving from St Petersburg, the state of 
the Caucasus Corps proved to be of no little consternation. When Nicholas I’s favourite I.
F. Paskevich arrived to take operational command of the Caucasus Corps in 1826, he was 
shocked by the wretched state of their uniforms, their inability to form standard formations 
such as column and square and, most of all, by the realisation that ‘blind obedience is not to 
their liking’, P. I. Vrioni, ‘Ermolov, Dibich i Paskevich’, RS, V, 1872, pp. 710-13,722-23, 
Paskevich to Nicholas 1 ,11 December 1826 OS. This latter point also worried Diebitsch 
who declared in 1826 that ‘the ruinous spirit of freethinking and liberalism is immersing the 
force’, Fadeev, Dekabristy, p. 22. Ermolov’s rule, tolerated by Alexander I due to his 
successes in pacifying the Caucasian tribes, was never acceptable to Nicholas and his 
removal from office during the Persian campaign of 1827 surprised no-one. On the precise 
circumstances, see Vrioni, ‘Ermolov, Dibich i Paskevich’, RS, V, pp. 707-26, VI, pp. 39- 
69, 243-80; Curtiss, Russian Army, pp. 24-36.
(13) RGIA, fond 660, op.l, d.l 12, f.26, Ermolov to A. A. Zakrevskii, 20 May 1819 OS.
(14) Kiselev’s ‘liberal’ reputation was secured by his close associate and biographer A. P. 
Zablotskii-Desiatovskii. There seems to be no strict Soviet view of Kiselev. I. S. Dostian, 
‘Uchastie dekabristov v izuchenii Balkan i Russko-Turetskikh voin XVIH-nachala XIX v.’, 
SS, VI, 1975, p. 24, deems him a ‘measured liberal’, whilst N. M. Druzhinin, ‘Sotsial’no- 
politicheskie vzgliady P. D. Kiseleva’, VI, 1946, No.2-3 (combined), pp. 33-54, is far more 
critical, arguing that Kiselev wished to preserve the ‘feudal-absolutist order’ in tact, p. 48.
(15) Druzhinin, ‘Sotsial’no-politicheskie vzgliady’, p. 41.
(16) Curtiss, Russian Army, p. 55; Epanchin, Takticheskaia podgotovka, p. 39.
(17) RNB-OR, fond 379, d.483, ff.4v-5, quoted from an article by F. P. Kornilov, undated, 
(from context 1890s). The author states that Kiselev’s report was written between February 
1819 and May 1820. Kiselev provided Alexander with the following commentary on 
himself, ‘Without previous experience and therefore without right occupies his position.
Has intelligence and, even more so, pride, from which he could prove to be of use. He is 
honest and is ready to make sacrifices in order to be of use. However, in the event of the 
slightest dissatisfaction, he will sacrifice everything to satisfy his ambition’, ibid., ff.2-2v.
(18) Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, Kiselev, I, pp. 222-23.
(19) F. I. Bulgakov, ‘Russkii gosudarstvennyi chelovek minuvshikh trekh tsarstvovanii - 
Graf P. D. Kiselev’, IV, VII, 1882, p. 139.
(20) Ibid. pp. 114, 125-26.
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(21) Bulgakov, ‘Kiselev’, p. 139. In fact, between 1820 and 1825 there were thirteen 
recorded cases of disturbances in Russian regiments, Curtiss, Russian Army, p. 8. An 
example of the pedantry of army discipline may be provided by the case of the ‘Poor 
Hussar’, an anonymous poem written at the expense of General L. O. Roth during a ball 
held to mark his promotion in 1823 to the command of the Third Infantry Corps. The poem 
was sent up the chain of command, eventually reaching Grand Duke Constantine, Diebitsch 
and finally the Tsar himself. Despite the investigations of the military police the culprit was 
never discovered. The relevant documents (including the poem) are in RGVIA, fond VUA, 
d. 18210, ff. l-13v.
(22) On the activities of the officer-Deeembrists of the Second Army see, V. G. Bazanov, 
Dekabristy v Kishineve (M. F  Orlov i V. F. Raevskii) (Kishinev, 1951); I. F. Iowa,
Iuzhnye dekabristy i grecheskoe natsional ’no-osvoboditel ’noe dvizhenie (Kishinev, 1963), 
Bessarabiia i grecheskoe natsional ’no-osvoboditel Tnoe dvizhenie (Kishinev, 1974), 
Dekabristy vMoldavii (Kishinev, 1975); S. Koval’, Dekabrist V. F. Raevskii (Irkutsk, 
1951); P. I. Lebedev, Pestel ’ - ideotog i rukovoditel' dekabristov (Moscow, 1972); M. V. 
Nechkina, Dvizhenie dekabristov (Moscow, 1955), 2 vols; M. Raeff, The Decembrist 
Movement (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966); On their military ideas, see Prokof ev, Bor’ba, 
pp. 182-299; Dostian, ‘Uchastie Dekabristov’, pp. 23-35; Beskrovnyi, Ocherki, pp. 69-96. 
There is much to recommend the view of J. L. H. Keep that the Decembrists should be 
treated as a military rather than civilian intelligentsia, ‘The Russian Army’s Response to the 
French Revolution’, JFGO, XXVIII, 1980, p. 515, Soldiers o f the Tsar: Army and Society 
in Russia 1462-1874 (Oxford, 1985), pp. 231-49.
(23) Iowa, Dekabristy v Moldavia pp. 57-60.
(24) For list of names see Prokof ev, Bor 'bay p. 273.
(25) Kiselev was instrumental in securing the command of the 16th Infantry Division for M.
F. Orlov in June 1820 and the Viatka Regiment for Pestel (hitherto Wittgenstein’ adjutant) 
in November 1821, A. V. Semenova, ‘Iuzhnye dekabristy i P. D. Kiseleva’, 7Z, XCVI,
1975, pp. 131-33.
(26) Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, Kiselev, I, p. 90.
(27) Iowa, Dekabristy vMoldavii, pp. 60-61, 87-116
(28) Ibid., pp. 87-90.
(29) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.764, ff.l7-17v, Report of Kiselev, 1820. The Junker curriculum 
consisted of grammar, Russian history (from Rurik to Paul I), mathematics, world 
geography and field fortifications, ibid., ff. 37-60v. The standard view, e.g. P. Bobrovskii, 
‘Ob uchrezhdenii iunkerskikh uchilishch’, VS, 1864, No.l 1, p. 92; F. A. Miller, Dmitri 
Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia (Charlotte, 1968) that the Junker schools were 
established in the Russian army only after an 1822-23 proposal by General F. V. Rudiger is 
incorrect.
(30) Prokof ev, Bor’ba, pp. 208-13,228.
(31) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.ll/182a, sv .ll, d.2, ff.41-42v, Report ofKiselev, 11 March 
1824 OS. It is clear from a December 1828 report by Diebitsch that these proposals were 
accepted, transforming Kiselev’s General Staff into a very powerful institution, Kagan, 
Military Reforms, p. 115-18.
(32) Irvine, ‘Capiti Staffs’, pp. 167-77.
(33) Ibid., p. 165. It is not suggested, however, that Kiselev’s General Staff evolved into a 
fully modem Staff - the essential characteristic of the latter was the ability to create
‘specific plans for war’. Irvine rightly considers that this was possible only in the railway 
age and thus that the first ‘fully developed’ General Staff was created by H. Moltke in 
Prussia between 1857 and 1867. Using an extensive railway network, the Prussians could 
develop ‘comprehensive, detailed, and highly reliable planfs]’, ibid., p. 178. In the 1820s, 
the Russians obviously did not have such opportunities and thus their war plans, though as 
‘specific’ as could reasonably be expected by the standards of the time, remained somewhat
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‘abstract’ when compared to the later Prussian versions. For details of Russian war 
planning in this period, see Chapters V and VI.
(34) Quoted in Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, Kiselev, I, p. 207.
(35) [lit.] ‘Experience of a commentator of the Ottoman Empire’.
(36) These studies are discussed in Chapter IV. Kiselev also proposed sending mapping 
expeditions to the Balkans to improve Russian cartography, see below, pp. 139-40 
(footnote 6).
(37) K. F. Toll (1777-1842) began his career as a Quartermaster staff officer during the 
Napoleonic Wars. In 1812, he became General-Quartermaster of the First Army and, 
subsequently, of the allied armies of Russia, Prussia and Austria. In 1815-23, Toll served 
as Quartermaster-General of the General Staff of H.I.M. and, in 1823-29, as Head of the 
General Staff of the First Army.
(38) Glinoetskii, Istoriia Russkogo general ’nogo shtaba, I, pp. 361-68; see also below, 
Chapter IV.
(39) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.1810, f. 642, ‘Pervaia turetskaia voina pri Imperatritse 
Ekaterine II’, 1827.
(40) Glinoetskii, Istoriia Russkogo general ’nogo shtaba, II, p. 23.
(41) Prokof ev, Bor’ba, pp. 229-37.
(42) Glinoetskii, Istoriia Russkogo general ’nogo shtaba, II,p. 23; Epanchin, Takticheskaia 
podgotovka, pp. 34-35.
(43) N. Medem, Obozrenie izvestneishikh pravil i sistem strategii (St Petersburg, 1836), 
pp. 32-38; G. P. Meshcheriakov, Russkoe voennaia mysV v XIX  v. (Moscow, 1973), p. 41.
(44) Prokof ev, Bor’ba, pp. 232-36.
(45) It is, of course, true that, after 1815, two light infantry [chasseur] regiments were 
established in every infantry division of the Russian army. However, these ‘chasseurs’ 
rarely practised operating in open order or sharpshooting and, aside from their uniforms, 
were indistinguishable from regular infantry, G. A. Leer, Obzor voin Rossii ot Petra 
Velikogo do nashikh dnei (St Petersburg, 1898), IV, Book I, p. 309.
(46) Prokof ev, Bor’ba, p. 237-38.
(47) Ibid, p. 236.
(48) It appears that Pestel’ was himself able to transform officer-soldier relations within his 
own regiment and succeeded in winning the genuine devotion of his men. Two years after 
his anrest (in 1825), the rank and file of the Viatka Regiment still openly defended him.
One soldier is reported to have said of one police investigator sent to question the regiment 
that the latter wanted ‘to force out of us the spirit of Pestel”  but that ‘his own soul will 
leave him before PesteF’s spirit leaves us’, RGVIA, op.16/183, sv.1038, d.l, ff.2-3, Police 
report to S. F. Zheltukhin, 11 Februaiy 1827 OS. Another report stated that all the NCOs 
and soldiers of the regiment were devoted to Pestel’ and that they had refused to accept 
their new commander, ibid., ff. 6-8, Police report to Nicholas I, 16 February 1827 OS.
(49) Quoted in N. K. Shil’der, Imperator Aleksandr pervyi (St Petersburg), IV, p. 285-86.
(50) Iowa, Dekabristy v Moldavii, pp. 83-84.
(5\)Ibid., pp. 145-50.
(52) Ibid., pp. 154-68.
(53) Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, Kiselev, I, p 157. The surveillance system, originally limited 
to 16th division was, sometime in 1823, extended to cover the entire Second Army. This 
was no easy task as the army was quartered over five gubemii. It involved the creation of 
an elaborate network of informers drawn primary from civilians. The informers bore the 
general title korrespondety, and were subdivided into three ranks. The first and lowest was 
that of ispolnitel ’ [executor], who were recruited from a wide source - merchants, priests, 
state officials, noblemen and doctors. These informers were paid 200 roubles [per annum?] 
for periodic correspondence. Their watchword (or password) [parol ’] was nol ’za [use]. 
The second rank was that of nadziratel ’ [supervisor], who were sent written instructions,
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for the execution of which they were paid 500 roubles. Their watchword was zabotlivost ’ 
[attention]. The highest rank was popechitel ’ [guardian], who read the reports of the other 
ranks, recruited more informers and executed special missions for which they were paid on 
an ad hoc basis. Their watchword was doverie [trust]. In each region where the Second 
Army was quartered one ispolnitel ’ and one nadziratel ’ were to be assigned to the main 
quarters of each battalion, division and corps. This, in total, required the recruitment of 169 
agents, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.781, ff.l-3v, 7, ‘Uchrezhdenie sekretnoi korrespondensii’,
1823. Another report states that many agents were recruited from amongst the local Jews 
and that they operated in the 16th, 18th and 19th Infantry Divisions. Apparently many of 
their reports were written in Hebrew, ibid., ff.8-9v, Report of anon., 1823. The system was 
probably, either in whole or in part, invented by Colonel I. P. Liprandi. The latter had, 
during Russia’s recent occupation of Paris, researched into the workings of Napoleon’s 
secret police and had become something of an expert on espionage techniques. On his 
return to Russia he joined the Second Army and was used by Sabaneev in 1821-22 to 
investigate the causes of the disturbance in the Kamchatka Regiment and organise the 
nadzor on the 16th division, Iowa, Dekabristy v Moldavii, p. 148-49. On a more general 
note, it appears that before the establishment of the Third Section in July 1826 (and 
probably afterwards as well) the General Staffs played a prominent role in the gathering of 
intelligence on politically suspect civilian institutions as well as military ones. See, for 
example, a very interesting report to the General Staff of H.I.M. on the anti-Russian 
sentiment of young Polish noblemen in the gubemiia of Khar’kov and its university, RNB- 
OR, fond 1000, op.2, d.411, ff.1-5, N. I. Demidov to Diebitsch, 10 April 1826 OS.
(54) For details of their arrest and trial, see Iowa, Dekabristy v Moldavii, pp. 169-205.
(55) Quoted in Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, Kiselev, I, pp. 221-22.
(56) RGVLA, fond VUA, d.17184, f.184, ‘Otchet ob upravlenii vtoroi armii, 1819-28’.
(57) Iowa, Dekabristy vMoldavii, pp. 140.
(58) Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, Kiselev, I, pp. 125-26, 157-67,222-23.
(59) Iowa, Dekabristy v Moldavii, pp. 179-83.
(60) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.703, ff. 1-11.
(61) Semenova, ‘Iuzhnye dekabristy’, pp. 128,142.
(62) Ibid., pp. 131-41; Bulgakov, ‘Russkii gosudarstvennyi chelovek’, p. 142; I. D.
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III. THE SECOND ARMY AND THE GREEK REVOLUTION, 1821-22
The Origins of Ypsilantis’ Revolt 1820-21
Whilst the long-term causes of the Greek revolution may be traced to cumulative 
effects of the spread of French revolutionary ideas, the rise of modem Greek nationalism 
and the growth of a politically-conscious Greek mercantile class(l), it is nevertheless true 
that the revolt of 1821 resulted from a series of ‘conspiracies and accidents’.(2) The 
landmark in this respect was the founding of Philike Hetairia by three Greek merchants in 
Odessa in 1814. Continuing the work of an earlier organisation founded in Vienna in 1797, 
this ostensibly philanthropic society aimed by means of a coup d'etat to overthrow Ottoman 
rule in both ‘Greece’ and the Balkans generally.(3)
The establishment of Hetairia in Novorossiia’s leading port was certainly no 
coincidence. The growing emigre community of Greek seamen acted as the perfect cover 
for the society’s covert activities and allowed it access to the high-ranking Greeks within 
the Russian service. It was through the latter that Hetairia hoped to win the support of the 
Tsar and gain the promise of a Russo-Turkish war to assist their enterprise.
Hetairia's initial hopes rested on drawing Capodistrias into their circle. In 1816a 
certain Galatis was despatched to St Petersburg to recruit the Foreign Minister. When 
Capodistrias declined the offer, and advised the society against revolutionary means(4) 
their attention turned to Alexander Ypsilantis, the head of a distinguished exiled Phanariot 
family(5) and a General in the Russian army. The latter accepted and was made the leader 
of Hetairia in April 1820. After two more overtures to Capodistrias were turned down in 
1820, Ypsilantis decided to prepare for revolution without him and requested a two-year 
leave of absence from the Tsar. (6)
In July 1820, Ypsilantis left St Petersburg to meet the various branches of Hetairia 
in Moscow, Kiev and Odessa. When he reached Izmail in October, Ypsilantis summoned a 
military council to draw up a concrete plan of revolutionary action. Differences within the 
council were, however, apparent from the beginning. One party favoured igniting the main 
revolt in the Peloponnese and Epirus in order to co-ordinate their activities with Ali Pasha - 
the rebellious Albanian leader who had been at war with the Sultan since the summer of 
1820. Serbs, Bulgars, Wallachians and other Balkan Christians were to be drawn into an 
anti-Ottoman coalition and aid the main revolt through localised uprisings. A rival, more 
conservative faction, however, favoured beginning the revolt in the Principalities in the 
belief that the Sultan, in contravention of the Russo-Turkish treaties, would occupy the 
province so provoking a war with Russia. After some debate the council accepted the
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former plan and Ypsilantis left for Kishinev to make some final preparations. For reasons 
that have never been entirely clear, Ypsilantis changed the Hetairia plan and now decided 
to begin the revolt in the Principalities. A possible cause was that M. Sutzo, the Hospodar 
of Moldavia, had joined Hetairia in November, thus making such a venture all the more 
appealing. The revolt was planned to begin on 15 November 1820 OS, but Ypsilantis fell 
ill and so again preparations were postponed. The final twist in proceedings came in 
February 1821 when a Hetairia messenger sent to open communications with Ali Pasha 
was captured by the Turkish authorities with certain compromising documents on his 
person. Ypsilantis decided to begin the uprising as soon as possible and on 22 February OS 
crossed into Moldavia and gave the signal for local Hetairists to join his band.(7)
One of Ypsilantis’ main objectives in beginning the revolt in the Principalities was 
to attract the Turkish forces away from their garrisons in the Morea, thus allowing a general 
uprising to develop there amongst the Greeks. Whilst this was soon achieved in April, 
Ypsilantis’ aim of attracting other Balkan Christians to his side proved a complete failure. 
His main hope was based on joining forces with the Wallachian Pandours (a warlike people 
of Lesser Wallachia) who, under the command of the peasant Tudor Vladimirescu, were, 
since 23 January OS, already in open revolt. Although the Wallachian uprising had 
possibly been arranged with Hetairia to coincide with Ypsilantis’ venture, Vladimirescu 
was intent on pursuing his own aims. He declared his revolt to be directed solely against 
the injustices of the Hospodars, not Ottoman rule, and wished only to make himself ruler of 
Wallachia. Vladimirescu refused outright to support Hetairia’s more far-reaching aims and 
when he opened negotiations with the Porte in May, Ypsilantis had him executed.(8) The 
hope for Serbian support was scuppered by the timely intervention of Russia, whilst the 
other Balkan Slavs were simply too disorganised or too unwilling to fight.(9) The fate of 
Ypsilantis’ final objective - to attract Russian intervention on the side of the Greeks also 
proved problematic (see below).
The main point of historiographical dispute centres around the extent to which the 
Tsarist military and civilian authorities knew of, and perhaps even aided, Ypsilantis’ revolt. 
The widely accepted view that the highest Russian political authorities knew nothing of 
Hetairia's preparations(lO) was first challenged in 1971 by I. F. Iowa. The latter 
presented the controversial thesis that both the Tsar and Capodistrias knew of the existence 
and aims of Hetairia and allowed Ypsilantis to continue his preparations in Russia ‘with 
[their] silent agreement’.(11) Unfortunately, Iowa’s argument is not based on any 
significant new documentary evidence but largely upon Capodistrias’ own account of his
dealings with Hetairia which were published over a century ago.(12) Whilst it is certain
that Capodistrias (and probably Alexander) knew that an organisation called Hetairia
existed, Iowa fails to prove that the Russian Cabinet knew, firstly, that Ypsilantis had
become the head of the organisation in April 1820 and, secondly, that Ypsilantis was
making concrete plans for revolution from the end of 1820.(13) Also unconvincing is
Iow a’s analysis of why Alexander I disowned Ypsilantis venture at Laibach. The Tsar is
said to have refused his support due to the pressure of Britain and Austria and due to
Russia’s poor economic situation.(14) Alexander could have easily foretold that the other
Powers would oppose the revolt and this did not in any way preclude Russia aiding
Ypsilantis secretly. Alexander did genuinely oppose Ypsilantis’ revolt and took no
measures to assist him.(I5)
There is a far stronger case for the argument that certain independently-minded
front-line commanders in the South of Russia, to varying degrees, knew of, or supported
Hetairia’s plans. Much of this stems from Ypsilantis’ personal acquaintance with Kiselev,
M. F. Orlov and other officer-Decembrists of the Second Army.(16) It seems almost
certain that Ypsilantis revealed a great deal of his preparations to Orlov during his brief stay
in Kishinev in October 1820. At that time Orlov was commander of the 16th Infantry
Division and the head of the revolutionary society Soiuz Blagodenstviia [lit. ‘Union of
Prosperity’}. Some months earlier he had written to A. V. Raevskii:
They say that Ah Pasha of Jannina in the eightieth year of his life has 
adopted Christianity and is threatening the Turks with the liberation of 
Greece. If the 16th division was set free for this liberation it would not be 
so bad. I have 16,000 men under arms, 36 guns and six Cossack regiments.
With these one could have some fun.(17)
According to one account, Ypsilantis revealed his plans in detail and persuaded Orlov, 
along with his force, to cross the Pruth into Moldavia with him.(18) Whilst this version 
contains certain inconsistencies, more recent research has added credence to it. For 
following his meetings with Ypsilantis, Orlov, who was on the most radical wing of the 
Russian revolutionary movement, proposed at a Moscow convention of the Soiuz 
Blagodenstviia (January 1821) that revolution be raised immediately in Russia. His idea 
was to create an international revolutionary organisation (which was to include Hetairia) 
and, using his own division and the military colonies, to simultaneously begin a Russian and 
Greek revolution.(19) In conjunction with this and other evidence, all Soviet writers are 
unanimous in their agreement that there was some unspecified understanding between the 
two men, though its exact nature has been open to dispute.(20)
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The evidence against Kiselev is less clear cut. Prior to 1821 he had corresponded 
freely with Ypsilantis over the possible future liberation of Greece,(21) but whether he 
knew of any concrete plans to this end is doubtful.(22) A. F. Langerone, the Governor of 
Novorossiia, was later to recall that during Ypsilantis’ brief stay in Odessa in 1820, the 
latter had spoken of his quest to ‘resurrect ancient Greece’,(23) but had reported nothing to 
St Petersburg. Indeed, during the first month of the revolt, Langerone had freely issued 
passports to the Odessa Greeks wishing to join Ypsilantis.(24) Langerone’s behavior, 
much like Kiselev’s, may however be explained by their ignorance of the true state of 
affairs. For it was widely assumed that Ypsilantis acted with the direct or indirect backing 
of the Tsar.(25) This uncertainty was compounded during the first weeks of the revolt by 
the delay in the arrival of instructions from the Foreign Ministry.(26)
The failure of the Novorossiia authorities to forewarn of an uprising prepared in 
their domains attracted the suspicion of St Petersburg.(27) This came as a surprise to many 
as, somewhat naively, it was assumed that Ypsilantis’ revolt would receive imperial favour 
as it gave Russia a good pretext for a declaration of war on the Porte.(28) Such a view was 
mistaken; the Tsar was genuinely attached to the conservative principles of the Holy 
Alliance. He was in no mood to allow a revolutionary movement to endanger his system of 
monarchical solidarity.
The Tsarist Reaction. 1821-22
It was unfortunate for Ypsilantis that Alexander was at the Congress of Laibach 
when the uprising broke out. It had been convened to deal with the recent revolutions in the 
Italian peninsula and Alexander was in no mood for the antics of another conspiratorial 
society. The Tsar had just heard of Vladimirescu’s revolt in Wallachia and was convinced 
that the spirit of Jacobinism was now spreading eastwards. As Nesselrode told his consul 
in Wallachia:
En Valachie comme a Madrid a Lisbon et a Naples, c’est une poignee 
de soldats qui a ouverts la [iillegible, peine ?] des disordres et qui 
s’efforce de livrer l’empire [Ottoman] aux mains de l’anarchie.(29)
Thus Alexander’s first instinct on hearing of Ypsilantis’ venture in Moldavia was to openly 
and unequivocally condemn the revolt. If there was any wavering at all in his mind, it was 
soon dispelled by Ypsilantis himself. The latter had sent a letter to the Tsar in an attempt to 
justify his actions.(30) Ypsilantis wrote openly of the existence of his ‘societe secrete’ 
which had for some years been plotting revolution in the Sultan’s domains. His greatly 
exaggerated claim that the Morea, Serbia, Bulgaria, Thrace and Macedonia as well as the
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Principalities were up in arms served only to alienate further not endear the Tsar to his 
enterprise.
Alexander thus informed Ypsilantis that he would receive neither ‘direct nor indirect 
assistance’ from Russia and urged his renegade General to end the revolt.(31) In the 
meantime Russia would continue the policy adopted in the wake of Vladimirescu’s revolt - 
namely, that Russia would seek a iigne commune’ with her allies in order to oppose the 
‘torrent des revolutions qui menace de bouleverser encore une fois l’Europe’ and restore 
order to the Ottoman Empire. Although the Porte was not party to the Vienna treaties and 
thus not entitled to the guarantees offered to signatories, ‘L’Empereur et Ses augustes allies 
n’en font pas moins resolus de respecter a l’egard de la Turquie, les principes qui forment la 
base de leurs relations’.(32)
Despite the moderation of Russia’s initial response, the seeds of the future Russo- 
Turk conflict were nevertheless discernible at Laibach. For although Alexander condemned 
the rebels, he was adamant that the Turkish authorities were not to be permitted to punish 
those Greeks who had not taken part in the revolt. Russia would observe a strict neutrality 
between the warring factions unless, in Capodistrias words, her ‘friendly interference’ was 
needed ‘to protect the Greeks from the vengeance of the Turks’.(33)
Turkish reprisals against the civilian population of the Principalities had, in fact, 
begun almost immediately upon the outbreak of the revolt. By March, a flood of refugees 
had made its way to the Ottoman frontier, seeking protection in Russian Bessarabia. The 
refugee problem was extremely sensitive as their admittance into Russia was bound to be a 
cause of friction in Russo-Turkish relations. It is therefore remarkable that for almost a 
month, the local authorities in Bessarabia, namely its Governor-General, I. N. Inzov and the 
commanders of the Second Army, decided Russia’s immigration policy without any 
instructions from the Foreign Ministry or the Tsar.
On 25 February 1821 OS, Sabaneev instructed Inzov to allow refugees to pass the 
Russian quarantine and ordered some of his military units to move to the Moldavian 
border. (34) The Commander-in-Chief, P. Kh. Wittgenstein, soon confirmed these 
orders.(35) Inzov was to admit refugees to save them from ‘a certain death’ and the army 
was to fend off any Turkish pursuit into Russian territoiy.(36) Wittgenstein, however, 
stressed that despite a plea from the Hospodar of Moldavia M. Sutzo,(37) he had no 
authority to send military units into Moldavia itself.(38)
Only on 26 March OS did Wittgenstein receive instructions from Nesselrode.(39) 
Alexander agreed that whilst the innocent inhabitants of Moldavia were to be admitted:
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All participants in the revolt against the Turkish government are to be 
refused completely any protection and under no pretext are to be 
allowed to enter into our territory...[The Tsar] considers all these 
persons to be subverters of the general order and criminals against their 
lawful government and therefore wishes that the Turkish leadership 
takes the most energetic measures to end the revolt and to punish the 
criminals. [The Tsar has invited the Porte to] take the strictest measures 
for the execution of this by means of military force.(40)
The order to refuse the admittance of Ypsilantis’ rebels certainly put Sabaneev and 
Inzov, who were noted for their sympathy towards the Balkan Christians, in a difficult 
position.(41) When the first reported instance of an attempt by rebels to enter Bessarabia 
arose in April, both did their best to persuade Wittgenstein to admit them. Sabaneev wrote 
of three armed rebels who were requesting refuge. He accepted that Wittgenstein’s 
instructions of 26 March OS forbade the acceptance of revolutionaries, but pointed to a 
supposedly contradictory instruction in the same order by which Balkan refugees were to be 
accepted ‘in order to save their lives’.(42) Wittgenstein’s reply was non-committal. It 
made no mention of the case in hand and gave only an abstract formula. All rebels 
‘especially the leading ones and those who are armed’ are not to be accepted but that 
‘private persons are to be accepted without discrimination as we have no means of 
establishing with accuracy which of them participated in the revolt’.(43) Sabaneev 
interpreted these instructions as permitting the acceptance of the rebels.(44) In May, 
Sabaneev received a further request for sanctuary from 300 rebels. He declared his 
readiness to grant it in the event of ‘necessity’, that is in order to save their lives. He, 
however, set down two preconditions; the rebels had to ‘firstly, lay down their weapons 
and, secondly, submit themselves to our cordon guards and remain there’.(45) Sabaneev 
understood that as long as the rebels disarmed and caused no trouble in Russian territory he 
could justify their admittance on the grounds of saving their fives. Thus of the many 
thousands of refugees accepted by the Second Army between March and November 1821 
there is little doubt that this number included many rebels.(46)
Whilst the military authorities in Bessarabia were dealing with the practical 
problems of the influx of refugees, Russia’s diplomats in the capital were deciding the 
question of war or peace. Alexander’s initial hostility to the Greek revolt had by the end of 
April been greatly reduced. For following the spread of the revolution from the 
Principalities to the Morea on 25 March OS, the Porte began exacting reprisals on its 
Christian population with an ever-increasing barbarity. Its army ravaged the Principalities 
whilst in the capital the Greek Patriarch Gregory V was executed and many Orthodox
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churches were destroyed.(47) Ypsilantis’ revolt had ceased to be merely a localised affair 
and was rapidly acquiring all the elements of a religious cum national struggle for 
survival.(48)
G. A. Stroganov reported from Constantinople that his initial policy of giving 
‘concours moral’ to the Porte’s attempts to quell the revolt was failing. It was neither 
allaying the suspicion of the Turks that Russia was implicated in the revolt, nor imparting 
‘un esprit de clemence et de pacification’ to the army’s treatment of the Sultan’s Christian 
subjects. Turkish reprisals were conducted without any distinction between ‘1’innocent’ 
and ‘le coupable’.(49) Unwisely, the Porte strengthened Russia’s diplomatic hand by 
openly violating certain articles of the various Russo-Turkish treaties and agreements. 
Stroganov could, for instance, claim that the attacks on the Orthodox religion constituted a 
contravention of article VII of the 1774 treaty.(50) In addition, by May, the Porte had 
begun hindering the passage of commercial ships under the Russian flag through the Straits 
- a contravention of various articles of a 1783 Russo-Turkish commercial treaty.(51)
During its occupation of the Principalities, the Turks contravened Russia’s treaty rights by 
dismissing the Hospodars and imposing taxes without the latter’s consent. (52) Finally, a 
Serbian deputation sent to negotiate a territorial dispute arising from the 1812 Treaty of 
Bucharest had been detained indefinitely in Constantinople.(53) The net result of the 
Porte’s actions was that Russia gained far surer grounds for a possible declaration of war.
Echoes of Stroganov’s increasing exasperation were soon heard reverberating from 
St Petersburg. In May, Nesselrode complained of the Turkish army’s devastation of the 
Principalities and refused a Turkish request to hand over Greek refugees citing the Porte’s 
unwillingness to distinguish the innocent from the guilty as justification.(54) By June, 
continued Turkish intransigence had finally exhausted the patience of the Tsar. Alexander 
now believed that the Turkish authorities were no longer fighting the Greek revolutionaries 
but conducting a war against the Greek population as a whole and the Orthodox religion. 
Stroganov was instructed to present the Porte with an ultimatum. Should it be refused he 
was to quit Constantinople - the traditional prelude to a declaration of war. (55) Stroganov 
consequently submitted a forceful representation to the Porte on 6 July OS. It demanded an 
end to Turkish reprisals against innocent civilians, a repair of the damaged churches and a 
restoration of the rights and prerogatives of the Greek religion as established in the various 
Russo-Turkish treaties.(56) It, however, received no response and war seemed inevitable.
It has been argued that Russia used the Greek crisis merely to justify a declaration of war 
and further its own ambitions in the East. (57) Whilst this is certainly true of certain Russian
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diplomats, Alexander’s own motives for intervention were unselfish. He believed the 
Porte’s repressive measures were counter-productive and served only to fuel an intractable 
religious war that was in the interests of no one. If the Sultan would not listen to reason 
then the use of force had to be considered in order to protect Russia’s co-religionists and to 
stabilise the region as a whole.
The new turn in Russian foreign policy activated the war party. This faction was 
not, however, homogeneous and it forwarded differing arguments in favour of military 
intervention. A common argument used by conservatives was one based upon an appeal to 
religious affinity and historical parallel. A. S. Sturdza, for instance, argued that the Greek 
revolt was legitimate and could not be equated with the other European revolutions in Italy 
and Spain. Rather it was a religious struggle against an infidel which could be equated with 
Russia’s own struggle against the Mongol yoke.(58)
The outlook of other diplomats, especially the ‘foreign adventurers’ such as Pozzo 
di Borgo, though cloaked in a feigned and opportunistic rhetoric of Holy Russia’s duty 
towards its co-religionists, was in fact grounded in the more concrete reality of Russian 
strategic self-interest. Pozzo argued that the historic and religious differences between 
Russia and the Porte rendered the existence of the two Empires ‘incompatible’. Should war 
break out, peace could not be established until ‘the Turks are forced from Europe’. Pozzo 
favoured the capture of Constantinople and the creation of a neo-Byzantium Empire. The 
latter was to fall under the patronage of Russia, whilst Constantinople (with the Straits), 
though nominally made a free city, was to occupied by Russian garrisons.(59)
A more moderate position was adopted by Capodistrias, the head of the war party. 
Following Stroganov’s departure from Constantinople on 14 July OS, the Foreign Minister 
argued for limited military intervention. Unless the Porte withdrew its forces from the 
Principalities, began to observe Russia’s treaty rights and had ceased its ‘guerre 
d’extennination’ by 20 September OS, Russia was to occupy the Principalities.(60) 
Capodistrias parried an idea recently forwarded by Castlereagh that intervention would only 
aid the European revolutionary movement- it was the Porte’s continued reprisals that 
endangered European stability.(61)
The High Command of the Second Army fully supported the Greek cause and were 
eager tor war. At the outbreak of revolution Kiselev considered ‘the so-called rebellion [to 
be] lawful’ and by July, believing war unavoidable, expressed only regret that the Cabinet 
was ‘dragging its heels’.(62) Since 1819 Kiselev had been in correspondence with 
Diebitsch over a future war plan against Turkey.(63) The latter had accepted Kiselev’s idea
of a Balkan crossing and a march on Constantinople. Therefore, in July, Diebitsch drew up 
a war plan which presumed the need for a 100,000-man army for a six-month campaign 
opening on 1 March OS.(64) Although of a rudimentary nature and yet to gain official 
sanction, Diebitsch’s plan would have been the basis of any Russian offensive had it been 
decided to push operations beyond the Danube.(65) It is also clear that at the time of 
writing (July) it was already too late to attempt a Balkan crossing for 1821. Diebitsch had, 
therefore, some time earlier already drafted a compromise war plan.(66) In 1821 Russia 
was to content herself with the occupation of the Principalities and possibly push some 
forces to the Trajans Wall to shorten the width of her operational base and to facilitate the 
crossing of the Danube the following year. In 1822, the army was to march on the capital 
capturing en route the vital ports of Varna and Burgas which were to act as supply centres. 
Diebitsch, however, had significant doubts as to the readiness of the army for such an 
enterprise. Not only was there a shortage of siege artillery but the Black sea fleet, which 
was to carry the main bulk of the army’s supplies, had a great deficiency in transport ships. 
It was calculated that the existing cargo capacity was sufficient to supply only 72,000 men 
with food provisions for only two months. Ironically, this capacity was, in fact, excessive, 
as the Second Army had only enough provisions to supply 40,000 men for one month and it 
had insufficient funds in its own budget to obtain them. The purchase of the necessary food 
supplies, means of transport as well as the establishment of magazines required an 
unspecified amount of time and money. Kiselev, though favouring war, was also sober 
enough to realise the difficulties involved. As early as May he had pointed to the lack of an 
agricultural surplus in Novorossiia which ensured that a ‘prompt opening of a [military] 
campaign cannot be carried out’.(67) In addition, his opinion that a push to the Trajans 
Wall in 1821 was ‘very difficult’ made a Danubian crossing more difficult for the main 
force in 1822 and thus further complicated a deep offensive into Ottoman territory.(68)
Despite these presumed difficulties, Stroganov’s departure in July forced the Tsar to 
seriously consider coercive measures against the Porte. Alexander was adamant, however, 
that no solution, military or otherwise, was possible without the support of his allies,(69) 
and brushed aside Capodistrias’ view that Russia should act unilaterally.(70) Unfortunately 
for the Tsar the allies had their own agenda. It has been well remarked that the other 
Powers were concerned with the fate of Balkan Christians only insofar as they impinged on 
Russo-Turkish relations.(71) The European Powers feared that the sanction of military 
support to aid the Greeks would end, at best, in a Russian protectorate over Greece, at
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worst, in the destruction of the Ottoman Empire - the sole barrier to Russian expansion into 
the Balkans and Mediterranean.
Of all the Powers, Austria was the most pro-Turkish. Mettemich feared war would 
see a Russian annexation of the Principalities and the occupation by Russia of the strategic 
point of the Danubian delta so controlling the trade of that waterway. Moreover the support 
of the Greeks could encourage nationalist movements in the Balkans and elsewhere and so 
threaten the veiy existence of the Habsburg’s multi-national Empire.(72) Castlereagh 
feared any increase of Russian influence over the Porte and the Straits question, as well as 
the spreading of Greek nationalism to the Ionian islands, then under British control.(73) 
Bourbon France, desirous of a foreign adventure to gratify public opinion and reassert her 
Great-Power status was however tempted with intervention in the Balkans and it was 
therefore natural that she should be the first to be approached (in July) by Alexander with 
the offer of an alliance against Turkey.(74) The French Prime Minister A. E. Richelieu and 
in particular his ambassador in St Petersburg A. de La Ferronays gave some thought to the 
proposal(75) but due to the fear of Britain and Austria refused to pursue it or even openly 
support a Russian declaration.(76) At the same time Alexander inquired as to the position 
of Britain and Austria in a possible war, but did not receive a clear answer.(77) Fearing 
war, Castlereagh and Mettemich met in Hanover in October 1821 to agree on a joint 
strategy. It was agreed that a distinction was to be made between two separate issues - one 
concerning a concrete and narrow Russo-Turkish treaty dispute, the other concerning the 
wider Greek question. Russia’s quest to restore her contravened treaty rights (such as those 
concerning the Principalities) were to be supported, but it was to be denied that Russia had 
any right for unilateral action over Greece - the Greek question concerned all Europe and its 
solution was to be decided by all the Powers in concert. In addition, Mettemich set himself 
the task of discouraging Alexander’s growing favour of the Greeks by presenting their 
revolt as part of the universal revolutionary conspiracy. (78) As Kh. A. Lieven, Russia’s 
ambassador in London, correctly reported, the aim of the meeting had been to enforce this 
policy on Prussia and France in order to ‘eloigner les chances de la guerre’.(79)
Meanwhile events in the Principalities, amounting essentially to a war scare, added 
an urgency to proceedings. In November, Sabaneev reported that there was a 25,000 man 
Turkish force in Moldavia and the number was growing daily. It was rumoured that the 
Sultan intended to attack and reclaim Bessarabia.(80) Although the High Command 
remained skeptical of the truth of such reports, Kiselev was nevertheless ordered to put his 
forces onto a defensive footing. Rumours of attack, however, continued and therefore
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Kiselev left for Bessarabia to make further investigations.(81) This was certainly needed as 
by December, Inzov reported that over 350,000 Turks were making their way to Danube 
and preparing for an offensive.(82) Following the winter break, another imminent attack 
was predicted in March 1822.(83) It was only in April that Kiselev was able to finally 
dismiss the rumours - they had been spread by the Turks themselves in order to force the 
Russian army into defensive positions and so avert an attack across the Pruth.(84)
In February 1822, Alexander, convinced of the need for allied support, sent D. P. 
Tatishchev to Vienna to seek a solution with Mettemich. The latter, in keeping with his 
above-mentioned distinction, proposed that the allies present Russia’s specific treaty 
demands to the Porte and would support a war should the Sultan refuse them. The Greek 
question was to be entrusted to a Congress in September.(85) Despite a strong protest from 
Capodistrias, Alexander accepted Austria’s solution.(86) Following an assurance from 
Britain in May that the Sultan had accepted these demands, Alexander finally decided 
against war.(87) The pro-Congress policy associated with Nesselrode had won the day and 
Capodistrias early retirement from office in the summer of 1822 was an almost inevitable 
consequence.
There has been some debate as to why Alexander felt compelled to seek an allied 
solution and forgo unilateral military action over Greece. A popular argument is that, under 
the spell of Mettemich, he feared Russia’s support of the Greeks would spread 
revolutionary activity throughout Europe.(88) A more cynical argument is that the Tsar was 
only restrained from war due to the poor state of the Russian economy and army(89) or 
because he feared the consequences of beginning a war without the sanction of the Great 
Powers.(90) The most convincing analysis, however, is that Alexander drew back from war 
in a genuine desire to preserve the unity of the alliance.(91)
With Alexander’s decision in early 1822 to convene a Congress over Greece the 
spectre of war was averted and so the first round of the diplomatic struggle came to an 
end.(92) Alexander had been cruelly deceived by his allies, especially Mettemich, who 
sought only to buy the Sultan time to crush the revolt.(93) For the next three years Russian 
diplomacy was to be bogged down in a never-ending series of conferences, allowing the 
initiative over the Greek question to pass to Britain and Canning.
The Second Army and the Study of the Greek Revolt
When news of the uprising reached Kiselev, one of his first actions was to send 
Pestel’ on a mission to investigate its causes. Pestel’ completed three trips to Bessarabia
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between March and June 1821 and wrote up his findings in a series of official reports.(94)
Whilst in his private letters to Kiselev, Pestel’ revealed his sympathy for the rebels and
advocacy of Russian military intervention, the reports themselves were objective in tone
and did not betray Pestel’’s own opinions.(95) It is evident even from his first report of 8
March OS that Pestel’ had gained a good understanding of the causes and aims of the
revolt.(96) He fully distinguished between Vladimirescu’s aim of freeing the Principalities
from Hospodar misrule and Ypsilantis’ goal of independence for Greece and possibly the
Balkans as a whole. He was likewise aware of the flaw in Ypsilantis’ decision to begin the
revolt in Moldavia. The local inhabitants did not join his rebels as:
The Moldavians hate the Greeks even more than the Turks for they have 
always had as the rulers of their province Greek Princes [Hospodars] 
and therefore ascribe to them, more than to the Turks, all the causes of 
their unhappiness.
At this time more intelligence was being gathered by Inzov’s agents in Moldavia. The 
latter, more or less correctly, discovered the origins and development of Hetairia as well as 
their organisational structure. Of special interest is their intelligence on the immediate 
origins of the revolt.(97) Apparently, during Ypsilantis’ visit to Odessa(98) he was given 
authority from the Hetairia Directory to begin preparations for revolution. The initial plan 
was for Ypsilantis to leave for France ‘to prepare a general, so to speak, uprising of 
journalists against Turkish despotism’.(99) This propaganda war was to prepare European 
public opinion for the coming revolution. Just as Ypsilantis was about to leave however, he 
received a letter from M. Sutzo, the Hospodar of Moldavia. It claimed that the 
revolutionary situation had matured and that the Turkish authorities were increasingly 
suspicious of some revolutionary plot. It was for this reason that Ypsilantis decided to 
remain in Russia and begin the revolt in Moldavia, presumably with Sutzo’s support. This 
intelligence, if correct, explains Ypsilantis’ vacillations in late 1820-early 1821 and rests the 
decision to begin the revolt in Jassy with Sutzo.
Meanwhile Pestel’ was attempting to draw on Hetairia's experience for the 
development of the revolutionary plans of his own. He was impressed not only by 
Hetairia's organisational structure(lOO), but by their vision for what was to replace the 
Ottoman Empire in Europe. In one of his reports Pestel’ informed Kiselev that the 
Hetairists envisaged the creation of a ‘federal republic’ on the model of the United 
States.(lOl) Using this idea as his model,(102) sometime in early-mid 1821, Pestel’ drew 
up his Tsarstvo Grecheskoe [Greek Kingdom] - a curious document which consists merely 
of a list of ten Balkan regions and their respective boundaries. (103)
The origins and significance of this document have aroused much debate. An early
interpretation was that it was written as a tempting foreign policy programme, to be
presented to the Tsarist authorities to induce it to intervene in the Greek revolt with the aim
of destroying Ottoman power and creating a pro-Russian neo-Byzantium state. In
deference to Tsarist political principles, Pester is said to have eschewed his republican
ideals and presented the prospective state as a monarchy or kingdom.(104) This, somewhat
unfeasible view, was soon attacked by the acknowledged authority on the Decembrist
movement. It was argued that Pester would never have proposed the establishment of a
monarchy and that the idea was probably passed onto him during his mission to Bessarabia
by a Hetairist of a less radical political persuasion.(105) The most convincing case,
however, has been presented by Dostian who argued that the document was of joint
authorship between Pestel’ and some unknown Hetairist.(106)
Whichever version is accepted, all Soviet writers have agreed that Pestel’ did
genuinely believe in the creation of a ‘Greek Kingdom’ as part of a revolutionary and
‘progressive’ foreign policy in which (in his own words) the ‘system of conquest’ [sistema
zavoevatel ’naia] of the past was to be replaced with a ‘system of patronage’ [sistema
pokrovitel’stvennaia].(101) One may, however, certainly question PesteP’s commitment to
such an altruistic programme for, as already mentioned, his ideas on foreign policy were in
fact very traditional - the key tenets being expansion and Russification. With regard to the
Balkans in particular, the idea of ‘patronage’ was no departure from Tsarist policy.
As a result of his 1821 mission, Pestel’ discovered that the idea of Russia’s
messianic role in the East was, in those parts, widely believed to exist. He informed
Kiselev that the Greeks had no faith in assistance from either Austrian or British but that:
Tous les yeux et toutes l'es attentions se portent done vers Russie...[The 
Greeks] esperent de voir arriver les armees russes non pour comme 
venant au secours des insurges...mais comme venant venger la religion 
profanee.(108)
Pestel’ was likewise impressed by the treaty rights which legitimised Russian involvement 
in the Balkans:
The Treaty of [Kutchuk] Kainardji and the Conventions of Jassy and 
Bucharest...lays upon Russia the obligation to render patronage to all the 
Christian subjects of the Sublime Ottoman Porte. Russia may not 
therefore refuse its patronage to the Greeks without the scorning her 
sacred duties and without the contravention of the treaties which she has 
always followed with the utmost precision.(109)
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Thus by a ‘system of patronage5, Pestel5 imagined no more than the traditional Tsarist 
notion of the willing submission of Balkan peoples to Russia and the sanctification of 
Russian influence there by treaty right.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Following the receipt of reports from Pestel5, Inzov and other military agents 
Kiselev established his General Staff as the centre the for the investigation of the Greek 
revolt. In early 1822 he informed Inzov of his intention to commission the writing of the 
first historical account of the revolution. To this end Kiselev outlined the various areas of 
research that were still required. They related, in particular, to (i) the connection between 
the first Greek secret society, founded by Rigas Velestinlis in Vienna in 1797 and the 
Russian Hetairia movement (ii) the role of Napoleon and the French revolutionaries in these 
societies (iii) the level of coordination between the revolts of Ypsilantis and Vladimirescu 
(iv) the character of Ypsilantis. This information was to be gathered from the Hetairia 
refugees who had fled to Bessarabia the previous year.(llO)
The resulting work bore the title Obozrenieproizshestvii vMoldavii i Valakhii v 
techenii 1821 goda [Review of Events in Moldavia and Wallachia in 1821],(111) First 
discovered some thirty years ago, it was initially thought to be a private report of Pestel5 to 
members of his Southern Society.(112) A later study however has shown it to be 
indisputably an official work written under the auspices of the General Staff.(113) The still 
disputed question of authorship is dealt with below.
The opening paragraph sets the tone for the remainder of the work, ‘After three 
centuries of oppression by Turkish rule, the spirit of freedom was inflamed amongst the 
descendants of Ancient Greece5. Far from the dry, matter-of-fact language one would 
expect from an official document, it is written in an emotional and romantic, though not 
uncritical style, and betrays some sign of literary pretension on the part of the author. The 
analysis of the origin of revolution is, unusually for the time, not grounded in the religious 
imagery of the struggle between Islam and Orthodoxy but on the ‘historical right5 of the 
Greeks for self-government and their ‘desire for a better way of life5.
After a brief allusion to the role of Russo-Turkish wars, the French Revolution and 
the Napoleonic wars on the development of Greek national consciousness the work 
proceeds to the organisational structure of Hetairia, which incorrectly, it cites as being 
established in Moscow in 1816.(114) It then turns to Hetairia's preparations for revolution 
in 1820-21 .(115) Generally it confirms ArslTs summary of these events(116) but departs
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on certain points. For example, it suggests that the Porte was informed of the existence of
Hetairia in 1820 through the ‘English Ministry’, and that Hetairia knew of the coming
Persian attack on Turkey.(117) It confirms that Ypsilantis had initially intended to begin
the revolt in the Morea but states that he was talked out of this by a certain Hetairist named
Zanto. The latter believed an uprising in the Principalities would deflect Turk forces away
from the Morea and allow Hetairia to forge links with the Serbs and Bulgars.(118)
The most interesting aspect of the work however is its evaluation of the character of
Ypsilantis. For whilst it is solidly pro-Greek, the work casts much criticism on both
Ypsilantis’ overall strategy and his own personal bravery. It is especially harsh on
Ypsilantis’ decision to begin the revolt in Moldavia and then flee to Austria following the
defeat of his main forces in May 1829:
Leaving behind his forces he issued an order, by which, in reproaching 
the Greeks and Moldavians for a lack of spirit and betrayal,...he desired 
to vindicate his own behavior and lay all the blame for the failure upon 
his comrades...Neither in general plan nor in his own individual actions 
did he show either that greatness of thought or the courage and contempt 
for death which form the basic traits of any personality summoned...to 
the judgment of histoiy. Not once did he participate in battle and had 
not sufficient moral strength to endure the alienation of his followers - 
alienation is incomparably more hurtful than failure itself: for the latter 
can sometimes signify insufficient luck; the former, however, is always 
seen as due to a lack of character.(119)
Writing probably sometime in 1822, the author had already witnessed the failure of
Ypsilantis’ venture. Hence his conclusion in steeped in moral and didactic tones, with
Hetairia*s experience cited as being a ‘valuable instruction for nations [narody\ .(\2§) The
idea of beginning the revolt in the Principalities failed because Hetairia, in overestimating
the degree of political maturity of the people it was attempting to liberate, was unable to
attract the support of the local inhabitants:(121)
Nations, like all things living in the world, have their own age...to speed 
up the transition of a nation from age to another, especially from youth 
to maturity, cannot be the task of one or several persons, regardless of 
how great their abilities may be. Force of circumstance,...the striking 
example of neighbours and the long term direction of minds on a 
common course - these are the weapons with which the masses are 
moved and without which it is impossible to inspire them into a quick 
march.(122)
The author was very harsh on would-be revolutionaries who see revolution as simply a coup
d'etat, executed by a small band of professional conspirators:
When a whole people feels its own strength and has a firm desire for a 
better life, personalities appear and the worthy are replaced by the
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worthier. In this case there is no failure, for new resources appear at 
every step...but in the staff of one society, such as Hetairia, the limited 
number of people and resources are soon exhausted and after a few 
failures, each of the members is already following his own agenda: one 
thinks of his own personal escape, another is abandoned to the flow of 
circumstance, the most resolute seeks a brilliant finale.(123)
Who then is the author of this document? Certainly, the political ideas entertained 
in the work provide a valuable clue. The author, whilst accepting the progressive idea that 
self-determination was an essential right of peoples and nations, reserves this right only for 
those which have reached an advanced stage of historical development. This conservative 
stance alone rules out Pestel’ as a possible author.(124) This has led Dostian to suggest the 
authorship of I. G. Burtsov(125) - a young officer in Kiselev’s General Staff, researching 
Ottoman history. On the moderate wing of the Russian revolutionary movement, Burtsov 
had refused to join Pestel” s more radical Southern Society following the break up Soiuz 
Blagodenstviia in January 1821. By way of analogy, Burtsov’s analysis of Ypsilantis’ 
revolt, may be regarded as a defence of the reformist wing of the Decembrist movement, 
who were opposed to the introduction of political rights to Russia by revolutionary means.
Whilst Dostian’s thesis has much merit it is not incontrovertible. There is evidence 
to suggest that the author was I. P. Liprandi - the Second Army’s expert on both the 
Ottoman Empire and the workings of secret societies. In 1821, Liprandi was sent to 
Moldavia to find the causes of the Ypsilantis’ revolt(126) and on his return to Russia 
organised a surveillance on Hetairists in Russia.(127). As a result, Liprandi had ample 
opportunity to gather the intelligence needed to write Obozrenie and, indeed, he wrote at 
least two known works on the 1821 revolt.(128) The opinionated tone of Obozrenie is very 
characteristic of Liprandi’s writings, as are its political overtones. Liprandi believed that 
the European revolution after 1815 (in Spain, Naples and Piedmont) were caused, not by 
popular agitation, but by the actions of a small group of conspirators (predominantly 
soldiers and veterans ‘deprived of the means of existence’).(129) Clearly in Obozrenie this 
idea is applied to the Hetairia*s revolt in the Principalities . Finally, the concluding moral 
of Obozrenie reflected Liprandi’s firm belief that a nation’s political system had to 
correspond to its level of historical development.(130)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Research into the Greek revolution was only one of the tasks that Kiselev had 
assigned to his General Staff. Kiselev was also committed to two much larger projects - the
writing of a complete history of previous Russo-Turkish wars and the making of 
preparations for a possible future one. It is to these subjects that we now turn.
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IV. THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SECOND ARMY AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN MILITARY THOUGHT, 1815-34
The main task facing the General Staffs of European armies after 1815 was to 
establish the lessons of the wars of the Napoleonic era and then determine the degree to 
which they could, or indeed should, be integrated into existing tactical and strategic 
doctrine. Potential lessons had been offered, not only by Napoleon himself, but by the 
response of other states to his aggression. In the case of Russia, the experience of its 
(largely unsuccessful) Turkish war of 1806-12, acted as a further stimulant in the quest for 
innovation in military affairs. This chapter traces the development of this process within the 
Russian army, with particular reference to the search of the Second Army for guidance in a 
future Russo-Turkish war.
The impact of the Napoleonic Wars on Russian Military Thought
The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars heralded not only the modem era 
of politics, but also that of modem warfare. Their successes served to overthrow the 
doctrines and conventions of the so-called ‘limited warfare’ of eighteenth-century 
Europe.(l) The latter arose primarily as the result of the political reforms of Louis XIV, 
who, in a quest to establish an absolute monarchy, sought to destroy the remnants of the 
feudal order and greatly increase the power and centralising ability of the state. This 
allowed for the creation of regular, standing armies, which were more disciplined and 
reliable than the feudal levies of old. Their main limitations were, however, firstly, their 
size. A standing army entailed great expense, and so it became common policy for states to 
create small, professional forces. This latter quality had however a serious drawback; for 
the time required to train and drill new recruits meant that an army, once lost, could not be 
recreated in any short space of time. As each state became conscious of its finite military 
resources, the idea that war was a practical instrument of policy gradually lost ground.
Only the brave was ready to risk war, and even then, only the foolhardy prepared to engage 
in actual combat. Seeking at all cost to avoid the ‘decisive battle’, the attacker was content 
to occupy an enemy province, the defender content to hinder this enterprise by the 
construction of fortresses on its borders. War either took the form of a succession of 
sieges, or, if this proved too troublesome, a series of manoeuvres to cut the enemy’s supply 
line. War came to resemble a game of chess in which no pieces could be taken; its main 
purpose was to assist in the negotiations of the diplomat.(2) In short, the means and ends of 
European war were said to have become ‘limited’, or in contemporary parlance 
‘civilised’. (3)
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The leading militaiy theorists of the age reflected this conservatism. H. Lloyd 
(1720-83) believed all strategy to revolve around the ability of each army to defend its 
supply lines. A. H. D. von Bulow (1757-1807) considered as paramount the position of the 
army’s base and the direction and length of its operational line. Archduke Charles of 
Austria (1771-1847) based his theory on the unchangeable nature of terrain and the need to 
occupy its strategic points. The common traits in the works of these theorists are that 
firstly, none considered the destruction of the enemy’s forces as the primary object of war; 
secondly, all believed military theory to revolve around one overriding principle or factor; 
and finally, that although ostensibly based on the study of historical experience, all sought 
to extract from it simplistic ahistorical and rational/geometric laws that existed 
independently of time and space. Moral, political, social factors were ignored, as were the 
higher strategic concerns, such as the overall object of the war.(4)
Both the theory and practice of ‘limited’ warfare were however to be swept away 
by the Wars of the French Revolution. In the same way that ‘limited’ warfare was the 
offspring of the reigning political system - monarchical absolutism, so it was that the new 
political forces of democracy and nationalism should breed their own revolutionary form of 
warfare. The defeat of Austria and Prussia and their allies by the French in 1792-99 
showed that ‘war had again suddenly become an affair of the people, and that of a people 
numbering thirty millions, every one of whom considered himself a citizen of the state’.(5)
The revolutionary idea was that universal conscription and promotion by merit 
would create a people’s army to replace the small, aristocratic, professional armies of the 
old order. War was to be fought not for the selfish interests of the monarch or the cabinet 
but for the popular and virtuous causes of republicanism and national survival. The material 
and moral strength on which the Nation at Arms could draw on ‘had no longer any definite 
limits’.(6) This was most apparent regarding the great number of men which the French 
could put in the field. Heavily out-numbering his opponent, Napoleon was able to seek the 
destruction of the enemy’s forces. For the remainder of the nineteenth-century this new 
strategic principle was to dominate military thinking.
After 1815 military thinking throughout Europe was dominated by the debate as to 
what degree the lessons of the 1792-1815 wars were to be accepted. The need for this 
debate was made particularly pressing by the fact that the major European armies of the old 
order had themselves, from 1806 onwards, been forced to adopt certain revolutionary 
principles following their defeats by Napoleon. Universal conscription was introduced in 
many states, and wars of national liberation were waged by the Prussians, Spanish and 
Russians.
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On the other hand, many wished to avoid the issue altogether. In autocratic states, 
for example, talk of universal conscription was controversial as it would de facto signify an 
end to serfdom. The appeal to the cause of nationalism was obviously impossible in the 
Habsburg Empire, and problematic for the Russian Empire. The conservative reaction after 
1815 aimed to consolidate the aristocratic domination of the officer corps and opposed the 
idea of merit as the primary factor in promotion.
Generally speaking, the conservative political climate of the years of the restoration, 
the undertakings at Vienna to preserve the European balance of power and the Holy 
Alliance’s appeal for monarchical solidarity all served to reinforce the trend away from the 
aggressive tendencies of ‘revolutionary’ warfare and initiated a reversion (of varying 
degrees) to the methods and doctrines of the period of ‘limited’ war.(7)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
In Russia the debate over the question of the Napoleonic legacy was, in official 
circles, dominated by the military theories of A. H. Jomini (1779-1869). After a number of 
years service Napoleon’s army, in 1813, Jomini joined the Russian army, having already 
secured a reputation as one of Europe’s leading theorist following the publication of his 
L 'art de la guerre (Paris, 1807). Jomini’s ideas, though ostensibly based on a historical 
study of the campaigns of Napoleon and Frederick the Great, were essentially a throw-back 
to the geometric, rationalist tradition of the early Enlightenment. His belief in the existence 
of a priori laws led him to assert that ‘from the most ancient times there has existed 
fundamental laws upon which the military art is based’, these laws were ‘dependent neither 
on the type of weapon, nor time, nor space’.(8) Jomini’s originality consisted in accepting 
that the destruction of the enemy’s forces in the field, not the capture of magazines or 
fortresses, was the primary aim of combat. To achieve this, the commander had to amass 
his troops and bring them to bear on the weakest point of the enemy’s force. Success in 
combat was dependent entirely upon direction of the operational line and the relative 
number of men on each side. This emphasis on the quantifiable concepts of mass, space 
and direction allowed Jomini to slip back into the rationalist tradition and construct various 
geometric models for the correct procedure of combat.(9)
Jomini’s theory dominated the official military doctrine of the Russian army and its 
General Staffs.(lO) In an 1810 edition of the leading military publication Voennyi zhumal, 
it was said of Jomini’s work:
This is the only theory; if one acts against its rules one cannot expect
success other than by blind luck; great commanders have always
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followed it...There is no work that...could be of more use to a man
preparing himself to take a command.(ll)
As already alluded to, the reasons for the wholesale adoption of Jomini’s theory are 
to be found in the very narrowness of the latter’s ideas themselves. As Jomini sought only 
mathematically demonstrable eternal laws, his ideas related only to combat; the higher, less 
tangible realm of strategy was almost entirely ignored. In adopting Jomini’s belief in the 
primacy of tactics the Russian military establishment could, with justification, continue its 
Gatchina tradition of strict formations, blind obedience and perfecting drill, as these were 
the very qualities required to execute Jomini’s geometric models in actual battle. This type 
of fighting suited smaller, professional units, and therefore avoided the need to discuss 
controversial issues such as universal conscription or the use of ‘populist’ causes in war 
such as national pride or religion. Since success was dependent upon executing 
predetermined rules, the human factor in war could be reduced to a minimum. This avoided 
the need for initiative, which was considered the first step towards ‘freethinking’.(12) The 
absence of strategic factors, such as the political object of the war, in the latter’s theory, 
likewise suited the autocratic state, for, in theory at least, it limited the army’s influence to 
combat and not politics, which remained the preserve of the Tsar.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The opposition to the official doctrines of the Russian army came predominantly 
from the future Decembrists and their fellow travellers. In contrast to many ‘progressives’ 
in other European states, the military ideas of the Decembrists were not, however, simply a 
repetition of those of the French revolutionaries. Although many revolutionary ideas were 
adopted, the Decembrists were never prone to the ‘Cult of Napoleon’ that was prominent in 
Europe at that time. The most important reason for this was the upsurge in nationalist 
sentiment following Russia’s defeat of Napoleon in 1812. This victory inspired new 
writings on Russian military history which sought to glorify all things Russian. A. V. 
Suvorov and M. I. Kutuzov were said to have been greater commanders than by Napoleon, 
and that they had invented the latter’s tactical innovations.(13) Consequently Jomini was 
criticised, not only for the admittedly narrow basis of his work, but also for basing his 
theories on a study of foreign commanders - Frederick and Napoleon, and not on Russia’s 
military heroes.
The new nationalist trend in Russian historical writings is primarily associated with 
F. N. Glinka.(14) In a string of works written after 1815, Glinka attacked the view 
prevalent in Europe that Russia had not deserved its victory in 1812 and that in general her
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military history was not worthy of attention. Russia needed historians who were Russian
‘by birth, actions, upbringing, will and spirit’ since ‘a foreigner with all his good will cannot
know Russian history so well as to immerse himself in the spirit of the great forbears of the
Russians’.(15) Glinka, in tracing Russia’s successes against the Tatars, the Swedes and
Napoleon, permeated his works with the idea of that ‘national’ or ‘popular’ spirit was the
prime factor in victory:
O people of courage, people of renown. Preserve for ever the purity of 
morals, the greatness of spirit, the passionate love of your cold 
motherland, be forever Russian and you will be, as you were, first 
amongst peoples. Centuries will pass...and a new force of all the 
peoples of the earth will founder upon your strength - a wall which 
nothing can penetrate.(16)
When Glinka became editor of the official military journal Voennyi zhumal in 1817
he encouraged the publication of military histories of wars from the days of antiquity up to
Napoleonic period. Perhaps Glinka’s most important decision, however, was to allow the
publication of I. G. Burtsov’s article ‘Mysl’ o teorii voennykh znanii’ [A Thought on the
Theory of Military Knowlege], which was openly anti-Jomini.
Burtsov attacked the scholastic traditions of eighteenth-century military strategy
that were so noticeable in Jomini’s ideas. Empiricism was held to be the only true
approach to the ‘science’ [nauka\ of war, or indeed, of any other subject:
Experience precedes reasoning in man...he observes the objects of his 
surroundings and using the fight of reason discovers their qualities...the 
uniting of [these] concepts forms knowledge, and their exposition in a 
systematic order forms science.(17)
Burtsov then criticised Jomini’s belief that the study of tactics alone was sufficient for the
creation of military science and the training of prospective commandeers:
The reasoning of people who maintain that after the works of Jomini 
there is nothing left to be decided in military science is entirely 
false...For the complete training of the commander military knowledge 
alone is insufficient; all the political sciences which have a bearing on 
national security...and, on the other side, all the moral [nravstvennye] 
factors which command the human heart, must be included in the 
structure of a general expansive theory.(18)
Burtsov’s ideas certainly owed their origin to a study of the Napoleonic wars. 
However, in contrast to Jomini, who dissected from these campaigns only tactical 
innovations, Burtsov understood the strategic significance of Napoleon’s unification of 
political and military command, as well as the importance of ‘moral’ forces, as exhibited in 
the wars of national liberation waged most notably by the Spanish and the Russian people.
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It was against the background of this debate that Kiselev began considering his
project for the writing of the histories of previous Russo-Turkish wars. The exact
circumstances surrounding the origins of this venture are not entirely clear(19); it is
probable however that Kiselev was influenced by the call of Glinka for works on Russian
military history and later, by Burtsov’s complaint that:
The writing up of campaigns, which forms the main activity of 
contemporaiy military writers, although having an influence on the 
general theory of war, this influence is mediocre, weak and practically 
useless. It is useless because these writers...merely repeat the rules 
which have already been clearly forwarded in the writings of Jomini and 
Archduke Charles.(20)
Burtsov’s criticism was directed primarily at the Russian army’s official military 
historian D. P. Buturlin.(21) As a leading member of the pro-Jomini General Staff of
H.LM. (and subsequently, of the First Army), Buturlin attempted in his writings to apply the 
Jomini’s principles to previous Russian wars.(22) The result was a turgid collection of facts 
and figures relating exclusively to battle. Analysis of the political object of the war, the 
topography of the theatre and intelligence on the forces, tactics and strategy of the Turks 
was almost entirely absent. Kiselev’s plan was essentially to rectify this type of military 
history through the adoption of the empirical approach advocated by Burtsov.
Kiselev and the Development of the Empirical School
Kiselev began preparations for his project immediately upon his appointment to
head of the General Staff of the Second Army in 1819. Archives were to be searched for
materials ‘which could serve as guidance in case of the opening of military action against
the Turks’.(23) Thus Kiselev’s study, though historically based, was intended for didactic
and not purely theoretical or academic purposes. Writing to A. A. Zakrevskii in 1819 he
developed his proposition further:(24)
Previous action ought to serve as instruction for the future: from this the 
observer can deduce the reasons for success and failure...and will adopt 
sure principles for his own guidance.
The empirical approach was needed as ‘theory cannot accommodate the multitude of 
individual factors which can be known solely by the attentive observation of events and 
places’. A co-ordinated project was needed to gather the relevant documents as they were 
‘scattered in different places and in a disorderly fashion mixed up with a huge number of 
insignificant documents’.
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Specifically, Kiselev sought material on Russia’s Turkish campaigns, 1711-1812, 
relating to four issues. Firstly, a detailed description of the ‘material sphere’ of Turkish 
wars was needed, that is, an account of the Russian army’s supply and magazine network, 
the construction and placement of artillery depots, hospitals, bridges and the use of the 
Danubian Principalities as administrative and supply centres. Secondly, a topographical 
description of the Balkan theatre was to establish the location of waterways, roads, river 
crossings, Turkish fortresses, mountain passes (25) as well as the effects of the local climate 
on health of Russian troops. Thirdly, a survey of the various war plans offered by Russian 
generals and an assessment of the degree to which they were appropriate and successfully 
executed.(26)
Finally, and somewhat controversially, Kiselev was keen to establish the various
political objects of Russia’s Turkish wars. He attributed Russia’s generally mediocre
successes against the Porte to the fact that the political object was often unclearly defined
and had little bearing on the formulation and execution of war plans. Kiselev clearly
understood the significance of politics for a coherent military strategy and approached the
Clausewitzian ideal that ‘state policy was the womb in which War is developed’.(27) His
idea was controversial in so far as it could be seen to imply the interference of the military
in a question traditionally reserved for the Tsar and his foreign policy advisers.(28) Kiselev
outlined his ideas thus: Russia had to decide whether its object in a Turkish war was the
‘expulsion of the Turks from Europe or the acquisition of specific, particular gains at the
conclusion of peace’. The war’s political object was to determine the means by, and the
manner in which, the war was to be fought:
The first proposition cannot be fulfilled without the mediation of other 
powers and the use of extensive material means [two acting armies, a 
fleet, supplies for two campaigns, strong reserves in Europe and Asia].
The second demands the development of less resources, but requires 
greater surprise and speed so as to act on the spirit [dukh] of the enemy, 
to force by fear that which the usual methodical action cannot achieve.
Therefore in the first case all must be subordinated to the material 
factor, in the second, all to the moral [nravstvennyi] factor; but in both 
cases, the wisest use of the resources given by the government is an 
essential condition, without which success cannot be expected.(29)
Kiselev then reiterated a view that had been gaining currency since the end of the 
1806-12 Turkish war, namely, that the ignorance of the Balkan theatre meant that Russia’s 
victories against the Turks came at a huge economic cost which was not recouped in the 
eventual peace treaty. (30) By way of example Kiselev gave a brief outline of the last 
Turkish war.(31) This example was particularly apt as Russia’s political objects during this
i
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war vacillated wildly between 1806 and 1812, ranging from a possible partition of the 
Ottoman domains in Europe with France, to a unilateral annexation of Bessarabia and the 
Principalities, to a state of affairs whereby in 1811 Russia was content to sign peace on 
almost any terms. The absence of a consistent and coherent war aim in this period had a 
disastrous effect on the formulation and execution of Russian war plans.
In his review Kiselev pointed to numerous instances of spumed chances to defeat 
the main Turkish forces. The first reason for this was that the strategies adopted by the 
Russian generals did not conform to the object of the war. When, for example, in 1810 
Russia’s political situation demanded that the Porte be quickly forced to the negotiating 
table her generals continued to fight a slow, methodical war of siege warfare, so causing the 
military stalemate to drag for two more years.(32) The second reason was attributed to the 
slow movement of the Russian army caused by deficiencies in the ‘material factor’, such as 
delays in building bridges, the lack of artillery and supply problems. Although a greater 
number of men were used against Turkey than ever before, the insufficient measures taken 
against disease caused the army to remain undermanned.(33) By the eventual Treaty of 
Bucharest 1812 Russia gained only Bessarabia in Europe which was ‘scant reward for the 
great sacrifices made during the six years of war’.(34)
Thus one of the primary motives behind Kiselev’s project was to address and then 
rectify the fact that Russia, despite its victories, gained little from Turkish wars, since she, 
firstly, did not have a clear idea of the political object of the war and, secondly, failed to 
learn the lessons of previous wars by paying insufficient attention to the theatre of war.
What was needed therefore was not some all embracing abstract theory such as Jomini’s 
but detailed specific empirical knowledge.
On beginning his project Kiselev sought the opinion of other high-ranking officials 
of the Tsarist establishment. Diebitsch and E. F. Kankrin both agreed with the proposal. 
Buturlin found it to be ‘fort utile et fort interessant’.(35) Nesselrode was sufficiently 
impressed to grant Kiselev’s request to use the Foreign Ministry’s archives.(36) Aside from 
this source, materials were collected up to 1824 in archives of the General Staff of H.I.M., 
the Chancellery of the General-Quartermaster, the Department of the Inspectorate and the 
Military-Topographical Department. Many valuable documents were also found in the 
Bessarabian fortress of Izmail.(37)
The search for material did not, however, proceed without difficulty. The main 
source of resistance came from Baron K. F. Toll and the Quartermaster Staffs (of the 
General Staffs of H.I.M. and the First Army), who were suspicious of Kiselev’s intentions.
90
The principles of the Kiselev’s project were so divergent from the maxims of Jomini that it
was seen as a threat to the latter’s institutional wisdom. Toll believed that his staffs had a
monopoly on all strategic innovation and viewed Kiselev’s General Staff as overly
independent and thus a potential rival.(38)
Toll thus ensured that his Quartermaster Staff refused to send Kiselev certain
requested documents on the rather tenuous argument that ‘in the case of an enquiry [from
another source] we ourselves will be left with nothing’, and claimed its department was too
overworked to make copies for him.(39) Kiselev was requested to send his own aides to
make the relevant copies, though it was not until 1822 that they were admitted into the
archives.(40) In granting this concession, Toll was nevertheless quick to voice the opinion
that the proposed research was unlikely to yield any significant results. Topographical
information on the Balkan theatre was said to be already provided in the maps of his own
Quartermaster Staff, whilst the military history of the Turkish wars had already been studied
in Buturlin’s Istoriia pokhodov Rossiian v XVIII stoletii [History of the Campaigns of the
Russians in the 18th Century] and the recently completed Opiscmie vsekh pokhodov protiv
Porty Ottomanskoi s 1769po 1812 [An Account of all the Campaigns against the Ottoman
Porte from 1769 to 1812]. Toll considered that:
These works deserve the attention of all military men, for, without 
burdening the reader with the details of unimportant events, gives him a 
full understanding of the course of each campaign...moreover, the 
writer’s analysis clearly uncovers all the mistakes made during each 
campaign, so making the work most instructive.(41)
Clearly, Toll did not understand (or rather, did not want to understand) the idea 
behind Kiselev’s project. Buturlin’s works concentrated entirely on battles - the 
‘unimportant events’ which he omitted included the construction of the army’s supply 
system, the crossing of rivers, the administration of the Principalities and so forth. All of 
these factors were in fact more important to the outcome of Russo-Turkish wars than battle 
since, in the field, Russian forces were almost assured of defeating the Turks without great 
difficulty.
The project faced other problems The files of some archives were in total disorder 
and had to be sorted by Kiselev’s aides themselves.(42) By 1822 the lack of funding for the 
project began to make itself felt.(43) As a result, not all the necessary documents were 
gathered.(44)
Occupied with his many other duties, Kiselev delegated almost all the tasks 
connected with the research and writing of the project to certain staff officers, almost all of
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whom were either members of, or close to Decembrist circles.(45) Pestel’ was assigned the 
task of buying relevant books and maps in St Petersburg during his visit there in the winter 
of 1819-20.(46) Burtsov was commissioned to write the chapters concerning the 1806-12 
Turkish war and supervised the collection of materials.(47) The progressively minded N.
V. Petrov wrote up the wars of Catherine II and was the overall editor of the project.(48)
The project was finally completed towards the end of 1827.(49) It consisted of five 
parts:(50) (i) the campaigns of Peter I (1711)(51) and Anne I (1736-39)(52); (ii) the first 
Turkish war of Catherine II (1769-74)(53); (iii) the second Turkish war of Catherine II 
(1787-91)(54); (iv) campaigns of Alexander I (1806-12)(55); (iv) Obozrenie material ’nykh 
sposobov turetskoi voiny [A Review of the material resources of Turkish wars].(56)
As regards the content of the study, it is clear that Kiselev himself was somewhat 
disappointed with the fruit of his labours. Due to the unavailability of certain documentary 
collections and the lack of resources assigned to the project he did not consider the 
information given in the study either ‘complete or sufficient’.(57) It could be argued that 
the study was actually too factual, at the expense of analysis and a theoretical oversight. 
Though to a degree warranted, such a criticism misunderstands the principle behind the 
work. Kiselev was interested in neither military theory nor military history in the academic 
sense. Unlike many of his contemporaries he sought neither to construct an all-embracing 
strategic theory, nor glorify the exploits of his predecessors. As a practical man, making 
preparations for a Turkish war, he was interested in solving the concrete problems Russia 
had encountered in previous wars. As a result, the study’s emphasis on issues such as the 
location of Balkan mountain passes, or the best place to cross the Danube, or the supply 
system used by Suvorov, whilst of great use to the commanders of the Second Army, were 
and are of far less interest to anyone else, including the present-day reader. This is not to 
say, however, that the project did not have wider implications for the Russian military 
establishment, for it did. Kiselev did draw certain conclusions regarding Russia’s previous 
Turkish wars which he hoped to use in his quest to increase the power and independence of 
the Second Army’s General Staff. Before outlining Kiselev’s ideas on this question we turn 
to the pioneering work of I. P. Liprandi which ran parallel to that of Kiselev’s.
The Military Ideas of I. P. Liprandi
Pushkin’s rhetorical question ‘who and where is Liprandi?’ succinctly expressed the 
enigmatic status that our subject had acquired in contemporary Russian public life. Though 
vilified by Herzen and the liberal intelligentsia for his anti-revolutionary espionage work, an
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uneasy doubt nevertheless remained that one was dealing with no mere grey and faceless 
Tsarist yes-man. Historian, publicist, soldier, strategist, spy - there seemed no end to the 
talents of this freethinking reactionary.
Liprandi’s abilities first came to the attention of the militaiy command during the 
Russian army’s occupation of France. Its commander, M. S. Vorontsov, employed 
Liprandi’s services between 1815 and 1819 to study the techniques of Napoleon’s secret 
police as well as making him head of the Russian military police.(58) Following the return 
of these forces to Russia, Liprandi was transferred to the Second Army, and began service 
in the cradle of the Southern Decembrists - M. F. Orlov’s 16th Infantry Division. There he 
began mixing with the local elite of Kishinev and regularly attended the meetings of 
Decembrists at Orlov’s house. The question of his political affiliations at this stage have 
raised some controversy, and Liprandi has been cited as being both a Decembrist(59) and a 
Tsarist agent.(60)
The evidence seems to suggest that, from 1815, Liprandi was certainly a secret
agent but that during the 1820s he was concerned primarily with external espionage and the
gathering of intelligence on the Ottoman Empire.(61) His movement in Decembrist circles
was probably not connected with his espionage activities; he was simply drawn to their
discussion of modem, enlightened ideas. Though a firm believer in Tsarism, Liprandi was
always keen to adopt ‘progressive’ ideas if they could be used to strengthen the Russian
army and state. This apparent contradiction is clearly revealed in his ideas on the tasks of
the secret military police. Liprandi was convinced by his experience of the Napoleonic
Wars of the primacy of psychological and moral motives in explaining human behaviour.
His favourite and oft-repeated phrase was that ‘spirit [dukh] forms the soul of an army’.(62)
He believed that in a well-managed army with good commanders and a esprit de corps
there was no need for a secret police. But in an army in which:
...every soldier sees himself as the last member of his nation 
[otechestvo]...In an army where the officer is a nobody, unprotected 
from private and personal persecution and where the high command is 
arrogant, unapproachable and deaf to his complaints - in such an army 
not only the body dies, but also the vigour of spirit that is the first 
quality of any military man.(63)
The standing of the army in the nation at large was also of great importance. In Austria, for 
example, ‘the soldier is utterly despised by the people and as such is deprived totally of 
spirit...This Empire owes its existence solely to [the workings of] its police’.(64) Such 
views were hardly those of a traditional reactionary and they implied the same criticism of 
the harsh discipline of Russian army as had been levelled by Kiselev.
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For the Tsarist authorities, more controversial still were Liprandi’s views on the 
merits of irregular warfare and his representation of the partisan as a model soldier.(65)
The latter had been impressed by the fighting spirit of partisans, as exhibited during the 
Napoleonic wars. Liprandi researched into the history of irregular warfare and concluded 
that the popular anti-Napoleonic uprisings of 1812*13 constituted the ‘formation of a true 
strategic partisan war’ which finally ‘appeared in its full glory as an idea and as a 
science\{66) Liprandi believed that Europe’s greatest modem army was defeated primarily 
by partisan warfare and not the strategy and tactics of the allied regular armies. As he put 
it:
...neither the numerical strength nor the organisation of his [Napoleon’s] 
army, neither the ability of his commanders nor his own genius was 
powerful enough to strangle the hydra of a peoples’ war that constantly 
renewed itself.(67)
These partisans exhibited exactly the type of martial spirit that Liprandi believed all
successful armies required:
Blind executors of commands have a respectable place in the line, but 
the individual partisan, who is often in action away from the eyes of the 
commander, ought to have completely different qualities: an enterprising 
spirit, courage, and a passion for service ought to animate each of them.
It is not sufficient for him [the partisan] to execute orders only in such a 
way as to avoid being called into account [for his actions].(68)
Again the influence of Kiselev and the Second Army’s quest for humanising military service 
are felt in these words.
It was, however, Liprandi’s knowledge of the Ottoman Empire and its armed forces 
that primarily attracted the interest of the military authorities in St Petersburg. In 1832 the 
Nicholas Military Academy was established and the Tsar was receptive to any new military 
ideas which could potentially be used as a part of the training programme for the next 
generation of General Staff officers. In April of that year, the Academy’s President, Grand 
Duke Michael commissioned Liprandi to systemise his research into the Ottoman Empire in 
an accessible written form, under the working title Kharakteristicheskie svoistva i 
politicheslie mneniia turetskikh voisk [The Characteristics and Political Outlook of the 
Turkish Military Forces].(69) The original idea for such a work was Liprandi’s, who, in his 
own words, had some years earlier began making preparations for it as a ‘private 
individual’.(70) It seems certain, however, that Liprandi concurred with Kiselev on this 
matter in order that their two separate studies would complement each other. Liprandi was 
certainly keen to acknowledge his debt to Kiselev, who acted as his patron and intellectual 
mentor. Liprandi wrote of his own work:
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This important enterprise...could not, of course, with the exception of 
your Excellency, have been successfully completed by anyone else. As 
long ago as 1820, whilst in the middle of countless tasks, you laid the 
first foundation in Russia for the acquisition and collection of 
topographical and military intelligence on the Eastern [Ottoman] 
Empire.(71)
Liprandi even proposed adding his study to Kiselev’s own study as ‘no one more than your
Excellency has a greater right to my works’.(72)
By 1834, Liprandi’s impressive study was completed. It was entitled Opyt
slovoistolkovatelia Ottomanskoi imperii... and, as an aid to clarity, took the form of an
encyclopaedia.(73) The tasks of the work were to give a historical analysis of the influence
of religious, political and psychological factors on the mentality of the various ethnic groups
that comprised the Ottoman armed forces. Especial emphasis was given to the traditional
influence of the Koran on the Ottoman martial spirit.(74)
Although Liprandi’s study, much like Kiselev’s, essentially was comprised of a
collection of empirical facts on the Ottoman Empire, the former used his material to present
a new concept of strategy. Liprandi introduced his strategic ideas by first criticising the
work of Jomini, as had now become obligatory for the officers of the Second Army. The
belief in the latter’s ‘mathematical strategy’ (as Liprandi put it) was so widespread that in
case of war it was considered sufficient merely ‘to apply it to the current circumstances’:
There is [however] another theory, which has nowhere been expounded, 
and without which all the advantages of lofty strategic considerations 
and precise tactical calculations are rendered worthless.(75)
This new theory essentially revolved around the detailed study of one’s prospective enemy.
A psychological profile of the enemy’s mental strengths and especially weaknesses were to
be constructed and, in time of war, exploited for one’s own ends. Liprandi argued that this
idea had first been expressed in the Old Testament and the Iliad, and used in practice by the
Romans and the Greeks. The latter are said to have understood the concept of strategy as
meaning voennye khitrosti [lit. ‘military cunningness’], which in fact largely corresponds to
the idea of ‘stratagem’.(76) Alexander, Hannibal and Julius Caesar were all said to have
based their warfare on a detailed study of the weaknesses of their foes.
As regards contemporary warfare, Liprandi believed the key to understanding an
enemy’s army was to first study the ethnic, regional and national make-up of its troops, and
then the corresponding military characteristics of each:
Each European army is composed from peoples of different regions, 
different origins, morals, habits, spirit and so forth. That which 
frightens some, excites courage in others; the means successfully used
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against an army of one region cannot be used against an army from 
another.(77)
Some nationalities for instance have an oversensitive fear of artillery, others take no notice,
though will ‘rout at the whistle of a single bullet’.(78) It was therefore the character of the
enemy that was to determine strategic principles:
The qualities of character and political ideas of differing peoples and 
their armies form the main foundation of military science. It is only 
upon this foundation that strategic ideas can be based.(79)
Liprandi certainly wrote from experience. Having seen active service in Europe, 1807-15,
and the Ottoman Empire, 1828-29, Liprandi had fought with and against a whole array of
different nationalities. He was most impressed by the defeat of Napoleon by the Spanish
and Russian partisans. This was seen as a victory of the force of the national character and
spirit over impersonal tactical mastery.(80) The 1828-29 war was also a formative
experience for Liprandi, as he was assigned the task of recruiting Balkan partisans. As
these included Serbs, Bulgars, Albanians, Greeks, Moldavians and Wallachians he was able
at close quarters to observe their respective ‘national’ idiosyncrasies. On a more abstract
level, Liprandi was possibly also influenced by the contemporary Romantic idea of the
existence of ‘national genius’, which expressed itself in all modes of thought and action.
Knowledge of one’s enemy was held to be especially important with regard to the
forces of the Ottoman Empire:
The most experienced and skilful commander of wars against the French 
will at every step be dumbfounded when up against the Turk; he will be 
stopped by trifling obstacles, upset by movements which, in his opinion, 
are incorrect, and so forth.(81)
It was therefore the insufficient knowledge of the workings of the Turk’s mind that
accounted for Russia’s traditional difficulty in defeating quickly an enemy that was for
inferior to Russia in terms of tactical ability and firepower. It was precisely this failure that
Liprandi aimed to rectify this by his study.
His main hypothesis regarding the defining characteristic of the Turkish mind was
its domination by a religious world-view:
Turks of the fifteenth century are barely indistinguishable from present- 
day Turks. The Koran serves them not only as their law, but as their 
primary ecclesiastical, civil and military code.(82)
Thus despite the abolition of the Janissaries in 1826(83) and the subsequent creation of 
regular troop battalions on the European model, Liprandi believed that religious dogma,
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mysticism and superstition, not rational thought, dominated the mind and world view of the
Turk. The power of omen was said to be particularly strong:
The least significant event or circumstance - dreams, the flight of 
birds...the howl of dogs or wolves, the call of an owl, the crossing of 
one’s path by a hare or a fox...an eclipse of the moon or the sun, the 
shapes of cloud formations and an infinite number of other such 
examples can have a favourable effect, but, for the most part, the 
reverse is true. [The latter] once noticed by just one of their numerous 
units...is, in an instant, passed on through all the ranks...then at the 
appearance of the slightest obstacle or danger this fatal omen creates a 
general panic.(84)
A high-ranking Turkish officer had told Liprandi that the Turkish army arrived at Kulevcha 
for the fateful battle of June 1829 in the knowledge that it was doomed to defeat. The 
omens for this were, firstly, that the Grand Vizier had mounted a black horse which had 
white patches on its legs in the shape of a cross, and secondly, on their march to battle the 
army had passed two stray cart-horses from the baggage trail of another commander. 
Knowing well this Turkish idiosyncrasy, the Greeks and Serbs during their wars of 
independence would litter their enemy’s path with purposely-designed ‘bad omens’.(85)
The Turks believed that victory was achieved neither by the superiority of their 
forces, their courage, nor the skill of their commander. The will of God alone granted 
victory, and as a result, the Ottomans had no great respect for even the most successful of 
their commanders. Defeat, however, was always blamed on the commander. Should that 
commander be the Grand Vizier then all his army would be routed, and could not be 
regathered until the following April. (86)
Providence also determined the fate of each individual Turk in battle. It was 
believed that:
Every man has [written] on his forehead the precise minute of his death: 
this accounts for the fact that Turks wear neither armour nor helmets nor 
anything that could protect themselves from the blows of their 
enemy.(87)
This being the case, Liprandi was interested as to why this fatalism did not render the Turks
as brave and effective in the field as they famously were under siege. He discovered a great
number of factors at play. Bravery in the field was limited to certain number of fanatics; the
rest of the troops ‘serve as mere decoration’.(88) It was thus important to attack and
destroy these elements first. The Ottoman rank and file drew their courage from the results
of their first encounter with specific enemy units:
Defeat during the first engagement with the enemy has an influence on 
all peoples, but on the Muslim this influence is inexplicable. Turks are
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completely convinced that if, during the first encounter,...they deliver 
the first blow then their victory is assured.(89)
In the 1828 Turkish campaign, the significant encounter occurred between the 3rd Hussars 
Division and Turkish forces at Kozludzhi. The Turks won, and from this time on attacked 
this division without fear or remorse. Liprandi found a solution to this in the actions of 
General A. L. Voinov during the 1806-12 war. The latter ordered his strongest regiments to 
don the uniforms of previously defeated units, so as to entice the usually conservative 
Turkish forces into battle.(90)
During battle itself it was important to exploit other Turkish idiosyncrasies. On 
approaching the field of battle, it was important to create as much noise at possible; the 
sound of marching, drums, whistling shells could in itself induce a Turkish rout.(91) The 
Turks paid almost no attention to gathering intelligence of enemy movements. This was due 
to the custom whereby Turkish spies were not punished for failing to inform their 
commander of the nearby presence of enemy troops or their preparation for an impending 
attack. This was merely taken as a lack of ability; misinformation, however, was 
immediately punishable by death. As a result, Turkish spies were very cautious about 
supplying any information at all (92) It was thus relatively simple to outmanoeuvre Turkish 
forces, or, as Baron P. K. Geismar had shown at the battle of Boeleshti in 1828, to attack 
Turkish encampments at night.(93)
When attacking, Liprandi considered it paramount to direct one’s forces against the 
Turkish infantry. Turkish cavalry was considerably superior to Russian in both terms of 
manoeuvrability and sharpshooting.(94) It weakness was it always acted independently and 
never assisted its infantry, due to the fear that should the latter be routed they would turn on 
their own cavalry in order to use their horses as a means of escape.(95) Turkish infantry 
would almost certainly be routed if attacked in the rear; their inability to retreat in an 
orderly fashion meant that such a rout would result in its complete destruction. An 
interesting ploy in this respect could be learned from the Greeks and Serbs who, during 
battle, would shout in Turkish ‘the infidels are attacking the rear’. This was a traditional 
Turkish war ciy and served as a signal for a certain panic-stricken flight. (96). Another 
cunning ruse was to attack the Ottoman musicians since, from the time of the Jannissaries, 
Turkish forces were prone to rout if their battle music for any reason ceased. (97)
As regards the Turks noted ability to resist sieges, Liprandi discovered that fortress 
garrisons, when surrounded with no chance of escape, showed unparalleled bravery. Often 
unable or unwilling to risk a storm, the Russian army had traditionally allowed its sieges to
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develop into prolonged blockades in an attempt to starve out the Turkish garrisons.
Liprandi considered this a great folly as, in contrast to the widely-held view, he discovered
that the Turkish army and its fortresses were always extremely well supplied. The reason
for this was to be found in the Turks’ unscrupulous attitude towards procuring requisitions
from its civilian population:
In general, the means used by the Turks with regard to [securing] food 
supplies are in complete contrast to those used by enlightened European 
states. This military power [the Ottoman Empire], not yet possessing 
solid civilian foundations, does not pay any great attention to the well­
being of the population, especially in its European Christian provinces.
Therefore, in time of war, it invariably places at its disposal all the 
property of the inhabitants in the theatre of war, caring little of famine 
or of the exhaustion of the peasantry.(98)
Liprandi believed that the only solution to the problem of besieging Turkish fortresses was 
either to not conduct sieges at all or, if a siege were vital, to leave one route of escape open, 
as the Turks would not be able to resist taking it.(99)
Liprandi’s analysis may be read as an indictment on Russia’s traditional means of 
warfare against the Turks. The methodical war plans of the past, with their emphasis on the 
slow and predictable movement of troops to increase the area of the operational base and 
siege warfare suited the mentality of the Turks. The latter were extremely resilient under 
siege, and took the methodical movements of regular troops as a sign of passivity and 
uncertainty on the part of the enemy.(lOO). Liprandi believed that the Turk’s morale and 
will to fight could be far more easily defeated by any quick, unexpected, movement and by 
attacking the Turks in the field whenever possible.(lOl).
Although Liprandi possibly exaggerated the importance of the specific effects of 
particular ruses on the Turks, his general aim of seeking to understand the mind of the 
enemy was certainly important and innovative. No less significant was his research into the 
ethnic breakdown of Ottoman forces.
Liprandi believed that the best trained Ottoman troops were to be found in the 
Sultan’s European provinces. The latter had traditionally provided the Porte with its 
standing army(102); whilst Africa and Asia provided volunteer forces in time of war.
Added to the fact that European Turkey contained many ‘military settlements’ [voennye 
poseleniia] it was clear that ‘war in European Turkey is incomparably more difficult than in 
Asiatic [Turkey]’.(103)
The most important source of infantry in Europe was ‘Albania’.(104) Liprandi 
considered Albanians to be ‘the best irregular infantry in the world’ as they were excellent
shots, able when outnumbered to disperse and then regather and, generally, because of their 
natural predilection for ‘barbaric cruelty combined with cunning’. As a result they were in 
high demand, and hired out their services to Egyptians, Serbs and the Hospodars of the 
Principalities. Their mercenary status, however, proved to be their weakness, for, in 
Liprandi’s words, the adage ‘no money, no Albanians’ was a constant source of concern to 
their employers. Ypsilantis, for instance, was said to have ‘based all his hopes’ on having 
enough funds to hire them. The Sultan’s financial difficulties, as well as his political dispute 
with the largely autonomous Albanian Pashas meant that during the 1828-29 war only 7,000 
Albanians served in the Ottoman army. The other weaknesses of the Albanians were their 
unreliability, a proneness to bribery, an inability to fight outside forests or mountains and 
their excessive fear of artillery.(105)
The best cavalry available to the Sultan was found in Bosnia.(106) The Bosnian 
cavalry comprised Turks who, in former times, had played an important role in the 
expansion of the Sultan’s domains into Europe. In return for their service they were given 
lands in Bosnia and in other provincial outposts of Ottoman Europe. Although outstanding 
cavalrymen, Liprandi believed that their utility had declined in recent years. Their 
transformation from warrior caste to landed aristocracy had, since the middle of the 
eighteenth century, eroded both their martial spirit and loyalty to the Sultan. Their 
increasingly strained relations with the Porte meant that they played almost no part in the 
1828-29 war. As a result of the Serbian and Greek revolutions the caste was deprived of 
most of its estates, after which its importance declined rapidly.(107)
Since the greatest weakness of the best Ottoman troops (the Albanians, Bosnians 
and Janissaries) was their unreliability in time of war, Liprandi believed that the Sultan’s 
military reforms and the creation of a regular standing anny would be very beneficial to the 
Porte:
The formation of a [regular] Turkish army promises many successes.
Their skill in the use of firearms, their innate individual bravery, their 
religious fanaticism...their half-savage morals and love of freedom, once 
combined with organisation and regulation, could soon make them one 
of the finest armies in all Europe.(108)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The conclusion Kiselev reached, as a result of his both his own and Liprandi’s 
work, was that Russia, in each of its previous Turkish wars, had expended far too much 
time, resources and men to defeat an essentially inferior enemy. As a result the benefits 
accrued at the peace negotiations were often negligible compared to the losses incurred by
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Russia during the course of the war. The reasons for this were twofold; firstly, due to the 
lack of knowledge regarding the theatre and forces of the Ottoman Empire; secondly, due to 
the failure to co-ordinate military strategy with the political object of the war.
Kiselev, using in particular the example of the 1806-12 war, argued that these evils 
could only be rectified by an institutional restructuring of the Russian army. The great 
power assigned to the five successive Commanders-in-Chiefs used during the latter war 
meant that no continuity in the conduct of the war was established and that success or 
failure depended solely upon the ability, as well as the whims and caprice, of individual 
commanders. Aside from a few notable exceptions, such as M. I. Kutuzov, these 
commanders had no real experience of the theatre of war or the enemy and acted as if they 
were fighting a regular European army. They had shown insufficient knowledge of the 
scarcity of supplies in the Balkans, the effects of the local climate on the health of the 
troops, and underestimated both the region’s natural geographical barriers and the extreme 
difficulty in besieging Turkish fortresses. (109)
The remedy Kiselev proposed was, as Toll had feared, to establish the Second 
Army’s General Staff as the supreme co-ordinating institution for Turkish wars. The latter 
was to be given autonomy in the gathering of intelligence on the Ottoman Empire and then 
in the formulation and execution of Turkish war plans. Since the early 1820s, Kiselev had 
already begun preparing his General Staff for this new role. His idea was well expressed by 
Liprandi:
In Russia there must exist for each enemy special tactics and a special 
institution which has precise and complete knowledge of the theatre, 
character, habits, means of existence and type of forces [of the 
enemy].(110)
In other words, the study of each potential enemy was to be institutionalised. Thus one of 
the main motives behind Kiselev’s and Liprandi’s projects was to establish the study of 
the Ottoman Empire as the institutional responsibility of the Second Army. Once 
established in this role, the next step for Kiselev’s General Staff was to monopolise the 
formulation and execution of Turkish war plans. The former was achieved through 
Kiselev’s correspondence with Diebitsch (who was close to both Alexander I and Nicholas 
I) .( lll)  Executing a war plan proved to be more problematic, for this was undoubtedly the 
preserve of the Commander-in-Chief. Thus, during the 1820s Kiselev introduced two 
important measures designed to limit to independence of the C.-in-C. and make him more 
dependent upon his General Staff. The first measure concerned tactical doctrine. Kiselev 
was concerned that the army had no specific battle formations to counter the Turkish tactics
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of attacking with large numbers of irregular cavalry. In previous wars, each individual C.- 
in-C. had adopted his own tactics which in Kiselev’s opinion were ‘often erroneous’.(112) 
Based on their study of previous Russo-Turkish wars, Kiselev’s General Staff established 
new formations and these, as noted, were eventually adopted by the Second Army and 
practised in manoeuvres in 1826 and 1827. The second measure was the aforementioned 
1824 reform of the chain of command between the C.-in-C. and the General Staff. The 
reform, in effect, prevented the C.-in-C. from issuing orders directly to the individual 
branches of the General Staff. All orders now had to be directed to the head of the General 
Staff, so greatly increasing the latter’s role and the autonomy of his institution as a 
whole.(113)
Whilst Kiselev achieved a great deal in the first half of the 1820s his plans for his 
General Staff were threatened by the accession of Nicholas I. The new Tsar was, by 
nature, a great centraliser and in 1826 he established a committee to consider proposals for 
establishing a new institution which was to standardise official military doctrine and the 
teaching of tactics and strategy. Jomini’s proposals for the establishment of a central school 
of strategy in St Petersburg to train all future Staff officers was accepted and, following 
delays caused by the Persian and Turkish wars, and then the subsequent Polish rebellion 
(1830-31), a Military Academy was established in 1832.(114)
Nicholas saw the multiplicity of General Staffs then existing in the Russian army as 
harmful. Not only did they inflate the costs of the military establishment by employing an 
excessive number of staff officers, but the often ambiguous relationship between the 
Generals Staffs and their Commander-in-Chiefs proved to be a cause of many 
problems.(115) Thus in 1832 a major reorganisation was undertaken. The number of 
military units was reduced allowing for the abolition of many staffs.(116) The staffs that 
remained, including the General Staff of H.I.M., were deprived of their autonomy and 
subordinated to the War Ministry. As a result the age of the General Staffs in Russia came 
to a end and the age of the War Ministry was bom.(117)
At a very early stage Kiselev must have sensed the threat to his idea of autonomous 
General Staffs. He was, however, powerless to prevent change. Once the 1828-29 Turkish 
war was concluded the Second Army was abolished. Its units were transferred to the First 
Army and its General Staff abolished outright.
This is not to suggest, however, that the work of Kiselev’s General Staff had no 
lasting impact on the development of military ideas in Russia. Their ideas concerning the 
unique nature of Turkish wars, the need for General Staffs to specialise in the study of
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prospective enemies and their resources, and the worth of historical/empirical research as
true guide to military action all gradually found adherents within the military establishment -
especially after the experience of the 1828-29 Turkish war. Indeed, even Jomini himself
was forced to concede much ground in his 1833 publication Analiticheskii obzor glavnykh
soobrazhenii voennogo iskusstva i ob otnosheniiakh onykh s politikoi gosudarstv (St
Petersburg) (translated from the French edition, Tableau analytique des principales
combinaisons de la guerre et leur rapports avec la politique des etats, Paris, 1830).
Jomini accepted that there did not exist a priori universally applicable rules of warfare:
In forming...a war plan against France, Austria or Russia, it is 
impossible to base it on the same considerations as for a war against the 
Turks or any other Eastern people, whose brave though unstructured 
forces are capable of neither order or of decisive manoeuvres.(118)
Jomini also accepted that the study of tactics alone was insufficient preparation for war. In 
addition, an army needed a ‘war policy’ [voemaia politika] which he defined as the need to 
study the finances, defences, national characteristics, military system and talents of the 
enemy nation as well as the geography of the prospective theatre of war.(119) He accepted 
the idea that the main task of the General Staff was to collect and interpret such 
intelligence:
The archive [of the General Staff] should be supplied with the great 
number of historical materials relating to previous wars, as well as those 
relating to statistical, geographical, topographical and strategic 
matters.(120)
Jomini acknowledged the degree to which such information could be of vital significance in 
challenging accepted wisdom. In an obvious reference to Kiselev’s investigations (which 
during the 1820s established beyond doubt that the Balkans were traversible), he wrote that 
prior to this:
Almost all military men in Europe had almost the same erroneous 
knowledge of the Balkan mountains and of the true strength of the 
Ottoman Porte...It seemed as if an order was issued from 
Constantinople to consider this mountain range almost 
insurmountable. (121)
In his analysis of the 1828-29 Turkish War, Jomini conceded that his own iron rule that a 
general must never split up his forces could be broken when fighting the Ottoman 
army.(122)
Jomini, though granting the above concessions, and generally accepting the need for 
commanders to have a greater understanding of higher strategic factors, such as the 
political object of the war, was nevertheless adamant that his own ideas concerning the
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primacy of tactics remained central to military theory. He argued that ‘war policy’, or
research into the enemy and the theatre of war, was needed only to formulate the war plan;
once war had begun then the ‘constant rules ofpure military strategy’, (by which he meant
tactics), take over, and:
...there is already no need to take into account the character or attitude 
to us of the native population in which the war is being waged, nor the 
character and qualities of the enemy commander, nor even the theatre of 
war and its economic means.(123)
Nevertheless, it was Jomini’s acceptance of the general need for research that facilitated the 
establishment of historical sections within the Russian General Staff in 1832. It is doubtless 
that, as a result of this decision, Liprandi was requested by Nicholas in this year to 
systemise his writings on the Ottoman Empire. The work of these historical sections, 
however, took a predominantly academic direction and they failed to establish any great 
influence over official military doctrine as Liprandi had advocated. Even the appearance of 
a so-called ‘historical school’ under N. V. Medem, Professor of Strategy at the Nicholas 
Military Academy, did little to change matters(124) and as late as 1851 Liprandi was still 
criticising the army for failing to construct particular strategies and tactical innovations to 
correspond to the weaknesses of each potential enemy.(125) This was an inevitable 
consequence of Jomini’s opinion that historical research could only assist in the formulation 
of war plans but was irrelevant to the actual waging of war.
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V. WAR PLANNING AND DIPLOMACY, 1819-28
The Search for Strategy. 1819-28
One of Kiselev’s first actions on becoming Head of the Second Army’s General 
Staff in 1819 was to draw up a war plan against the Ottoman Empire. He was assisted in 
this enterprise by the large body of experience acquired by the Russian army during their 
five previous Turkish wars fought between 1711 and 1812. This knowledge, though as yet 
imperfect, helped to establish the main strategic factors involved in these wars, as well as 
highlighting the peculiar difficulties associated with warfare in the Balkan theatre.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
By Kiselev’s time it was already an acknowledged fact that the Balkan theatre 
greatly assisted the Turks, who, since the middle of the eighteenth century, had consistently 
adopted a defensive strategy in wars with Russia. The Danube and the Balkan mountain 
range presented the would-be attacker with two formidable natural barriers. The former 
was prone to flooding and could only be crossed at specific times and places, whilst the 
latter was considered by most military authorities to be impassable for a large body of 
troops. The Turks reinforced these natural barriers with strategically placed fortifications. 
The Turkish right flank was protected by the smaller fortresses Tultcha, Isachki, Matchin, 
Hirsovo, as well as the larger Brailov (see Map B). Although these fortresses were not a 
great hindrance to an invading army, any subsequent progress along the Babadag-Vama 
road, the main artery of the Turkish right flank, was seriously disrupted by the hostile 
inhabitants of the Deli-Orman forest and the Dobrudja region. The former contained a 
substantial indigenous Turkish population, including various Asiatic fanatics, whilst the 
latter was inhabited by the Zaporozhtsy and Nekrasovtsy - Cossacks who had fled Russia in 
the eighteenth century and now periodically served as irregular troops in the Sultan’s army. 
The partisan warfare conducted by these peoples had in previous wars wreaked havoc on 
Russia’s lines of supply and communications.(l) The great fortress-port of Varna, unless 
captured, seriously diminished the threat of Russian naval action on the Ottoman coast.
The Turkish centre was dominated by the three fortresses - Shumla, Silistria and 
Rustchuk. The first, considered by many the ‘key to the Balkans’, was an imposing edifice. 
Built on almost inaccessible mountainous terrain and able to house a garrison of over
40,000 men, it served as the traditional resting place of the main Turkish forces. It had 
never been captured by the Russians. Its importance was such, that the debates over the 
execution of the 1828-29 war plans largely centred on whether an attempt was to be made
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for its capture. Silistria and Rustchuk were situated on the right bank of the Danube and 
served to obstruct its crossing by an invading force. They held garrisons of over 20,000 and
10,000 men respectively and had resisted prolonged sieges in the past.
The key to the Turkish left flank was Sophia. Once taken, the Russian army along 
the Sophia-Adrianople road and march on Constantinople. The two main problems with 
such an operational line were, firstly, that Russia would have to cross the Danube further 
upstream between Widdin and Rustchuk. Such an enterprise was considerably more 
hazardous than a crossing further downstream as the river here was wider, the Turkish 
flotilla stronger, and the presence of large Turkish garrisons in Widdin and Rustchuk made 
a Turkish interception of the crossing more likely. The second difficulty with this invasion 
route was that its distance from Russia’s likely operational base - the Danubian 
Principalities - created exceptional difficulties for the army’s supply network.
In addition to particular problems of each Turkish flank, there were also more 
general difficulties associated with the theatre as a whole; one had to consider the scarcity 
of roads, the large area of barren or uncultivated land, the lack of clean water and climatic 
conditions conducive to fever and plague. These conditions wore down the movement of an 
invading force at every step and exemplified Clausewitz’s notion of the ‘friction of war’. 
Much of the region was covered in forests, which assisted the Turk’s irregular warfare and 
obstructed Russia’s desire to give battle and destroy the main Turkish forces in the field.(2)
Although a land invasion of the Ottoman Empire in Europe presented substantial 
difficulties, the two most obvious alternatives, an amphibious landing on the Turkish coast 
south of the Balkan mountain range (up to and including Constantinople) or, a major 
offensive through Asiatic Turkey, were considered even more hazardous. The former 
required complete naval mastery of the Black Sea and a very large fleet to transport the 
necessary number of men; at best, a naval landing was but an adjunct to operations on land. 
The latter was thought impossible due to the extreme difficulty in supplying large numbers 
of troops in such barren terrain. Thus a land invasion through Europe was still regarded as 
the optimum solution by almost all Russian commanders. The latter had invariably opted 
for an operational line directed against the very strong Turkish centre - Brailov-Silistria- 
Shumla.(3) The aim of such operations was to either capture these fortresses or force the 
Turkish army into the field and defeat it. As the army had only even reached Shumla twice 
before (1774,1810),(4) let alone capture it, the idea of a further push south and a Balkan 
crossing was hardly ever entertained. As shall be shown, the innovation introduced by 
Kiselev was to direct the main operations against the Turkish right flank (along the Black 
Sea coast) en route to a Balkan crossing.
In addition to the question of the operational line, the other main strategic quandary 
centred on the question of which of the Turkish fortresses could and should be besieged. 
Most generals feared pushing forward while leaving Turkish fortresses in rear. Therefore, 
following the maxims of ‘methodical’ warfare, they sought to besiege systematically all 
fortresses before pushing further into the Sultan’s domains. This system was, however, 
extremely slow and expensive, and even if achieved did not guarantee that the Sultan would 
sue for peace. Only a defeat of the main Turkish forces or an attack on Constantinople 
could guarantee this.(5)
There were, however, two great weaknesses in the Turkish defensive system. 
Firstly, certain Balkan passes were both unfortified and passable by a large body of troops. 
Though a small minority of military men (amongst them A. V. Suvorov and M. I. Kutuzov) 
had for some time believed this to be true, it was not however established beyond doubt 
until Kiselev enquired into the matter in the 1820s.(6) A Balkan crossing offered decisive 
results, for the army could then march on Adrianople - the sole connection between 
Constantinople and European Turkey.(7) The capital could then be attacked and Turkish 
reinforcements be prevented from assisting it.
The second and potentially explosive weakness of the Ottomans was the presence 
of Balkan Christians in the theatre of war. Aside from the benefits of operating in friendly 
territory, the Russian army had the option of raising large numbers of partisans. Such a 
measure would however involve Russia’s acceptance of their political demands, so making 
peace negotiations more problematic and risking the alienating other powers. After 1815, it 
was considered by the Tsars only as a measure of last resort.
As regards the utility of previous war plans, two notable examples had been offered 
by A. V. Suvorov and M. I. Kutuzov. Both these generals, like Kiselev after them, had 
sought the means for a rapid, decisive victory over the Turks. Suvorov, following a request 
from Catherine II for a plan to destroy the Ottoman Empire in Europe, presented his 
proposals in a war plan of 1795.(8) He proposed a two-year campaign in which an army of
150,000 men was to cross the Balkans and march on Constantinople. Like most Russian 
commanders, Suvorov feared crossing the Balkans until all Turkish forces in the Russian 
rear had been defeated. Therefore in the first campaign Russia was to besiege and occupy 
all the Danubian fortresses from Izmail to Rustchuk as well as Varna and Shumla. The 
march on Constantinople in the second year was to be assisted by the Baltic fleet, which
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was to force the Straits, as well as by the raising of a levde en masse amongst the Porte’s 
Christian subjects.
Admittedly, much of the plan was either impossible in practice or, by Kiselev’s day, 
politically inadmissible. The 1806-12 war had proved that even a far greater force was 
unable to occupy all the above-mentioned fortresses in six years let alone one. The 
probability of the Russian fleet forcing the Straits was negligible.(9) The centrepiece of the 
plan - to raise a huge army of Balkan partisans was obviously unfeasible following Russia’s 
post-1815 commitment to preserve the Ottoman Empire as well as the general distaste of 
the Tsars for populist/nationalist movements. Nevertheless Suvorov’s proposals contained 
the germ of Kiselev’s idea of 1819 in that it, firstly, proposed the crossing of the Balkans, 
secondly, included a coastal line of operations, with combined land and fleet action and 
finally, highlighted the idea that a march on Constantinople offered the greatest propect for 
a decisive result.
In contrast, Kutuzov had, as a result of his experience of the 1806-12 Turkish war,
become fully convinced of the futility of siege warfare. His disagreement with the
Commander-in-Chief A. A. Prozorovskii in 1809 - nominally over the planned siege of
Brailov - was rooted in differing strategic conceptions. Kutuzov opposed the existing
system of ‘methodical’ warfare and favoured a deeper offensive thrust into Ottoman
territoiy.(lO) Kutuzov’s ideas culminated in his 1811 war plan. It envisaged the use of
three army corps, each acting independently of each other. The first was to head along the
Black Sea coast, cross the Balkans and then head for Adrianople and Constantinople. The
second was to secure the rear of the first corps by attacking or blockading the main Turkish
forces which were always kept in Shumla. A third corps was to march on Sophia via
Nikopol to cut off the Sophia-Adrianople road from any Turkish reinforcements rushing to
relieve the capital.(ll) Kutuzov justified the plan’s departure from the accepted practice
(as so forcefully advocated by Jomini) of concentrating one’s forces, thus:
Against the Turks one must not operate as one does against a European 
army, with all ones forces concentrated....Against the Turks one can 
safely, with...strong corps, attempt daring ventures, without having any 
communications between them....Any unexpected or novel movement 
causes them [the Turks] such confusion that one cannot even 
contemplate as to what mistakes this will force them into, and as to how 
great our success will be.(12)
Kutuzov’s plan, more than any other, offered Kiselev the prospect of acting ‘on the spirit of 
the enemy, to force by the influence of fear that which the usual methodical action cannot 
achieve’.(13)
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S t * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Captivated by the strategic possibilities of a Balkan crossing, Kiselev began
corresponding with various military authorities on this point in 1819. In August, he
informed Diebitsch that the common view regarding the difficulties of this crossing were
‘tres faudees’, and that in a future Turkish war:
Je pense qu’une base principale sur la mer, offiirait de plus surs 
resultats. Wellington m’a en a donne Fexample. Pourquoi ne serait il 
point suivi? La saute de Varna et de Burgas conduit a Adrianople.(14)
Kiselev’s advocacy of a coastal operational line, which Diebitsch accepted(15), was 
intended to facilitate combined land and naval action.(16) Twenty ships of the line were to 
both supply the 100,000-man army and conduct amphibious assaults of the two above- 
mentioned ports. In greatly increasing the speed and mobility of the army, this strategy 
would surprise the Turks who, presumably, would expect the Russians to conduct a 
ponderous siege of their Danubian fortresses (as occurred during the 1806-12 war). The 
prospects of a successful assault on Burgas were especially good. This port was situated 
south of the Balkan mountain chain, and a landing here could act as an avant-garde for the 
main Russian forces who were to cross the Balkans by land.
Over the following year, Kiselev gradually refined his ideas, and in 1820 informed 
Diebitsch (then the Head of the General Staff of the First Army) of his thoughts.(17) It was 
paramount that Russia’s military strategy corresponded to the political aim of the war; that 
is, whether Russia intended to ‘faire la guerre pour obtenir une paix advantageouse ou bien 
chasser les Turcs du continent Europeen’. Reflecting Alexander’s acceptance after 1812 of 
a conservative Eastern policy, Kiselev maintained that ‘cette dernier hyposition ne sera 
j ’ose le croire jamais le but de notre gouvemment’. This being the case, the best chance of 
prising an advantageous peace treaty from the Sultan was by a quick, decisive war - 
specifically a two-year campaign to march on Constantinople.
The adoption of Kutuzov’s idea of dividing the army into independent corps 
allowed Kiselev to propose the simultaneous conduct of two operational lines, in order to 
‘former deux bases, l’une sur la mer par Varna et Burgas - l’autre sur le base Danube par 
Brailov, Silistria et Shumla’. In the first campaign the army was to secure the Principalities 
and ‘Bulgaria’ as an operational base by besieging or attempting to ‘bloquer severement’ 
the three latter fortresses. The objectives of the second operational line were to take Varna 
(in conjunction with a naval assault) and occupy the Balkan passages. In the second 
campaign the Balkans were to be crossed, Burgas taken, and a march on Adrianople and, if 
necessary, Constantinople undertaken. Around 120,000 men were required to execute this
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plan, although, controversially, Kiselev favoured the ‘tres grande utilite’ of augmenting this 
force with Balkan partisans.
Kiselev knew that any Russian advance on Constantinople was sure to arouse the 
consternation of the other European Powers and he was forced to acknowledge the potential 
threat of British and Austrian intervention. Should the former come to the aid of the Porte 
and send its fleet into the Black Sea then ie  mouvement par notre gauche [i.e. along the 
coast] serait entiere paralysee’. In this case Russia would have to attack Adrianople from 
the west via Sophia. Should Austria declare against Russia then the threat of an Austrian 
push eastwards into the Principalities would make any attempt at a Balkan crossing 
extremely hazardous. It followed therefore that the Russian Foreign Ministry acquired the 
task of keeping these two powers neutral in a future Russo-Turkish war.
Diebitsch accepted the essence of Kiselev’s plan and, following the outbreak of the 
Greek revolt and Stroganov’s departure from Constantinople, drew up his own version.(18) 
It differed from Kiselev’s plan in three respects. Firstly, the army was to reach 
Constantinople in one year not two. Secondly, Diebitsch was adamant that Shumla had to 
be captured (not just blockaded as Kiselev advocated) before the Balkans could be 
traversed. Finally it set a rigid timetable to events, with the campaign to begin on 1 March 
OS and Constantinople to be reached by 1 August OS. The plan, though of a rudimentary 
nature, illuminates two significant defects in Diebitsch’s military thinking that were to have 
an adverse effect on the outcome of the eventual war. First, Diebitsch exaggerated the 
weakness of Turks - events proved that it was an almost impossible task to reach 
Constantinople in five months. Second, Diebitsch, always fearful for his flank and rear, was 
not prepared to cross the Balkans before Shumla had been taken. In his 1821 plan he wrote 
the fateful words ‘the capture of this town is essential and not as difficult as is often stated’. 
Though, from a love of glory, Diebitsch committed himself to a bold, offensively-minded 
war plan, his military instincts (especially once in the field) remained true to the 
conservative traditions of the pre-Napoleonic era. Diebitsch’s cautious approach committed 
the army in 1828 to the lengthy siege of the Ottomans’ strongest fortresses. What was to 
have been a quick and decisive war thus turned into a grinding series of sieges.
Throughout the 1820s Kiselev’s ideas dominated military opinion over the question 
of the course of a future Turkish war. Between 1819 and 1828 there was barely a voice 
raised against a Balkan crossing.(19) All the ‘establishment’ strategists in St Petersburg, 
such as Jomini and D. P. Buturlin accepted Kiselev’s ideas. All agreed with Kiselev that 
the political objectives behind the Turkish war plan had to correspond to Russia’s official 
‘weak neighbour’ policy. Buturlin, for instance, in his memoir of 1822,(20) wrote:
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L’a vantage de la Russie seroit done de veiller a la conservation de 
Pempire Ottoman et non de travailler a accelerer sa chute...une puissance 
asiatique ne soit d’un voisenage plus sur et plus commode, qu’une 
puissance europeenne ne pourroit jamais l’etre. [If the Ottoman Empire 
is pushed into Asia then this will]...formeront en Asie une puissance 
respectable par sa concentration et que pourra meme devenir formidable 
pour nos ffontieres entre la mer Noire et la mer Caspienne.
Buturlin accepted that Kiselev’s idea for ‘une invasion rigorouse et decisive au de la
Balkan’ was designed not to end, but to preserve the existence of the Ottoman Empire.
Buturlin believed that if Russia wanted to:
... conserver les Turcs, il ne s’agiroit que de ffapper un coup decisif sur 
Constantinople afin de forcer la Porte a accepter les conditions qu’on lui 
imposera.
Buturlin, like Langerone, Diebitsch, Kiselev, Sukhtelen and almost all other Russian
generals favoured the use of Serbian forces in a Turkish war. He favoured sending a
Russian detachment to Sophia ‘pour donner la main aux Serviens et aux autres peuples des
slavonnes de la Herzegovinne et de l’Albanie’. Like Kiselev and Diebitsch, Buturlin gave
little significance to the Asiatic theatre. He believed that the problem of supplying a large
Caucasian force precluded the possibility of an offensive in Asia. Instead:
La destination du general Ermolov sera moins de faire les 
conquetes...que de mettre un combustion d’Anatolie en semant la 
mesintelligence parmi les pashas et en soutenant aux d’etre eux que 
viservient a l’independance.
At the eventual peace negotiations Buturlin favoured the granting of an ‘existence politique’ 
to Greece, the restoration of Serbian rights and the annexation of the Danubian 
Principalities and the land between the Phase and Kuban rivers (i.e. Circassia).
Whilst the plans of Buturlin and the other Generals accepted the need for a Balkan 
crossing there were differences of opinion regarding the timetable. Kiselev’s idea of a two- 
year campaign was supported by Langerone and Chuikevich but opposed by Diebitsch, 
Sukhtelen and Buturlin who believed that Constantinople could be reached in under six 
months. There were also differences over the number of men required for such an 
enterprise. At one extreme Buturlin demanded 200,000 men whilst, at the other,
Chuikevich believed that 100,000 was more than sufficient. These disagreements were, 
however, more apparent than real for, regardless of the number of men that actually began 
the campaign, many tens of thousands more lay in reserve and, with proper preparation, 
could be called upon at any stage. The aspect of the plan which troubled military minds 
most was, in fact, the question of Shumla. Kiselev did not make the capture of this fortress
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a sine qua non but Buturlin, following Diebitsch, was adamant that the Balkans only could
be crossed ‘apres la defaite de Farm6e Ottomanne et la prise de Shumla’.(21) Most
significantly, this view had the backing of Jomini, who, whilst occupying an ambiguous
position in the Russian military hierarchy, nevertheless exercised great influence through his
reputation as Europe’s premier strategist.
Jomini first committed his views to paper in a memoir of April 1828.(22) He
distinguished between three types of war plan. The first, a ‘guerre methodique’ involved
the occupation of all the Turkish fortresses on the Danube and Bulgaria in the first
campaign, with a Balkan crossing attempted in the second. Jomini was against such a plan,
for ‘il est plus sur, mais il n’oflre que de minces resultats pour des grandes sacrifices’. The
second possibility was a ‘guerre d’invasion’ in which the Balkans would be crossed without
making the defeat of the main Turkish forces or an occupation of its main fortresses a sine
qua non. Jomini deemed this idea (which was essentially was Kiselev’s) as ‘plus brilliant’
but considered that such an enterprise would ‘ne serait pas sans danger’. For once the army
began a Balkan crossing the undefeated Turkish forces could ‘se masser contre notre
droite’. The final option was to cross the Balkans and march on Constantinople once the
main Turkish forces had been defeated. Such a plan:
...serait une application de principes de la guerre et du systeme de 
Napoleon, offre a la fois gloire, securite et grands resultats: car c’est 
aux masses organisees de l’ennemi qu’il faut faire la guerre et non aux 
points geographique - ceux ci tombent quand les masses sont battues et 
desorganis£es.
Jomini was, however, faced with an uncomfortable problem. If the Turkish forces, which 
would almost certainly be encamped at Shumla, offered battle, then Jomini, in keeping with 
his theory, believed ‘il faudra marcher a eux et les battre completement’. Should the Turks 
however remain in Shumla and refuse battle in the open field, what was to be done? A 
siege could drag on indefinitely thus destroying the main virtue of a ‘guerre d’invasion’, 
namely speed and surprise. Jomini entertained the idea of leaving large Russian forces to 
guard Shumla, whilst sending an isolated corps across the Balkans. Suvorov’s operations in 
Switzerland and Napoleon’s at Saint Bernard suggested ‘tres forts que l’operation est 
faisable’. Jomini was, however, compelled to dismiss this precedent as not applicable to 
the Balkan theatre. No doubt the fact it contradicted his own maxim that the commander 
should never split his forces also played on his mind. Jomini hypothesised as to Russia’s 
predicament should her army cross the Balkans and allow the undefeated Turkish army to 
leave Shumla and attack Russian forces on the Danube. The Russian army could continue 
its march on Adrianople as planned, although this ‘serait hardie’. Alternatively, a retreat of
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the army from Rumelia back across the Balkans to defend its rear ‘serait plus militaries’ but
would obviously force an unsuccessful end to the campaign. Faced with such a problem
Jomini’s natural conservatism reasserted itself and his final verdict was that:
Tout ceci prouve que strategiquement parlant il est plus sage de ne point 
s’avancer au dela du Balkan sans avoir deposte le gros de l’armee 
ennemie de Shumla.
If the Turks refused to leave Shumla and give battle, Russia was not to push on with the 
southwards offensive but remain there and either blockade the fortress or try and force out 
the garrison by some enveloping movement on its supply line. Fatefully, Jomini considered 
this latter operation as ‘hardie sans doute, mais que je ne regarde comme impracticable’.
It is the thesis of this chapter that the successes and failures of the 1828-29 
campaigns can be traced back to the debate over the execution of Kiselev’s original war 
plans of 1819-20. Kiselev’s ideas were of sufficient promise to convince the military 
establishment of the advantages, both politically and militarily, of a Balkan crossing. The 
adoption of his plan ultimately delivered the intended political results in the 1829 Treaty of 
Adrianople. The war as a whole, however, was marred by the unsuccessful 1828 campaign. 
Although there were many individual and specific reasons for its failure, we may point to 
the underlying strategic mistake made by the Russian High Command. The dogmatic 
insistence on the capture of Shumla in 1828 ensured that the campaign degenerated into a 
series of prolonged and pointless sieges and blockades, so repeating the mistakes of the 
1806-12 war. It is of some irony that the prime perpetrators of this folly should have been 
Jomini and his followers. The self-proclaimed interpreter of Napoleon’s revolutionary type 
of warfare was bound by the very logic of his own theory to argue for the siege of Shumla 
as the most ardent supporter of ‘la guerre methodique’.(23)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
If Kiselev had a large degree of success in converting the military establishment to 
his war plan, the task of persuading Nesselrode, Alexander and after him, Nicholas, to 
adopt his bold military solution proved considerably more troublesome. It was to take 
seven long years from the beginning of the Greek revolt before Russia was to finally open 
hostilities against its Eastern neighbour and, even then, there was no guarantee that a 
Balkan crossing would actually be attempted.
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The Greek Question in the Period of Congress Diplomacy. 1822-25
Deprived of allied support for coercive measures against the Porte and not wishing 
to endanger European unity by unilateral action, in 1822 Alexander agreed to the Anglo- 
Austrian offer of mediation between Russia and the Porte. The British ambassador Lord 
Strangford, aided by the Austrian intemuncio, was to secure the Sultan’s assent to Russian 
demands relating to the specific infringements of existing Russo-Turkish treaties carried out 
by Turkish authorities during their suppression of the revolt - notably the defamation of 
Greek churches, the military occupation of the Principalities and the hindering of vessels 
bearing the Russian flag to pass the Straits.(24) As, however, Russia had no specific treaty 
right to interfere in the wider question of the fate of the Greek revolt and, indeed, the future 
political status of the Greeks,(25) these issues was to be entrusted to a European Congress.
When the Congress was finally convened at Verona in late 1822 the Greek question 
had been eclipsed by more recent revolutionary events in the Iberian peninsula.(26) The 
Congress was dominated by the potential rift in Allied unity caused by Britain’s refusal to 
support French intervention in Spain(27) although, as mentioned, Britain and Austria were, 
in any case, in no hurry to seek a solution over Greece, their aim being merely to secure 
Russian inactivity through never-ending discussions.
Undaunted, Russian diplomacy for the following three and a half years persevered 
with its policy of allied co-operation and a collective solution to the Balkan crisis. Why did 
Russia persist so long over an issue that attracted no positive interest from any other 
Power? One traditional explanation is that intervention over Greece was merely a cover for 
expansionism, Russia’s ultimate goal being ‘the end of European Turkey and the shifting of 
her capital to the Bosphorus’.(28) More recent evidence has shown this view to be 
untenable. The diplomatic correspondence of the Russian Foreign Ministry reveals that it 
held the following consistent line:(29) Russia sought an end to the civil war, firstly, for 
humanitarian reasons - to stop the annihilation of a Christian people, especially following 
the discovery of Mohammed Ali’s ‘depopulation scheme’ in 1825(30); secondly, the 
continuation of the war could lead to further revolutions in Ottoman Europe(31); thirdly, 
Greek shipping needed to be protected from Turkish attack as it was vital to Novorossiia’s 
exports; fourthly, that continued Russian passivity would increase the Porte’s intransigence 
on other Russo-Turkish disputes. Finally, despite Russia’s consistent foreign policy line 
that she did not seek in the Greek question the gaining of exclusive influence or territory at 
the Porte’s expense(32) certain ambitions in the East were, nevertheless, secretly held. 
Though as yet ill-defined in the early 1820s, these ambitions eventually evolved into the war
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aim of annexing certain ports and fortresses in the Caucasus, in order to lessen the influence 
of the Sultan in that region and improve the Russian frontier.
Whilst it is true that certain diplomats, such as Pozzo and G. A. Stroganov, 
favoured more expansive war aims, their private opinions never became official policy.(33) 
At no stage was the commitment to a ‘weak neighbour’ policy questioned by either 
Alexander or Nicholas and their closest advisers. It was acknowledged that, for all the 
Turks’ stubbornness, Russia, through her treaties, had more exclusive influence over the 
Balkans and the Straits with the Ottoman Empire in existence. If the latter fell, the Powers 
would resist, by war if necessary, a Russia occupation of the Straits, whilst the Sultan’s 
European Empire would be replaced by new independent Balkan states with unknown 
leaders, uncertain political affiliations and very probably not exclusively bound to, or 
guaranteed by Russia, but by all or some of the Great Powers.
Thus when in January 1824 Alexander attempted to restore the Greek question to 
Europe’s diplomatic agenda by offering the first concrete proposal for the political future of 
‘Greece’, he envisaged the creation not of a frilly independent Greek nation-state, but of 
three semi-autonomous ‘Principautes’ under the Sultan’s nominal suzerainty.(34) As these 
Principalities were to have similar status and privileges to their Danubian counterparts and 
Serbia, the proposal was essentially an extension of Russia’s, by now traditional, policy of 
making concessions to the Ottoman Christians’ demands for greater political freedom, in 
order to preserve at least a semblance of the territorial and political integrity of the Sultan’s 
European Empire. This proposal was however open to the counter that, in H. Temperley’s 
phrase, the Tsar wished for ‘six meagre and divided Balkan Principalities...[to]...revolve as 
satellites around the Russian sun’.(35) It was for exacdy this reason that Mettemich 
preferred a frilly independent Greece and, indeed, was the first to propose it in 1824.(36)
The conferences established to discuss the Russian proposal dragged on 
intermittently through 1824 and the first half of 1825. From the outset, however, it was 
clear that chances of reaching a consensus between the allies was nil. The Memoire itself 
had been leaked and published on 31 May 1824 in the Constitutionnel.(37) It was rejected 
immediately by both the Sultan and the Greeks (the latter wanted only frill independence). 
Austria was happy merely to delay any decision, whilst George Canning (who had replaced 
Castlereagh as Britain’s Foreign Secretary in 1822) refused to join the discussions at all, 
and was no more ready than Mettemich to accede to the Russian demand that the Mimoire 
be ultimately imposed by force if necessary.(38) The fate of Strangford’s mission was no 
more pleasing. Having secured the Porte’s nominal assent to rectify certain treaty
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contraventions relating to the Principalities and Russia’s maritime trade, he quit
Constantinople in the summer of 1824. Russia, however, denied the Porte was executing
her promises and further delayed the restoration of full diplomatic relations (Russia had had
no ambassador at Constantinople since July 1821). Russia also questioned Strangford’s
political allegiance, leading to much subsequent mutual recrimination.(39)
The Strangford affair, added Alexander’s decision to break off allied negotiations
over Greece in late July,(40) meant that the Anglo-Austrian plan concocted by Mettemich
and Castlereagh in 1821 had run its course. Alexander, urged to declare war by his
diplomats,(41) finally relented and on 5 August OS(42) decided to leave for the south of
Russia to supervise the Second Army’s preparations for war.(43)
During Alexander’s stay in Novorossiia, a leading military official prepared a
Memoire on the attitude of the army as a whole towards a probable conflict.(44) The
unnamed author,(45) in very frank terms, centred his analysis around the general malaise
prevalent throughout the army and Russian society at large, and proposed, by way of
remedy, the invigorating power of war. The well-being of the army was said to be of vital
concern as its conduct served as an example to the rest of the population:
Votre armee, Sire, dispersee dans les gouvemmens les plus riches de la 
monarchic...y exerce la plus inevitable influence sur l’esprit de toute une 
population, qui vivant aussi habituellement avec des hommes, qu’elle 
respecte comme ses defenseurs et que leur sphere plus etendue lui fait 
regarder comme des espices [?] d’oracle, se penentre insensiblement 
des opinions professees par ces memes hommes.
The rural clergy was of no use as it was failing to fulfil the role of moral teacher and instead
‘ne cherche que trop souvent dans le vin et dans la debauche une honteuse compensation &
Tennui du son isolement social’.
The army itself, especially in the outlying imperial lands, was gripped by ‘l’esprit
d’inquietude’ - a phenomenom difficult to combat due to the nature of the officer corps:
L’officier de la ligne, qu’une premiere education plus que negligee ne 
tient si souvent qu’a une tres petite distance morale des hommes qui se 
trouvent sous ses ordres, perd, par une existence partagee entre l’ennui 
et la sommeil.
Boredom exposed the officer corps to political indoctrination and freethinking, with the
numerous military rallies used as opportunities for the discussion and dissemination of
liberal and revolutionary ideas:
Pendant la longue duree des rassemblemens annuels des differentes 
trouppes de V.M.I...les officiers s’entretenant de leurs idees mutuelles, 
du cruel ennui qui les devore et surtout du [illegible] desolant sous 
lequel ils envisagent leur avenir social, ces epanchemens reciproques
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attisent de plus en plus le feu cache du volcan qui se [illegible] sous nos 
pas et done les explosions pourroient avoir des suites d’autant plus 
funestes que les idees innovatrices du siecle.
The author offered two solutions to the widespread dissatisfaction within the military. One
was to isolate army units from the population and indeed each other through the further
development of the ‘colonisations militaries’; however this could not be achieved ‘assez
promptement pour preserver l’etat d’une commotion semblable aux secousses qui
etranglent, il y a quelques annees, tout le Midi de l’Europe’. This being the case there
remained but one answer:
La violence du mal veut un remede plus violent et ce remede extreme 
mais infalliable est celui d’une guerre selon l’esprit et les voeux de Vos 
peuples, d’une guerre d’extinction contre le fanatisme et la barbarie des 
feroces Ottomans.
Such a measure was justified by the (somewhat dubious) precedent of certain ‘hommes 
eclaires du cabinet de Louis XVI’ who sought to ‘dissiper Forage’ of revolution by 
‘quelque guerre conforme a l’esprit national, e’est-a-dire contraire la pohtique anglaise’. A 
further justification was found in the policy of Catherine the Great, who sought to ‘refouler 
l’lslamisme au dela du Bosphore’.
It is clear that, in the tradition of many military men of post-Restoration Europe, the 
author sought to difiuse the social problems caused by the spread of French revolutionary 
ideas and the example of revolts in Spain, Naples and elsewhere, by recourse to war, 
especially those of ‘national unity’.(46) When speaking in abstract of the ‘army’ it is quite 
possible that the author was thinking primarily of the Second Army. This unit was located 
in Russia’s provincial backwaters, subject to the boredom and resdessness of such a posting 
and, under the direction of Pestel’, contained the most radical circle of freethinkers. We 
cannot be sure whether he possessed concrete information concerning revolutionary activity 
but certainly felt, like many others, that something was in the air. If so, his instinct proved 
to be correct; using the opportunity of Alexander’s unexpected death in Taganrog on 19 
November 1825 OS, a plot was hatched for revolution.(47)
Whilst the author of the aforementioned Memoire revealed some cynical though 
shrewd observations regarding Russia’s domestic problems,(48) the means he proposed to 
fight a ‘guerre d’extinction’ against the Porte showed him to be nothing but a dreamer. He 
offered every known cliche connected with Russia’s ‘designs’ in the East and presented a 
programme so ambitious it would have shocked even D. Urquhart and the other British 
Russophobe publicists.(49)
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Answering the dictum ascribed to Napoleon, that Russia must ‘ou tomber ou 
s’agrandir’, the author considered that for Russia to progress she needed to increase her 
commercial strength by becoming ‘une grande puissance maritime’. This was to be 
achieved by an attack on the Ottoman Empire in support of the Greek revolution. This 
measure was, ironically, to be justified by the doctrine of the Holy Alliance, which 
guaranteed ‘toute existence chretienne et toute existence legitime’. Russia was to do 
Europe a favour by expelling Islam and give the Sultan just reward for his policy of inciting 
Russia’s Caucasian subjects against the Tsar - ieur legitime souveraine’. Once victorious, 
Russia, by way of partition, was to receive Constantinople, Ta grande partie de la Turquie 
et toute la Grece’, and become Tarbitre de la balance Europeenne’. The author then 
contemplated a second stage of expansion, in which the Tsar ‘se trouve obligee ou de 
conquerir l’lnde ou de s’etendre en Europe’ - a course of action that, by giving suitable 
employment to the army would also ‘prevenir une revolution interieuse’.
Russia had, of course, to contend with the possibility of other powers resisting this 
scheme. The author believed that Austria could easily be detached from an anti-Russian 
coalition by the offer of an alliance and the promise of Serbia and other territories. Prussia 
was seen as a natural Russian ally and may be compensated through acquisitions in Saxony, 
Poland and on the Rhine. France was considered too weak to be of consequence; since the 
reign of Louis XVI she has lost all influence in Germany, Italy, Sweden and Poland. The 
United States, whose possible role in a future general war was increasingly attracting the 
attention of Russia’s foreign policy makers, was considered the latter’s ‘alliee naturale’ and 
‘tous les diplomats regardent une guerre entre les deux puissances comme une guerre 
absolument impossible’.(50) The attitude of Britain remained problematic, but as she 
supported the revolted Spanish colonies she had to support the Greek cause and her public 
opinion would never allow a war in support of despotic Turkey.
Though his ideas are of much interest, there is little need to show how out of tune 
the author was with official Russian policy. When, in late 1829, the French King Charles X 
made an official approach regarding an equally fantastic plan (known as the ‘Poliganac 
Memorandum’) for a complete restructuring of the 1815 settlement the French Ambassador, 
having read the moderate terms of the Adrianople Treaty, dared not even mention it to the 
new Tsar, Nicholas 1.(51)
The Accession of Nicholas I and the Drift to War. 1826-28
The outcome of the disputed succession following Alexander’s death was to hold 
international as well as domestic repercussions for Russia. Austria came out clearly in
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favour of Grand Duke Constantine, whom they regarded as a guarantor of the Holy Alliance
and an opponent of the Greek cause:(52)
The accession of the Grand Duke Nicholas on the other hand is much 
dreaded. He is stated for some years past to have maintained a regular 
intercourse with liberals of Berlin, as well as of the younger branches of 
the Royal Family of Prussia, all of whom are stated to have...opinions 
inconsistent with the principles of the Holy Alliance.(53)
Other than, in Gentz’s words, ‘sa passion pour les details du service ou, pour mieux dire, de 
/ 'exercice militaire\54), the character of the new Tsar was unknown to Europe. The 
British Government was no less concerned. Nicholas’s accession was followed almost 
immediately by the outbreak of war with Persia, thus seeming to confirm an image of a ruler 
bent on a ‘career of youthful conquest’.(55)
The most pressing question for Nicholas concerned, however, not Persia but Turkey 
and whether Alexander’s decision for war was to be upheld. Much has been written 
concerning the new Tsar’s thinking on the Eastern Question; the simple truth, however, is 
that Nicholas, being unacquainted with the facts of this complicated matter, deferred to the 
advice of his Foreign Minister, following his counsel almost to the letter. Nesselrode 
himself had passed through something of a political conversion since 1821; the spectacle of 
the succession of failed conferences over Greece had led him, some time in 1825, to discard 
his previous pro-Austrian, pro-Congress policy (with regard to the Eastern Question) and 
join the Russian war party. Uneasy, however, of the possible consequences of unilateral 
Russian action, he hoped to entice Britain into an alliance against the Porte - an idea which 
Alexander had been toying with since the summer of 1825. In short, Nesselrode, 
developing the germ of a policy adopted by Alexander in 1825, became the main driving 
force behind Russia’s Eastern policy in the period 1826-29.(56)
Nesselrode outlined his position to the Tsar thus: the allied Powers were conspiring 
to secure Russian inactivity and forcing her cabinet, ‘a renouncer aux principes qu’il avait 
toujours soutenus et suivis dans les affairs d’Orient, d’y aneantir les bases de ses relations 
et de son influence’. Nesselrode believed that the failure of Strangford’s mission and the 
revelation of the ‘depopulation scheme’ made coercive action against the Porte both 
justified and necessaiy. Russia was to offer one last ultimatum to the Sultan regarding the 
various Russo-Turkish treaty contraventions, whilst intervention over Greece was to be 
secured if possible via a British alliance.(57) The proposal, after a period of uncertainty, 
was accepted and formed the basis of the Anglo-Russian negotiations when Wellington 
arrived in St Petersburg a few weeks later.
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f t * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The origins of the Wellington mission and the resultant Protocol of 4 April 1826 are
intricately bound up with the foreign policy of Canning. The tenure of this, the most insular
of British foreign secretaries, was marked by hostility to the European Concert and towards
Austria and the Holy Alliance in particular. Throughout the nineteenth century his
controversial policies, such as the recognition of the revolting Spanish colonies or
opposition to French intervention to restore the Spanish throne were taken as a mark of a
‘liberal’ foreign policy. An antithesis was established between Canning’s ‘liberal’ and his
predecessor Castlereagh’s ‘reactionary’ policy. This long-held view was eventually
overturned in the first decades of this century by the founders of diplomatic history in
Britain - C. Webster and H. Temperley. The new orthodoxy was that of a continuity, not a
change, in the underlying principle of the two men’s policies. Castlereagh established the
precedent that the European Concert was formed solely against external danger - not
internal revolution and Canning continued it in practice.(58) Canning, more than once,
acknowledged this fact himself:
[Mettemich] contends...that the Alliance was framed against the 
dangers of internal revolution: he admits, I presume that it was also 
framed against ambitious aggression from without. We contend that it 
was framed wholly against the latter danger...I thought that 
the...declarations of my predecessor...in the confidential memorandum 
respecting Spain, had set this question entirely at rest.(59)
The main difference between the two men was that Canning was more explicit and indeed
proud of his divergence with Europe; this was most evident in dealings with Mettemich,
with whom Canning was in a thinly-veiled state of animosity:
I do think it very inadvisable to face into conflict (as Prince Mettemich 
appears resolved to do) the abstract principles of Monarchy and 
Democracy...[he] seems to think that there is no security for peace 
between nations, unless every nation is at peace with itself; and that 
pure Monarchy is the charm on which such internal tranquillity 
depends...“There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the 
stars”...but Prince Mettemich is of the opinion that all should be alike: 
he is even for trying his hand upon us - to make our glory as like to that 
of the sun and moon of the continent...but he had better leave us quiet in 
our sphere, or we shall make most inharmonious music.(60)
Perhaps the greatest conflict between the two men was over Eastern matters. Canning had 
refused to attend the allied conferences over Greece and, instead, took several unilateral 
measures such as the recognition of Greek belligerency in 1823 which served to strengthen 
his reputation as a ‘liberal’ and now as a philhellene.(61) This view was also overturned by
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Temperley; for although Canning took several practical measures necessitated by the de
facto existence of Greek power, he had no real sympathy for the Greek cause in itself.
Canning’s main object throughout was, ironically enough, exactly the same as Mettemich’s
- through dilatory action to delay any allied decision over Greece thus, hopefully, restraining
Russia from intervention. It was only after Alexander had split from his allies in mid-1825
and news of the ‘depopulation scheme’ arrived in London (December 1825) that Canning,
fearing a Russian declaration of war, decided to ally himself with Russia as a means of
controlling her. (62)
Though it has been criticised,(63) there is much to recommend the accuracy of
Temperley’s thesis; Canning himself acknowledged the underlying unity of Anglo-Austrian
aims over Greece:
...we are working in the sense of Austria - though not in concert with 
her - and if not in concert, only because we had reason to believe...that 
our best chance of success in pursuit of a common object, was to pursue 
alone...Our object, however, is, you may assure Prince Mettemich, a 
common object.(64)
A weak link in the thesis, however, is that, firstly, Russia was somehow unwittingly 
forced into and then shackled by the British alliance; secondly, that as a result of the 
alliance Russia compromised her commitment to allied unity, so allowing Canning to 
achieve his aim of destroying the Congress system.(65) For one, the first overture for a 
separate Anglo-Russian understanding came not, as has been suggested, by Alexander, as a 
final act of desperation in mid-1825(66) but by Canning himself some six months earlier. 
Following Alexander’s decision in December 1824 to break off all communications with 
Britain over Greece,(67) Canning, far from being ‘not at all disturbed’,(68) was sufficiently 
concerned to use Stratford Canning, currently on a mission to St Petersburg (for the 
settlement of the disputed American North-West frontier) to raise the Greek question with 
Nesselrode. During a series of meetings in March 1825 Stratford asked Nesselrode to 
suspend the conferences on Greece to allow for a ‘frank and unreserved discussion’ on the 
question between the two Powers.(69) Stratford then expressed Britain’s readiness to offer 
its mediation ‘upon application...from either of the contending parties’ (Turks or 
Greeks).(70) Nesselrode was interested but felt Britain’s offer ‘too vague’ and wanted an 
agreement concerning the option of force, so as not to ‘tie up its [Russia’s] hands’ in the 
event of it becoming necessaiy.(71) As Stratford had no authority to concede this, the 
negotiations ceased; but the groundwork for a separate Anglo-Russian agreement had, 
nevertheless, been laid. Stradford expressed the hope that ‘at some more favourable
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season* further negotiations would allow for ‘the accomplishment of that important object
which the two powers professed equally to have at heart’.(72)
Two months after their last meeting Stratford, unexpectedly and at great haste made
his way to Warsaw where Nesselrode was currently residing. Though again no specific
agreements were made, Nesselrode considered that Canning was now definitely serious
about a separate agreement, the reason being:
...que plus le ministere anglais nous croira resolus d’aborder et de 
trancher cette grand question sans sa cooperation, plus pourrons esperer 
de le voir se rapprocher graduellement de nos principes et nos 
voeux. (73)
Nesselrode made it clear that the granting of ‘moyens coercitifs’ against the Porte was a 
sine qua non of any agreement; thus if war broke out, Britain would be forced to adopt ‘une 
attitude passive’. Finally, Nesselrode was adamant that ‘que pour entendre avec la Grande- 
Bretagne, nous n’abandonnerons pas nos autres allies’; if that was the aim of Canning’s 
overtures, then ‘elles manqueraient necessairement leur objet’.(74)
In short, Nesselrode had worked out Canning’s plan to the letter.(75) Although 
Pozzo di Borgo and Kh. A. Lieven had previously voiced their suspicion of Canning, 
Nesselrode and the Tsar were insistent on a policy of ensnaring Canning.(76) Thus when 
Madame Lieven, during her visit to St Petersburg (June- August 1825) was commissioned 
by Alexander to begin a rapprochement with Britain(77) it was already known that Canning 
himself desired it.(78) Following her return to Britain, Count Lieven and Canning began 
negotiations whilst Madame Lieven broke off her affair with Mettemich and turned her 
attentions to the man she had earlier deemed a ‘Jacobin Minister’.(79) After an interlude 
caused by Alexander’s death and the interregnum, this policy was continued under the new 
Tsar. Nesselrode was the guiding force behind the British alliance and its continuation into 
the Nicholaevan era.(80)
In order to finalise the Anglo-Russian accord over Greece in a joint declaration 
Canning despatched Wellington to St Petersburg in the Spring of 1826. Both the aims and 
execution of this mission have excited much controversy. Expecting to find the new Tsar in 
belligerent mood over Greece, the Duke instead, reported that Nicholas cared nothing for 
the Greeks and was concerned only for the rectification of the various Russo-Turkish treaty 
disputes which has plagued their relations since 1812.(81) Nicholas threatened war unless 
the Turks responded to one last ultimatum.(82) Wellington eventually accepted this
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measure and stated that in the event of a Turkish refusal to negotiate, Britain would not 
interfere in the resulting Russo-Turkish war, other than through the offering of ‘good 
offices’. (83)
Following the despatch of the ultimatum on 5 March OS and the arrival, four days
later of Count Lieven, Nicholas abruptly raised the Greek question. It has been argued that
this was all a carefully designed ploy to send the Duke on a ‘false trail’.(84) Whilst this
version cannot entirely be discounted, a less conspiratorial explanation may be offered. The
new Tsar, by Nesselrode’s own admission, was not yet well informed on Eastern
matters(85) and, in any case, preoccupied by other, more pressing matters:
In the very next room to that in which I received the Duke, the 
commission was still sitting, charged with the interrogation of those 
unhappy men, who had taken part in that horrible conspiracy. Was it 
time to think of other matters? Neither the Protocol, nor subsequent 
Treaty were acts of mine.(86)
Nicholas, having recently suppressed one uprising in his own nation, seems to have been in 
no mood to support rebels in another. Moreover, the Tsar was presently being advised on 
foreign policy matters not by Nesselrode but by Constantine, who was known for his pro- 
Turkish sympathies.(87) It seems likely therefore that it was only with the arrival of Lieven 
(possibly with instructions from Canning) that Nicholas understood the significance of an 
agreement with Britain - Russia’s foreign policy aim for some time. Lieven may have also 
impressed Nicholas to act by tales of the ‘depopulation scheme’ - one circumstance which, 
by the Tsar’s own admission, would definitely warrant intervention.(88)
In any case, negotiations began and eventually resulted in the Protocol of 4 April 
1826.(89) Allied mediation over Greece was proclaimed and justified by a recent Greek 
request for mediation from Britain.(90) . The document pledged the two powers (and any 
others which wished to join them) to mediate between the two waning factions for the 
purpose of establishing an semi-autonomous Greek province within the Ottoman Empire 
(art.I). Subsequent controversy however was to revolve around article III; if the Sultan did 
not accept allied mediation, then ‘quelque soit d’ailleurs l’etat des relations de S.M. 
Imperiale avec le Gouvemement Turc’, the two Powers would, nevertheless, continue ‘soit 
en commun, soit separement’ to seek reconcilliation between the belligerents. In other 
words, even if Russia declared war on the Porte the Protocol was to remain in force; if 
Britain procrastinated over her obligations, then Russia could offer her mediation alone.
It has been argued that Wellington either did not know what he was signing, or, was 
cajoled into doing so by the Russians.(91) Neither view is credible. In his instructions,
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Canning had made it clear that the aim of an agreement over Greece was to ‘induce the 
Emperor of Russia to forego, or at least to suspend an appeal to arms’ ;(92) Wellington 
however objected - ‘if war is on any account favourable to them, I don’t think I can prevent 
it’.(93) Russia, having spent almost five fruitless years trying to persuade its allies that 
mediation could only work if backed with the threat of force, was not about to conclude an 
agreement that denied such a measure. The Duke had in fact been set an ‘impossible 
mission’. (94)
Two Russian proposals for the eventual article IQ mentioned Russia’s right, in the 
event of Turkish refusal to accept mediation, for ‘une guerre’ and ‘mesures coercitives’.(95) 
Wellington substituted these explicit terms for the phrase already mentioned (quelque soit 
d’ ailleurs l’etat...)(96) - a phrase, indeed, so contrived, as to suggest that many hours were 
laboured upon it in an attempt to give Russia its right to war whilst attempting to allow 
Britain (albeit unsuccessfully) to save face. Wellington did, however, gain one (nominal) 
success; a Russian clause denying the aim, in the event of war, of an increase of ‘les 
possessions de la Russie en Europe'(97) was substituted by Wellington for a more 
satisfactory version (the eventual art.V).(98) All this demonstrates that the Duke was in the 
full possession of his senses and sought only to make the best of an extremely difficult 
situation.
Which side profited most from the Protocol? Temperley’s idea of a wholesale 
British victory(99) is untenable. Whilst it is true that Wellington secured a suspension of 
war, the ultimate price paid was the sanctification of the eventual Russo-Turkish war and 
the paralysis of Britain opposition to it. Canning did not achieve his aim of hoping ‘to save 
Greece through the agency of the Russian name upon the fears of Turkey without a 
war’ .(100) The more popular interpretation of a Russian victory is closer to the mark.(101) 
However, it must be remembered that Russia’s victory in 1826 was as yet nominal; she still 
had to secure Austria’s consent to coercive measures, or risk her alienation and an Austrian- 
led anti-Russian coalition. Russia indeed had also to fight and win a Turkish war - an 
enterprise far more difficult than had as yet been thought.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
By 1826, military planning had progressed from the formulation of general strategic 
principles to the making of concrete preparations.(102) Nicholas’ threat to declare war 
unless the Porte accepted the aforementioned ultimatum was not idle. In April 1826 the 
Tsar accepted a plan to occupy the Principalities.(103) Although the subsequent
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negotiations at Akkerman (which began in July 1826) postponed its execution, a deadline 
was set for an agreement (25 September 1826 OS) after which the Second Army would 
push to the Danube.(104) With war now a distinct possibility, the problem of the 
settlements of Zaporozhtsy and Nekrasovtsy was brought to the fore and the High 
Command initiated discussions on Russian policy towards them.(105)
Although the Russian and Turkish delegations did eventually come to an agreement 
at Akkerman, elements within the military remained unimpressed. One report argued that 
the Turks were only negotiating to win time, allowing Britain to assist them ‘a preparer a 
une defense active’. Austria’s friendship was becoming ‘plus en plus douteuse’ and the 
threat of an eventual Anglo-Austrian bloc against Russia was seen as a distinct 
possibility.(106) Fear of Mettemich’s intentions increased throughout late 1826 and 1827, 
especially with the receipt of intelligence of Austria’s military aid to the Porte.(107)
Kiselev added to such worries when he reported various Austrian intrigues in the 
Principalities. Austria’s aim was to force from the Boyars a request for Austrian protection 
in order to ‘legitimer l’occupation de la Wallachia’ by its troops.(108) Such a move would 
effectively block any Russian advance across the Danube. Russia would then either have to 
back down or declare war against Austria. It was this shadow of Austrian intervention that 
was to plague Russian foreign and military policy until the very end of the war in 1829.
The threat of an anti-Russian coalition however temporarily subsided following the 
signature of the Treaty of London in July 1827. This document, which largely repeated the 
terms of the 1826 Protocol, was important in two respects; first, France was added to the 
Anglo-Russian alliance over Greece(109); second, a secret clause added that, should the 
Porte refuse a request for an armistice, the allies were themselves to enforce it, ‘sans 
toutefois prendre part aux hostilites entre les deux parties contendantes’- another contrived 
phrase designed to fudge the question of coercive measures. The context of allied 
intervention, however, was clear enough - to prevent supplies arriving by sea to Ibrahim 
Pasha and his Egyptian forces in Greece.(llO)
The Sultan did refuse and a joint allied naval squadron under the command of the 
fiery philhellene Admiral E. Codrington was despatched to the Mediterranean in August. 
Stratford, in his instructions, informed the latter that he was to achieve his mission through 
peaceful means, though in the last instance ‘by cannon shot’ (a phrase he later regretted).
( I l l )  Ibrahim however remained stubborn and when some of his forces opened fire on the 
allied fleet, the Battle of Navarino (20 October 1827) began.(112) It ended with the
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destruction of almost the entire Turco-Egyptian fleet. Canning, one of the chief architects
of allied intervention had died on 8 August and did not live to see it.
Whilst it remains unclear whether Canning would have approved of Codrington’s
actions, the Russians were clearly jubilant. In September, Nicholas, suspecting British
intransigence, had expressed his intention to enforce the 1827 Treaty unilaterally, through
the occupation of the Principalities (though, nominally, in the name of all the allies).(113)
Such a measure would of course have been controversial and may even have led to Britain’s
withdrawal from the Treaty. Events at Navarino turned such calculations on their head.
The Sultan, in his fury, refused all talk of allied mediation so causing the allied ambassadors
to quit Constantinople in November.(114) He then issued a proclamation which preached
the coming of a Holy war and declared the Convention of Akkerman nullified.(115) These
two acts of defiance played into Russia’s hands, for they de facto, if not de jure, sanctified
a Russian declaration of war. Certain other European political developments in late 1827
also favoured Russia. Canning’s premiership had been succeeded by the stopgap
administration of Lord Goderich, whilst in France the pro-Russian diplomat La Ferronays
had become Foreign Secretary.(116) This further reduced the risk of Britain or France
opposing Russia’s right to war.
Whilst a declaration of war by Russia seemed to be increasingly probable, the
question of the war plan remained very much in the balance. Nicholas considered a Balkan
crossing a military and political risk and preferred the more conservative option of a
‘military demonstration’ through the occupation of the Principalities - an option that was
also far less likely to incur the wrath of Austria and Britain. Kiselev’s fears that his
brainchild was to be discarded were first raised in August 1827 proposals arrived from
Diebitsch stating the need to prepare some 160,000 men for action but remaining silent on
the question of operational details.(117) In September, Diebitsch ordered the Second Army
to push to the Pruth and to be prepared for action in January the following year or even
sooner. No mention was made of any concrete plan; only that the Tsar wished for the
‘immediate occupation the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia upon first
demand’.(118) With Diebitsch unable, or unwilling, to convince Nicholas of the merits of
the more decisive option, it was left to Kiselev to do so:
I would suppose that the aim of the war consists in forcing the Ottoman 
Porte to agree to the terms made to it. For this, a detached war in the 
provinces is insufficient; instead the very capital of the state should be 
threatened. In order to achieve this...the long and drawn-out system of 
previous wars must be set aside and, by quickly bringing the theatre of 
war to Rumelia, Constantinople is to be conquered, or an advantageous 
peace gained under its walls.
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Thus Kiselev repeated his idea that a short, sharp offensive on Constantinople should not be
seen as a means of destroying the Ottoman Empire, but as the only sure way of forcing the
Porte to accept Russian treaty demands. Kiselev proposed dividing the 160,000 man force
into one reserve (consisting of one cavalry corps) and two battle groups (of, respectively,
one and two infantry corps). The smaller battle group was to secure the Danube and
‘besiege or blockade* all the Turkish fortresses from Varna to Rustchuk, whilst the larger
was to cross the Balkans and besiege Burgas in conjunction with a naval assault. This latter
operation was considered ‘the most important...of the war’, for Burgas was to act as a
supply depot for the army. Chance had it that the destruction of the Ottoman fleet at
Navarino in fact made Kiselev’s proposal of combined naval-land operation more feasible
than it otherwise would have been. Finally, some battalions were to be sent to raise a
Serbian army to distract enemy forces and protect Russia’s right flank.(119)
Fearing a disagreement between the Second Army and St Petersburg, Diebitsch
proposed the following solution. Should the Porte’s actions force Russia to cross the Pruth
in the autumn/winter of 1827, then:
Our first movement should in no way lead to us to carry the war across 
the Danube - an action we should do the utmost to avoid due to political 
considerations and as this is His Majesty’s own wish.(120)
Instead the Principalities were to be occupied to lend force to negotiations.(121) Should, 
however, the Porte have refused allied demands by the Spring of 1828 then ‘our offensive 
should be rapid and decisive’.(122) Diebitsch enclosed a plan for a Balkan crossing(123) 
which essentially followed Kiselev’s above-mentioned plan but, characteristically, explicitly 
stated the need for the capture of Shumla. With the (unexpected) acceptance of the need to 
raise Serbian militia units in such a war, Kiselev’s victory seemed almost complete.
A lingering doubt however still existed; for whilst Nicholas and his entourage 
accepted, as a measure of last resort, the need for a Balkan crossing, they sincerely hoped, 
for ‘political considerations’, that the Porte would not push Russia that far. Essentially this 
was due to the unpredictability of Austria’s response. Russia’s desire not to antagonise her 
Holy Alliance partner was most clearly revealed in Nesselrode’s instructions to 
Wittgenstein regarding the hypothetical scenario of Austria occupying the Principalities 
during Russia’s southwards advance. In such an event, Wittgenstein was to request ‘par 
une simple invitation’ that the Austrians withdraw. If Austrians refused he would have to 
wait up to twenty days for further instructions to arrive from St Petersburg, leaving the
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position of the army ‘tres embarassante’. Instead, Wittgenstein argued that such an 
Austrian occupation should be treated as Tequivalent d’une declaration de guerre’.(124)
A compromise solution was found. In the first instance Wittgenstein was to invite 
the Austrian commanders ‘a se retirer’, should they refuse the Russian army was to 
continue its march. If the Austrians made no attempt to block this advance, they were to be 
treated as ‘amis et allies’, but if they resisted, then Wittgenstein was to repulse ‘la force par 
la force’.(125) In order to avoid such an unpleasant situation altogether Nicholas also 
proposed the formation of an avant-garde which, with the beginning of hostilities, was to 
race to Bucharest and pre-empt an Austrian counter-advance into Wallachia.(126) 
Wittgenstein estimated this force (composed of Cossacks) could reach its destination in six 
days, whilst both Principalities could be fully occupied in seventeen.(127)
Since it was clear by the end of December that the Turks were not about to invade 
the Principalities a final decision had to be made regarding the proposed Balkan crossing 
and Russia’s war aims. Nesselrode outlined the position of the Foreign Ministry in a note 
of 20 December OS.(128) Nesselrode accepted the need for war to enforce the 1827 July 
Treaty but was concerned with the attitude of Austria and especially Britain. Whilst it was 
true that with France Prussia and the United States pro-Russian, Britain was unlikely to risk 
war, the key to retaining her passivity was by keeping Russia’s war aims very limited. 
Russia was to reaffirm her existing treaty rights with the Porte, enforce the allied settlement 
on Greece but seek no territory in Europe. Nesselrode argued Russia was territorially 
satiated and that conquest, ‘en etendant son territoire, affaibliraient sa puissance’ and, for 
all their stubbornness, Russia ‘ne peut avoir de voisins plus commodes que les Turcs’.
Thus Kochubei’s ‘weak neighbour’ policy was reaffirmed. After the war Russia would 
become the protector of Greece, Serbia and the Principalities, so greatly increasing her 
influence over the Porte - indeed he wrote ‘il sera difficile de creer un gouvemment qui se 
trouve plus completement sous sa [Russia’s] dependence’. Nesselrode did not yet envisage 
the independence of Greece - she was to be granted internal autonomy and turned into an 
‘etat commercial’ able to handle Russia’s sea trade. He did, however, favour generous 
borders for the new ‘state’.(129) Finally, certain acquisitions in the Caucasus were needed 
- primarily Anapa and Poti, which were used by the Turks to incite rebellions in Russia’s 
Muslim territories.(130)
Nicholas, possibly swayed by Kiselev, accepted that these war aims could only be 
achieved by a Balkan crossing and on 25 December 1827 OS Diebitsch duly presented such 
a plan.(131) With the first sign of dry weather (estimated to be on 15 March 1828 OS) the
135
6th and 7th Corps were to occupy the Principalities. The Danube was not to be crossed 
until around mid-May however due to the lack of animal forage before that date. The above 
forces were to push south and in June cross the Balkans and occupy Burgas - the army’s 
supply depot. In the meantime the 3rd Corps was to have almost completed the sieges of 
Silistria, Brailov and Varna (for some reason the problem of Shumla was not mentioned). 
Units from the other two corps were to take Adrianople by 20 August OS and reach 
Constantinople between 15 September and 15 October OS.(132)
As for the question of Austrian intervention, Diebitsch had adopted Wittgenstein’s 
bellicose tone:
It is difficult to suppose that this Power will take [illegible] action 
against us, for she cannot but sense that in deciding to obstruct the 
flying of our banners in the capital of the Ottomans she will face the 
danger of seeing them in her very own capital.
If Austria did, however, intervene:
Then, before crossing the Danube, we must direct our main forces 
against Austria. The Polish Army combined with the Lithuanian 
Corps...and supported by parts of the First Army will operate from one 
direction. Your Army will operate from another by occupying only the 
Principalities and using your reserves to conquer Bukovina and support 
action in Galicia.(133)
This seemingly irreversible resolution to act decisively was however rocked by 
political developments. For following the fall of Goderich’s administration, Wellington was 
made Prime Minister in January 1828. Slighted by the events of April 1826 and as 
Turcophile as ever, the Duke was in no mood to allow the Russians another victory. The 
King’s Speech of 29 January deemed Turkey an ‘ancient ally’, Navarino - an ‘untoward 
event’ and expressed the ‘confident hope’ there would be no ‘further hostilities’.(134). 
Nesselrode drew the inference that Britain did not want to enact the July 1827 Treaty and 
feared that this would spur on the designs of Austria.(135) Suspicion was further raised 
when, in February, Wellington refused a request from La Ferronays to accept a Russian 
proposal for its army to occupy the Principalities in the name of the allies.(136) Added to 
this, Grand Duke Constantine, still opposed to a Turkish war, continued to make spurious 
claims that Prussia - long-regarded as Russia’s firm ally, was in fact joining Austria. 
Constantine, who had already interfered with Russia’s war planning by refusing to allow the 
Polish Army to join the Second Army, reported on 14 February OS that the Prussians were 
‘prets & marcher dans le 24 heures’.(137)
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Fearing the political consequences of a Balkan crossing Nicholas had a change of 
heart. On 20 February OS Diebitsch informed Wittgenstein that the Tsar wished for the 
Second Army to limit its offensive inthe first instance to an occupation of the Principalities. 
The war plan of 25/31 December 1827 OS was ostensibly still in force but the Danube was 
not to be crossed until ‘circumstances take a positive turn’. The starting date of hostilities 
put back to 20 April OS; thus even if a Balkan crossing was to be attempted, the army had a 
month less to complete it than was originally intended (in die plans of 25/31 December 
1827 OS).(138) Privately, Nicholas confided in Constantine his hope that an invasion of 
the Principalities alone would suffice to achieve Russia’s aims.(139) As a result Milosh 
Obrenovich was informed that his services were not required and that the Serbs were to 
Temain catai.(140) No doubt this decision ^ vas also intended to avoid further antagonising 
Britain, which had already voiced its concerns regarding a Serbian uprising.(141)
The Second Army was not perturbed by this change in starting date. Kiselev had 
already proposed 15 April OS due to the severity of the winter.(142) Wittgenstein 
concurred, adding that tiiis postponement was also needed for reserves to be brought 
forward.(143) Both, however, were still thinking very much in terms of a Balkan crossing 
and Diebitsch was forced to lessen their zeal for such an enterprise stating that ‘our political 
situation does not allow us at present to determine in any certain manner the time when 
action across the Danube is to begin’.(144)
On 21 March OS Nicholas seems finally to have decided on war.(145) The 
following day, Diebitsch revealed that ‘our political relations demand...: first the occupation 
of the Principalities, and then the crossing of the Danube’. Moreover, the opening of 
hostilities was put back to 25 April OS. The Danube was, in fact, still to be crossed 
(between 1 May and 1 June OS) but only near its delta in order to advance to the Trajans 
Wall. This was not an offensive measure but, as stated, merely an adjunct operation to the 
occupations of the Principalities (in order to shorten the army’s operational base). As part 
of operations, die fortresses Machin, Isachki, Tultcha, Brailov as well as die towns Babadag 
and Bucharest, were to be captured. Significandy, it was not stated which operations would 
follow should these operations prove insufficient to force the Sultan to sue for peace.(146)
The strategy of merely occupying the Principalities, though less likely to offend 
Europe, had however the following disadvantage - as Diebitsch informed Wittgenstein:
‘Les raisons politiques...nous obligeront plus que jamais de terminer dans une campagne les 
affaires du Levant et les differences avec le Porte’, otherwise Russia faced ‘la possiblite 
d’une coalition anglo-autrichienne’.(147) Thus for political reasons, Russia required a
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short, sharp war. The surest means of ending the war in one year was not, however, by 
occupying the Principalities but by a Balkan crossing. Nicholas, however, would not 
authorise such a daring enterprise, fearing that it would be viewed in Europe as an attempt 
to conquer Constantinople and destroy the Ottoman Empire. The dilemma thus came to 
following; what was more of a risk - a one-year war with a Balkan crossing, or, an 
occupation of the Principalities with the danger of this failing to lead to peace and thus 
forcing Russia into a possible second campaign? Nicholas clearly favoured the latter 
option; considering, however, the traditional stubbornness of the Porte, this strategy was 
ultimately based more on hope than on any realistic calculation.
♦ ♦ f t * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Meanwhile Nesselrode was inquiring into intentions of other Powers and working 
on a declaration of war. He now believed that, in all probability, Britain would not in fact 
risk a general war with Russia in 1828 as it was damaging to her trade and offered little 
gains even in victory. Should however such a war occur, Nesselrode was now certain that 
Prussia and France would, at worst, remain neutral. If Austria joined Britain then France 
would declare in Russia’s favour.(148) Did this mean Russia was prepared if necessary to 
fight a general European war for the sake of Greece? Nesselrode refused to think the 
unthinkable and avoided any definite answer. Although generally speaking, Nesselrode was 
now more optimistic about the international situation than Constantine, their differing views 
on the subject served only to impart more uncertainty to an already complicated situation.
In March, Kiselev arrived in St Petersburg to finalise military preparations and 
assist Nesselrode in the wording of the declaration.(149) The latter along with a 
‘Manifesto’ were eventually proclaimed on 14 April 1828 OS.(150) Russia declared that 
its recourse to war was justified by the Sultan’s contravention of existing Russo-Turkish 
treaties and diplomatic practice. These included the irregularities over the Treaty of 
Bucharest, the closure of the Straits to Russian shipping, Turkish interference in the Russo- 
Persian peace negotiations of 1828 and as a response to the Sultan’s Proclamation of 
December 1827 and the annulment of the Convention of Akkerman. The Declaration made 
it clear that the reasons for the coming war were not connected with the July 1827 Treaty 
but stated tentatively that Russia would ‘ne ecartera pas’ from the enactment of this treaty.
The low prominence given to the Greek cause was due primarily to the fact that 
whilst Britain and had not actually contested Russia’s right to war(151) she was obviously 
far from content at its prospect. For Russia to have declared war in the name of the July 
1827 Treaty (and, by implication, in the name of the three allies) would have only
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antagonised Britain further. Therefore reference to the Sultan’s treaty contraventions 
served, in part, as convenient fiction (although the annulment of Akkerman was probably 
sufficient in itself to cause a war, regardless of the Greeks). It is therefore incorrect to state 
that Nicholas did not go to war for Greece.(152) Nesselrode corresponded freely with 
Capodistrias of Russia’s intention to secure by war an ‘administration nationale en 
Grece’(153) and, following the declaration of war, the Greeks were sent 1.5 million roubles 
in aid and Admiral A. S. Greig instructed to supply them with ammunition and 
supplies.(154)
It is, however, true that, despite official claims to the contrary, with war now in 
sight, the temptation for extracting exclusive rights from the Sultan was proving very strong. 
Russia’s declared war aims were well established and were of no great surprise - various 
political rights for Greece, Serbia and the Principalities, the annexation of the Caucasian 
ports Anapa and Poti, a delimitation of the Danube, the destruction of certain Turkish 
fortresses and a war indemnity.(155) However, in April 1828, a new and controversial 
(secret) war aim appeared. Russia now sought unrestricted passage through the Bosphorus 
(but not the Dardanelles) for her ‘batiments de guerre’, ostensibly for the purpose of 
ensuring the unobstructed passage of Russian commercial shipping through the Straits.(156) 
Unfortunately there is no evidence as to exactly when, and by whom, this aim was first 
proposed. It had, of course, the backing of the Tsar, and it is likely that Pozzo pushed for 
its adoption.(157) Thus despite its many claims to the contrary, Russia, in attempting to 
override the ‘ancient regulation’ of the Straits (as established by the 1809 Anglo-Turkish 
Treaty), did, in fact, seek ‘exclusive influence’ in the Ottoman Empire as the result of a war 
over Greece. It is possible that since Russia, of all the allied Powers, was to carry by far 
the greatest burden of enforcing the July 1827 treaty over Greece, the Tsar believed in some 
just compensation. Alternatively (and more probably), the quest to dominate the right of 
passage through the Straits was seen as the final, missing piece of the ‘weak neighbour’ 
policy.
Whatever the truth, on 25 April 1828 OS, the Second Army, as planned, crossed the 
Pruth and hostilities commenced. Within days, Nesselrode reported that Austria was 
preparing for war and believed the sole means of forestalling this was by ‘la rapidite des 
nos mouvements’ and a quick and successful end to the war. (158) It was thus left to the 
army to rescue Russia from a predicament, the dangers of which the Foreign Ministry could 
postpone, but not ultimately avert.
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(1) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.885, f.2, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 17 August 1826 OS.
(2) The above commentary is based on RGIA, fond 673, op.l, d.223, ff.2-3, ‘O 
partizanskoi voine’, Liprandi; Epanchin, Ocherk, I, pp. 174-95.
(3) N. Luk’ianovich, Opisanie Turetskoi voiny 1828 i 1829 godov (St Petersburg, 1844), I, 
p. 242.
(4) Ibid., I, p. 205.
(5) In contemporary parlance, wars could be fought either ‘methodically’/‘systematically’ 
[metodicheski, sistematicheski\ or ‘offensively’/4decisively’ [inastupatel'no, reshitel'no]. 
The former roughly corresponded to the precepts of the ‘limited’ warfare of the eighteenth 
century. The army would only extend its operational line into hostile territory as it extended 
its own operational base. This entailed the systematic besieging of all the enemy’s 
fortresses (within one’s intended operational base). Once achieved, the army could 
continue its advance, safe in the knowledge that it left no enemy forces were left on its 
flanks or in its rear, and able to use the captured fortresses as supply depots in order to 
extend its magazine chain. This form of warfare, though extremely slow, suited the political 
aims in the period of ‘limited warfare’ as it was believed that the fall of each fortress would 
add to one’s diplomatic leverage and force the enemy to sue for peace. Though such a 
strategy could work against a European enemy, it could not work against the Turks. The 
latter held fortresses such as Silistria and Shumla that were so strong that the prospect of 
conquering them both was negligible. Added to the Sultan’s traditional stubbornness in 
suing for peace it was clear to many that such ‘methodical’ warfare offered no prospect of a 
quick, decisive war and an advantageous peace. The 1806-12 war, which was fought 
‘methodically’, offered ample evidence to support this view. In contrast, ‘offensive’ 
warfare involved a deep penetration of the enemy territory. Enemy fortresses were to be 
left in the rear, and instead, the army was to pursue one of two objects, either (i) to seek out 
and destroy the enemy’s main forces in the field, or (ii) capture a decisive strategic object 
such as the enemy capital. This type of warfare was practised, most notably by Napoleon, 
though, according to Soviet writers, also by A. V. Suvorov and M. I. Kutuzov, Epanchin, 
Ocherk, II, pp. 9-10; Clausewitz, On War, pp. 394-95; V. A. Liakhov, Russkaia armiia i 
flot v voine s ottomanskoi Turtsiei v 1828-1829 godakh (Iaroslavl’, 1972), p. 300.
(6) As part of his study on previous Russo-Turkish wars, Kiselev placed great emphasis on 
the gathering of maps and other topographical information relating to the Balkan passes, 
RGVIA, fond 14057, op.2, d. 13, f f l  l-16v, ‘Otchet’. This was certainly needed as, he 
considered that the Balkan theatre is ‘hardly known to us...by legend the Balkan mountains 
have been represented as an insurmountable barrier, so serving as an excuse for the idleness 
of the army - but on what is this [representation] based?’, RGVIA, fond 450, d.4, ff.4-5v, 
Note of Kiselev, 1819. Kiselev believed that ‘European Turkey is so little known in terms 
of its topographical...situation that, during the wars against the Turks, the actions of our 
armies have always been marked by a certain indecisiveness from which these wars have 
been prolonged and success has been paid for by great sacrifices’, RGIA, fond VUA,
d. 18237, f f l -2, Note of Kiselev, n.d. To rectify this problem, in 1820, Kiselev proposed 
sending officers from his Quartermaster Staff (disguised as merchants) to the Balkans to 
gather topographical and other information, ibid. Such a task was, however, impossible to 
execute without knowledge of the languages of the region. Therefore in the same year 
Kiselev submitted proposals regarding the teaching of Turkish, Greek, Serbian and 
Bulgarian in the educational institutions of Novorossiia. Khar’kov University was to take 
the lead in the study of these languages and train future teachers and translators, RGVIA, 
fond 14057, op.ll/182a, sv .ll, d.2, ff.55-56v, Note of Kiselev, n.d. Kiselev’s proposals 
eventually resulted in the sending of a certain Berg (probably Colonel F. F. Berg, the future 
Field Marshal) on a mission to Bulgaria, RGVIA, fond 450, d.4, ff.l-3v, Diebitsch to Berg, 
15 July 1826 OS. From 1826-27, Berg and his colleagues travelled over 2,000 versts, 
discovering in the process all the major routes from the Danube to Constantinople including
140
five passes across the Balkans, ibid., d.5, ff.17, Berg to Nesselrode, 10 February 1827 OS. 
None of these passages were fortified by the Turks, ibid, ff.43-48, Berg to Nesselrode, 10 
February 1827 OS. As a result of Berg’s mission, Russian cartography was greatly 
improved, see a list of maps in RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 18238. Kiselev did not believe, 
however, that sufficient intelligence could be gathered from one ad hoc mission. Indeed, as 
early as 1820, he cited the need for Quartermaster Staff officers to be permanently attached 
to Russian consulates in European Turkey. They were to act as military attaches, providing 
constant intelligence on the Ottoman army, RGVIA, fond 14057, op. 11/182a, sv .ll, d.2, 
ff.55-56v, Note of Kiselev, n.d. It is clear from a recent study on the origins of military 
attaches in Russia, G. Persson, ‘The Russian Army and Foreign Wars, 1859-1871’, Ph.D. 
(London, 1999), pp. 60-67, that Kiselev was ahead of his time in recognising their 
importance.
(7) Liprandi wrote of Adrianople, that ‘[in all Europe] there can hardly be a strategic point 
more important than this one’, RGIA, fond 673, op.l, d.223, f.2v, ‘O partizanskoi voine’.
(8) ‘Plan, podannyi Grafom Suvorovym na utverzhdenie Eia Velichestvu Russkoi 
Imperatritse v 1795’, RA, 1914, No.6, pp.162-76.
(9) The Dardanelles were, of course, forced by the far superior British fleet in 1807, but 
only with heavy losses and a fair degree of good fortune, Epanchin, Ocherk, m , pp. 183-84.
(10) lu. N. Guliaev, V. T. Soglaev, Feld'marshal Kutuzov: istoriko-biografisheskii ocherk 
(Moscow, 1995), pp. 239-44.
(11) Epanchin, Ocherk, n, p. 10. Kutuzov’s plan was never executed as Napoleon’s 
impending invasion of Russia forced Alexander to sign peace with the Sultan in 1812.
(12) Guliaev, Soglaev, Kutuzov, p. 247.
(13) Quoted above, p. 88.
(14) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, ch.II, ff.4-5v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 5 August 1819 OS.
The first reference to the Balkans in the correspondence of the two generals was, in fact, 
made some time earlier, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.672, ff.1-2, Diebitsch to Kiselev, 9 July 
1819 OS. Unfortunately the letter is almost entirely illegible. Kiselev also raised the matter 
with D. P. Buturlin, who replied that ‘Je crois comme vous que nos generaux ont exagire les 
difficultes de ce boulevard de la Turquie’, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.652, ch.I, Buturlin to 
Kiselev, 28 October 1819 OS.
(15) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.672, ff.7a-7b, Diebitsch to Kiselev, 23 October 1819 OS.
(16) The ‘example’ given to Kiselev by Wellington was the latter’s conduct of the 
Peninsular War, 1808-14. Wellington used the British fleet as both a means of supply and 
transport for his army. It is of some irony that Wellington, who of all British statesmen, 
was one of the most opposed to the 1828-29 Russo-Turkish War, should have (albeit 
indirectly) contributed to the formulation of the war plan itself.
(17) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.672, ff.l3-18v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 23 July 1820 OS.
(18) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.17967, f.l, Note of Diebitsch, 7 July 1821 OS. Diebitsch’s role 
regarding the origins of the 1828 war plan have been somewhat exaggerated. It is clear 
from the documents that Kiselev was the main force behind the idea that a Balkan crossing 
should be incorporated into war plans against the Ottoman Empire. Kiselev also produced 
the first such war plan (albeit in embryonic form). Diebitsch’s war plan of 1821 was not the 
first to propose a Balkan crossing (as suggested by Liakhov, Armiia, p. 97; Epanchin, 
Ocherk, n, pp. 11-12; Fadeev, Kris is, pp. 196-97), it merely made certain adjustments to 
Kiselev’s, most notably shortening the duration of the intended campaign from two years to 
one. Fadeev’s account of the development of Russian war planning, Krizis, pp. 196-201, is 
generally poor. Though there is some truth in the assertion that Diebitsch was schooled in 
the ‘scholastic’ military tradition of the eighteenth-century, his 1821 plan cannot be 
described as ‘metaphysical’, ibid., p. 196. The latter aimed at a deep offensive thrust and a 
rapid, decisive victory - the very opposite of standard eighteenth-century practice. The 
idea, ibid., p. 201, that a coastal line of operations was adopted so as to avoid the populated
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The operational line was chosen purely because it was the most direct route to 
Constantinople and allowed for combined fleet action.
(19) The idea was accepted by, amongst others, Generals A. F. Langerone, RGVIA, fond 
VUA, d.4483, ff.l-12v, ‘Projet d’une guerre offensive contre les turcs’, 6 May 1826 OS; P. 
K. Sukhtelen, ibid., d.4395, ff.l-6v, ‘Predlozhenie glavnykh dvizhenii pokhoda protivu 
Turtsii’, 12 November 1826 OS, and A. P. Chuikevich, ibid., ff.88-104, ‘Operatsionnyi plan 
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officials, such as the Finance Minister E. F. Kankrin began to offer plans for the crossing of 
the Balkans, ibid., f f l  34-55, June 1821. Later on some claimed they had in fact thought of 
it first. Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, for instance, claimed that Jomini had proposed it in 
1821, whilst he himself had offered the first concrete war plan in 1826, see his memoirs, 
‘Turetskii pokhod 1828 goda’, RS, XXIX, 1880, p. 49.
(20) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4395, ff.l 12-18v, ‘Memoire sur le plan d’operations a suivre 
dans le cas d’une guerre avec la Turquie’, D. P. Buturlin, 22 February 1822 OS.
(21) Ibid., f.l 15, Buturlin, ‘Memoire’. As the main Turkish forces were almost certain to 
be encamped in Shumla, these two conditions were, in fact, one and the same thing.
(22) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4586, ff.96-100b, Jomini to Nicholas I, ‘Observations dans la 
guerre de Turquie’, April 1828.
(23) Instructive in this respect are the views of Berg, who saw firsthand the defences of 
Shumla. He acknowledged that the fortress was the key strategic point of the theatre; its 
capture would mean ‘la conquete du pays situe entre la Danube et le Balkan’. The best 
chance for this would be in the first eight weeks of a war, as it took the Turks that long to 
assemble their forces there. Should, however, the Russian army miss this opportunity, then 
Shumla was not to be besieged at all. Instead, one part of the army was to ‘faire une 
demonstration sur Shumla et Varna, afin de reserver dans ces places la garrison et l’armee 
turque’, whilst another was to cross the Balkans in 48 hours. The Turkish army at Shumla 
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around 150,000 men, RGVIA, fond 450, d.5, ff.43-48, Berg to Nesselrode, 10 February 
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Diebitsch in 1829.
(24) VPRII/ IV, 1980, pp. 581-83, Nesselrode to Allied representatives, 14 September 
1822 OS.
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(26) Crawley, Greek Independence, p. 26.
(27) Temperley, Canning, p. 73.
(2%) Ibid., ?. 320.
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Transformation, p. 642.
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VI. THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1828-29
Preparations for War: The War Budget. Men and Supplies
Following the arrival of news of the Battle of Navarino, Diebitsch immediately 
instigated a debate over the size of the war budget for the now almost inevitable war against 
Turkey.(1) Presuming a one-year campaign and a force of approximately 155,000 men and
45,000 (cavalry and artillery) horses,(2) A. I. Chernyshev (the War Minister) estimated that 
the army required 16.6 million roubles in food supplies alone.(3) Costs were to keep rising; 
a problem exacerbated by the poor state of finances in the Second Army.(4) With the 
addition of war time wages (usually paid in silver roubles) and rations, the increase of 
artillery stocks and engineering depots, the building of hospitals, the buying of horses and 
so forth(5) the figure eventually rose to the considerable sum of 71m roubles.(6)
E. F. Kankrin, the Finance Minister, was adamant that Russia could not afford this 
sum and was prepared to take on the military establishment with his adage that ‘the cheaper 
we fight, the greater the power of Russia increases’. His argument rested on three 
premises.(7) First, Russia had no spare capital and it was imprudent to print more paper 
roubles.(8) Second, since Russia had vowed not to fight a war of conquest, the campaign 
would be shorter than envisaged and ‘in all probability, important operations will end at the 
Balkans’.(9) Finally, the army was obviously exaggerating its needs, as between 1808 and 
1812 it received a total of 68m roubles (at the current rate) in extraordinary expenses for 
fighting Turkey.
Kankrin’s own war budget, presuming a six-month war (not a year) offered, in the 
first instance, 31m roubles.(lO) Any deficiency in supplies were to be made good through 
requisitions from the Principalities and other occupied enemy territory. Chernyshev’s 
response was forthright(ll) He accused Kankrin of sacrificing the interests of the army to 
his own. True, previous Turkish wars had been less expensive but this was the ‘very reason 
for their prolonged continuation’. The system of requisitioning employed during 
Napoleonic Wars was not possible in the Ottoman Empire - an ‘underdeveloped’ region of 
‘sparse population’.
Diebitsch accepted both Chernyshev’s argument and his compromise figure of 
56m.(12) Kankrin retorted that the War Ministry already received great peacetime 
resources for a paper army of 1,296,068 men and 207,828 horses. As this was far in excess 
of the number actually at arms, the Ministry should therefore have a surplus in its budget. 
The Finance Minister was, however, defeated (probably on the insistence of the Tsar) and 
offered 61m roubles.(13) The final war budget was approved by Nicholas on 14 April OS -
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the same day as the declaration of war and only some eleven days before the Russian 
offensive was due to begin.(14)
Events were to prove all estimates woefully conservative. By the end of the year 
over 132m roubles (in extraordinary expenses) had been spent, with a further 125m 
budgeted for the 1829 campaign.(15) The financial difficulties the army encountered in 
1828 were not, therefore, due to a lack of funds as such, but to certain delays in their 
despatch caused by inter-ministerial wrangling. The great cost of the war was also to have 
implications at the eventual peace negotiations. The Turks could simply not pay the 
resulting war indemnity, tempting the Russians to raise the controversial idea of territorial 
compensation.(16)
The question of food supplies proved to be far more problematic. Chernyshev’s 
doubts over requisitioning were certainly correct and the army was forced to transport 
almost all foodstuffs with them, so creating exceptional difficulties for its supply network. 
The Russians, however, complicated matters from the outset by the practice of employing 
independent contractors to buy and transport supplies to army depots. According to 
Liprandi, a closed caste of contractors [podriadchiki] dominated the supply system in all 
wars fought between 1806 and 1830. Liprandi deemed them ‘privileged monopolists’ who 
‘constitute a special society whose conspiracy is extremely difficult to break’. By the 
existing law, these middte-men reserved: the right to annul contracts, provided they supplied 
as little as ten percent of the agreed goods. As soon as any difficulties arose, they would 
assert this right, often leaving the army in an embarrassing position. The other means of 
supply used was khoziaistvemoe rasporiazhenie [lit. ‘economic command’] - the sending 
of military commissioners to purchase supplies from landowners. These transactions were, 
however, also dominated by middlemen who took commissions of up to twenty percent.(17)
During the first year of the war, the army was, on paper, adequately supplied. Its 
demand for standard foodstuffs, flour (464,532 chetveriki) and groats [kmpa] (43,549 ch.) 
was met.(18) The main problem was the lack of oats for the horses. The demand for 
629,243 ch. could not be even half met and Diebitsch was forced to put all horses on half 
rations.(19) In July 1828, there were plans to acquire a further 200,000 ch. from 
Novorossiia, but it is most unlikely this was achieved. (20)
Corruption, inefficiency and natural wastage certainly greatly compromised these 
figures, but in 1828 the army did not quite starve, though many thousands of horses were 
lost through lack of oats, hay and natural forage.(21) A complete disaster was probably 
avoided by the capture of the port Kistendji on 12 June OS , which allowed M.S. Vorontsov
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to ferry in supplies from Novorossiia.(22) With more time to prepare and with the capture 
of other Turkish Black Sea ports, the supply problems were eased in 1829.
We turn to the much-debated question of the number of men actually used in the 
first year of the war. All calculations for expenditure and supplies were based on a force of 
c.l55,000men - composed from the 6th and 7th infantry Corps of the Second Army (79,
235 men); the 3rd infantry Corps (47,652) and the 10th infantry division (14,332) - both 
from the First Army; the 4th Reserve Cavalry Corps (14,332) and several thousand 
Pioneers.(23) However, only 115, 563 men actually entered the field at the beginning of the 
war(24) - a figure widely considered insufficient and a main cause of the failure of the 1828 
campaign.(25) The reasons for this low number are cited, variously, as being that:
Diebitsch considered this number sufficient;(26) certain units were not combat ready;(27) as 
a conscious signal of Nicholas’ commitment not to fight a war of conquest and destroy the 
Ottoman Empire(28) and that the Tsar believed ‘a mere demonstration would suffice to 
ensure the Sultan’s submission’.(29)
Whilst certain of these points have some merit, it must be remembered that roughly 
one third of the four above-mentioned Corps (roughly 40,000 men) were, as was standard 
military practice, left outside the theatre of war, as a reserve. (30) They would gradually 
enter it as the front-line units were destroyed. Nicholas, as noted, also planned to send 
units from the Polish Army as reinforcements. Thus the problem was not so much the 
number of men that entered the field at the beginning of the war in April 1828 OS, but the 
speed by which reinforcements could be brought to join or replace them. As mentioned, 
Wittgenstein as late as 15 February 1828 OS was voicing his concerns that the reserves 
were too far from the front and wanted to delay the opening of hostilities. The Polish Army 
itself was never sent due to the objections of Constantine. Instead the Guards, numbering 
some 25,000 men, were sent for in March, but arrived in the Balkans only in August 
1828.(31) It was subsequently decided in June to bring in Prince Shcherbatov’s Second 
Infantry Corps (40,000 men) to free front-line forces, though again, it could only arrive in 
September.(32) Thus though, on paper, by the end of 1828, Russia had committed up to
150,000 men to the field (with 50,000 still in reserve),(33) only insufficient numbers were 
able to reach the theatre at the critical moments, so delaying the conduct of sieges and the 
southward advance.
Preparations for war were hindered by other significant shortcomings. There was a 
serious deficiency in siege artillery. Only forty four pieces were taken (34) - enough to 
besiege only one large fortress at a time. From as early as June this hindered the southward
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advance and by August it ceased altogether. For one, the army (the units of the Second 
Army in particular) was also short of horses.(35) According to Luk’ianovich’s figures, the 
cavalry and artillery horses were eventually found, but there was certainly a deficiency in 
transport horses.(36) This, however, came as no surprise and, as early as 1826, a certain 
Captain Essen was sent to purchase 1,000 camels in the khanates of Central Asia.(37) A 
camel battalion appears, as was intended, to have actually been formed and used during the 
second campaign as transporters in mountainous terrain.(38)
Less excusable were the inept preparations for the Danubian crossing. With his 
researchers having worked on this question for many years, Kiselev should have made a 
better choice than Satunovo as the place of crossing.(39) The left bank was covered in 
swamp whilst the right towered one hundred feet above the water level and was presently 
defended by an encampment of 12,000 Turkish troops. The postponement of the war until 
the end of April OS served to coincide with the flooding of the Danube.(40) Ultimately it 
was only with the assistance of the zaporozhtsy boatmen (who had recently come over to 
the Russian side)(41) and due to a feeble Turkish resistance, that the Danube was crossed in 
May/June at all.
Another important shortcoming on the eve of war was the ambiguity created in the 
command structure following the decision of Diebitsch and the Tsar himself, to accompany 
the army on its campaign. The former, as Head of the General Staff of H.I.M., occupied the 
most powerful position in the Russian army; however, his role was that of strategic planning 
not the conduct of operations. Indeed, the Head of Staff had no legal authority whatsoever 
to interfere in the operational decisions of Commander-in-Chief. (42) Diebitsch, however, 
could not help interfering in the running of the campaign and he was to increasingly tempted 
by the prospect of leading the troops himself to a glorious victory. By the middle of 1828 at 
the latest, he had acquired designs on the very post of the Commander-in-Chief. (43) The 
latter was held by the passive Wittgenstein, who was widely considered an ‘old 
woman’.(44) This situation had already allowed Kiselev to dominate the workings of the 
Second Army and, with the ever-mounting failures of the 1828 campaign, Diebitsch and 
others entertained ideas of succeeding him. The presence of Nicholas further undermined 
Wittgenstein’s position in inviting the attentions of all generals who wished to circumvent 
the nominal command structure and forward their own military plans. The temptation also 
to catch Tsar’s eye by some great feat greatly spurred on the natural rivalry existing 
amongst the Russian generalitet.(45)
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Lord Heytesbury, who accompanied the Tsar during the second half of 1828 made
the following observation:
The presence of the Sovereign at the head of his army can never be a 
matter of indifference. It is either a great evil, or a great good. If he 
have the talent of a Frederick, or of a Napoleon, the advantage of the 
absence of all responsibility except towards himself, is incalculable. If 
he have no military talent, the disadvantage of his assuming the 
command is in the same proportion. But of all false propositions, the 
falsest and most embarrassing is that of a Sovereign accompanying his 
army in his simple capacity as Sovereign; disclaiming all intention of 
interfering, yet yielding to the pleasure of doing so at every instant; 
favouring some movements, censuring others and distributing honours 
and rewards from his own personal observation....The presence of a 
Sovereign under such circumstances paralyses everything. We have a 
proof of this before us, where in consequence of the Emperor’s 
interference, everybody commands and nobody. The Emperor himself,
General Diebitsch, General [K. Kh.?] Benckendorff, the Grand-Duke 
[Michael], General Kiselev, General [M. S.] Vorontsov, all, in short, 
except the Commander in Chief. Where there is no unity of will, there 
can be no unity of action. All falls into confusion - the fault is 
everywhere and the responsibility nowhere.(46)
Another of Heytesbury’s criticisms was that Nicholas’ imparted a conservative 
approach to the conduct of the war due to his fear of the international repercussions should 
the Ottoman Empire actually fall in battle. By the end of the first campaign certain generals 
were openly complaining that he ‘always allowed political considerations to outweigh the 
military’.(47) There is some truth to this; for as mentioned Nicholas, fearing the possibility 
of an Anglo-Austrian intervention, changed to the original war plan of 25/31 December
1827 OS (the Balkan crossing) to one of merely occupying the Principalities. Once 
hostilities began, Nicholas certainly expected the Turks to sue for peace once the 
Principalities were occupied. Nicholas thus greatly contributed to the general mood of 
complacency by presuming that the ‘war’ would, in fact, constitute a simple ‘promenade 
militaire’, akin to the recent Austrian and French campaigns in the Italian peninsula and 
Spain.(48) On the other hand, once the campaign opened, the Tsar, by most accounts, was 
resolute in action and instrumental, for instance, in the crossing of the Danube in 
May/June.(49) Moreover, by a twist of fete it was, in fact, Nicholas himself who became in
1828 one of the strongest advocates of the more daring plan of a Balkan crossing, whilst his 
generals were content to advocate more conservative courses of action.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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The Turkish preparations for war proved little better than the Russian. The Greek 
revolt had drained the Sultan’s finances and occupied some of his best troops (in particular, 
Mohammed Alps Egyptians). Although all Muslim men aged 14 to 60 had been called to 
arms, the results were disappointing.(50) Of a nominal European force of 150,000 men, 
probably only two thirds were in the actual theatre of war at any one time. Up to 40,000 of 
the total were newly-trained regular troops, formed following the massacre of the 
Janissaries in 1826. Though suffering from lack of combat experience their main defect 
was a lack of suitable officers (foreigners were debarred from entering the service). The 
Sultan stationed around half of his available troops in the fortresses of the Danube and 
Bulgaria. The rest (around 40,000, mostly regulars), forming the main offensive force of the 
Ottomans, was stationed at Shumla and given to the command, not of the Grand Vizier, 
Mehmet Selim, (as was tradition), but the Seraskier, Hussein-Aga-Pasha.(51)
When war broke out, the Turks in the Balkan theatre adopted their by now 
traditional defensive strategy of remaining in their fortresses and avoiding battle in the open 
field.(52) Events proved this strategy correct; the heat, plague and the friction of war 
generally could damage the Russians far more than the Turks ever could. Forcing the 
Russians into long sieges likewise suited the resilient Turks. Moreover, the Turkish 
Command, whether intuitively or through receipt of intelligence, had made an accurate 
prediction of Russia’s strategy. They divided the Russian war plan into the following 
periods:
1st. The occupation by the Russians of the Principalities as far as the 
Danube. 2nd. The passage of that river, and the advance of that army 
towards the Balkan mountains...3rd. The passage by the Russians of the 
Balkan mountains and the forward movement to the Capital.(53)
Aware from previous wars of the conservative nature of Russian commanders it was safe 
for the Turks to presume that phase three would only follow once their large fortresses in 
Bulgaria had been taken. The Sultan ordered his army to remain on the strategic defensive, 
avoid large encounters and use its irregular cavalry to conducting partisan-style raids on the 
Russian supply lines. He hoped that the longer the war progressed, the likelier it was for 
Britain, Austria and even Persia to join in alliance with him. In any case, it was believed 
the European powers would never allow Russia to cross the Danube let alone the 
Balkans.(54) Throughout 1828, Constantinople remained relatively calm, confident that no 
assault on the capital was forthcoming. (55)
The situation in the Caucasian theatre differed greatly from the Balkans. Here the 
Turks could constantly augment their forces with irregular troops and had a great numerical
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superiority over the Caucasus Corps.(56) If the war could be brought into the Russian 
Caucasus then there was also the prospect of inciting revolts amongst the Muslim 
inhabitants. Everything thus pointed to a Turkish offensive and readiness to face the 
Russians in the field.
The Balkan Campaign of 1828(57)
Following the opening of hostilities on 25 April OS, the first months of the 
campaign proceeded, certain delays notwithstanding, according to Diebitsch’s final plan of 
22 March 1828 OS.(58) As planned, the 6th Corps occupied Wallachia and Bucharest, 
with a ‘flying unit* [letuchii otriad\ of Cossacks racing to the Austrian border to pre-empt a 
possible Austrian intervention. The 7th Corps surrounded Brailov, whilst the 3rd Corps 
prepared for a crossing of the Danube some time in May. Although, as mentioned, there 
was a certain delay in traversing this river, most of the intended forces had crossed by the 
envisaged date of 1 June OS. The siege of Brailov proved somewhat more problematic. 
Grand Duke Michael ordered a storm on 2 June OS, but the assault failed with the loss of 
around 2,500 men killed and injured. Impressed however by the severity of the attack the 
Turks surrendered within days. The news of the capitulation caused the surrender of 
another three Turkish fortresses on the Danube and in the Dobrudja between 4 and 18 June 
OS.(59) By 6 June OS, the 3rd Corps had reached Kirasu (on the Trajans Wall), thus 
completing Diebitsch’s March plan.(60) Nicholas now hoped the Sultan would see reason 
and sue for peace.(61) The Sultan remained stubborn and only a deeper thrust into Ottoman 
territory would secure his surrender.
Unfortunately, due to the slow movement of certain units the Russian army was too 
undermanned to conduct operations much beyond an occupation of the Principalities and 
the Trajans Wall. Thus although the main striking force - the 3rd Corps - had reached the 
latter in good time, its further progress was halted. The chasseur brigade of the 7th Infantry 
Division was still across the Black Sea attacking Anapa; the 4th Reserve Cavalry Corps had 
not yet arrived; many units were still attacking and occupying the minor Danubian 
fortresses. The intended reinforcement - the 7th Corps - was still at Brailov with all the 
army’s siege artiiiery. It was therefore decided to send for the Second Infantry Corps, 
though it could only arrive in September. As the 3rd Corps had no more than 15,000 men 
available for action, further offensives were halted.(62)
When the aforementioned units (with the exception of the Second Corps) eventually 
arrived they assembled at Bazardzhik on 28/29 June OS. Russia now possessed an
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offensive force of some 45,000 men, though with units sent to guard communications and 
supply lines, this figure probably decreased by some 10,000.(63) The plan of ending the 
war through a mere occupation of the Principalities had failed, though no new war plan had 
been officially accepted.(64) The remainder of the campaign degenerated into a struggle 
between those who favoured Kiselev’s original idea of a Balkan crossing and those who 
preferred the more conservative option of ending the war at Shumla through the defeat of 
the Seraskier’s main forces there. The picture was also doubly complicated by the Russian 
lack of manpower, which increasingly allowed force of circumstance to dictate operations. 
The fate of the 1828 campaign was now to hinge on the crucial decisions taken in early July 
OS.
Nicholas initially decided to attack Varna. This port previously had no significance 
in Russo-Turkish wars as Russian commanders had always adopted their offensives against 
the Turkish centre. Kiselev’s innovation of a coastal line was however accepted as Varna’s 
capture would aliow the import of supplies from Novorossiia and link up the army with the 
navy. This operational line was also the shortest route to the Balkans. As, however a push, 
on Varna exposed the army to the danger of a Turkish flank attack from Silistria, it was 
decided to besiege this latter fortress simultaneously (with the 6th Corps, currently 
occupying Wallachia).(65)
The situation was however transformed following the receipt of a report from the 
Russian avant-garde, citing a very heavy concentration of Turkish troops near Shumla - this 
was the Seraskier’s main force o f40,000 men. As the threat of a Turkish flank attack was 
considered too great to be ignored, it was decided to postpone temporarily the siege of 
Varna and head for Shumla. Such an operation was particularly tempting as, should it 
prove successful, it would entail the destruction of organised Turkish resistance and almost 
certainly an end to the war. In any case, the planned siege of Varna was now pointless 
since the fleet had yet to arrive from the current siege of Anapa and as all the siege artillery 
was still at Brailov.(66)
A Russian strike force of 30,000 men left Bazardzhik on 4 July OS arriving at 
Enibazar three days later, where a military council was held. It was confirmed that the 
Turkish army was to be attacked but, disastrously for the Russians, it was also decided that 
even if the Turks retreated to Shumla, the fortress itself was to be attacked. Due to the very 
large Turkish garrison and insufficient Russian siege artillery both a siege and a storm were 
deemed impossible. Instead Shumla was to be ‘surrounded’ by the 3rd and 7th Corps. It is 
not entirely clear what was initially meant by this, but it eventually developed into an
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enveloping manoeuvre designed to impose a blockade - an attempt to induce that fortresses 
capitulation by severing its supply channel and forcing the garrison to fight in the open field. 
Simultaneous with this operation, Silistria was to be besieged (with 6th Corps) as well as 
Vama (when the fleet and Guards eventually anived).(67)
On 8 July 1828 OS the Russian forces arrived at Shumla. Up to 40,000 Turkish 
troops were found in the field and it was decided to give battle immediately. The Russians 
however spumed their chance of defeating the Seraskier. The actual battle lasted but a few 
hours and the Turks, after minor losses of a few hundred men, retreated to the safety of 
Shumla.(68)
Following this failure, the plan adopted at Enibazar on 7 July OS was enacted. This 
was to destroy all chance of ending the war in a single campaign. The Russian forces were 
ordered to disperse over a large area and thus the Turkish garrisons of the above three 
fortresses were all larger than each of the respective attacking Russian forces. The siege of 
Vama was delayed by the late arrival of the fleet from Anapa (22 July OS) and the late 
arrival of the Guards (28 August OS). Once the artillery arrived (4 September OS), the 
siege could begin and Vama eventually fell on the 29th OS, though under controversial 
circumstances. The planned siege of Silistria did not materialise due to the size of the 
Russian forces (only 10,000 men). By way of reinforcement the 2nd Corps arrived in 
September, though again the lack of artillery precluded any meaningful operations.(69)
The blockade of Shumla proved disastrous and was the greatest single blunder of
1828. Far from the army magazine chain the Russians soon run out of supplies and 
especially forage. The attempt to encircle Shumla failed due to regular lightning counter­
attacks by Turkish cavalry from Shumla. Such attacks increased progressively in their 
boldness and severity and following two major assaults on 14 and 27 August OS, 
Wittgenstein’s 3rd Corps was forced to scale down operations to a mere ‘observance’ of 
Shumla.(70) At one stage a full retreat was almost necessitated but, on the Tsar’s 
insistence, the Russians held on (to protect the flank of units besieging Vama) and retained 
certain units at Shumla almost to the end of the campaign.(71)
It always been unclear who exactly made the decision taken at Enibazar(72) and 
who subsequently supported it and insisted on its execution. Certain evidence, however, 
points conclusively to Jomini and Diebitsch.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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As already noted, Jomini based his theory of war on the necessity of destroying the 
main enemy forces. He had never been converted to the idea of a Balkan crossing per se - 
this was merely to be a symbolic coup de grace following a defeat of the Turkish forces at 
Shumla. From as early as June 1828 Jomini had become convinced of the dangers of such a 
crossing and did everything in his power to convince the Tsar to end the war at Shumla not 
Constantinople.(73) Ostensibly, Jomini gave as his reason the lack of troops - a Balkan 
crossing required an active force of around 80,000 men. The present number (according to 
Jomini, 50,000-60,000), meant that ‘nos forces ne sont pas sufficiantes dans le moment 
pour mener une invasion au dela du Balkan et garder en meme temps la vallee du Danube’. 
Russia had sufficient men to observe or attack Silistria, Rustchuk, Shumla and Vama, but 
not enough for ‘une invasion decisive sur Adrianople’.
Though the shortage of men was significant, one suspects that Jomini possessed 
exaggerated notions of the threat posed to Russia’s position on the Danube and the right 
flank as a whole. Events were to prove that the Turks’ incompetence in the field made their 
numerical superiority something of an irrelevance and their threat minimal. The cynic 
might, however, also point to a more hidden motive behind his opposition to a Balkan 
crossing - that Jomini was concerned lest such a manoeuvre (without a defeat of the Turks 
at Shumla) actually led to victory, thus, by consequence, destroying the basis of his theory. 
He therefore made it perfectly clear to Nicholas that ‘les regies de guerre exigerent qu’on 
s’attache a combattre et a detruire les masses organisees de l’ennemi’. He therefore 
proposed an attack on Shumla as well as on Vama and Silistria which also housed 
significant Turkish forces. These (simultaneous) attacks were to involve sieges if necessary 
and progress until the fortresses had been ‘ou reduitees ou bloquees’.
Jomini, of course, therefore agreed with the decision taken at Bazardzhik on 30 
June OS to march on Shumla. This plan was not in itself so bad; recent Turkish attacks had 
suggested the Seraskier was willing to fight and the opportunity to face them in the field had 
to be taken.(74) What was disastrous was the decision taken at Enibazar to proceed with a 
blockade of that fortress as well as concurrently undertake the siege of Vama and Silistria. 
Jomini had himself advocated this and therefore must take a good proportion of the 
blame.(75)
Jomini, however, is deserving of especial criticism because he viewed the war as 
little more than a showcase for the demonstration of the validity of his theory. He seems to 
have been as much concerned with proving the latter correct as in actually winning the war. 
As late as 29 August OS, Jomini was still demanding more attacks on the Shumla garrison
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and the simultaneous sieges of Silistria and Vama, as V est dans la destruction ou la 
dispersion de ces masses [organisees de Fennemi] qui consiste toute Fart de la guerre’.(76) 
Turning to Diebitsch, the documents show clearly that he fully concurred in 
Jomini’s fear of a Turkish flank attack from Shumla and worked hard on Nicholas to 
dissuade him from a Balkan crossing before the latter* s fall. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
Tsar, by the summer of 1828, had become converted to the idea of a Balkan crossing.
Whilst the reasons for this are not entirely clear, it seems that he was very desirous of 
ending the war in a single campaign, fearing the international repercussions of a second 
(primarily Anglo-Austrian intervention). Moreover, it was soon obvious that the blockade 
of Shumla was not working and it was worth considering alternative operations.
Therefore, in August, Nicholas, unhappy with the 3rd Corps’ inactivity at Shumla, 
proposed sending that unit in conjunction with the Guards when they arrived (via Vama) 
across the Balkans to Aidos and then pushing to Burgas to join up with the fleet. The plan 
was to be enacted regardless of whether Vama or Shumla actually fell. Shumla was merely 
to be observed by the 7th Corps (15,000 men), which was sufficient to defeat the 40,000 
man strong Turkish garrison if it entered the field.(77) It was of some irony that the Tsar, 
previously sceptical about the whole issue of a Balkan crossing, had now become its strong 
supporter.
Diebitsch, however, was pulling in exactly the opposite direction. He was adamant
that the Balkans could not be crossed until both Vama and Shumla had been taken.
Diebitsch wanted to strengthen Russia’s position at Shumla by adding the Guards and
pushing to Eski-Dzhuma to cut off the garrison’s supplies. This would be either the prelude
to the siege and capture of the fortress or a means of forcing the Turkish 40,000-man
garrison to come out and fight in the field.(78) This idea was almost certainly inspired by
Jomini’s war plan of April 1828.(79)
At Diebitsch’s request, Kiselev drew up the operational details for the
blockade.(80) Although in his earlier war plans, Kiselev had allowed for the possibility of a
blockade of Shumla, he had envisaged it as a containing measure - to guard the army’s rear
during a Balkan crossing. He certainly did not consider its capture as essential prerequisite
of a Balkan crossing. Indeed, under the present circumstances, he ruled out entirely any
hope of its capture:
In the present state of affairs, it seems that an active continuation of the 
campaign and, in particular, a strong attack on Shumla, would be very 
especially advantageous for us. For by September our forces will have 
inevitably decreased, whilst those of the enemy, doubtless, have 
increased. On the hand, it is impossible not to confess, that the
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resources here available to us are insufficient for the capture o f this 
fortress i f  the Turks intend to defend themselves. (81)
Unfortunately, due to the army’s lack of men, Kiselev ruled out a Balkan crossing and could
think of no viable course of action other than a blockade of Shumla (though what he thought
this would achieve is unclear). He believed that even when the Guards and 2nd Corps
eventually arrived:
...this will not give a sufficient [numerical] advantage in order, in late 
autumn, to act decisively and boldly on the other side of the Balkans as, 
by that time, the Ottoman forces will have increased. Thus the 
campaign of 1828 will probably end on the peaks of the Balkan 
mountains, which with capture of Shumla and Vama will give us a firm 
foundation for the preparation of the army for an early opening of the 
war in 1829.(82)
This was all veiy different from Diebitsch’s position. The latter was ideologically 
opposed to any attempt at a Balkan crossing in 1828 and, as shall be seen, it was not his 
idea to push for one in 1829. Diebitsch wanted to end the war at Shumla - this 
corresponded to his conservative instincts in the field and his essential agreement with the 
ideas of Jomini, whose theory placed the capture of that fortress (and the defeat of the main 
Turkish forces inside) as the centrepiece of any Turkish war plan. In contrast, Kiselev did 
genuinely believe in the essential validity of a Balkan crossing, and came to oppose it only 
for pragmatic and not theoretical reasons.
This said, Kiselev’s plan for the blockade was certainly an abject failure and he 
must take his fair share of criticism. More importantly, however, Kiselev allowed himself 
to be dominated by this failure and his descent into conservatism was soon to begin. By the 
end of the campaign he was almost a broken man and was to retract all his previous ideas 
regarding the Turkish war plan. He came to believe that a Balkan crossing was a 
unrealisable dream and ultimately had not the courage to advocate one in 1829.
S i c * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Following his adoption of Kiselev’s operational plan of 25 July OS (the blockade of 
Shumla), Diebitsch proceeded to resist Nicholas’ plan to withdraw the 3rd Corps and send 
it across the Balkans. Ostensibly, Diebitsch cited the effect this withdrawal would have of 
the morale of the troops and the opportunity this would give the Turks for a counter 
attack,(83) though in fact he believed Balkan crossing was impossible, or at least too great a 
risk. The case for remaining at Shumla however was becoming progressively weaker, for 
on 14 August OS the Turks mounted a strong counter-attack forcing Wittgenstein to leave
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Eski-Stambul and so destroying the Russian aim of a blockade. Although Wittgenstein 
earned for this a strong censure from Nicholas(84) the Commander-in-Chief had in fact 
always been sceptical about the whole idea of a blockade, resisting Diebitsch’s proposal to 
send the Guards there instead of to Vama.(85) Diebitsch himself was, in fact, far more 
responsible for the folly at Shumla and he continued to make matters progressively worse 
by delaying a withdrawal when Russia’s position there was already hopeless.(86) Although 
Nicholas was eventually forced to admit that ‘nous avons fait beaucoup de sottises a 
Shumla’(87) he refused to blame his favourite.
When the Guards finally appeared they were despatched, as Nicholas originally 
favoured, to Vama (they arrived on 28 August OS). Even before the siege actually began 
Diebitsch came out openly against any Balkan crossing for 1828. He stated that best that 
could be hoped for was the fall of Vama, though clung to the, by now absurd, idea that 
Shumla could still be captured.(88) Jomini himself was also still advocating this and 
perhaps Nicholas was eventually fooled into believing it.(89) In any case, as the siege of 
Vama continued up to 29 September OS(90) any idea of further meaningful operations 
became impossible.
Other than the operations at Shumla and Vama the rest of the campaign was 
unremarkable. The Turks avoided large scale encounters and limited operations to attacks 
on isolated units and on Russian supply lines. One important exception however was the 
Battle of Boeleshti, 14 September OS. Around 25,000 Turks (mostly irregular cavalry) had 
crossed Danube at Widdin and occupied Kalafat. They planned to march on Kraovo, link 
up with other forces from the Turkish Danubian fortresses, and push the Russians from 
Bucharest and Wallachia. A small Russian force o f4,200 under General Geismar 
unexpectedly attacked at night and secured a stunning victory.(91) This was a powerful 
demonstration of the Russians’ superiority in the field and of the wisdom of the Turkish 
strategy in generally avoiding such encounters. Alternatively, it also demonstrated how 
exaggerated were the Russian’s fear of the Turks’ superiority in numbers and of the actual 
threat of a flank attack from Shumla or Silistria.
The Caucasian Campaign of 1828
The role of the Caucasus Corps in a future Turkish war had received almost no 
attention from Diebitsch and Kiselev during the 1820s. The Balkan theatre was considered 
to be of paramount importance - the Caucasian, merely an adjunct. Ermolov had however 
been considering the subject and some time in 1826 submitted the following proposals.(92)
The role of his corps was, by an offensive into Anatolia, to deflect Ottoman forces away 
from the more important Balkan theatre. An attack was also the best means of defending 
the Caucasus, as the corps had too few men to hold the frontier at all points against a strong 
Turkish invading force. A Turkish occupation of the Russian Caucasus would prove 
disastrous as since there was ‘no trust in the people’ of the region (especially the Muslim 
population) and their defection to the Turkish side could not be discounted. Thus 
everything pointed to the a Russian assault on the Pashaliks of Kars and Akhaltsykh - this 
would cut of all roads and passes leading to Russian territory as well as forcing each 
individual Pasha, first and foremost, to defend his own territory, thus hindering the 
concentration of Ottoman troops (see Map C). At the time of writing, Ermolov feared a 
combined Turco-Persian attack and therefore proposed two variations of this plan, 
dependent upon the arrival of Russian reinforcements. The more defensive was to attack 
from Akhaltsykh and, if the main Turk forces (which were bound to assemble at Erzerum) 
were not too great, then to push onto Kars. All route from Persia were to be blocked The 
more ambitious was to take Kars and push to Erzerum. A Persian attack was to be halted 
by a counter flank attack into the Persian khanate of Erevan. Other than these operations 
Ermolov considered the capture of Anapa vital, as it was used by the Turks for arming the 
Circassians and other rebellious tribes.
By the time Ermolov’s successor, Paskevich, was forced to consider operations in 
early 1828, the situation was still unclear as the Persian war was not yet over. In February, 
Paskevich was informed that war with Turkey was ‘inevitable’ and the following plan 
offered.(93) The Tsar was adamant that due to the weakness of the Russian operational 
base in the Caucasus, a strong offensive into Anatolia ‘did not correspond to the rules of 
war’. Only limited operations were to conducted in order to ‘secure the borders of 
Georgia’ and ‘deflect part of the Turkish forces’ from the Balkans. This entailed the 
capture of Poti, Akhaltsykh and Akhalkalaki. The 20th Infantry and 2nd Uhlan Divisions, 
sent to reinforce the Caucasus Corps during the Persian war, were to return to Russia, 
taking Anapa en route. Some days later, Nicholas, increasingly concerned by the 
unwillingness of the Shah to accept terms and the need to protect the soon-to-be-annexed 
khanates of Erevan and Nakhichevan from a Turkish attack, concluded that ‘the best means 
for a defence with small forces against Asiatic peoples is, without doubt, a decisive attack 
on the latter themselves’. Paskevich was therefore now to push to Kars and then head north 
to Akhaltsykh and the other aforementioned towns. However the bolder option of pushing 
further to Erzerum and Trabizond was ruled out completely.(94)
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Although the situation was ultimately ameliorated through the signing of peace with 
Persia on 10 February OS, Paskevich accepted the logic of taking Kars. Due however to a 
lack of men he refused to return the two aforementioned divisions to Russia and was 
generally unenthusiastic about detaching forces for the capture of Anapa. The latter did not 
pose a great military threat, rather its importance was political, being as it was the centre of 
Turkish influence in the Caucasus. Paskevich tried to scupper the Tsar’s plans by claiming 
his troops could only be freed for an expedition to Anapa in September. Otherwise, 
Paskevich’s plan was to assemble his forces at Gumri, and follow Nicholas’ plan of 10 
February OS.(95)
Paskevich had at his disposal 56 infantry battalions, 11 cavalry squadrons, 17 
Cossack regiments and around 150 guns, some 45,000 troops. He chose to commit one 
third for internal security and over one-third for protecting the Russo-Turkish frontier and 
the occupation of north-west Persia (to ensure that nation’s neutrality and payment of the 
war indemnity). This left a strike force of only 15 infantry battalions, 8 cavalry squadrons,
6 Cossack regiments and 68 guns - a total of some 12,000 men.(96) This dispersion has, 
quite unfairly, been condemned as an over-defensive ‘reactionary cordon strategy’.(97) 
Paskevich was sufficiently prudent to devote substantial resources to combat the threat of 
Persian and Turkish-induced rebellions in the Russian Caucasus.(98) If not supressed 
immediately, the latter could prove far more troublesome than the Ottoman army itself. The 
Sultan was certain to urge the Circassians and Chechens to conduct raids against the 
Russians, whilst the local Muslim rulers who ruled with Russian consent remained 
unreliable.(99) In any case, it is clear that Nicholas sanctioned only limited action in 
Asiatic Turkey, and, for this, the Russian strike force proved sufficient.
The Russian Caucasian campaign opened on 14 June OS, some six weeks later than 
the Balkan campaign.(100) The Russian force left Gumri and marched on Kars.(lOl) 
Russian intelligence reported a Turkish garrison there of around 10,000. It was due to be 
reinforced by units from the 30,000 strong main Turkish force at Erzerum. Thus, on 
reaching Kars, Paskevich wasted no time in ordering a storm. It fell, with heavy Turkish 
losses, on 23 June OS. The Pasha of Kars, Mahmed-Emin, was captured and, on his 
person, papers relating to the Turkish war plan were discovered. The Turks had aimed at 
pushing the war into the Russian Caucasus on three operational lines - Adzaria to Guria, 
Akhaltsykh to Imeretia and Bayezid to Erevan. The concentration of Russian troops at 
Gumri however had changed their plans, for the Turkish command feared a Russian attack 
on Kars and then Erzerum - the main Turkish base in the Caucasus. The Seraskier of
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Ottoman Asiatic forces, Kiosa-Mehemt, had therefore in mid-June OS rushed with 15,000 
men from Erzerum to reinforce Kars. When the latter fell to the Russians, Kiosa was but 
one days march away.(102)
With Kars taken and the Turkish operational base cut in two, Paskevich began 
contemplating further operations. Kiosa had bypassed Kars and pushed to Ardahan, so 
tempting Paskevich with the prospect of a large scale encounter. However Kiosa soon 
returned to Erzerum, where with a garrison of over 30,000 he was too strong to be attacked. 
Paskevich therefore decided to head north and capture Akhalkalaki and then Akhaltsykh. 
This would not only secure the Russian frontier but allow the local peasantry to return from 
the mountains. They had been forcibly sent there by the Turks to deprive the Russians of 
buying and requisitioning their food supplies. After this, there was the option of attacking 
Batum, Trabizond and even Erzerum.(103) Diebitsch and Nicholas concurred in the plan, 
though ruled out any attack on Erzerum in 1828. This was to be postponed until 1829 ‘so 
that (Paskevich’s] operations...will complement our operations across the Balkans if the war 
does not end in this year’.(104) Instead he favoured a push to Batum and then 
Trabizond.(105)
Before pushing north Paskevich ordered the forces of General K. F. Hesse at Kutais 
to capture Poti. This was designed to lessen Turkish influence in Guria, where the much- 
distrusted Princess Sophia was in dispute with the Russian authorities over her claim to be 
regent. The port fell on 15 July OS without great resistance.(106) The following day, 
Paskevich left Kars with 10,000 men.(107) Certain detachments feigned movements 
towards Erzerum and Akhaltsykh whilst he main force headed for Akhalkalaki. This fooled 
Kiosa into returning south to Erzerum to resist a bogus Russian attack.(108) Paskevich 
arrived at Akhakalaki on 23 July OS and a few cannon shots were sufficient to inflict heavy 
losses and induce its capitulation.(109) The Russians then marched on Akhaltsykh, 
capturing Khertvis en route. The former, a lawless outpost of the Ottoman Empire, was the 
crime and slave-trade capital of the whole Caucasus. Even the Sultan had dared not issue 
proclamations there announcing the abolition of the Janissaries and the introduction of 
conscription into the regular army.(llO) Just as the Russian force approached the town 
from the east, Kiosa with a 30,000 man force was arriving from the south. Paskevich gave 
battle on 9 August OS and secured a famous and comprehensive victory. Akhaltsykh was 
besieged and captured on 16 August OS and later that month detachments were sent to 
capture Atskhur and Ardahan.(lll)
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In September, Paskevich decided not to push to Batum as intended and ended 
operations for 1828.(112) Though some have sought to deny it, one must be impressed by 
success of Paskevich’s campaign.(113) The Pashaliks of Kars and Akhaltsykh were 
completely conquered, so securing the Russian frontier and opening up the Boijomi pass for 
operations in 1829. Despite Turkish intrigues(114) Paskevich was also able to ensure that 
no general uprising, even amongst the Circassians and Chechens, took place that year, nor 
indeed the next.(115) Though the former led raids into Russian territory (on the right bank 
of the Kuban) throughout the summer, subsequent Russian punishment expeditions, 
involving several thousand of troops, kept the situation under control.(116) Paskevich’s 
decision to leave behind substantial garrisons for internal security appears therefore to have 
been largely vindicated.
On the level of strategy, the 1828 Russian campaign was dominated by the quest to 
capture certain important geographical points - roads, mountain passes and towns. The 
former two were required for the security of the Russian border, the latter as a source of 
supplies. It was not Paskevich’s overriding aim to destroy the main Turkish forces, but did 
so, when Kiosa gave him the opportunity in August. Such victories notwithstanding, it is 
true that no degree of Russian success in the East could induce the Sultan’s submission and 
end the war. The Caucasian theatre was of secondary importance and it could not 
compensate for the failure in Europe.
Conclusions on the 1828 Campaign
The war aim of 1828 - the conclusion of an advantageous peace with the Ottoman 
Empire, was not achieved due to the failure of the Balkan campaign. This failure resulted 
from serious deficiencies in resources and strategy. The most important of the former were 
the lack of siege artillery and the insufficient number of troops in the theatre of war (due to 
the slow movement of reserves). The Russians were also disadvantaged by the climatic 
conditions of the Balkans - notably, this resulted in the lack of forage for horses and a 
severe outbreak of plague.(117)
The above must not, however, be allowed to obscure the real reason for the 1828 
failure - the grave strategic errors that transformed the plan for decisive and bold offensive 
on the capital into a grinding series of sieges and blockades, reminiscent of the worst 
examples of ‘methodical’ war. The over-exaggerated fear of the operational base, lines of 
communication and the Russian right flank led to the dispersal of the available forces over a 
huge area. It was not, however, this dispersion in itself that proved fatal, but the ends to
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which this was done.(118) Too many troops were left behind to guard the Principalities and 
the captured Danubian fortresses, whilst others were committed to secondary objects such 
as the sieges of Brailov, Silistria and Anapa.(119)
The greatest single blunder was the attempted blockade/siege of Shumla. Whilst 
writers have agreed on this point,(120) it is the thesis of this chapter that the essential cause 
of this error was the underlying, destructive influence of Jomini. Legitimised by the latter’s 
theoretical works, his own war plan of April 1828 and subsequent proposals of 15 June and 
29 August OS, Russian military doctrine was dominated by the quest to destroy the main 
enemy forces. Whilst this doctrine was applicable if the enemy chose to enter the field and 
give battle, it was not applicable should it decide to avoid large encounters and remain 
entrenched in fortresses such as Shumla. Following the lost opportunity of 8 July OS, it 
was the inability the High Command to liberate itself from the confines of this doctrine that 
ensured disaster.(121)
Underpinning the whole Russian failure was however perhaps one even more basic 
flaw - the Russian Command fought the Ottoman forces as if they were a regular European 
army. As already noted, as a result of the research projects of the Second Army’s General 
Staff, the idea of the uniqueness of Turkish wars was to gradually gain currency within the 
military. This process reached its apogee in the works of Liprandi, who, with all the relish 
of a somewhat patronising savant, happily passed the remainder of his life publicising the 
folly of applying European strategic notions against an Asiatic foe.(122) Liprandi thus 
gives for instance the obsession in 1828 with a Turkish flank attack short thrift. He points 
to the first Russian movements in April OS - following the Danubian crossing, the main 
forces, leaving in their rear Brailov, Silistria and a number of other smaller fortresses, 
pushed on quickly to Karasu on the Trajans Wall. Why did these garrisons allow the 
Russians to cross the Danube in the first place almost unmolested? Why did the garrisons 
of Silistria and Shumla, who were but a few days march from Karasu, not mount a flank 
attack as soon as the disjointed main Russian forces began arriving there in the first days of 
June OS? Why did Brailov, Machin, Tultcha and Hirsovo all capitulate in mid-June OS 
after it was clear the main Russian forces had passed them by, and that Brailov had already 
resisted a storm by the second line Russian forces (the 7th Infantry Corps)? Though many 
Russian commanders were not aware of it, Liprandi argued that the initial Russian offensive 
to the Trajans Wall was in fact very risky. It broke all the established ‘mathematical laws’ 
of warfare and would have been impossible to execute against a European enemy.(123)
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All this should have alerted the army to the great weakness of the Turks in gathering 
intelligence on enemy movement and organising counter-attacks. Unfortunately the 
opposite was true and the Russian Command became progressively more conservative as it 
pushed its operational line further into Ottoman territory. Still fearing a flank attack ordered 
the siege of Silistria and blockade of Shumla. For reasons already alluded to this was 
mistake - the Turks were always resolute in sieges and their garrisons always very well 
supplied. Sieges and blockades should be avoided as Turkish garrisons only rarely left 
them for raids and it was sufficient to merely to observe them with cavalry units. Liprandi 
believed that, due to certain quirks in the Turkish mentality, the surest way to induce their 
capitulation was simply to leave them behind and push deeper into Ottoman territory (as 
had been the case with Brailov and the other Danubian fortresses).(124)
Ultimately the 1828 campaign failed because too great a significance was given to 
protecting its operational line and in seeking the decisive battle with an enemy that was not 
willing to offer it. This caused the army to fight in a predictable and methodical manner. 
Whilst such a method was applicable against a European army it was not against the 
Ottomans:
In war with Asiatics it is essential to act on the imagination. The surest 
means for this are speed and surprise....This type of war inevitably 
spreads fear and confusion in the Turkish army, which is unused to a 
strict observation and does not employ sufficient means for correct 
intelligence on the enemy.(125)
Both Kiselev and, before him, Kutuzov had expressed similar ideas,(126) leading both to 
propose a Balkan crossing. Should this have been attempted in 1828, or was it impractical 
given the army’s scant resources? Kutuzov believed that against the Turks ‘success 
depends not upon a great number of men but on the intelligence and vigilance of the 
commanding General’.(127) Certain contemporaries believed a crossing in 1828 was both 
necessary and achievable.(128) Their ideas essentially concurred with Nicholas’ plan of 9 
August OS - for the 7th Corps to merely observe Shumla, the 6th to observe or siege 
Silistria and the 3rd to siege Vama. The Balkans could then have been crossed with the 
arrival of the Guards in late August OS. During the winter months following the close of 
the campaign it was left for the Russian Command to muse over a possible lost opportunity 
in 1828 and gather the necessary resolve for an attempt in 1829.
Political and Military Developments. October 1828 - April 1829
The failure to end the war in a single campaign and the Sultan’s continued refusal to 
treat for peace, greatly complicated matters for Nesselrode and Russia’s diplomatic
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relations. In October, the Foreign Minister again raised the spectre of an Anglo-Austrian 
alliance, maintaining that, whilst in 1828 he could guarantee that Russia ‘aurait 1’Empire 
Ottoman seul a combattre, il ne peut maintenant exprimer sous ce rapport que de simples 
esperances pour la campagne de 1829’.(129) Relations with Britain had certainly 
deteriorated since the summer. Wellington had completed his victory over the remaining 
Canningites in his Cabinet, who were forced to leave in May. Nesselrode now feared a 
return to ie  systeme du marquis de Londonderry’ [Castlereagh] and a closening of relations 
between London and Vienna.(130)
Since the beginning of the Russo-Turkish war, Wellington had become increasingly 
suspicious of Russian designs; this manifested itself over three specific issues. The first 
was a Russo-French proposal for a French expedition to the Morea to expel the forces of 
Ibrahim. Though utterly opposed, Wellington was forced into retreat and the French forces 
landed in August 1828.(131) The second issue concerned a Russian demand for belligerent 
rights in the Mediterranean and the blockade of all vessels bound for Constantinople. 
Despite Aberdeen’s view that this was ‘quite impossible’, again the Russians had their 
way.(132) Finally there was the question of the future frontiers of ‘Greece’. The Russians, 
supported by the French, favoured a larger Greece, with the Arta-Volo frontier and the 
inclusion of Eubea (Negropont), Samos and even Crete. Wellington was opposed to 
anything beyond the Morea, but again was defeated.(133)
Russia’s relations with Austria were even cooler. Throughout 1828 and into 1829 
many intelligent reports had accused Vienna of supplying the Turks via the Danube and of 
the continuing preparations of her army for war.(134)
Nesselrode had, however, overestimated the closeness of Anglo-Austrian relations. 
Although Mettemich had put out feelers for a separate understanding with Britain in
1828,(135) he was rebuffed. Aberdeen, the new British Foreign Secretary, dismissed 
Austrian policy as ‘timid and calculating’ and correctly suspected that her apparent 
preparations for war were merely an exercise in brinkmanship designed to scare the 
Russians into more moderate war aims.(136)
Following the receipt of more judicious Russian intelligence, Nesselrode eventually 
became convinced of the non-existence of an Anglo-Austrian combination in the Spring of
1829. A. F. Matouszewic reported from London that the Wellington administration was 
currently gripped by the question of Catholic Emancipation. The affairs of Greece were 
considered secondary and he predicted confidently that TEmpereur sera l’arbitre des 
destinees de l’Orient’.(137) In the same month, G. M. Stroganov, who had recently been
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sent on a mission to Vienna to assess the readiness of the Austrian army, delivered his 
verdict. Only Austria’s Italian Corps was ‘sur un vrai pied de guerre’, and the likelihood of 
any attack in 1829 was negligible.(138) Finally, the signature of the 22 March 1829 
Protocol over Greece negated the threat of Britain separating with Russia, so allowing 
Nesselrode the boast - ‘nous avons acquis une securite complet pour la campagne [of 
1829]’.(139) Although certain disputes with Britain remained, (such as the Russian naval 
blockade of Crete), Nesselrode was sure that a military success in 1829 would make them 
an irrelevance. As he told Diebitsch, ‘Battez bien les Turcs, mon cher comte, et tous ces 
petits nuages se dissiperont les unes apres les autres’.(140)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The discussions over the war plan for 1829 proceeded no more smoothly than those 
for 1828. In the immediate aftermath of the first campaign the High Command had become 
increasingly pessimistic concerning the feasibility of a Balkan crossing. This was 
compounded by the acceptance of Nesselrode’s fears (of late Autumn 1828) regarding the 
threat of an Anglo-Austrian alliance. Diebitsch’s ideas, in particular, were notable for their 
timidity and indecision. He envisaged two possible plans for 1829; either (i) a landing at 
Burgas (whether in conjunction with a Balkan crossing or not is not stated), or (ii) remain 
on the Danube, taking only Silistria and leaving all offensive action to Paskevich who was 
to push to Trabizond. Diebitsch considered ‘avantages plus certain que le 
premiere...[et]...en meme temps beaucoup moins de sacrifices et offre moins de risques’. 
Such a plan also would also keep the Russian army close to the ‘frontieres de 1’ Austrich, ce 
qui peut-etre n’est pas une consideration a negliger’. The problem, however, was that these 
forces could not be supplied by sea - only by the Danubian flotilla which was understrength 
and liable to attack.(141)
Kiselev was barely more positive. He ruled out a Balkan crossing for political 
reasons. A crossing was now said to necessarily lead to the fall and capture of 
Constantinople, which was against Russia’s declared war aims. In any case, its capture was 
not possible ‘by one war and one nation’ and required huge resources which Russia could 
not collect in time for 1829. Instead, Russia was to siege the remaining Turkish Danubian 
fortresses and make preparations for a possible third campaign in 1830. Kiselev admitted 
that ‘a methodical war against the Turks does not promise great results...but at least the 
army will not be exposed to ruin’.(142) Shamed by the failure of 1828, Kiselev shied away 
from offering a bolder plan. Throughout the 1820s he had been the greatest opponent of
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traditional methodical action and the strongest supporter of a decisive push on
Constantinople. In 1827, he had boldly asserted that:
I suppose the aim of the war consists in forcing the Ottoman Porte to 
the terms made to it. For this a detached war in the provinces is 
insufficient; instead the very capital of the state is to be threatened...by 
quickly bringing the theatre of war to Rumelia, Constantinople is to be 
captured, or an advantageous peace gained under its walls.(143)
By the end of the first campaign Kiselev had retracted his testament. It is unclear whether 
Kiselev wished he had never proposed the idea of a crossing, or whether he cursed himself 
for his inability to execute it in 1828. What is certain, is that the reality of war had 
transformed him, in military terms, into an arch-conservative.
Heeding the advice of his generals, the Tsar, the prime advocate of a Balkan 
crossing in 1828, became fully convinced of its impossibility. He believed that ‘le bon sens 
et la prudence exigent imperieusement d’abandonner l’idee d’une invasion au dela des 
monts’ and instead he had decided to ‘conduct the war across the Danube in a more 
systematic than offensive manner’. The army was to consolidate its operational base in the 
Balkans through the sieges of Silistria and Giurgevo, whilst in the Caucasus Paskevich (as 
Diebitsch had proposed) was to ‘act offensively’ by pushing to Erzerum and then 
Trabizond. At this stage still fearful of the European reaction to a second campaign, 
Nicholas maintained that ‘ce plan prouvera a l’universe entier que nous continuons non en 
conquerants, mais en gens sages et prudents’. Although Wittgenstein had not pleased the 
Tsar in 1828, due to the modest nature of the intended 1829 war plan, he was retained as 
Commander-in-Chief. (144)
In November 1828, the situation was, however, transformed with the submission of 
a memoir by the (now retired) decorated veteran of the Napoleonic wars General I. V. 
Vasil’chikov.(145) Under the rubric - ‘war with Turkey is a purely administrative matter’, 
Vasil’chikov blamed the shortage of horses, the problem with reserves and the absence of 
various supplies in 1828 on the failings of individual generals(146) though predominantly on 
the general lack of coherence in the Russian command structure. Vasil’chikov even hinted 
the problems caused by the Tsar’s interference in the campaign, though tempered this 
criticism by arguing that ‘the Sovereign is occupied by other, more important questions and 
cannot scrutinise fully the minute details connected with the preparations for a campaign’. 
Vasil’chikov made it clear, however, that he did not seek to offer solutions of his own, and 
requested instead the establishment of a special committee to discuss the future 1829 
campaign.
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On 19 November 1828 OS, Nicholas presided over a committee composed of V. P. 
Kochubei, A. .1. Chernyshev, Baron K. F. Toll and Vasil’chikov himself (147) The 
committee reaffirmed Russia’s general war aim as being ‘ne de renverser le Sultan, 
mais...forcer la Porte Ottomane a conclure une paix’. Nicholas, recanted his recent decision 
and accepted that ‘une guerre systematique, qui se bomeroit simplement a la prise de 
quelques fortresses sur le Danube’ was insufficient for this purpose. More decisive action 
was needed - a siege of Silistria was to remove the threat to the Russian left flank and allow 
the army to push south across the Balkans in conjunction with a amphibious assault on 
Burgas. As regards the vexed problem of Shumla, its capture was not deemed essential to 
the success of the campaign. A possible attack in early March OS was, however, 
considered, as Ottoman irregular forces were always disbanded during the winter, hopefully 
making the fortress poorly defended at this time and its capture a formality.(148). As 
regards the number of troops needed, a proposal from certain (unnamed) committee 
members for 170-200,000 men was rejected due to the ‘impossibility de nourrir et 
d’approvisionner [ces] forces’. Instead, the more modest figure of 100-120,000 men was 
accepted.
This proved to be the final decision and it was echoed in the plans of other military 
authorities.(149) After years of dither and hesitation due to the fear the logistical and 
political hazards of a Balkan crossing, a firm commitment had finally been reached.(150)
As regards the personnel for the next campaign, Nicholas made important changes 
in February 1829. These changes were essentially the result of a desire to rationalise the 
command structure. A debate on this issue had been instigated by Vasil’chikov, Diebitsch 
and Wittgenstein, all of whom had recently submitted memoirs to the Tsar. All agreed that 
the 1828 campaign was marked by a confusion in the command structure because 
Wittgenstein, the nominal Commander-in-Chief had had almost all his authority usurped by 
the presence of the Tsar and the interference of the Heads of Staff, Diebitsch and Kiselev. 
Clearly, this could not be repeated in 1829 and Nicholas veered towards the solution 
proposed by Diebitsch. The latter argued that the Commander-in-Chief should be given 
full, undivided power to conduct the operations of coming campaign as he saw fit. The 
main hindrance to this was the Head of General Staff of the Second Army, who, in acting as 
the main, often sole, interface between the Second Army and the Commander-in-Chief (as a 
result of Kiselev’s earlier reforms) was able to use his great power to dominate the C.-in-C. 
Diebitsch’s ultimate solution to this was to abolish the very position of Head of Staff. As, 
however, it was imprudent to do this half-way through a war, Diebitsch argued for three
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changes for 1829; first, the C.-in-C. was to choose his own Head of Staff; second, the Head
of Staff should be allowed to request a combat assignment at the first vacancy; third, all
correspondence between the General Staff and the Second Army was to be transmitted only
via the C.-in-C..(151) The subtext to Diebitsch’s proposal (dated 10 December 1828 OS)
was clear enough. Diebitsch wished to increase enormously the power of the Commander-
in Chief because he himself coveted the post. Though certain that he would eventually be
made C.-in-C., Diebitsch felt uneasy at the prospect of having Kiselev as his Head of Staff.
The latter knew intimately the workings of the Second Army and, as his relationship with
Wittgenstein proved, had a history of seeking to dominate the C.-in-C.. Moreover,
Diebitsch believed that having such an able man as Kiselev as his Head of Staff could prove
a source of intrigue should the 1829 campaign begin to go wrong. As he put it:
The human mind finds mistakes in others much quicker, though cannot 
itself always do better; in any case, the sharp eye of subordinates 
lessens the trust towards the commander and takes from him all moral 
authority.(152)
Fortunately for Diebitsch, the 1828 campaign had already convinced Kiselev of the futility 
of working alongside him. In September 1828, Kiselev had requested he be relieved of his 
staff duties and be assigned the command of a division.(153) Nicholas had, in fact, refused 
and thus Diebitsch ensured in his December proposals that the right to a combat post was 
assigned to the Head of Staff.
Nicholas was swayed by Diebitsch’s proposals. Wittgenstein was replaced by 
Diebitsch as Commander-in-Chief since he was not considered suitable to execute the new 
bolder war plan of crossing the Balkans.(154) Kiselev was replaced as Head of Staff by 
Toll, probably on the advice of VasiFchikov.(155) Kiselev himself was allowed to take up 
a combat post.(156) In addition, Nicholas was attracted by Diebitsch’s idea of eventually 
abolishing the very post of Head of Staff. Already resolved to end the autonomony of the 
General Staffs throughout the Russian army and generally centralise the Russian military 
establishment in the War Ministry, Nicholas decided to end the existence of the Second 
Army once the Turkish war had been concluded. The Second Army’s General Staff was to 
be abolished outright and its military units transfered to the First Army.(157) This decision 
was to complete Kiselev’s fall from grace in military affairs. The plans for his General 
Staff, the empirical school of strategy, his dream of leading a Balkan crossing had all 
disappeared. It was left to others to reap the glory of this latter enterprise whilst, almost 
symbolically, Kiselev spent almost all of the 1829 campaign north of the Danube, guarding 
Diebitsch’s rear.
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The stage was finally set for the 1829 campaign. Diebitsch received the planned 
reinforcements, so increasing the Russian force to around 125,000 men and 452 guns.(158) 
The capture of Varna in 1828 had greatly eased the traffic of supplies. By May, Vorontsov 
had already delivered from Novorossiia two months worth of foodstuffs for 100,000 men 
and 30,000 horses, with more to arrive.(159) The main inconvenience faced was the 
prolongation of a severe winter in the Balkans and the flooding of the Danube, which 
caused the opening of the land campaign to be postponed to around 15 April OS.(160) This 
deprived the Russians of the opportunity for their envisaged early attack on Shumla and 
allowed the Turks, now under the command of the new Grand Vizier, Reshid-Pasha, to 
amass significant forces there. Fearing that Diebitsch would allow this to distract him from 
his southward advance, Nesselrode urged him, ‘ne regardez ni a droit, ni a gauche, ni en 
arriere, et pour Dieu! n’admettez pas la possibility d’une troisieme campagne’.(161)
The Balkan Campaign of 1829
Hostilities commenced with the naval assault on Sizopol, which was captured on 16 
February OS. As this port was situated south of the Balkan mountain chain, the Russians 
could now, if necessary, bypass this obstacle and land forces directly in Rumelia. The 
capture of Burgas was also at first considered, since it had been long considered vital to a 
Balkan crossing (as supply depot). Diebitsch however opposed its capture in the Spring as 
should the Turks attempt to retake it, Diebitsch would be forced to open the campaign 
earlier than he planned and cross the Balkans before the capture of Silistria.(162)
As regards operations on land, Diebitsch proposed diving his forces into three 
independent corps. Kiselev controlled the right-flank forces (c.25,000 men) in Wallachia, 
assigned to prevent a Turkish counter-attack into the Principalities. The Russian centre 
(c.50,000) was stationed near Silistria and commanded by Diebitsch. The remaining forces 
(c.50,000) formed the left-flank under General L. O. Roth and were in occupation of 
Bulgaria.(163) Diebitsch’s plan was straightforward - to besiege Silistria and then cross the 
Balkans leaving an observing force at Shumla. The option of attempting a crossing without 
first capturing Silistria (as Jomini advocated) was rejected. Ostensibly, this was because 
this would entail leaving two infantry divisions besieging Silistria, in addition to another five 
guarding the army’s flank and rear. This would leave only five infantry divisions for action 
across the Balkans. Diebitsch considered this insufficient. If, however, Silistria and even
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Shumla were captured, this would release an extra two divisions. Diebitsch, however, 
considered even this force unsatisfactory and requested that the reserves be brought into the 
theatre sooner than was planned.(164)
This was too much for Nicholas to bear. The Tsar informed Diebitsch that after the 
deployment of defending forces and garrisons, he had seven and two-thirds infantry and 
four cavalry divisions for offensive action (around 70,000 men). He would, in addition, 
receive in August OS a further 60 reserve battalions (c.36,000 men). Nicholas reminded 
Diebitsch that in 1828 the army captured six fortresses and blockaded Shumla with only six 
infantry and two and a half cavalry divisions. All Diebitsch had to do in 1829 was take 
Silistria and cross the Balkans. Considering that the Turks had in Europe only 100,000 
men, the Tsar wrote, ‘je ne puis ne pas trouver etrange que vous trouviez vos moyens 
insuffisants! - Veuillez done ne plus revenir la-dessus\(165) The fact is that Diebitsch, 
despite Nesselrode’s admonitions, could not take his eyes off his flank. His 8 January 1829 
OS war plan cited the need to capture Silistria due to its proximity to the Russian 
operational line and base and for similar reasons in his abovementioned letter of 24 March 
OS even raised the possibility of capturing Shumla and Rustchuk as well.
In any case, on 31 April OS Diebitsch ordered the forces of the Russian centre to 
march and within a week the siege of Silistria had begun.(166) Meanwhile, Reshid-Pasha, 
had decided to leave Shumla with 30,000 men (including up to 20,000 regular infantry) and 
attack the avant-guarde of the Russian centre barring the route to Varna and Silistria. On 5 
May OS, they clashed at Eski-Amautlar, where the 16th Infantry Division, though greatly 
outnumbered, held its ground and inflicted heavy losses on the Turks.(167) This proved to 
be another demonstration of Russian superiority in the field and of the threat a flank Turkish 
attack from Shumla.
The new Turkish commander’s willingness to give battle played into Russian hands. 
The Russians had sought a decisive battle throughout 1828 and Nicholas had given strict 
instructions to continue this quest in 1829.(168) Suspecting that the Vizier would another 
attempt another attack, in late May Diebitsch took half of his 40,000 besieging force from 
Silistria and joined Roth’s units near Shumla.(169) Diebitsch proved to be correct. The 
Vizier intended to mount another flank attack to cut off the Russian forces at Varna and 
then head north to relieve the besieged forces of Silistria. On 30 May OS the two forces 
met at Kulevcha. It resulted in the decisive battle that Russia had sought for over a year, 
and in the utter defeat of Reshid’s 40,000 man army.(170) Diebitsch however remained 
cautious. He ruled out a Balkan crossing until Silistria fell and, despite Nicholas’ censure,
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demanded the speedy arrival of reserve battalions of the 3rd, 6th and 7th Infantry Corps, as 
well a whole extra infantry division.(171) Buoyed by the success at Kulevcha, the Tsar 
consented. Reinforcements were to arrive by 25 July OS.(172)
When Silistria eventually fell on 18 June OS, Diebitsch was in no rush to begin a 
crossing. Instead he pushed towards his main offensive forces to Shumla, where the 
remnants of the Vizier’s army had now returned. The idea was to fool the Reshid into 
believing that another blockade was to be attempted. Certain units could then be secretly 
withdrawn and used to cross the Balkans.(173) Diebitsch was, however, in danger of also 
fooling himself, for his proximity to Shumla caused the reappearance of his idie fixe. For 
on 5 July OS Diebitsch argued that ‘if the Grand Vizier has not left an overly large garrison 
in Shumla, then, conducting an energetic siege, we may possibly capture it’. Diebitsch 
considered its capture important in the event of having to fight a third campaign! He 
decided to wait another few days for the grouping of his offensive forces and then ‘the great 
question of the crossing of the Balkans ought to be decided, - either that, or there will be a 
second battle with the Vizier’. (174)
Fortunately, Diebitsch decided for a crossing as the Turkish forces were of 
insufficient strength to prevent it.(175) General A. I. Krasovskii’s 3rd Corps (c. 15,000 
men) was moved from Silistria to observe Shumla, whilst the 2nd, 6th and 7th Corps 
(c.47,000 men) were on 8 July OS ordered to head south.(176) The mountain range was 
crossed between 9 and 11 July OS and on the 12th, Burgas, Ahiotu and Misivri were taken 
so greatly increasing the amount of reinforcements and supplies that could be delivered 
directly to Rumelia by sea.(177) The Vizier was taken completely by surprise, believing 
that the Russians would not attempt a crossing without first taking Shumla. When news of 
the crossing arrived, the Vizier, in what was one last gamble, twice sent his remaining 
forces across the Balkans to attack Diebitsch in the rear. The two Turkish expeditions (of 
c. 10,000 and 5,000 men respectively) were, however, easily defeated on 13 and 31 July 
OS.(178)
Diebitsch pushed onwards to Adrianople, the second capital of the Ottoman Empire, 
and occupied it without a fight on 8 August OS. As Turkish plenipotentiaries did not 
however arrive, Diebitsch believed only further operations could temper the Sultan’s 
obstinacy. Although the continued spread of plague and the need to leave behind garrison 
forces meant that Diebitsch could muster only 25,000 men, he nevertheless considered that 
this ‘seroit bien suffisant pour arriver jusqu’a Constantinople car il n’existe plus pour le 
moment l’armee Turque’. This force, however, was not considered sufficient actually to
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capture the capital (in view of its 600,000 Muslim inhabitants) or even occupy the castles 
on the Bosphorus. It was therefore proposed to either push units to Lule-Burgas and the 
Dardanelles, leaving the attack on Constantinople for a third campaign in 1830. 
Alternatively, Diebitsch could march on the capital in any case and hope that a panic would 
spread amongst the populations causing them ‘a se soulever contre le gouvemement actuel 
et a nos livrer la ville’.(179)
Both variants were of course problematic as they entailed the end of the Sultan’s 
rule (which Nicholas did not wish) and could well precipitate the intervention of Britain and 
Austria. The Sultan’s last faint remaining hope - the arrival of the forces of the Pasha of 
Skodra was soon to be checked by Kiselev’s pre-emptive march from Raxova towards 
Sophia in August.(180) The war was essentially over - only time and the arrival of 
reinforcements separated Russia from the ultimate prize. Following however the Tsar’s 
orders, Diebitsch was more concerned with gaining a peace treaty and avoiding the 
unimaginable consequences of the fall of Constantinople than in delivering the final blow. 
The fate of the Ottoman Empire was to rest now on the obstinacy of the Sultan and the 
diplomatic skills of Zabalkanskii.
Conclusions on the 1829 campaign
The judgements on Diebitsch’s campaign have been marked by strong opinion on 
all sides. The most critical view has been the Soviet, which repeats the accusation that 
Diebitsch had an excessive fear for his flank and rear and sought always to avoid large 
encounters.(181) Whilst the first is certainly warranted, the second is completely incorrect. 
Moltke, who was both learned in military matters and a neutral, was more positive,(182) but 
had no access to the Russian military correspondence and could not know how obsessed 
Diebitsch was with Shumla and feared the Balkan crossing. Epanchin is also quite 
favourable,(183) though again, he overestimated Diebitsch’s role in pushing for the latter. 
The most favourable view however is that of Luk’ianovich.(184) The author makes the 
impressive claim that that in splitting his army into three independent corps, one crossing 
the Balkans, one observing Shumla and one guarding the Sophia-Adrianople road, Diebitsch 
was guided by the same principles as Kutuzov’s plan of 1811 .(185) Unfortunately, it is 
unclear whether Diebitsch actually knew of the plan (as Luk’ianovich himself admits) and 
one must not forget the factor of coincidence and good fortune (such as the Vizier’s 
decision to offer battle at Kulevcha). A better argument is that the 1829 campaign was 
proof of the value of Kutuzov’s ideas rather than the ability of Zabalkanskii. The former
179
based his ideas on the value of movement, which the Turks could not cope with. The 
feigned blockade of Shumla and rapid march across the Balkans in July 1829 fooled a 
Turkish army used to Russian methods of slow, methodical siege warfare and confident that 
only the fall of Shumla would lead to a crossing. The Russian march across the Balkans 
sent the Vizier into a panic and forced him to deploy his remaining forces. Thus it was 
unexpected movement - a Balkan crossing and a march on Constantinople, that was in fact 
the best method of forcing the Turkish army into the field and securing a decisive battle. 
Diebitsch saw things exactly the other way round. For him (as for Jomini) a crossing was 
not an opportunity, but a hazardous enterprise to be attempted only after the decisive battle 
had taken place. In 1828 this search for battle had resulted in failed blockade of Shumla.
In 1829, the Vizier’s decision to fight at Kulevcha freed Diebitsch’s hands. If the former 
had remained in Shumla with his 50,000 man garrison then Diebitsch would have been 
forced back into the quandary of 1828. Left to his own devices, would Diebitsch have had 
the resolve to bypass Shumla this time and cross the Balkans? We can never know for sure, 
but all the evidence points to the negative.
The Caucasian Campaign of 1829
The successes of the Caucasus Corps during the first campaign had convinced 
Paskevich of the offensive potential of his forces, despite its relative numerical weakness. 
Geography and common sense dictated that any offensive had to begin with the capture of 
Erzerum - the key to the Turkish position in the Caucasus. What should follow was, 
however, less obvious and Paskevich offered two plans.(186) The first was a bold strike 
into the heart of the Anatolian plateau. A push to Sivas would cut most of Constantinople’s 
communications with its Asiatic provinces and their copper and silver factories - an 
important source of the Sultan’s income. The main problem revolved around supplying the 
army far from its operational base as well as protecting its flanks. An elongated magazine 
chain was considered too prone to attack and the only solution was to be supplied by sea 
from the port of Samsun.(187) The Russian left flank was to be secured by winning over 
the independent-minded Kurds whilst, on the right, the Turkish forces at Trabizond were to 
be kept diverted by Russian naval operations. This ambitious plan was made dependent 
upon arrival in the summer of 20,000 recruits to augment Paskevich’s already increased 
offensive force of 16, 883 men and 68 guns. Should this not occur then Paskevich favoured 
the more modest plan of heading for Trabizond. Its capture, (in conjunction with a naval 
assault), would deprive its Pasha’s forces (composed primarily of the ferocious Laz tribe) of 
the chance of attacking Erzerum.
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Paskevich’s ideas were, however, fated not to be realised. Nicholas’ acceptance of 
the decision 19 November 1828 OS committee meant that the Balkan theatre would 
dominate over the Caucasian. Paskevich’s more daring plan was therefore unlikely to 
receive the resources it required and, indeed, was unnecessary should a Balkan crossing 
take place. Paskevich’s other plan of attacking Trabizond was in fact little more of an 
afterthought and he himself admitted that ‘as a means of exerting political influence on 
Turkey I do not find its capture important’.(188) Thus although the Tsar was to give 
Paskevich a large degree of autonomy in fighting the war, everything pointed to the 
campaign beginning and ending at Erzerum.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Hostilities began on 20 February 1829 OS with an early and unexpected Turkish 
offensive following the news that the Russian embassy in Tehran had been stormed by a 
riotous mob and the ambassaor A. S. Griboedov murdered.(189) The Sultan, believing that 
Persia was now about to enter the war on his side, ordered the capture of Akhaltsykh at any 
cost to open up the Boijomi pass into Russian territory. The 20,000 man Turkish force was 
however beaten back following a heroic twelve-day defence by General V. I. Bebutov and 
his two battalions.(190) Around the same time another 8,000-man Ottoman force crossed 
the border into Guria. Princess Sophia had recently fled to Turkey and in her 
correspondence to the Gurian aristocracy urged the support of this offensive. A pre­
emptive attack on the Turkish camp on 5 March OS by General Hesse’s 2,500 men, 
however, destroyed this threat.(191)
Throughout the remaining months Spring and into early Summer, Paskevich 
remained on the defensive as news of Persian preparations for war (ultimately proved to be 
false) continued arriving from many sources.(192) Finally, in June OS, learning that the 
new Seraskier Sivas-Hakki had left Erzerum with 40,000 men Paskevich began preparations 
for an offensive. His force had been recently augmented by four regiments of irregular 
Azeri cavalry (c.2000 men) collected from Russia’s Muslim provinces.(193) Paskevich 
headed from Kars along the Erzerum road to meet Hakki, who had divided his forces into 
two corps of 30,000 and 20,000 men respectively. In a series of battles and manoeuvres, 
13-20 June OS, Paskevich inflicted a devastating defeat.(194) Erzerum subsequently 
capitulated without a fight on the 27th OS.
Paskevich now halted his offensive for one month, content merely to beat off the 
various small scale Ottoman raids along his front-line. The most numerous of these came
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from the Kurds on the Russian left-flank. At the beginning of the war Nicholas had given 
Paskevich 100,000 chervontsy to win over the Kurds over, and some agreement with them 
had been made. According to Paskevich however, due to a rumour that the British and 
French ambassadors had announced that they would allow no Russian annexations, the 
Kurds, fearing reprisals from the Sultan for their passivity, began their raids.(195)
In late July OS Paskevich renewed his offensive following reports that a new 
Seraskier was gathering Laz troops in the Pashlik of Trabizond. To disrupt this he marched 
north and defeated a 12,000 force at Hart on the 27th OS. Paskevich considered then 
pushing to Trabizond, but ruled it out, ostensibly due to a lack of troops, but really because 
it was irrelevant to the course of the war.(196) Another Russian detachment was 
despatched along the road to Sivas. It has been claimed that these operations were intended 
to secure Trabizond as a naval base and then begin a conquest of central Anatolia.(197)
This is incorrect. Paskevich merely wanted to protect the routes to Erzerum and defend the 
fertile areas of the Pashalik, using its supplies for quartering over the winter.(198)
In another sense Paskevich was merely going through the motions - consolidating 
his position and awaiting an end to the war. He had achieved his goals - the defeat of the 
Seraskier and the capture of Erzerum. There was also success at home as the Muslim tribes 
of the Russian Caucasus again remained relatively calm.(199) Even the infamous Chechen 
warlord, Bei-Bulat, had called for a truce.(200)
News from Adrianople was, however, painfully slow in arriving and as late as 26 
September OS, sporadic fighting continued.(201) Paskevich was becoming impatient. All 
Europe held its breath. As Heytesbury wrote from St Petersburg, ‘the die is already 
cast...either a peace is signed, or the Cossacks are bivouacking in the Seraglio’.(202)
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(1) RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 4468, f.2, Diebitsch to A. I. Chernyshev, 19 October 1827 OS.
(2) Diebitsch and Kiselev had both recently advocated a force of this size, see above, pp. 
132-33.
(3) RGVLA, fond VUA, d.4468, ff.20-20v, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 29 November 1827 
OS. This estimation largely concurred with Wittgenstein’s, who proposed a budget of 24m 
roubles (for supplies) for a one and a half year war, ibid., ff.10-11, Wittgenstein to 
Diebitsch.
(4) It was 3m roubles in debt, ibid., ff.3-8v Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 26 October 1827 OS.
(5) See the various reports and budgets in ibid, ff. 26-106, passim.
(6) Ibid., ff.l 12-15, E. F. Kankrin to Diebitsch, 9 February 1828 OS. This figure denotes 
extraordinary expenditure above and beyond the normal, peacetime budget of the army 
which, in the late 1820s, stood at c,160m roubles per annum, Kagan, Military Reforms, p. 
97.
(7) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4468, ff. 112-15, Kankrin to Diebitsch, 9 February 1828 OS.
(8) The Persian war had already drained the Treasury by 14.3m roubles.
(9) Ironically Kankrin, who had himself proposed a Balkan crossing some years prior (see 
p. 141, footnote 19) was now not willing to pay for it.
(10) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4468, ff.l 16-27, War Budget of Kankrin, 9 February 1828 OS.
(11) Ibid., ff.l65-69v, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 14 March 1828 OS.
(12) Ibid., ff.l70-70v, Diebitsch to Kankrin, 19 March 1828 OS.
(13) Of which 12.7m was made conditional and 6.5m was to be repaid, ibid., ff. 171-80, 
Kankrin to Diebitsch, 26 March 1828 OS.
(14) Ibid., ff. 192-93. The total budget was 62,166,884 r., 72.5 k., of which some 20m was 
made conditional.
(15) Ibid., ff.229-300, Report of War Ministry, n.d. The expense of the 1828 campaign 
was, in part, due to the unforeseen calling of the Second Corps to the theatre in June 1828, 
as well as to the costs of quartering troops in the Balkans over the winter of 1828/29. The 
exorbitant cost of the war led the Russian Government to seek foreign loans. An attempt to 
secure credit from the House of Rothschild in 1828 had been thwarted by Mettemich, 
Crawley, Greek Independence, p. 105. Instead 18m guilders was loaned from the 
Netherlands, with a further 24m in 1829, VPR n/VII, 1992, pp. 592, 720, Ukase of 22 July 
1828 OS. In June 1829, a certain Moritz Goldsmith, a Rothschild agent, unexpectedly 
arrived in Odessa, offering to sell Russia a large number of Austrian and Dutch gold coins 
[ducats/chervontsy]. Such currency was always needed in time of war to pay for supplies in 
enemy lands (paper money was usually not accepted). Kankrin however was not prepared 
to pay the proposed rate (1 lr. 18-20k. per coin, instead of the current market price of 1 lr.
8-12k.) and dismissed Goldsmith as a ‘speculator’, see documents in RGVIA, fond 14058, 
op. 1/184a, sv.104, d.5,ff.l-7.
(16) See below, pp. 231-32.
(17) RGIA, fond 673, op.l, d.404, ff.l-5v, ‘O shabzhenii armii prodovol’stvom’, by 
Liprandi, 1831.
(18) RGVLA, fond VUA, d.4468, f.84, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 20 January 1828 OS; ibid, 
d.4469, ff.96-107, Report on Supplies sent in 1828, 31 July 1828 OS (one chetverik is 
equivalent to 15.8 lb/7.11 kg). Aside from the military colonies, which provided one third 
of the flour, most of the remainder was acquired in the southern gubemii, three of which 
(plus the Bessarabian and Taurida oblasti) were placed on a war footing [voennoe 
polozhenie], ibid., d.4445, ff.5-13v, ‘Predlozhenie kakim obrazom prodovol’stvovat’ 2 
armii’, n.d., (from context, November 1827). This entailed forced requisitions in lieu of 
taxation [podat *], Luk’ianovich, Opisanie, I, p. 45. Wittgenstein initially opposed this 
requisitioning. He feared it would exhaust the southern gubemiias and favoured instead 
raising taxation and buying supplies, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.49-59, Wittgenstein to
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Diebitsch, 31 October 1827 OS. He subsequently changed his mind, ibid., ff.77-86v, 
Wittgenstein to Diebitsch, received 29 November 1827 OS.
(19) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4468, ff. 105-06, Diebitsch to Kankrin, 2 February 1828 OS.
(20) Ibid., d.4469, ff.96-107, Report on Supplies sent in 1828, 31 July 1828 OS. In the 
final analysis there were only sufficient oat rations to feed 8,000 horses satisfactorily, 
Epanchin, Ocherk, I, p. 403, out of a total of 23,000 cavaliy and 6,700 artillery horses used 
in the first months of the war, Luk’ianovich, Opiscmie, I, pp. 66-67.
(21) Epanchin, Ocherk, I, pp. 437-39.
(22) Luk’ianovich, Opiscmie, I, pp. 45,144. The failure to capture the larger port of Varna 
until October 1828 did, however, greatly limit the amount of imported supplies.
(23) RGVLA, fond VUA, d.4468, f.81, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 20 January 1828 OS.
With some minor exceptions, these was the exact forces Diebitsch had proposed five 
months earlier, ibid., d.4444, ff .l-2, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 9 August 1827 OS.
(24) Epanchin, Ocherk, I, p. 414. The breakdown was 75,141 infantry, 15,389 cavalry, 
4,108 Cossacks, 396 guns. Thus the actual fighting strength was only 94,638 men, the 
remaining 20,000 being pioneers, sappers and non-combatants. Even then, one should 
subtract the 6,289 men of the 4th Reserve Cavalry Corps who were scheduled to leave after 
the main forces and arrive at Izmail on 23 May OS, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.l 98- 
201 v, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein,, 22 March 1828 OS. This accepted, H. C. B. Moltke’s 
claim, The Russians in Bulgaria and Rumelia in 1828 and 1829 (London, 1854), p. 26, that 
Russia began the campaign with only 65,000 combatants still seems impossible.
(25) P. Geisman, ‘General’nyi shtab v Turetskoi Voine 1828-29’, VS, 1910, No.3, p. 79; 
Leer, Obzor, part IV, bk.l, p. 309; Fadeev, Krizis, p. 206.
(26) Fadeev, Krisis, p. 206. Fadeev maintains that Diebitsch considered the forces of the 
Second Army alone sufficient for the task. It is clear from footnote 23 that this is incorrect.
(27) Epanchin, Ocherk, I, pp. 344-47.
(28) Shroeder, Transformation, p. 655; Leer, Obzor, part IV, bk.l, p. 309. This excuse 
was an invention of the Russians themselves, see BL, Add. MS. 41557, f.84, Heytesbury to 
Aberdeen, 19 August 1828; see also below, footnote 57.
(29) BL, Add. MS. 41557, f.84 Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 19 August 1828.
(30) The reserve, under General Witt also included the 3rd Reserve Cavalry Corps and 
other units, making a total of 60 infantry battalions and 120 cavalry squadrons (over 50,000 
men), Luk’ianovich, Opiscmie, I, p. 69.
(31) Luk’ianovich, Opiscmie, H, pp. 1,5. The Guards’ mobilisation was hindered by a 
shortage of horses, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4462, ff.l9-20v, Report of anon., 31 January 
1828 OS.
(32) Luk’ianovich, Opiscmie, I, pp. 149-50.
(33) Of this number at least 8,000, however, were ill and unfit for duty, ‘Imperator Nikolai 
Pavlovich i gr. Dibich-Zabalkanskii: Perepiska 1828-30’, (hereafter ‘Imperator’), RS, 
XXVII, 1880, pp. 513-14, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 9 August 1828 OS. The formation of 
Witt’s reserves was generally handled very badly, Shil’der, ‘Voina’, p. 104
(34) Luk’ianovich, Opiscmie, I, pp. 66-67.
(35) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.33-33v, 41, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 9 August 1827 
OS; ibid., d.4445, fF.19-19v, Report of anon., November 1827. At the same time the 
Emperor’s own war-time entourage of dignitaries, foreign diplomats and military observers 
had some 4,000 horses, Liprandi, Osobennosti, p. 57.
(36) The forces used during the 1828 campaign were short of 12,000 horses, Zablotskii- 
Desiatovskii, Kiselev, I, p. 290. This shortage seems to have been a legacy of a Tsarist 
decree of 2 April 1823 [OS?] which reduced the number of horses throughout the imperial 
army as part of a plan for cutting expenditure on the army by some 18m roubles, PRO, FO 
352/9B, C. Bagot to G. Canning, 13 May 1823.
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(37) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.18002, ff.l-lv, Diebitsch to Ermolov, 13 May 1826; ibid, 
d.4445, ff.29-29v, Report of anon., 10 November 1827 OS.
(38) ‘Imperator’, RS, XXXIV, 1882, p. 171, Diebitsch to Nicholas 1 ,18 July 1829 OS, 
mentions the use of 2,000 camels. In 1829, E. L. Blutte (Britain’s consul in Bucharest) 
reported that ‘the means of transport for conveying stores and provisions from the [Black] 
sea shore to the various points occupied by the Russians in the interior of Rumelia, consist I 
am told of about 4,000 camels collected in the Crimea and elsewhere, which is said 
accompanied the army over the Balkan[s]’, PRO, FO 97/402, ff.71-71v, Blutte to Lord 
Cowley (H. Wellesley), 10 August 1829.
(39) The idea was certainly Kiselev’s, RGVLA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.20-32v, ‘Obshchee 
predpolozhenie otnositel’no rasporiazhenii dlia dvizheniia i deistviia 2 armii v novom 
sostave’, enclosed in Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 9 August 1827 OS.
(40) Epanchin, Ocherk, I, pp. 417-18; Wurtemberg, ‘Pokhod’, RS, XXVII, 1880, p. 6.
(41) In late 1827, with war almost certain, General-Major S. A. Tuchkov led a mission to 
the Zaporozhtsy and Nekrasovtsy. He reported that their combined settlements comprised
3,000 families but that only 300 men had joined the Turkish army. The remainder were 
prepared to make peace with the Tsar. Tuchkov proposed that they receive an Imperial 
pardon and be resettled back into Russia, RGVLA, fond 14057, op. 11/182a, sv.36, d.3, ff.2- 
3, Tuchkov to Kiselev, 31 October 1827 OS; ibid., sv.96, d.5, ff.l5-18v, Report of 
Tuchkov, 19 April 1828 OS. Nicholas welcomed this news, but, still suspicious of these 
Cossacks, favoured their resettlement far away from the Turkish Balkan border in the 
Caucasus, specifically in the Karbada or by the Kura or Arax rivers, ibid., sv.36, d.3, ff.ll-  
13, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 17 December 1827 OS. Tuchkov was, however, opposed, 
arguing that the Caucasus were too unfamiliar to them and proposed instead Bessarabia as 
the optimum location, ibid., ff.21-22v, Kiselev to Diebitsch 2 February 1828 OS. This was 
accepted by Nicholas, but he insisted that resettlement was to begin only once the war had 
begun so as not to ‘arouse the attention and displeasure of the Turkish Government’, ibid., 
ff.24-24v, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 23 February 1828 OS. Once the campaign opened, 
the first appeals for Russian patronage followed almost immediately. In May, a request of 
one thousand Zaporozhtsy for protection was granted and plans were immediately made to 
send them to I. N. Inzov, the Head of Colonies in Bessarabia, ibid., ff.37-37v, 46, A. V. 
Rudzevich to Wittgenstein, 12,15 May 1828 OS. The Zaporozhtsy repaid the Russians by 
rendering them vital assistance during the crossing of the Danube on 27-30 May 1828 OS, 
Epanchin, Ocherk, I, p. 418; Shil’der, Nikolai, II, pp. 138-39. In June, the Nekrasovtsy 
took an oath to Nicholas, RGVIA, fond 14057, op. 11/182a, sv.36, d.3, ff.60-60v, Diebitsch 
to Tuchkov, 4 June 1828 OS. By the end of the year, a proposal was accepted to form, 
under a Colonel Gladkii, a ‘Danubian Cossack Regiment’ of five hundred Zaporozhtsy. It 
was proposed that after the war the regiment was to be permanently settled on the Kuban 
near Anapa, ibid., op. 16/183, sv.956, d.10, ff.l-4v, A. I. Chernyshev to Wittgenstein, 5 
December 1828 OS. Their role was to help defend the Caucasus Line against the raids of 
the Circassians. However, by the time the unit was formed in early 1830 {ibid., ff.l66-67v, 
Gladkii to Obruchev (no initials), 21 March 1830 OS) Paskevich had already begun his 
series of expeditions against the Caucasian tribes, and was not in a position to execute the 
plan. Gladkii himself believed the plan should be abandoned altogether and like Tuchkov 
preferred Bessarabia as the site of settlement, ibid., 173-73v, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 10 
April 1830 OS. M. S. Vorontsov, however, remained suspicious, and favoured the ‘Anapa’ 
option, or at least settling the Zaporozhtsy further from the Turkish border in Kerch’, ibid., 
ff.l81-82v, Vorontsov to Chernyshev, 16 May 1830 OS. Likewise, as regards the 
Nekrasovtsy, Vorontsov feared that, should they be settled in Bessarabia, their knowledge 
of the Danubian tributaries would allow them to evade Russia’s defence posts and cordon 
sanitaire. Nicholas agreed that Kerch’ was a more suitable location, ibid., sv.944, d.49, 
ff.22-22v, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 17 February 1830 OS. Unfortunately, the ultimate fate
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of the Cossacks is unclear, though it appears that, in fact, almost none of them permanently 
resettled into Russia, ibid., sv.956, d.10, ff.239-40, Gladkii to L. O. Roth, 27 May 1830 
OS; Shil’der, Nikolai, II, p. 139.
(42) Kagan, Military Reforms, pp. 109,119-20,298.
(43) Wurtemberg, ‘Pokhod’, RS, XXVII, 1880, p. 86. Diebitsch was always more attracted 
to the idea of commanding troops in battle than to the more mundane staff work with which 
he was formally charged. During the 1826 Persian campaign, Diebitsch, according to one 
account, was involved in an intrigue with Ermolov which aimed at foiling Paskevich’s 
attempt to gain command of the Caucasus Corps. In return, Ermolov was to grant Diebitsch 
the opportunity of leading certain units in the 1827 campaign, Shcherbatov, Paskevich, II, 
pp. 201-06. The intrigue, however, came to nothing and thus, in 1828, Diebitsch appears to 
have been doubly resolved not to let an even greater opportunity for glory to pass him by.
It is perhaps not irrelevant to observe also that Diebitsch was descended from an ancient 
aristocratic Siliesian clan, noted for its martial abilities. His ancestor, Hans von Diebitsch, 
fought for the defence of Vienna in 1520 against the Ottomans at the height of their power, 
‘Imperator’, RS, XXVII, 1880, p. 95.
(44) BL, Add. MS. 41558, f.10, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 2 January 1829.
(45) The rivalry between Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg (Commander of 7th Corps) and 
Diebitsch was especially strong, see Wurtemberg, ‘Pokhod’, RS, XXVII, 1880, pp. 86, 
527-29; RA, ‘Iz vospominaniiaprintsaEvgeniia Virtembergskogo’, 1878, No.l, pp. 356-58. 
In 1828, Nicholas was accompanied by some forty five Generals (of all types), including 
every veteran General of the Napoleonic Wars then still alive. By the end of 1829, death 
had reduced this number to a more manageable twenty five, Liprandi, Osobennosti, pp. 61- 
63. The problem of overstaffing was not unique to Russia. One of the few Russian sources 
of intelligence on the British Army (1815-53) is an extract from an 1832 British newspaper 
article, enquiring as to why His Majesty’s army of 100,000 men required the command of 
508 Generals and 6 Field Marshals. This was held to be ‘adequate to the command of all 
the armies in the whole world...whether civilised or barbarous’, RGVIA, fond 431, d.13, 
f.13, Report of 16 January 1832 OS.
(46) BL., Add. MS. 41557, fF.147v-48, Heytesbuiy to Aberdeen, 17 October 1828. It is 
clear from Nicholas’s correspondence with Diebitsch (‘Imperator’, RS, XXVII, 1880, pp. 
95-110, 510-26, 764-80; XXVIII, 1880, pp.409-28 ; XXIX, pp. 891-934) that no major 
decision was taken in 1828 without the consent of the Tsar.
(47) BL, Add. MS. 41557, f.148, Heytesbuiy to Aberdeen, 17 October 1828
(48) Martens, Sobranie traktatov, XI, 1895, p. 379; Fonton, Vospominaniia, I, pp. 83-86.
(49) Shil’der, ‘Voina’, RS, XXX, 1881, p. 101.
(50) It had been the Sultan’s intention to raise around 240,000 men, RGIA, fond 673, op.l, 
d.221, ff.3-4v, ‘O partizanskoi voine’, Liprandi.
(51) V. I. Sheremet, Turtsiia i Adrianopol'skii mir 1829 g. (Moscow, 1975), p. 194; 
Epanchin, Ocherk, I, pp. 157-162,417,421. The Turks retained their traditional dislike of 
regular service and recruiting sufficient numbers was problematic. The Sultan was 
ultimately forced to withdraw conscription for this force, RGVIA, fond 450, d.5, ff.74-79, 
Berg to Nesselrode, 25 February 1827 OS. Berg believed it would take a generation for the 
Sultan to form a whole regular army of over 100,000 men, ibid.
(52) Due to their weakness, the Turks were more adamant than ever before not to give 
battle, see, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4585, ff.96v-97, ‘Istoriia turetskoi voiny 1828 i 1829 
godov’, Lieutenant Kobiakov (no initial), 1830.
(53) PRO FO 519/43, f.234, Cowley to Aberdeen, 3 July 1828.
(54) Sheremet, Adrianopol 'skii mir, pp. 32-34,43-44; VPRII/VTI, 1992, p. 695.
(55) PRO FO 519/43, f.292, Cowley to Aberdeen, 10 September 1828.
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(56) In theory, the Asiatic Pashaliks could raise up to 200,000 men, W. E. D. Allen and P. 
Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields (Cambridge, 1953), p. 23, though in both 1828 and 1829 
less than half that number was achieved.
(57) There are a number of campaign histories on the 1828-29 war. The first ever (which 
was limited to the events of 1828) appears to be that of Berg (possibly the aforementioned), 
RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 4686, ff.l-29,12 December 1828 OS. His explicit aim was to 
‘revenir des erreurs qui sement des joumaux etrangers mal informes’, (the latter had 
revelled in Russia’s failure of 1828). The work makes the most of Russia’s limited 
successes in 1828, blame the Turks for avoiding battle and argues that Nicholas began the 
campaign with less men than in previous Turkish wars, due to his desire not to destroy the 
Ottoman Empire, f. 8. The first full campaign history is probably an unpublished official 
account by Lieutenant Kobiakov, ‘Istoriia turetskoi voiny 1828 i 1829 godov’, 1830, 
RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 4585, ff.47-241v. This file, ff. 258-79 also contains a summary of 
the Battle of Kulevcha (30 May 1829 OS), by [D. P.?] Buturlin, 28 June 1829 OS. The first 
published account is the purely factual Iovskii (no initial), Poslednaia voina s Turtsieiu (St 
Petersburg, 1830). Luk’ianovich, Opisanie (1844-47), I-IV, is better, though by far the best 
account is Epanchin, Ocherk (1906), I-IH, though it concentrates heavily on the 1829 
Balkan campaign. The best study of the Asiatic campaigns is A. V. Ushakov, Istoriia 
voennykh deistvii v aziatskoi Turtsii v 1828 i 1829 godakh, I-II (St Petersburg, 1836). 
According to Beskrovnyi, Ocherki, p. 91, it was written on the orders of Paskevich to 
glorify his campaigns. Though possibly true, the work is objective in tone, comprehensive 
on details and contains a good introduction to the region as a whole. In RGVIA, fond VUA 
d.4643, there is a manuscript entitled ‘Obozrenie oblastei Aziatskoi Turtsii, sopredel’nykh 
Rossiskim vladeniem za kavkazom’ n.d. It is of much interest, though it may be a draft of 
Ushakov’s work. Soviet accounts have added much polemic but little to our actual 
knowledge of events, Fadeev, Krizis, pp. 241-73,285-311; Liakhov, Armiia, pp. 101-299. 
Of works in other languages, only Moltke, Russians (first published in German, 1845), is of 
real interest.
(58) See above, pp. 136,149 (footnote 146).
(59) Liprandi believed that the surest means of securing the surrender of Turkish fortresses 
was by ignoring them and pushing on forwards. By way of example he argued that it was 
the 3rd Corps push to Karasu that caused the fall of Brailov, Machin, Isakchi, Tul’cha and 
Kistendjeh, Liprandi, ‘Osada Turetskikh krepostei’, RI, 1855, No.5, p.3.
(60) Epanchin, Ocherk, I, pp.417-21; Luk’ianovich, Opisanie, I, pp. 79-153.
(61) ‘Zapiski A. I. Mikhailovskogo-Danilevskogo, 1829’ RS, LXXIX, 1893, p. 199.
(62) Luk’ianovich, Opisanie, I, pp. 113,149-51; Epanchin, Ocherk, I, p. 418.
(63) Epanchin, Ocherk, I, pp. 420-21.
(64)/&/</., Ill, pp. 383-84.
(65) Luk’ianovich, Opisanie, I, p. 242; Epanchin, Ocherk, I, p. 420.
(66) Epanchin, Ocherk, I, p. 421; Luk’ianovich, Opisanie, I, pp. 190-92.
(67) Epanchin, Ocherk, I, pp. 421-22;
(68) Luk’ianovich, Opisanie, 1 ,198-203; Epanchin, Ocherk, I, p. 421-22. Liprandi, 
Osobennosti, pp. 43-89 passim, claims that the Russian forces could have defeated the 
Seraskier’s army were it not for Diebitsch taking the personal command of the cavalry units 
nominated to outflank the Turkish centre (comprised mainly of irregular infantry). The 
latter had been thrown into panic almost upon the very commencement of battle and were 
soon in retreat. If Diebitsch had attacked them, Liprandi believed a rout would have 
inevitably followed, but Diebitsch, overly fearful of a counter-attack from the Turkish 
cavalry, held back. Liprandi’s criticism of Diebitsch is but part of his general attack on 
‘cabinet soldiers’ who whilst ‘famed in European wars’ failed miserably in Turkish ones, 
ibid, p. 80.
(69) Epanchin, Ocherk, I, pp. 427-28.
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(70) Ibid, p. 424.
(71) ‘Imperator’, RS, XXVIII, 1880, pp. 412-13, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 27 August 1828 
OS.
(72) No documentary record of the meeting has been discovered and all secondary sources 
are silent on this point.
(73) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4586, ff.78-80v, Jomini to Nicholas 1 ,15 June 1828 OS.
(74) Epanchin, Ocherk, I, p. 421.
(75) The Enibazar decision was so close to Jomini’s proposal of 15 June 1828 OS that it is 
possible that it was based precisely on the Frenchman’s ideas. Furthermore, Jomini had 
already inisisted in his war plan of April 1828 that a blockade (or an attack on the supply 
lines) of Shumla was an essential prerequisite of a Balkan crossing and the best means of 
forcing the main Turk forces to give battle - ‘SL.l’ennemi tient obstirement a Shumla, il 
faudra reunir nos efforts autour de cette ville ou bien si Ton redoute les inconvenients d’un 
blocus, on pourra manoeuvre par Kazan sur les derrieres. Operation hardie sans doute, 
mais que je ne regarde comme impracticable, et qui deciderait problement l’ennemie a venir 
nous livrer bataille lui meme en rase campagne; chance que nous devons rechercher avec 
empressment’, RGVLA, fond VUA, d. 4586, ff.l00-100b.
(76) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4685, fif.l-6v, Note of Jomini, 29 August 1828 OS. Jomini also 
stated that ‘s ij’etais a la tete de la armee et maitre absolu je prefererai une tentative sur 
Shumla comme plus conform a mes antecedents et a mon caractere’. Jomini was fortunate 
in avoiding any criticism for the 1828 campaign. In part this was due to a misunderstanding 
by contemporaries of his true opinions on the conduct of the war. For instance, both 
Fonton, Vospominaniia, I, pp.78-82, and Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg, ‘Pokhod’, RS, 
XXVn, 1880, p. 86, claimed that, in 1828, Jomini was the strongest advocate of a Balkan 
crossing.
(77) ‘Imperator’, RS, XXVII, 1880, pp. 516-20, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 9 August 1828 
OS.
(78) Ibid., pp. 109-10, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 7 August 1828 OS.
(79) See above, footnote 75 and pp. 118-19.
(80) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4684, fif.11-13, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 25 July 1828 OS.
(81) Ibid., ff.5-5v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 20 July 1828 OS. Emphasis added.
(82) Ibid., f.5v. It should be noted that in his earlier war plans (of July 1820 and September 
1827, see above pp. 115-16,132-33, 148 [footnote 119]), Kiselev had advocated a two- 
year campaign and seems to have always believed a one-year campaign to be overly 
ambitious.
(83) ‘Imperator’, RS, XXVII, pp. 775-76, Diebitsch to Nicholas 1 ,19 August 1828 OS.
(84) Ibid., pp. 771, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 21 August 1828 OS.
(85) Ibid., p. 105, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 7 August 1828 OS.
(86) Ibid., pp. 778-80, Diebitsch to Nicholas 1,23 August 1828 OS. The verdict of most 
historians has been to lay the greatest responsibility for the attack on Shumla on Diebitsch 
who is said alone to have genuinely believed that it could actually be captured. All agree 
(except Luk’ianovich, Opisanie, I, p. 267, who is mistaken) that Wittgenstein was opposed 
to the blockade believing Shumla would never be taken, anon., ‘Cherty iz zhizni 
tsarstvovaniia Imperatora Nikolaia I’, VS, IX, 1868, p. 162; Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, 
Kiselev, I, p. 280; Tatishchev, Nikolai, II, pp. 143-49. As for Kiselev, his biographer 
absolves him of all responsibility, Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, Kiselev, I, p. 280.
(87) ‘Imperator’, RS, XXVIII, p. 416, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 27 August 1828 OS.
(88) Ibid., XXIX, p. 894, Diebitsch to Nicholas 1,2 September 1828 OS. The Russian 
position at Shumla had recently become even more tenuous following a large Turkish 
assault on 27 August OS. A potential rout was avoided due to intelligence from Liprandi 
forewarning of the attack, ibid., XXVIII, pp. 416-20, Diebitsch to Nicholas 1,29 August 
1828 OS.
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(89) In ibid., XXIX, p. 925, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 2 September 1828 OS, the Tsar 
enclosed a recent note of Jomini which was said to contain ‘quelques bonnes idees’. The 
note is doubtless that of 29 August 1828 OS (see above, footnote 76), which was written at 
Varna, where the Tsar himself arrived on 30 August OS. In it, Jomini proposed the 
simultaneous sieges of Silistria and Vama as well as an attack on Shumla - ‘le point decisif 
des operations’.
(90) The official Turkish version (as proclaimed by the Sultan himself) was that Usuf- 
Pasha, the co-commander of Vama (with Izzet-Pasha) took a bribe from the Russians to 
secure his garrison’s capitulation in October 1828, Sheremet, Adrianopol ’skii mir, p. 47. 
Tsarist historians, e.g. Luk’ianovich, Opisanie, n, p. 120, admit that Usuf subsequently 
emigrated to Russia but only in order to avoid the Sultan’s vengeance for the loss of Vama. 
Soviet writers have always denied any underhand Russian practice, Sheremet,
Adrianopol'skii mir, pp. 48,197-98. The whole affair nevertheless remains suspicious.
The Russians went to great lengths to assist Usuf, persuading the Grand Vizier to hand over 
Usuf s property and harem, which were then sent to Odessa, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4809, 
ff.62-62v, L. O. Roth to Wittgenstein, 26 December 1828 OS. Moreover, the Russians, as 
a rule, were certainly not averse to bribery. Following his defeat at Boeleshti by Geismar, 
the Turkish commander - Ibrahim-Pasha, Seraskier of Widdin - fell into dispute with the 
Sultan. Geismar was instructed to ‘enter into secret communication’ and persuade Ibrahim 
to hand over the fortress of Widdin, ‘promising him, in the name of H.I.M., a reward for 
such an action’. If Ibrahim agreed, but was unable to persuade his garrison to surrender, 
Geismar was ‘in any case, to promise him safe refuge in Russia and a decent maintenance 
as has been done for Usuf-Pasha', ibid., d.4722, ff.l-2v, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 26 
December 1828 OS. Emphasis added.
(91) Luk’ianovich, Opisanie, II, pp. 208-22.
(92) RGVLA, fond VUA, d.4660, ff.2-13v, Report of Ermolov, n.d. (from context, early 
1826).
(93) Ibid., d.4329, ff. 30-37, Diebitsch to Paskevich, 28 January 1828 OS.
(94) Ibid., Diebitsch to Paskevich, ff.63-71, 10 February 1828 OS.
(95) Ibid., ff.263-66, Paskevich to Diebitsch, 29 March 1828 OS. Due to Paskevich’s 
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(175) Ibid., pp.163-64, Diebitsch to Nicholas 1,9 July OS. Diebitsch’s decision was 
perhaps not as bold as it seems. For following the Battle of Kulevcha, Diebitsch sent the 
diplomat F. P. Fonton to sound out the Vizier (at Shumla) on peace terms. The latter’s 
representatives did not rule out negotiations but required time to receive instructions from 
the Sultan, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4850, ff.51-52v, Diebitsch to Nicholas, 2 June 1829 OS; 
ff.53-60v, Report of F. P. Fonton, 7 June 1829 OS. It is possible that Diebitsch’s decision 
to push forces to Shumla (following the fall of Silistria on 18 June OS), as well as his
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Vizier and sign a peace without the need for a Balkan crossing. By July it was obvious the 
Vizier was not about to negotiate and there was little option other than a Balkan crossing as 
another blockade of Shumla was bound to be opposed by Nicholas.
(176) Luk’ianovich, Opisanie, IV, p. 10.
(177) For an account see Epanchin, Ocherk, III, pp. 33-81. Diebitsch was awarded the title 
Zabalkanskii (presumably following the precedent of Rxmdantsev-Zadunaiskii),
‘Imperator’, RS, XXXIV, 1882, p. 175, Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 4 August 1829 OS.
(178) Fadeev, Krizis, pp. 303-04; Beskrovnyi, Russkoe voennoe Iskusstvo, p. 205; 
‘Imperator’, RS, XXXIV, 1882, pp. 169-70, Diebitsch to Nicholas 1 ,18 July 1829 OS; 
ibid., XXXVI, 1882, pp. 81-84, Diebitsch to Nicholas 1 ,1 August 1829 OS. Following 
these attacks, Diebitsch became utterly convinced of the need to capture Shumla. Despite 
Nicholas’ express wishes to the contrary, Diebitsch, almost right up to the very signing of 
the eventual peace treaty, was still issuing orders for a siege, ibid., XXXIV, 1882, p. 175, 
Nicholas I to Diebitsch, 4 August 1829 OS; XXXVI, 1882, p. 90, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 
24 August 1829 OS.
(179) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4850, fF.l 08-113v, Diebitsch to Nicholas 1 ,13 August 1829 
OS.
(180) Zablotskii-Desiatovskii, Kiselev, I, pp. 308-13. It later transpired that the Pasha of 
Skodra had no intention whatsoever of rescuing the Sultan (with whom he was in dispute), 
Vinogradov, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, pp. 230-31.
(181) Fadeev, Krizis, pp. 297-304.
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(184) Luk’ianovich, Opisanie, IV, pp. 203-06.
(185) See above, p. 114.
(186) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4644, ff.297-99v, Paskevich to Nicholas 1,21 November 1828 
OS.
(187) Not Trabizond, as suggested in Allen, Muratoff, Battlefields, p. 31.
(188) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4644, ff.298-98v, Paskevich to Nicholas 1,21 November 1828 
OS.
(189) According to the Soviet version, the whole affair was arranged by the British mission 
in Tehran in order to engender a Russo-Persian war and so relieve the pressure on the 
Sultan, Balaian, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia Irana, pp. 234-67; S. V. Shostakovich, 
‘Proiskhozhdenie “Reliatsii” o gibeli Griboedovskoi missii, TIGU, XVI, 1956, pp. 149-59. 
At the time of his death Griboedov was attempting (without great success) to win 
Nesselrode’s and Paskevich’s consent to a Russo-Persian alliance and Persia’s entrance 
into the Russo-Turkish war, A. Berzhe (ed.), ‘Aleksandr Sergeevich Griboedov. 
Deiatel’nost ego kak diplomata: perepiska s gr. Paskevichem, gr. Nesselrode i dr.’, RS, 
XVII, 1876, pp. 736-39; A. S. Griboedov, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (Petrograd, 1917), 
III, pp. 238-41.
(190) Sheremet, AdrianopoVskii mir, p. 63; RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4809, ff.268-71, Journal 
of Paskevich, 15 March 1829 OS.
(191) RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 4809, ff.267v, 272, Paskevich to Nicholas 1 ,15 March 1829 
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announced his decision to raise a Georgian militia of some 6,000 men for internal defence,
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Khachapuridze, K istorii Gruzii, p. 181. Paskevich presumed this measure would cause no 
problems as Ermolov had raised a similar number of Georgians during the 1826 Persian 
campaign. Unfortunately, Paskevich made a serious error due to his ignorance of local 
custom. Ermolov, who possessed a far greater understanding of such matters, likened the 
traditions of military obligation in the Caucasus to those of Medieval Europe. ‘You are 
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campaign without upkeep and payment. This is why the militia raised last year was 
disbanded after about one and a half months. For the 1827 [Persian] campaign, militias will 
be formed and then disbanded after serving the customary obligation of one to two months’. 
As a rule, Ermolov was opposed to the payment or permanent enlistment of Caucasian 
peoples as their attitude to war was quite traditional - they were attracted only by the 
prospect of plunder and demanded higher wages than Russian soldiers (the Soviet claim, 
Fadeev, Krizis, p. 152 that the Georgian militia of 1826 constituted a ‘patriotic uprising’
[patrioticheskii podem] thus appears to be incorrect). Moreover, Ermolov believed that the 
Georgians’ tradition of irregular warfare made them unaccustomed to the discipline required 
for regular service. Prophetically, he warned that ‘even if a militia is supported on Treasury 
fimds and receives payment, then dishonourable individuals will be found who will 
propagate the idea that this is merely the first step to the introduction of [compulsory, long­
term] conscription. This without fail will make a detrimental impression on the population 
and could be the cause of certain disturbances’, RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4309, ff.7-9v, 
Ermolov to Diebitsch, 12 January 1827 OS. Unfortunately, Ermolov’s argument remained 
unheeded. In 1829, Paskevich announced that the Georgian militia units were to serve for a 
six-month period and planned to use Russian officers to teach them rudimentary tactical 
formations. This led to the spread of rumours amongst the Georgian population that they 
were to be enlisted into the regular army for twenty five years. In the Spring, disturbances 
broke out throughout Eastern Georgia, forcing Paskevich was forced to abandon his idea 
entirely, Khachapuridze, K istorii Gruzii, pp. 179-86. Georgian militias were successfully 
raised during the wars of 1853-56 and 1877-78 but compulsory universal conscription into 
the regular Russian army was not introduced until 1889, ibid. p. 187.
(194) Details in Allen, Muratoff, Battlefields, pp. 33-39.
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Diebitsch, 20 August 1829 OS. The Kurds were thus not neutral throughout the war as 
maintained in Allen, Muratoff, Battlefields, p. 44.
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(197) Allen, Muratoff, Battlefields, pp. 41,44.
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(199) Ushakov, Istoriia, II, p. 294.
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fond VUA, d.4809, ff.542-44, Journal of Paskevich, 11 July 1829 OS.
There are varying estimations on Paskevich’s 1829 campaign. Fadeev, Krisis, p. 306-11, is 
very negative, allowing Paskevich no praise for his defeat of the Seraskier in June and 
critical the decision not to push further west after Erzerum. Alternatively, Ushakov, 
Istoriia, II, is most favourable, as is Allen, Muratoff, Battlefields, pp. 31-45. W. Monteith, 
the somewhat overawed Englishman who accompanied the Russians in 1829, went as far as 
to speak of the ‘genius of Prince Paskiewitch’ and considered the 1829 campaign one of the 
most ‘glorious...in the whole of the Russian annals’, W. Monteith, Kars and Erzeroum,
with the Campaigns o f Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829 (London, 1856), pp. 300-301. 
Considering the war as a whole, one must certainly be impressed by the apparent ease at 
which the numerical inferior Caucasus Corps consistently defeated large Turkish forces and 
captured their fortresses with no great effort. In part, this was due to the defects in a 
Turkish military organisation that was in transition from semi-irregular to a regular army, as 
well as due to its traditional technological weakness in artillery, Allen, Muratoff, 
Battlefields, pp. 38-39. This, however, does not explain why the Russian army had such 
great problems in the Balkans against a Ottoman army possessing precisely the same 
defects. The underlying reasons for Paskevich ‘amazingly easy’ success, ibid., must be 
sought in the peculiarities of the Caucasian theatre. They are threefold. First, as Liprandi 
argued, the quality of the Ottoman irregular forces raised in the region was, in the main, of 
much lower quality than those of Ottoman European. Second, the Turks were determined 
to adopt the strategic offensive in the Caucasus whilst remaining defensive in Europe.
Thus, unlike the commanders of the Second Army who had to force the stubborn Turkish 
army out from its fortresses, Paskevich was faced by a Seraskier only willing to give battle. 
This suited Paskevich’s tactically superior forces and allowed him to win a decisive battle 
in 1829. This led directly to the capitulation of Erzerum and relieved Paskevich of the need 
of a potentially costly siege. Third, in terms of strategy, war in the Caucasus was more 
straightforward than in the Balkans. The mountainous terrain was dominated by a certain 
number of roads and passes limiting Russia’s offensive possibilities to really only two 
operational lines - a push on Kars from either Gumri or the Boijomi pass. The value of 
Kars was obvious as a forward base. After this, there were again only two real options - a 
westwards push to Erzerum or the more conservative northern route to capture the minor 
Turkish fortresses near the Boijomi pass. The real test of generalship would come only if it 
was decided after Erzerum to push into Anatolia. Here the number of strategic options 
increased greatly and there appeared the problem of how the army was to be supplied in 
distant provinces and how its elongated operational line was to be defended. Paskevich 
was well aware of these difficulties and for this reason remained at Erzerum. In the final 
analysis, the 1828-29 Caucasian campaigns were the work, not of genius, but of a safe pair 
of hands.
(201) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4809, ff.597-612, Journal of Paskevich, 30 August-2 October 
1829 OS. The Seraskier asked for an armistice only on 28 September 1829 OS.
(202) BL, Add. MS. 41558, f.210, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, 11 September 1829.
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VII. THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR AND THE USE OF BALKAN IRREGULARS,
1828-29
One of the more sensitive questions facing the Tsarist establishment on the eve of 
war was the prudence of raising irregular or partisan units from amongst the Christian 
inhabitants of Ottoman Europe.(l) Such a policy, though adopted many times in previous 
Turkish wars,(2) had, in recent years, become greatly politicised, much to its detriment. 
After 1815, Russia was greatly prone to the general fear of revolutionary and nationalist 
movements that dominated European politics of the Restoration Era. This engendered at St 
Petersburg a deep distrust of all organisations and movements of a populist nature and many 
baulked at any suggestion of the arming of a civilian population. Moreover, Russia was 
publicly committed to the principle of legitimism and, notwithstanding her support of the 
Greeks, she had no desire to compromise further the authority of the Sultan through the 
incitement of more of his subjects to rebellion. The situation in the Balkans had, by 1828, 
become so tense that it was feared that the use of even limited numbers of partisans could 
inflame popular anti-Turkish sentiment to the point of revolution. The ability of a small 
irregular force to create a levee en masse in the Balkans had already been aptly 
demonstrated by Ypsilantis in 1821. The unleashing of another revolt amongst the Serbs, 
Bulgars, Moldavians or Wallachians was seen as certain to threaten the very existence of 
the Ottoman state (to whose continued preservation Russia was committed) and further 
complicate relations between the Great Powers.(3) Thus, as A. Kh. Benckendorff correctly 
concluded, Nicholas had done his all to avoid the perception of the Turkish war as an open- 
ended religious cum ethnic struggle. Instead, the war was presented as ‘a simple argument 
between two courts, which was to be settled by the army without the participation of the 
people’.(4) Such political considerations thus pointed against a repetition of the practices 
of the last Turkish War, during which Russia had actively supported Bulgar, Pandour and 
Serbian irregular units.(5)
The Russian military establishment, however, had a different agenda. Most leading 
generals for instance favoured the use of Serbian forces, the benefit of which, was thought 
to have been increased now that Russia intended to cross the Balkans. Such a southwards 
advance threatened to leave Russia’s right flank exposed and an uprising in Serbia was 
considered the best means to pre-empt a Turkish assault via Widdin into Lesser 
Wallachia.(6) The use of other nationalities was proposed by Admiral D. N. Seniavin, who 
had previously fostered military co-operation with the Montenegrins during the Napoleonic 
Wars. He argued for the creation of an avant-garde composed of the mountain population
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of the Adriatic coast. This force of ‘several hundred’ men was to assist the army during the
crossing of the Balkans.(7) In a later proposal, the Admiral favoured creating similar units
from the inhabitants of the Principalities and Balkan mountains. Seniavin was insistent
however that, whilst such units should be commanded by Russian officers, their irregular
organisation and status should be retained. Attempts to introduce regular army discipline
were to be avoided. Instead, ‘simple treatment, praising of their bravery and certain
concessions with regard to plunder will be a more effective means of control than
discipline’. Generally, great emphasis was placed on the utility of winning over the local
Christian population at large to Russia’s side. This was to be achieved through the
intermediary of the Orthodox clergy, which throughout Ottoman Europe was ‘dissatisfied
with the Porte’ and could easily ‘be bought’.(8)
To some, the use of Bulgar irregulars appeared the most viable option. For
following the end of hostilities with the Porte in 1812 the aforementioned Bulgar zemskoe
voisko [‘land militia’] was resettled en masse into Bessarabia, so establishing a reservoir of
trusted and experienced warriors, ready to volunteer for future service.(9) The most
ambitious proposal was that of Lt-Col Serristory.(lO) The Bulgars were to be again formed
into irregular units and used ‘a etre le noyau de guerillas qui s’organiseront en Boulgarie’.
As the main Russian force crossed of the Danube, this irregular force:
...sera lance dans les montagnes pour exciter les habitans leurs 
compatriots a prendre les armes et balayer des partis ennemis les 
passages des Balkans, nos communications et nos flancs.
Whilst Serristory aimed at nothing less than the unleashing of a mass Bulgar partisan 
campaign, A. F. Langerone offered the more moderate proposal of organising the 
Bessarabian Bulgars into two 500-man cavalry regiments as a means of augmenting 
Russia’s Cossack regiments.(ll)
Whilst such projects found a sympathetic ear at the High Command of the Second 
Army, the Tsar’s attitude remained one of extreme caution.(12) Nicholas was particularly 
opposed to Serbian participation in the war. He feared that this would inevitably result in 
an uncontrollable revolution amongst this, the most organised and warlike of the Balkan 
nationalities, currently under the leadership of the unpredictable and ambitious Milosh 
Obrenovich. Throughout 1828, Milosh was repeatedly instructed to ensure his nation’s 
passivity.(13) The proposals of Serristory and Langerone were also both dismissed and, in 
February 1828, Nicholas expressly forbade the formation of volunteer forces.(14) A 
nominal concession was however made in April, following an approach from the
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aforementioned Bessarabian Bulgars. Although their request to serve as a independent 
irregular force was declined, Nicholas allowed them to enlist into the 4th Uhlan 
division.(15) This decision had in fact little meaning as F. P. Pahlen had already dismissed 
these ‘volunteers’ as ‘consisting of a rabble of vagrants who would be of more harm than of 
use’ .(16) The Russian Government thus entered the war with no policy and no intention of 
allowing any formation of irregular or partisan units.
The Campaign of 1828
Fearful of the unpredictable response of the Balkan population to the 
commencement of hostilities, the Russian campaign opened with a carefully worded 
proclamation to the inhabitants of Bulgaria.(17) It emphasised that the war was being 
waged, not for the destruction of Ottoman rule, but to ensure the Sultan’s observance of 
Russian treaty rights. It assured both the Christian and Muslim inhabitants that they would 
be protected from violence and urged both to remain calm. Russia’s aim was to dispel the 
idea of a war of conquest and thus prevent both a general uprising amongst the Christian 
population, and dissuade the large Turkish population of the region from conducting 
partisan action against the Russian forces. Whilst the proclamation urged the Bulgars to 
supply the aimy with provisions, the policy of avoiding the arming of the Christian 
population remained in force. As the campaign progressed, circumstance and military 
necessity were however to compromise this decision.
The first steps towards a rethink were prompted following receipt of a report of 
General-Major S. A. Tuchkov, who, on Wittgenstein’s advice, had been made zemskii 
komissar [‘land commissar’] for ‘Northern Bulgaria’ (the Babadag region) in February
1828.(18) In March, Tuchkov was charged with the gathering of information on Bulgaria, 
with a view to the optimum means of administering the region following its impending 
occupation by the Russian army. Tuchkov reported that, in contrast to Serbia and the 
Principalities, ‘Bulgaria’ was governed as a Pashalik, having no indigenous organs of self- 
government. Without also the stabilising force of a Bulgar landowning class (the Bulgars 
knew no aristocracy) there seemed no easy means of averting the chaos that was sure to 
ensue upon the impending disintegration of local Turkish authority. Tuchkov thus saw no 
solution other than the direct rule of these lands by Russian officials and the creation of 
zemskoe poselennoe voisko [fit. ‘land settlement militia’]composed of local Bulgars to 
maintain internal order and repel Turkish partisan raids. Whilst the name of this force 
implied an irregular status, Tuchkov had evidently wider ambitions for it. It was to consist
of infantry, cavalry and light artillery units, divided in battalions. The soldiers were to be 
uniformed and be trained to form line, column and square.(19)
Tuchkov’s proposal soon received the full support of Kiselev, who requested that 
Tuchkov be despatched sufficient arms and artillery for a one thousand-man force.(20) 
Somewhat surprisingly, Nicholas agreed.(21) Though the Tsar gave no reason for his 
decision, it is almost certain that sensing the campaign was not progressing as planned, 
Nicholas was unwilling to detach more units from his already understrength army for the 
internal security of occupied lands. Significantly, the army was especially short of 
Cossacks, who usually performed ‘irregular’ functions such as the policing of occupied 
land.(22) The Tsar’s agreement however came with the proviso that, after the war, all 
members of the zemskoe voisko were to be resettled into Russia (as occurred in 1812). 
Ostensibly, this was to protect them from Turkish retribution, though probably also because 
Nicholas feared they could act as the nucleus of a future armed Bulgar nationalist 
movement. On the same date, Nicholas agreed to another of Tuchkov’s plans to form two 
regiments, one infantry, one cavalry, from the Black Sea Cossack settlements in Bessarabia. 
They were to assist the zemskoe voisko and man the Danubian flotilla.(23)
Tuchkov’s proposal was however destined never to be enacted, as the Turks had 
already driven most of the Bulgars of the Babadag region from their homes. Tuchkov’s 
request to call up the Bessarabian Bulgars instead was not accepted (for reasons 
unstated).(24) It must however be admitted, that Tuchkov’s ideas, amounting as they did to 
the creation of a proto-regular Bulgar army, were in any case unrealisable, at least in the 
short term. The Bulgars had no experience of regular warfare nor of the discipline it 
required. The plan regarding the Black Sea Cossacks also faced difficulties, with M. S. 
Vorontsov reporting in July that only insufficient numbers were to be found in 
Bessarabia.(25)
Whilst the above debates were continuing, Russian commanders on the ground, 
unbeknown to the High Command, were already employing the services of irregulars. Their 
use was prompted by the latter themselves who, quite voluntarily, appeared at the army’s 
forward posts offering their services. The first two units of volunteers appeared at Turtukai 
in May, as General L. O. Roth’s 6th Corps was preparing to cross on to the right bank of 
the Danube. They numbered in total around 275 men (composed of Bulgars, Greeks and 
other Balkan nationalities) and were commanded, respectively, by a certain P. Fokiiano and
G. Mamarchev - a veteran of the 1806-12 war and future Bulgar revolutionary.(26) Due to 
their extensive knowledge of the Balkan theatre, Roth agreed to attach them to his corps.
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The Bulgar volunteers accompanied Roth’s forces to Sihstria where they participated in a 
large encounter on 9 June OS and assisted in the subsequent blockade of that fortress.
Their presence was however soon discovered by Wittgenstein, who, in accordance with 
official policy, ordered their immediate expulsion. Fortunately, Roth was able to reverse 
this decision and the volunteers remained with his force until the end of the campaign. They 
were charged with various duties, including the manning of a flotilla for the disruption of 
Silistria’s communications and the clearing of the Silistria-Bazardzhik road from Turkish 
irregular cavalry. Both leaders were eventually decorated for their services. Two other 
such volunteer groups were subequently to appear - a fifty-man force under a certain 
Aleksei, of whom little is known, and multi-national force of 150-200 men under Milko 
Petrovich, an ethnic Bulgar, domiciled in Serbia.(27)
The later, by all accounts, was a charismatic though controversial character. He 
arrived at a Russian outpost in Lesser Wallachia on 11 September OS(28) where he found 
the beleaguered local commander Baron F. K. Geismar facing an imminent attack from a
26,000 man Turkish force currently encamped at Kalafat.(29) Geismar had been assigned 
the unenviable task of protecting the Russian extreme right flank with a force of 3,000 men, 
and throughout 1828 had sought reinforcements by whatever means necessary. In June, 
contrary to Russian policy, he had augmented his force with 150 local Pandours(30) and 
was now happy to accept Milko and his band.
On 12 September OS the Turkish force left camp, planning to march on Kraiova and 
then onto Bucharest. Geismar believed his only chance of victory was by a surprise, pre­
emptive counter-attack. One of Milko’s men, K. Sherengaki, infiltrated the base and 
acquired vital information on the Turkish positions. This allowed Geismar to make a daring 
night attack, resulting in a famous victory at Boeleshti.(31) For his part in the battle Milko 
was awarded a golden sabre with the inscription ‘For Bravery’.(32)
Milko’s appearance was however to complicate Geismar’s relations with both the 
Russian Foreign Ministry and the Serbian leader Milosh Obrenovich. Geismar had already 
forged a friendship with the latter during the course of the war as a result of their mutual 
interest in gaining Serbia’s entry into the war. Geismar was in desperate need of more 
troops whilst Milosh saw Serbian participation in the war as the surest means to further his 
nation’s (as well as his own) ambitions at the eventual peace negotiations.(33) Milosh 
sought to increase his use to Russia by furnishing Geismar with reports on Turkish 
movements near Widdin. In August, he reported, correctly, that 20,000 troops had
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assembled there and had begun crossing over to Kalafat in preparation for a flank 
attack.(34)
A further closening of ties was disrupted by Milosh’s discovery of Milko’s presence 
in Wallachia. The latter’s very name sent the Serbian leader into veritable rage. Milko was 
condemned as a man ‘craving for human blood’, and his immediate dismissal was 
demanded.(35) Ostensibly, Milosh’s argument was that Milko’s presence contradicted 
Nesselrode’s instructions for Serbians to remain neutral. The subtext however was that 
Milko was regarded as a potential usurper and a threat to Milosh’s rule in Serbia.
Milko was indeed certainly something of an adventurer. He claimed the title of 
Kniaz ’ [Prince], though Liprandi, who knew him personally, believed him a notorious 
brigand.(36) We know that Milko had previously served in Karageorge’s elite military 
force (along with his brother who commanded it).(37) Following Karageorge’s 
assassination by Milosh’s followers in 1817, a long-running feud had developed between 
the two clans.(38) It is thus probable that Milko was associated with Milosh’s rivals, hence 
the latter’s rage. What is certain, is that soon after Boeleshti, Milko made the unexpected 
offer ‘d’entreprendre dans son pays un armement general’ to assist the Russian war 
efifort.(39) It was obvious to Nesselrode that Milko aimed to gain control of this Russian- 
sanctioned Serbian force and use it to oust Milosh. The offer was thus refused outright as it 
would ‘entrainerait indubitablement des fatales consequences pour le repos de le 
Servie’.(40)
Either informed of, or suspecting, Milko’s proposal, Milosh was forced into an 
immediate counter offer. Geismar duly reported Milosh’s claim that ‘Serbia is ready for an 
uprising’ and his request for the immediate despatch of 12,000 Russian troops and 20,000 
muskets to Belgrade. Geismar supported the plan and requested permission to cross the 
Danube himself.(41) No immediate response was, however, forthcoming from the Tsar. 
Undaunted, Milosh continued his attempts to win Russian acceptance of a Serbian uprising. 
He now reported that the hitherto unreliable Pasha of Skodra, had recently agreed to assist 
the Sultan, and with up to 40.000 men and was preparing to march to Widdin.(42) When 
this threat failed to materialise, Milosh claimed he himself had averted it through a private 
agreement with the Pasha. (43)
Developments over the Winter of 1828-29
Whilst the Russian authorities had made certain concessions regarding the use of 
Balkan irregulars in 1828, the failure of the campaign forced a major review of policy.
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Most Russian commanders welcolmed this move, viewing the use of such irregulars as a
solution to two important problems encountered that year; firstly, to combat Turkish
partisan war in Bulgaria, which caused great damage Russian supply network and secondly,
to augment Geismar’s force and decrease the threat to right flank.
The most pressing question, that of Serbia’s possible entry into the war, was
discussed by the aforementioned committee of 19 November 1828 OS.(44) It was rejected
on three grounds: first, to be effective, the Serbs would have to be supported by around
12,000 Russian troops, which could not be spared; second, their use would incense Austria;
finally, their participation would complicate peace negotiation as their political demands
were sure to increase ‘in proportion to their role in military operations’.(45) This view was
subsequently supported by Jomini, who believed that *une diversion en Servie...comme
operation purement militaire ce serait une folie’. The Serbs were to be used only for
political reasons - to justify a demand for their independence (should Russia wish this) at
the eventual peace negotiations.(46)
Milosh, still unperturbed by the lack of interest in his offer, continued to send more
alarming reports to St Petersburg. The new supposed threat was that Abduragman, the
Pasha of Bosnia, had agreed to assist the Sultan and was preparing to occupy Serbia. It was
as a direct result of this report that Nicholas finally consented to a Serbian uprising, on the
grounds that such an occupation was a contravention of Serbia’s treaty rights.(47) The Tsar
was at this stage probably supported by Diebitsch who, in his recent war plans, had
advocated the use of the Serbs.(48) Wittgenstein was thus informed that:
H.I.M. no longer considers himself justified in restraining the Serbs 
from an uprising and prohibiting them from securing, by force of arms, 
the satisfaction of the advantages granted to them in treaties by the 
Porte; it is for the non-fulfillment of treaty rights that Russia herself has 
declared war...it would be beneficial however not to announce this to 
the Serbs at present. In the meantime...the weapons, artillery and shells 
of which the Serbs are in need, are to be immediately prepared and 
transported to Wallachia in order that they be at hand at the appropriate 
time.
The weapons included 10,000 ‘English’ muskets from the Kiev arsenal and light artillery 
taken from the captured Turkish fortresses. Serbian operations were to be designed to 
coincide with the intended Russian offensives.(49)
Geismar naturally welcomed this unexpected news and sought to justify it further. 
He had recently received intelligence (probably from Milosh) that the Porte had just 
concluded an agreement with Austria, by the which the latter, by means of its commercial 
flotilla, was to supply the Turkish Danubian fortresses with provisions. Geismar thus
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proposed using the Serbs to occupy the banks of the Danube upstream from Widdin and 
‘cut all [Turkish] communication with Austria’.(50) His efforts however were in vain, as an 
unexpected reversal of policy was to follow within days of his despatch. On 9 February 
1829 OS, the very day he was made Commander-in- Chief of the Second Army,(51) 
Diebitsch wrote to Nicholas in support of a recent report by Nesselrode objecting to the use 
of the Serbs. The latter’s opposition was no doubt based on the fear of reprisals from 
Austria, though why Diebitsch had now reversed his previous position is somewhat 
unclear.(52) Deferring to his trusted advisers, Nicholas now accepted the ‘disadvantages 
and inconveniences’ of a Serbian revolt, though, significantly, Diebitsch was awarded full 
discretionary power to raise the Serbs in the event of ‘extreme circumstances’.(53)
More concrete concessions were forthcoming regarding the use of other irregular 
forces. In November, M. S. Vorontsov had submitted a plan to form four infantry battalions 
from volunteers recruited amongst Balkan peoples residing in Odessa, Kishinev, Jassy and 
Bucharest. According to Vorontsov, previous volunteer units had been of dubious military 
value due to their aversion to ‘any order and any discipline’ and thus proposed the 
introduction a regular element to their organisation. They were to be formed on the basis of 
chasseurs, receive payment and be commanded by Greeks in the Russian military service. 
The nucleus of each battalion was to be formed from the men of the Greek Balaklava fight 
infantry battalions. Once in the field, more units could be raised using trained recruits as 
their cadres - a process that could be continued ‘ad infinitum’.(54) Although Diebitsch was 
in principle in agreement,(55) Vorontsov’s proposal were threatened by a rival plan. As 
mentioned, Geismar had raised a Pandour force in 1828 and by the end of that campaign 
had secured the support of Langerone and Wittgenstein to raise more such units for
1829.(56) Fearing a loss of control over the organisation and use of irregular forces, a 
memoir was submitted attacking Vorontsov’s plan.(57) It stated that volunteers were 
usually undesirables, often criminals, fleeing their masters or the authorities. They were 
motivated solely by the quest for war booty and deserted at the first sign of danger. During 
the 1806-12 Turkish war, when four thousand such volunteers were left unsupervised, they 
proceeded only to rampage through the Principalities in search of loot, until they were 
rounded up and disarmed by Russian forces. The author claimed that in all of Southern 
Russia and the Principalities there were but 200-300 men of Balkan origin who were 
sufficiently trustworthy and possessed proper experience of mountain warfare. The only 
reliable source of irregular troops were said to be the Pandours, who in 1807, under 
General-Major 1.1. Isaev, defended Wallachia with minimal support from Russian troops.
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At present the Pandours had formed themselves into a 2,000-man militia and were again 
willing to repeat this task.
Swayed by these arguments, Nicholas consented, with the proviso that the Pandours 
remained a defensive force and under no circumstances crossed the Danube.(58)
Langerone’s detailed plan for their organisation was duly accepted.(59) A total of 2,959 
officers and men were to be formed into six battalions, each composed o f400 infantry and 
40 cavalry men. The Pandours were to be supplied with weapons and provisions from the 
Russian army and receive 52,800 piastres to buy 264 horses. Their wages totaled 21,020 
piastres per month. Overall command was entrusted to the Pandour chieftain Sludoniar 
Soloman, a veteran of the last Turkish war and noted for his devotion to Russia.
Parallel to these developments, Liprandi had been working on a more ambitious 
proposal of his own. In January 1829 he submitted a report entitled ‘On the necessity of 
forming a corps of partisans on the right bank of the Danube’ .(60) Liprandi cited Turkish 
partisan raids as main cause of the failure of the 1828 campaign. Russia had paid too much 
attention to destroying the main enemy forces, allowing its irregular cavalry units and the 
local Turkish population to attack and destroy Russia’s magazine chains and 
communications. More important than the losses to supplies, these never-ending raids 
served to ‘create depression and despondency in the [Russian] army, destroying along with 
the body, its spirit’. Only the creation of a Russian partisan corps could protect supplies, 
ward off night attacks and keep the Muslim population in check. Moreover, these partisans 
could fulfil an important offensive role through hit and run tactics, which were sure to create 
havoc due amongst the naturally disorganised Ottoman forces.
As regards the organisation of the partisans, the model of 1812 was considered 
inapplicable. This irregular war was fought on home soil, predominantly on horse against 
the supply lines of a regular army, weak in cavalry.(61) In the Balkans, partisans faced a 
hostile population and large tracts of forest which made cavalry very prone to attack and 
indeed accounted for the heavy losses of Cossacks in 1828. These partisan units thus had 
to contain infantry and be supported by regular troops in order to make attacks on Turkish 
forces. The whole corps was to consist of three battalions of chasseurs, 600 Cossacks, 6 
guns and 1,200 volunteers (of which 900 were to be infantrymen).(62) They were to be 
issued with drums, horns and rockets, the sound of which was said to cause panic amongst 
the Turks.
Special care was to be taken in hand-picking volunteers with experience rather than 
‘collecting any old rabble...which brings more harm than good’. Fortunately, the revolt of
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Hetairia in 1821 had attracted to the Principalities many adventurers, who combined a 
hatred of the Turks with the quasi-military experience of men ‘raised in brigandage’. They 
knew well both the local terrain and the psychology of the enemy. Although these men 
were alien to ideas of strict military discipline, Liprandi took the unconventional, and 
indeed, somewhat controversial view, that their independent nature was in fact an asset. In 
order to increase their effectiveness, the partisans were to be separated into units of around 
thirty men, each acting independently. They were to follow the march of large bodies of 
regular troops, shielding them from Turkish raids, gathering intelligence and so forth. On 
discovery of larger enemy forces they were to call in the chasseurs and their artillery for 
support. This role demanded qualities very different from that of the soldier of the line. It 
required initiative, self-reliance and an adventurous spirit.(63) Liprandi believed the only 
means of ensuring the partisans’ good conduct was through the prudent selection of their 
commanders. The leader of each unit was to be elected by the men themselves - a tradition 
of all armed bands of the Balkans. Overall command had to be entrusted to a man with a 
deep knowledge of the character of Balkan peoples. He was to recruit all the men 
personally and be able win their trust and respect. Naturally, Liprandi coveted this position 
himself.
Impressed by the above arguments, Diebitsch consented to the plan, which was to 
be executed by Liprandi himself. His only conditions were that, in the first instance, only 
200-300 men were to be recruited, drawn solely from the inhabitants of the 
Principalities.(64) It was feared that recruitment in the Balkans could ‘push the Slavic 
tribes to a general uprising’.(65)
The final plan of note was that of G. I. Shostak, a Captain in the General Staff of
H.I.M..(66) It essence, this ambitious proposal was a development of Tuchkov’s earlier 
idea of forming a Bulgar militia. However, whereas the latter envisaged a 1,000 man force 
in Bulgaria, Shostak spoke of ‘several tens of thousands of muskets’ being transported to 
Varna. Inspiring the local population with ‘the prophecy...of the Third 
Constantinople’ [s/c](67) a near army of irregulars was thus to be raised south of the 
Balkans in Rumelia. At the end of the war they were to be resettled in Bessarabia, forming 
a ‘standing militia’ and solving the problem of the underpopulation of southern Russian. 
Whilst it seemed improbable that Nicholas would ever authorise such a measure, Dibietsch 
did not dismiss the proposal and forwarded it to Wittgenstein for consideration.(68) The 
reasons for Diebitsch’s interest were to become clear only the following year, as the 
Russian army prepared to cross the Balkans.
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The Cam paign o f  1829
The recruitment for the Pandour corps progressed well and by the opening of the 
campaign the intended six battalions had been formed.(69) On 23 March 1829 OS,
Geismar requested that the Pandours be permitted to conduct operations, not only in 
Wallachia, but to cross on to the right bank to the Danube to pre-empt a possible Turkish 
crossing at Widdin. This however was refused outright by Pahlen who feared that their 
presence on the Serbian border would lead to a ‘revolt amongst the Serbs’.(70) A 
subsequent request by Kiselev to foim an additional corps of 1,500 cavalry Pandours 
specifically for action on the right bank of the Danube (this time to pre-empt a Turkish 
crossing at Giurgevo) was likewise refused.(71) The Pandours thus limited their action to 
the left bank, where they assisted Geismar’s forces in repelling Turkish raids into 
Wallachia. The largest battles were fought between May and August, against Turkish 
forces up to 3,000 men strong.(72) Late into the campaign a 7th battalion was created to 
serve as a garrison in Tumo.(73) Due to their good conduct during the previous campaign, 
Geismar secured Diebitsch’s consent to re-employ the volunteer units of 1828. In April, P. 
Fokiiano and his band of 120 cavalry men were recruited. Their presence was especially 
welcome as Geismar was short of Cossacks and 24,000 piastres were secured from the 
budget of Wallachia (now controlled by Russia) to purchase horses for them. In contrast to 
1828, these volunteers were now to be paid - a total 1,190 piastres per month.(74) This 
expense was probably justified as, according to Liprandi, Fokiiano’s unit was the most able 
of all the irregulars used in 1828.(75) Gesimar also again used the services of Aleksei and 
his band of 90 men.(76)
As for Milko, his continued presence in the Russian army was placed in doubt 
following Nesselrode’s investigations into his past. Milko’s standing in Serbia was said to 
be negligible and his pretension to Majesty entirely false - his title of Kniaz ’, as was Serbian 
custom, merely denoted the status of a village elder.(77) Geismar was however able to 
secure Nicholas’ support and prevented Milko’s possible expulsion.(78) To avoid further 
complications with Milosh, the latter was transfeiTed from Geismar’s force in Wallachia 
and entered Liprandi’s partisan corps.(79) Reports however soon reached Diebitsch 
concerning instances of ‘unreliable conduct’ (primarily drunkenness) amongst members of 
Milko’s 100-man band. They were ordered to return to Geismar’s force and a secret 
nadzor was placed upon them.(80) There they served for the remainder of the war, though 
Milko, in somewhat heroic fashion, was killed at Turtukai before its conclusion. (81)
Liprandi’s recruitment of partisans proved more troublesome than expected. 
Diebitsch had been persuaded to consent to the original request for 1,200 partisans but by 
the beginning of May only 349 men had been recruited. This was primarily due to 
Diebitsch’s order to limit recruitment to the Principalities. Local custom dictated that all 
mercenaries were hired on St George’s day (23 April) and after that date it was difficult 
gain their services. Moreover, to reduce costs, Liprandi had decided to recruit only those 
possessing weapons. This proved an impossible limitation as, since 1821, the Turks had 
undertaken thorough measures to confiscate all the region’s privately-held weapons. 
Fortunately, the project was salvaged by the appearance of Mamarchev, Milko and another 
Serbian leader Suliot and their volunteers.(82) The lack of weapons was partially relieved 
by Diebitsch’s decision to send Liprandi 350 muskets.(83)
By July, a motley collection of 950 brigands, mercenaries and former Hetairists had 
been collected and were ready by action. In addition, Liprandi was given control of the 8th 
Chasseur and St Petersburg Uhlan regiments.(84) As Diebitsch had by this time already 
crossed the Balkans, their role was limited to the conduct of rearguard action. Their 
primary task was to clear the forest of Deli-Oiman [fit. ‘mad forest’] of Turkish partisans. 
Covering an area of 12,000 square versts and populated by 60,000 Turks (many of whom 
were fanatics imported from Asiatic Turkey), the forest was a thorn in Russia’s side 
throughout 1828. The main road from the Trajans Wall to Bazardzhik and Shumla passed 
through it and Russian supply convoys were subjected to constant attack. By a combination 
of force and threats, Liprandi’s partisans were very successful in securing the local Turkish 
populations passivity and their raids all but ceased. Liprandi’s force subsequently 
performed a similar mission near Rustchuk.(85)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Whilst, at the opening of the campaign, Diebitsch had consented to the use of 
limited irregular forces, he was as yet unready to commit himself to the raising of a more 
general levee. Diebitsch was particularly loath to use the Serbs, becoming as he was, 
increasingly distrustful of Milosh. Diebitsch, for instance, dismissed continuing reports 
from the latter of the Pasha of Skodra’s impending entrance into the war ‘as extremely 
exaggerated’. He believed the Pasha’s forces to be more limited than Milosh claimed and 
that if the Albanians were to attack, it would be in Bulgaria, and certainly not across the 
Danube into Wallachia. Diebitsch favoured opening some channel of communication with
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the Pasha, possibly through the Montenegrins, ‘but only not through Milosh, whose actions 
are invariably attended with calculations of his own personal gain’.(86)
Having correctly surmised that the supposed threat to Russian forces in Wallachia 
was a deft ploy designed to secure Serbia’s participation in the war, Diebitsch all but ruled 
out exercising his authority to raise a Serbian revolt. Instead, his attention shifted south 
towards the Bulgars of Rumelia, as a potentially more valuable source of irregular troops. 
The turning point in this respect proved to be the capture of Sizopol by Admiral A. S. 
Greig’s fleet on 16 February OS. Local Bulgars were soon found flocking to the port in 
search of protection and a one-hundred man volunteer force soon appeared. One of its 
leaders, a M. Staiko, along with Vulkan, a Bulgar emissary, approached the Russian 
admiral on 10 May OS. Claiming to be representatives of a secret Bulgar organisation, they 
stated that up to 20,000 Bulgars were ready for an uprising and prepared to take up arms 
against the Turks. All that was required was a supply of weapons.(87)
At around this time, Diebitsch was busy contemplating the crossing of the Balkans. 
Concerned, however, by a supposed lack of troops, he made such a crossing dependent 
upon the arrival of the reserve battalions of the active army as well as an extra infantry 
division. (88) There was however no certainty of this request being granted as Nicholas had 
already made plain his belief that Diebitsch possessed sufficient men for the tasks in 
hand.(89) The very day after Diebitsch above despatch had been sent, news of the Bulgars’ 
offer arrived from Sizopol. In a somewhat sudden conversion to panslavic ideology, 
Diebitsch now professed his concern for the Bulgars, a people of ‘common religion, origin 
and language’ with Russians, now ready to rise up against their Turkish ‘tyrants’ and 
‘oppressors’. His real motive however was clear - to arm the Bulgars and ‘in decisive 
fashion make use of their [present] disposition following the crossing of the Balkans’. 
Diebitsch understood well that the Rumelian Bulgars, by their very location south of the 
Balkans, were of greater use to the advancing Russian army than the Serbs could ever 
be.(90) Knowing well the Tsar’s concern of the international ramifications of any further 
Balkan revolts, Diebitsch maintained that the ‘European Cabinets...will view this [Bulgar] 
uprising as much less like a revolution than a similar uprising in Serbia’.(91) Greig fully 
supported this reasoning and on 26 May OS, Nicholas awarded Diebitsch full discretion to 
arm and use the Bulgars as he wished.(92)
Diebitsch was however in no hurry to use this authority and for two months the 
whole matter was left in abeyance. Various interpretations have been forwarded as to why 
this was so,(93) the simplest, however, is that, following the Battle of Kulevcha, Nicholas
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consented to Diebitsch’s request for reinforcements, so greatly reducing his dependency 
upon a Bulgar uprising.(94) Thus, whilst following the successful crossing of the Balkans 
in July, Diebitsch chose to arm a few hundred Bulgar volunteers, he also took the formal 
decision neither to raise and nor arm a Bulgar uprising in 1829. With his sights on a peace 
treaty, he believed their participation would only complicate negotiations. A general levde 
(of both the Bulgars and Serbs) was only to be attempted should the Sultan refuse to treat, 
so forcing Russia in to a third campaign.(95)
Whilst the Porte’s acceptance to negotiate precluded the need for this drastic 
measure, the Bulgars, as early as July 1829, had quite independently begun a series of 
uprisings in many regions of Rumelia. News of the eventual Treaty of Adrianople did 
nothing to appease them, as they demanded independence or at least the granting of political 
rights similar to those enjoyed by Serbia and the Principalities. In September 1829, 
Mamarchev returned to Rumelia to organise this ‘spontaneous and uncoordinated 
[stikhiinyi] national liberation movement’. Russia’s worst fears were realised the following 
April, when Mamarchev and his 500 volunteers began their insurrection.(96) Having been 
dragged into a Turkish war as a result of the actions of small band of revolutionaries in 
1821, the Russian authorities were in no mood to allow its repetition in 1830. Diebitsch 
ordered the insurgents to be disarmed whilst Mamarchev himself was captured and placed 
under house-arrest in Bucharest.(97)
Conclusion
Russian policy towards the use of Balkan irregulars was subject to great change 
over the period of the war. Due to Nicholas’ desire to end the war as quickly as possible, 
the initial intention of avoiding the employment of irregular forces was progressively 
compromised to a point whereby towards the end of 1829, counting Pandours, Liprandi’s 
partisans and the Bulgars armed by Diebitsch, around 4,000 irregulars were found in the 
Russian service. In addition, Diebitsch was given full authority to raise an indefinite 
number of extra irregulars through the encouragement of revolts amongst the Bulgars and 
Serbs.
Whilst such developments were welcomed by most Russian commanders, one 
cannot but be struck by the somewhat contradictory attitude they continued to maintain 
regarding the irregulars. On the one hand, their undoubted military ability was prized, even 
admired; on the other, their character and motivation for assisting Russia was often 
questioned. In many quarters the irregulars were seen as nothing but adventurers, potential 
revolutionaries and, above all, freebooters. General P. F. Zheltukhin believed, for example,
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that even the Pandours - the most experienced and disciplined of Russia’s irregular troops, 
were motivated solely by ‘a lust for booty, which they satisfy through the plunder of the 
enemy’s possessions’. Deprived of such an opportunity, he believed the Pandours would 
think nothing of ‘plundering their own lands’, as had apparently occurred during the 1806- 
12 Russo-Turkish war.(98)
This said, the irregulars’ conduct were generally good during the 1828-29 
campaigns (though, as noted, less so afterwards) with only limited recorded instances of 
insubordination and desertion. In part, this was due to their genuine hatred of the enemy 
and affinity with Russian war aims, but primarily due their prudent organisation by the 
Russian army. The temptation to introduce unaccustomed ‘regular’-style discipline was 
avoided. Instead, a close supervision of the irregulars was achieved through their 
attachment to regular Russian units. This, combined with the practice of recruiting for 
quality rather than quantity, allowed for the excesses associated with the irregulars of the 
1806-12 war to be avoided.
The most far-reaching consequence of the successful experimentation with irregular 
troops was that it allowed Russia to implement its official policy of establishing a 
permanent zemskoe voisko in the Principalities.(99) Thus, in June 1829, Nicholas ordered 
that the number of Pandour battalions be raised to ten. After the war, these units were to 
perform the functions of a permanent standing militia.(lOO) Aside from acting as an internal 
police force, their role was to bar or at least disrupt any future Turkish occupation of the 
Principalities and act as an avant-garde for the Russian army in the event of a future war in 
the Balkans.(lOl) The existence of this force, which was to be organised by Russian 
officers, was also to forge the idea of a ‘brotherhood- in-arms’ between the two states and 
generally complement Russia’s aim of turning the Principalities into a protectorate. At 
Adrianople, Diebitsch was able to secure the Porte’s consent to Nicholas’ proposal and 
legitimised the creation of a ‘milice’, charged, amongst other things, with the protection of 
‘la surete des frontieres ’.(102)
The realisation of this scheme was, however, temporarily hindered by the objections 
of Zheltukhin. He opposed the continued use of Pandours, both on the grounds of their 
supposed untrustworthiness and of the cost to the Principalities of maintaining such a 
permanent force.(103) Diebitsch, now somewhat unsure of how to progress, postponed the 
taking of any final decision. The existing Pandour units were to be retained but Kiselev was 
ordered to abandon the formation of the four new Pandour battalions in Greater Wallachia, 
(which was already half-way to completion).(104)
The replacement of Zheltukhin by Kiselev in October 1829 delivered no more 
clarity to the situation. Though the latter was, in principle, in favour of a Pandour force, 
deprived of funds and preoccupied with other more pressing matters, he took no positive 
action. Left in limbo and increasingly starved of supplies, the Pandours began to return to 
their homes. By December, over 250 had deserted their units. Increasingly concerned of 
this deteriorating situation, Kiselev sought a final decision from Diebitsch. The latter now 
ordered one half of the Pandour units to be disbanded, with the other retained, receiving 
supplies and payment from the budget of the Principalities. This was, in Diebitsch’s words, 
to be the ‘first step towards the regular organisation of this force’.(105) Influenced by 
Zheltukin’s fears of the unreliable nature of irregular forces (which probably corresponded 
to his own instinct), Diebitsch favoured the transformation of this ‘militia’ into a disciplined 
proto-regular army. In doing so, Diebitsch certainly reflected the opinion of a significant 
proportion of the Russian command. For it is clear from the proposals already mentioned 
above, that the introduction of regular elements to irregular forces had indeed been the first 
instinct of many (though not all) Russians commanders. Now that irregular forces were to 
be organised as a standing militia, it was difficult for the Russian military establishment to 
conceive of such a force as being anything other than a regular, or near-regular, ‘army’.
The implementation of this ambitious plan, as well as the management of its unforeseen 
consequences, was left to the care of Kiselev during his tenure as President of the 
Principalities.(106)
214
(1) This subject has received some treatment in V. D. Konobeev, ‘Natsional’no- 
osvoboditeFnoe dvizhenie v Bolgarii’ (hereafter ‘Dvizhenie’), UZIS, XX, 1960, pp. 221-74, 
(though it is concerned primarily with Bulgar volunteer groups). 1.1. Meshcheriuk’s article, 
‘Russkii tsarism i natsional ’ no-osvoboditel ’noe dvizhenie bolgarskogo naroda v 1828-29 
godakh’ in Kolonial 'naia politika i natsional ’noe osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie (Kishinev, 
1965), pp. 122-142, adds little original information. There are passing references in V. Ia. 
Grosul, ‘Moldavo-valashskie dohrovd’tsy v russko-turetskoi voine 1828-29, i rol’ Rossii v 
vossozdanii natsional’nykh armii v dunaiskikh kniazhestvakh’ (hereafter ‘Dobrovol’tsy’), 
UZKGU, LXXIII, 1964, pp. 17-20; Fadeev, Krizis, pp. 199-200,319-24; Grosul, Reformy, 
pp. 174-79; Vinogradov, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, pp. 221-31.
(2) See I. V. Semenova, Russko-moldavskoe boevoe sodruzhestvo (1787-1791 gg.) 
(Kishinev, 1968); I. V. Semenova, ‘Uchastie bolgar v russko-turetskikh voinakh XVIII v.’, 
BIS, II, 1970, pp. 319-51; I. V. Semenova, Rossiia i osvoboditel'naia bor’ba moldavskogo 
naroda protiv ottomanskogo igav XVIII v. (Kishinev, 1976); G. L. Arsh, ‘Russko- 
albanskie sviazi v period russko-turetsoi voine 1787-1791 gg.’, 7Z, LXIII, 1958, pp. 259- 
68; E. B. Shul’man, Russko-moldavskoe boevoe sodruzhestvo (1735-1739) (Kishinev,
1962).
(3) Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, pp. 224,232-33; Fadeev, Krizis, pp. 199-200. The situation in 
the Caucasus was, however, entirely different and during both the 1826-28 Persian war and 
1828-29 Turkish war, the Russians raised Armenian, Azeri and Georgian militias, see 
Ushakov, Istoriia, II, p. 294; Z. T. Grigorian, ‘Uchastie Armian v Russko-Persidskikh 
voinakh nachala XIX veka’, VI, 1951, No.4, pp. 16-25; Z. T. Grigorian, Prisoedinenie 
vostochnoi Armeniia k Rossii v nachale XIX veka (Moscow, 1959), pp. 124-40; M. 
Ismailov, Ob uchastii azerbaidzhantsev v riadakh russkikh voisk v russko-iranskikh i 
russko-turetskikh voinakhpervoi tretiXIX v. (Baku, 1954); G. V. Khachapuridze, K istorii 
Gruzii, pp. 178-87. The distinction was that in the Caucasus, Russia had certain 
expansionist aims and needed local volunteers to supplement the understrength Caucasus 
Corps. Moreover, raising partisans in the Caucasus was less likely to excite the attention of 
other powers.
(4) Sergeev, ‘Benkendorf, KA, 1929, No.6, p. 157.
(5) Whilst the Serbian forces fought independently within their own Principality, up to
20,000 partisans/volunteers fought with the Russian army in 1806-12. These were 
comprised predominantly of Pandours under Tudor Vladimirescu and Bulgars, who, in 
1811, were organised into a zemskoe voisko [‘land militia’] by M. I. Kutuzov, Grosul, 
‘Dobrovol’tsy’, pp. 15-16; Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, pp. 226, 234.
(6) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4651, ff.6-10v, Report of Kiselev, received 21 September 1827 
OS; ibid., d.4395, Plan of P. K. Sukhtelen, 12 November 1826 OS, ff.l-6v; ibid, ff.l 12- 
18v, Plan of Buturlin, February 1822 OS; ibid., d.17967, f.l, Note of Diebitsch, 7 July 1821 
OS; ibid., d.4483, ff.l-12v, Plan of Langerone, 6 May 1826 OS.
(7) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4414, ff.2-2v, Seniavin to A. I. Chernyshev, received 25 April 
1828 OS. On Seniavin’s contacts with the Montenegrins, see E. Tarle, Ekspeditsiia 
admirala D. N. Seniavina v sredizemnom more (1805-1807 gg.) (Moscow, 1954).
(8) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4414, ff.3-6, Proposal of Seniavin, received 26 May 1828 OS.
(9) Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, p. 234.
(10) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.ll/182a, sv.36, d.5, ff.8-10v, Project of 17 February 1828 
OS.
(11)Ibid., ff.l 1-12, ‘Note sur les Bulgares’, 29 February 1828 OS.
(12) Thus whilst Diebitsch issued orders from St Petersburg that the Second Army was to 
‘refuse decisively’ all requests from volunteers to serve alongside the Russian army, 
RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4444, ff.20-32v, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 9 August 1827 OS, 
Wittgenstein believed that Russia’s ‘co-religionists’ should be permitted to join the ranks of
215
the regular army or be formed into independent partisan units and used ‘in the outlying 
regions of enemy territory’, ibid, ff.49-59, Wittgenstein to Diebitsch, 31 October 1827 OS.
(13) VPRII/VII, 1992, pp. 438,554-56, Nesselrode to Milosh Obrenovich, 14 February, 28 
May; VPR II/VIII, 1994, pp. 13-14,12 October 1828 OS.
(14) Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, p. 232.
(15) RGVIA, fond 14057, op. 11/182a, sv.36, d.5, f. 13, Diebitsch to Inzov, April 1828.
(16) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.13, fF.1-1 v, Pahlen to Wittgenstein. Pahlen 
was temporary acting Governor of Novorossiia and Bessarabia.
(17) VPR II/VII, 1992, p. 491, Proclamation of P. Kh. Wittgenstein, no earlier than 14 April 
1828 OS.
(18) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.l 1/182a, sv.36, d.3, f.25, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 13 
February 1828 OS.
(19) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.l 1/182a, sv.36, d.5, ff.l4-18v, Tuchkov to Kiselev, 22 April 
1828 OS (with enclosed report dated 19 April OS).
(20) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.l l/182a, sv.36, d.5, ff.21-21v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, May 
1828.
(21) Ibid., ff.22-22v, Diebitsch to Kiselev, 14 June 1828 OS.
(22) Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, p. 239; RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.13, fF. 11- 
1 Iv, Langerone to Wittgenstein, 15 November 1828 OS.
(23) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.15, ff.6-6v, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 14 
June 1828 OS.
(24) Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, pp. 248-49.
(25) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.15, ff.16-17, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 11 
July 1828 OS. Sufficient numbers were not gathered until March of 1829, ibid, ff.l 13-
114v, Breakdown of Regiments, (616 infantry men, 583 cavalry men). It appears the units 
were eventually used during the second campaign, ibid, fF.125-25v, Vorontsov to Diebitsch, 
13 April 1828 OS.
(26) In the Russian documents Mamarchev was known by his pseudonym ‘Buiukli’, 
Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, p.237.
(27) Ibid., pp. 237-243.
(28) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4476, ch.2, ff.l43-43v, Report of Liprandi, 11 September 1828 
OS.
(29) Epanchm, Ocherk, I, p. 434.
(30) Wittgenstein eventually agreed to this measure, but insisted that the Pandours were 
were not to be formally attached to Russian units, RGVIA, fond 14058, op. 1/184a, sv.79, 
d.92, ff.3-3v, Wittgenstein to Borozdin, 14 July 1828 OS. The Pandours, originally of 
Serbian extract, were a mountain tribe of Lesser Wallachia who had been used by Austria 
as light infantry in the eighteenth century, A. I. Granit, Entsiklopedicheskii slovar' 
(Moscow, 7th edition), XXXI, p. 95. They were esentially paid mercenaries, not 
volunteers. For their services to the Russians they received five piastres per month, certain 
supplies and were exempted from taxation in the Principalities, RGVIA, fond 14058,
op. 1/184a, sv.79, d.92, ff.5-6, Pahlen to Wittgenstein, 27 June 1828 OS. According to 
Liprandi, Aleksei’s unit also served with Geismar that year, RGLA, fond 673, op.l, d.222, 
f. 16, ‘O partizanskoi voine’. As regards the total number of Balkan irregulars used in 1828, 
Konobeev’s figure of 550, counting die units of Marmarchev/Fokiiano, Milko, and Aleksei, 
pp. 243-44, may be exaggerated. Liprandi cites a total of 300, ibid., fF. 14-16. Adding the 
Pandours gives a total o f450-700. In addition, the Balkan Christians assisted the Russian 
army through the furnishing of much intelligence on the position of Turkish units, see 
reports in RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4476, ch.2, passim.
(31) Liprandi, Osobennosti, pp. 115-16.
(32) Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, p. 243. An equally good performance by the Pandours 
increased the Russians’ faith in them (which had been previously damaged by their
216
participation in Tudor Vladimirescu’s revolt of 1821) and eased the acceptance of 
subsequent plans to increase their number. They were commanded in 1828 by K.Ghika, a 
former Junker in the Russian cavalry and the brother of the Wallachian Hospodars Gregory 
(ruled 1822-28) and Alexander (1834-42), RGIA, fond 673, op.l, d.221, f.40, ‘O 
partizanskoi voine’, Liprandi.
(33) Aside from the return of the six Serbian provinces granted by the 1812 Bucharest 
Treaty, these included the right to establish a Serbian militia and the affirmation of Milosh 
as Serbia’s hereditary ruler, VPR II/VII, 1992, pp. 54-55,649, Nesselrode to Milosh, 22 
March 1827 OS.
(34) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4476, ch.l, Geismar to A. F. Langerone (Commander of 
Russian forces in the Principalities), 14 August 1828 OS (no folio numbers were available 
for this file).
(35) Ibid., d.4476, ch.3, ff.205-05v, Milosh to Geismar, 10 October 1828 OS.
(36) RGIA, fond 673, op.l, d.222, f.14, ‘O partizanskoi voine’, by Liprandi.
(37) Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, p. 243.
(38) Karageorge (1768-1817) was the leader of the first Serbian revolt of 1804-13 and in 
1808 he proclaimed himself ruler of Serbia. Fearing Turkish reprisals after the end of the 
revolt, Karageorge fled to Austria and then Bessarabia. The Sultan proceeded to proclaim 
Milosh Obrenovich as ruler of Serbia and when Karageorge returned home in 1817 he was 
assassinated, Anderson, Eastern Question, p. 48-50.
(39) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4476, ch.3, ff. 197, Nesselrode to Langerone, 12 October 1828 
OS.
(40) Ibid., ff.l97-97v.
(41) Ibid., ff.l82-83v, Langerone to Wittgenstein, 21 October 1828 OS. Geismar’s support 
of Milko was in no way diminished by the arrival of Milosh’s proposal. Forced into playing 
a double game to please both protagonists, Geismar informed Milosh of Milko’s dismissal 
{ibid., f.203, Geismar to Milosh, 2 November 1828 OS) though it is clear that the latter’s 
force had merely been temporarily disbanded and moved away from the Serbian border. 
Geismar fully intended to use the force in the following campaign and requested that they 
be paid during the intervening period, ibid., d.4723, Langerone to Diebitsch, 15 November 
1828 OS ( no folio numbers were available for this file). The men were awarded two 
chervontsy each and Milko put on captain’s pay, ibid., Report on Milko Petrovich, 24 
March 1829 OS. According to this document Milko had 100 men, not 150-200 as atated in 
Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, p. 243.
(42) Ibid., d.4476, ch.3, f.204, Milosh to Geismar, 16 October 1828 OS.
(43) VPR II/VIH, 1994, p. 565, Milosh to Nesselrode, 5 November 1828 OS.
(44) See above, p. 173.
(45) Epanchin, Ocherk, II, pp. 29-30.
(46) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4718, ff.l-6v, Jomini to Nicholas I, 8 January 1829 OS. The 
Tsar himself had no intention of making Serbia independent.
(47) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4723, Chernyshev to Wittgenstein, 25 January 1829 OS.
(48) Ibid., d.4699, ff.99-100v, 106-1 lOv, Plans of 26 October 1828 OS and 8 January 1829 
OS.
(49) Ibid., d.4723, Chernyshev to Wittgenstein, 25 January 1829 OS.
(50) Ibid., Geismar to Kiselev, 6 February 1829 OS. Nesselrode believed that the 
agreement, if it existed, was signed on the Austrian side by a private company and not the 
Government. Whatever the case, the interception of these supplies was ‘not in 
contravention of the general rules of war’ and therefore permissible, ibid., Nesselrode to 
Diebitsch, 12 March 1829 OS. It appears that Austrian boats were used to supply the 
Turkish fortresses in early 1829. They were (unsuccessfully) shelled by Russian artillery, 
ibid., Geismar to Pahlen, 3 April 1829 OS.
(51) Epanchin, Ocherk, II, p. 81.
217
(52) Neither Diebitsch’ letter nor Nesselrode’s report have been discovered, though their 
existence is clear from RGVIA, fond VUA, d. 4723, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 16 February 
1829 OS. Diebitsch’ opposition was probably due to the fact that as Commander-in-Chief 
he would be responsible for negotiating the eventual peace treaty and did not want this 
process complicated by Serbian demands. He was at this time also becoming quite 
distrustful of Milosh, see above, pp. 209-10.
(53) RGVLA, fond VUA, d.4723, Chernyshev to Diebitsch, 16 February 1829 OS.
(54) Ibid., d.4731, ff.l-3v, Report of Vorontsov, November 1828.
(55) Ibid., ff.4-4v, Diebitsch to Vorontsov, 19 November 1828 OS.
(56) Ibid., ff.5-5v, Wittgenstein to Nicholas 1,28 November 1828 OS.
(57) Ibid., ff.9-11. The document is anonymous and undated. Judging from its position in 
the file it was written in December 1828, probably by Wittgenstein.
(58) Ibid., ff.l2-12v, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 15 Januaiy 1829 OS. Vorontsov’s plan 
was discarded.
(59) Ibid., ff. 13-16, Diebitsch to A. I. Chernyshev, 20 February 1829 OS.
(60) RGIA, fond 673, op.l, d.367, ff.1-9, ‘O. neobkhodismosti sostavit’ korpus partizanov 
na pravom beregu Dunaia’, 10 Januaiy 1829 OS. Liprandi seems to have acquired this idea 
from a study of the 1768-74 Russo-Turkish war, during which General P. A. Rumiantsev 
formed ‘flying units’ [letuchie otriady] of Balkan partisans to supplement his small regular 
force, ibid., f.3; ibid., d.222, f.4, ‘O partizanskoi voine’, by Liprandi.
(61) For details on the Russian partisans of 1812 see Narodnoe opolchenie v 
Otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda. Sbomik dokumentov (ed. L. G.. Beskrovnyi) (Moscow, 
1962); V. I. Babkin, Narodnoe opolchenie v Otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda (Moscow, 
1962); B. S. Abalichin, ‘Urainskoe opolchenie 1812 g.’, IZ, LXXII, 1962, pp. 87-118; P.
M. Volodin, ‘O roli i chislenoosti moskovskogo narodnogo opolcheniia 1812 goda’, IZ, 
LXXII, 1962, pp. 246-58.
(62) A total of 4,550 men, ibid., d.367, f.10, Liprandi to Kiselev, 6 February 1829 OS.
(63) See above, p. 93.
(64) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.14, ff.l9-19v, Diebitsch to Liprandi, 20 
March 1829 OS.
(65) Liprandi, Osobennosti, p. 95.
(66) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.ll/182a, sv.38, d.67, ff.3-7, Plan of 19 September 1828 OS.
(67) Presumably a reference to the doctrine of the ‘Third Rome’, formulated during the 
reign of Ivan III. On its origins, see R. O. Crummey, The Formation o f Muscovy, 1304- 
1613 (London and New York, 1987), pp. 135-39.
(68) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.l 1/182a, sv.38, d.67, f.2, Diebitsch to Wittgenstein, 28 
November 1828 OS.
(69) The Pandours were supplied with weapons taken from horsQ-chasseur and dragoon 
regiments, RGVIA, fond, 14058, op. 1/184a, sv.99, d.14, ff.l-2v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 6 
January 1830 OS.
(70) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4822, f.36, ‘Militaiv-History Journal of Units in Lesser 
Wallavhia, 1829’. Pahlen had lately been appointed Russia’s ‘President’ \predsedatel ] of 
the Divans of Moldavia and Wallachia and was responsible for the defence of the 
Principalities.
(71) Ibid., d.4711, ff.3-5v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 7 April 1829 OS.
(72) Grosul, Reformy, pp. 174-76. Their activity is documented in RGVIA, fond VUA, 
d.4822, ff.28-149 passim, ‘Military-History Journal of Units in Lesser Wallachia, 1829’.
(73) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.13, ff.l26-26v, Kiselev to Diebitsch, 23 
September 1829 OS.
(74) Ibid., ff.77-78, Geismar to Diebitsch, 7 March 1829 OS; ff.93-93v, P. F. Zheltukhin to 
Diebitsch, 1 April 1829 OS.
218
(75) Following the end of the war, Fokiiano joined the Wallachian zemskoe voisko created 
by Kiselev, RGIA, fond 673, op.l, d.222, f. 15v-16, ‘O partizanskoi voine’, Liprandi.
(76) Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, p. 250.
(77) RGVIA, fond VUA, d.4723, Nesselrode to Diebitsch, 30 January 1829 OS.
(78) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.13, f. 108, Official Note to Milko, May 
1829 OS
(79) Ibid., ff.67-67v, Langerone to Kiselev, 19 February 1829 OS; ff.l 12, Milko to 
Diebitsch, 22 May 1829 OS.
(80) Ibid., sv.801, d.102, ff.l-lv, Police report, 19 June 1829 OS; ff.2-2v, Letter to Milko, 
20 June 1829 OS; ff.4-6v, Toll to Kiselev, 20 June 1829 OS.
(81) Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, pp. 250-51.
(82) RGIA, fond 673, op.l, d.222, ff. ll-16v, ‘O partizanskoi voine’, Liprandi; RGVIA, 
fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.14, ff.35-36, Liprandi to Toll, 28 April 1829 OS. The 
partisans were awarded exemption from taxation in the Principalities but were given no 
formal payment.
(83) Ibid., ff.50-51v, K. F. Toll to Liprandi, 9 May 1829
(84) RGIA, fond 673, op.l, d.222, ff. 13v, 18, ‘O partizanskoi voine’. Liprandi was so 
adamant that his partisan project should succeed that he spent 3,548 roubles of his own 
money on their formation. After the war he requested reimbursement from the army, RGIA, 
fond 673, op.2, d.6, ff.27v-28v, Liprandi ‘Tainye porucheniia, avgust 1827-avgust 1829’,
29 June 1831 OS.
(85) The most detailed account of their activity is in ibid., op.l, d.222, ff. 18v-108v. 
Extracts have been published in Liprandi, Ososbennosti, pp. 91-109, passim.
(86) RGVIA, fond 14058, op.l/184a, sv.104, d.la, ff.5-6v, Diebitsch to Nesselrode, 7 
March 1829 OS.
(87) Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, pp. 253-55.
(88) ‘Imperator’, RS, XXXII, 1881, p. 563, Diebitsch to Nicholas 1 ,16 May 1829 OS.
(89) See above, pp. 176-77.
(90) This explains his earlier interest in Shostak’s proposal.
(91) ‘Imperator’, RS, XXXII, 1881, pp. 566-67, Diebitsch to Nicholas 1 ,17 May 1829 OS. 
At this stage, Diebitsch proposed that all Bulgars who took up arms on the side of Russia 
were to be resettled in the Dobrudja region at the end of the war (no doubt in place of the 
Zaporozhtsy and Nekrasovtsy who were to be resettled in Russia), ibid., p. 567. This plan 
was never executed and, instead, thousands of Bulgars (including a great many that did not 
take up arms during the war) were resettled in Bessarabia, see below, pp. 237-38 (footnote 
71).
(92) Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, pp. 256-57.
(93) Ibid., pp. 257-58.
(94) See above, p. 177.
(95) RS, ‘Imperator’, XXXVI, 1882, p. 79, Diebitsch to Nicholas I, 25 July 1829 OS; N. K. 
Shil’der, ‘Adrianopol’skii mir 1829g. Iz perepiski grafa Dibicha’, DNR, XV, 1879, p. 542, 
Diebitsch to Nicholas 1 ,13 August 1829 OS.
(96) Konobeev, ‘Dvizhenie’, pp. 268-74.
(97) Meshcheriuk, ‘Dvizhenie’, pp. 137-38; RGIA, fond 673, op.l, d.222, ff. 15-15v, ‘O 
partizanskoi voine’. Mamarchev subsequently escaped and attempted another insurrection 
in 1833. He was again captured by the Russians, handed over to the Porte and exiled to 
Asiatic Turkey, ibid.
(98) RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.13, ff.119-121, Zheltukhin to Diebitsch, 19 
September 1829 OS. (In early 1829, Zheltukhin replaced Pahlen as President of the Divans 
and was de facto ruler of the Principalities). Sentiments similar to those of Zheltukhin were 
expressed by foreign observers such as E. L. Blutte, Britain’s consul in Wallachia. He 
believed that the Pandours, if left unsupervised by the Russians, would have ‘pass[ed] over
219
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Cowley, 27 March 1829. Blutte believed the other (non-Pandour) irregulars of 1828-29 
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Ypsilantis during his revolt of 1821, ibid., ff.38-38v, Blutte to Cowley, 12 June 1829. 
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volunteers of 1828-29 were somehow an expression of the Bulgaria’s capitalist 
development and its growing native bourgeoisie. The volunteers of Marmarchev, Fokiiano 
and Milko are deemed ‘sons of the Bulgar people’, and their participation in the war said to 
signal the progression of the ‘nationalist movement’ to the stage of the ‘armed struggle’, pp. 
224-26, 240, 243. Konobeev’s thesis is open to two major criticisms. First, the volunteer 
groups were, by Konobeev’s own admission, multi-national in composition, pp. 237-43. 
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Moldavian, (RGVIA, fond 14057, op.16/183, sv.868, d.13, ff.79-80, Begidov (no initial) to 
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interested in his adopted homeland of Serbia. There is no evidence that, with the exception 
of Mamarchev, any of the volunteers considered themselves Bulgarian nationalists. A more 
convincing argument is that the volunteers were analogous to the Greek Klephti (mountain 
brigands) fighting for the dual reasons of a genuine hatred of Turkish rule and a quest for 
booty, probably often seeing no distinction between the two. Secondly, whilst in this period 
there clearly existed an (albeit underdeveloped) specific Bulgar national consciousness and 
that certain politically conscious Bulgars translated this into concrete political demands,
(see evidence in ‘Dvizhenie’, pp. 244-47, 269-70), it is far from certain that such ideas were 
entertained by the Bulgar population at large. Living side by side with a significant Greek 
population as well as other Christians of various ethnicity, the Bulgars sense of identity was 
perhaps grounded more in religious than ethnic or national terms, especially as this served 
as a common bond, uniting them in opposition to their infidel oppressors. There is evidence 
for this in the organisation and aims of a secret society discovered by the Russian army in
1831. This revolutionary movement was founded by a number of volunteer-veterans of the 
1828-29 war in response to the failure of the treaty of Adrianople to assign political status 
and rights to the Bulgars and ‘Macedonians’. Its 600 members were of various ethnicity - 
some were Bulgars, others ‘Macedonians’ and its leader, a certain Grifon Davitskii, appears 
to have been a Macedonian Serb (‘Macedonia’ was, of course, merely a geographically 
expression, containing sizeable populations of Bulgars, Greeks, Serbs and other Balkan 
nationalities, Anderson, Eastern Question, pp. 268-69). The movement was essentially 
panslavic and anti-Islamic. On their banners they inscribed a poem (in Serbian) which
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implored Nicholas to ‘free the Christians’ and to ‘deliver us from eternal hell’. Their aim 
had been to gather 1,000 men at Voznisinskii monastery and attack Shumla in March-April 
1830. They may well have had connections with Mamarchev, though the documents are 
unclear on this point. The society continued operating until at least August 1830, RGVIA, 
fond VUA, d.1072, ff,19-24v, 63-63v, 66-66v, 81-83, 86-89v, 113-117,123-126, Reports 
to Kiselev, March-April 1831 OS.
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September 1829 OS. The four new battalions were to be raised in Greater Wallachia and 
were to consist of a total of 1,600 men and 196 officers, PRO, FO 97/402, ff.54-56v, Blutte 
to Cowley, 19 July 1829.
(101) Grosul, Reformy, pp. 233-34.
(102) VPR n/Vm, 1994, p. 271, Separate Act relating to the Principalities of Moldavia and 
Wallachia, 2 September 1829 OS.
(103) A ten-battalion force was said to cost 400,000 piastres per annum in wages alone. 
Moreover, the policy of exempting the families of serving Pandours from taxation would 
deprive the Principalities’ budget of some 300,000 piastres, RGVIA, fond 14057, 
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(104) Ibid., ff. 126-26v, Diebitsch to Kiselev, 23 September 1829 OS; ff.124, Diebitsch to 
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VIII. THE TREATY OF ADRIANOPLE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Upon the capture of Adrianople, Diebitsch outlined his ideas on further 
operations.(l) In command of a strike force of only 25,000 men, he considered an assault 
on Constantinople (with its 600,000 Muslim population) impossible. Thus, instead, he 
planned to advance to Chorlu and then capture the Dardanelles, whilst the Russian forces 
north of the Balkans were to attempt to capture as many Danubian fortresses as possible, as 
well as Shumla. If this had no effect on the Porte then, as noted, preparations were to be 
made to arm the Serbs and Bulgars for a third campaign the following Spring. For reasons 
not entirely clear, Diebitsch now believed that as long as Russia did itself not make great 
annexations, the other Powers would not fear the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In its 
place, ‘trois ou quatres Royaumes’ were to be created and placed under a general European 
guarantee.
The preservation of the Sultan’s Empire through conclusion of a peace treaty 
remained, however, Diebitsch’s primary aim. As early as June 1829, following the Battle 
of Kulevcha, attempts had been made to begin negotiations.(2) These continued throughout 
July, with the Russian envoy Prince V. G. Madatov urging the Vizier to treat, adding, 
significantly, that for the Sultan’s long term security, ‘it was more beneficial to be in a firm 
and constant alliance with Russia’.(3) The Turks, however, delayed and their 
plenipotentiaries arrived at Adrianople only on 17 August OS.(4)
Nesselrode had already furnished Diebitsch with Russia’s minimum and maximum 
demands.(5) The Sultan’s acceptance of the treaties of Akkerman and London (6 July 
1827) and the London Protocol of 22 March 1829 was considered a sine qua non of peace, 
as was a guarantee of the free passage for Russian commercial ships through the Straits and 
the payment of a trade and war indemnity. In addition, Diebitsch was to secure (in separate 
acts) demands relating to the political structure of the Principalities and gain for Serbia the 
territory she had been granted by the Porte in the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest but had never 
actually received. The maximum demands related almost exclusively to territorial 
annexations on the Asiatic frontier. These had increased steadily during the war due to the 
victories in the Caucasus and the forthright demands of Paskevich himself. (6) The obvious 
inability of the Sultan to pay the full indemnity increased pressure on Nesselrode to accept 
territory in lieu of part of this sum. The annexation projects ranged from the cession of the 
Pashalik of Akhaltsykh (with the towns of Atskhur, Akhalkalaki, Ardahan and Akhaltsykh), 
Anapa and Poti to a maximum demand of annexing, in addition, Batum, Adzharia (or 
‘Turkish Guria’), the Pashalik of Kars and even the Pashalik of Bayezid.(7) There were to
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be no annexations in the Balkans, with the possible exception of the Danubian delta, 
ostensibly for the creation of a cordon sanitaire.
Following the arrival of Diebitsch’s diplomatic aides, A. F. Orlov and F. P. Pahlen, 
the first formal conference with the Turkish negotiators was held on 21 August OS. The 
main causes of Turkish dissent concerned the war indemnity and the territorial demands in the 
Caucasus. Diebitsch was willing to compromise on the latter issue since as the Turks 
considered these provinces, far more than their European, their ‘true inheritance’, obtaining 
cessions here would prove very difficult More fundamentally, however, Diebitsch disagreed 
with Paskevich over the very principle of expansion in the East. Citing the experience of 
Rome and Britain, he believed that ‘annexations in Asia inevitably lead from one province to 
the next’, thus unnecessarily extending the frontier and forcing Russia to commit more troops 
for the defence of the region. Paskevich’s idea of augmenting his force with large numbers of 
local Caucasian tribesmen was also opposed by Diebitsch, as the latter’s loyalty was deemed 
questionable in the event of a future unsuccessful campaign. (8) At bottom, one suspects 
however, that die conflict between Nicholas’ two favourites was perhaps less to do with 
strategy and more to do with their own personal struggle for power and influence. Paskevich 
had a vested interest in empire-building in the East as this would strengthen the role and 
importance of the Caucasus Corps and thus of his own institutional power-base. Diebitsch 
was undoubtedly aware of this and was in no mood to act as accomplice to his own rival.(9)
As regards the war indemnity, Diebitsch was willing to allow its payment in 
instalments over a number of years, during which period, Russia was, by way of guarantee, to 
occupy the Danubian Principalities and Silistria. He considered annexing the Principalities 
outright in return for a reduction in the indemnity but, as he had no explicit authority to do so, 
he was forced to abandon the idea As a rule, Diebitsch made it clear that he preferred money 
to land and refused to seek territorial compensation in Asia unless the Turks offered this 
themselves (which was most unlikely). Following a second conference on 22 August OS, the 
Turkish negotiators left for consultations with the Sultan. Diebitsch set 1 September OS as 
the final date he would accept a response and, in the meantime, was to push units towards the 
capital and the Dardanelles. (10) This latter measure was supported by the Tsar, who was 
adamant that ‘unwanted guests’ should be barred from intervening in the treaty negotiations. 
Should a foreign fleet attempt to pass the Dardanelles, Diebitsch was authorised to respond 
‘par des coups de canon’.(ll)
The Sultan did, however, consent to the Russian terms and, following more brief 
negotiations, the Treaty of Adrianople was signed on 2 September 1829 OS.(12) The treaty 
secured the Porte’s acceptance of the allied treaties regarding the establishment of an 
autonomous Greece (art.X), the cession to Serbia of the territory granted in 1812 (art. VI) as 
well as a Separate Act granting extensive rights to the Principalities. In addition, Russian 
merchants were granted full freedom of trade throughout the Ottoman Empire and, more 
importantly still, the Straits were opened up to the vessels of all nations trading with Russia 
(art.VII). This brought to near completion the process, begun in 1774, of internationalising 
the Black Sea. Before that date the Sultan considered the Euxine his personal possession - a 
‘virgin shut up in the harem’, impenetrable to strangers. By the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, 
Russia had gained the right for her own commercial vessels to navigate these waters and pass 
the Straits. This right was gradually awarded to other powers and now, in 1829, it had 
become the right of all nations. (13) Article VII was silent, for some ominously so, on the 
question of the passage of war ships. This led to the suspicion that Russia, by means of a 
secret article or verbal agreement, had acquired the right to pass the Bosphorus and the 
Dardanelles. This interpretation has, correctly, been denied.(14) Although in the course of 
1828, Russia, as noted, aimed to secure the right for her war ships to pass the Bosphorus 
(though not the Dardanelles, which had aggressive implications against Britain), this war aim 
appears to have been dropped the following year - probably for fear of future British reprisals. 
No document relating to its discussion at Adrianople has ever been discovered. There are 
really only two possibilities, either a demand was made but refused, or, more probably, the 
matter was not raised at all.
As regards the Caucasian frontier, Diebitsch secured the Turks’ recognition of 
Russia’s sovereignty over the provinces annexed during the 1806-12 war and, in addition, 
gained Poti, Anapa, Akhaltsykh, Akhalkalaki and Atskhur (art.IV). This served to lessen the 
Porte’s influence over the Muslim Caucasian tribes as well as securing both entrances of the 
Boijomi pass. (15) The controversial aspect of the article concerned a passage stating that the 
East coast of the Black Sea between the Kuban and the port of St Nicholas (populated by the 
volatile Circassian tribes) ‘demeureront a perpetuite sous la domination de l’Empire de 
Russie’. Having just resolved one Caucasian border dispute arising from the misleading 
wording of the Bucharest Treaty, Diebitsch was to create another. (16)
The only territory annexed in the Balkans was the Danubian Delta. Nominally, it was 
intended for use as a quarantine and could not be fortified (art.IH). Far from being a minor 
acquisition,(17) however, the possession of the delta allowed Russia the potential to
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exert great control over the Danube and its commercial traffic. This served to defeat 
Austria’s long-held aim of acquiring the delta for itself for the protection of her most valuable 
trading route. (18)
The trade and war indemnity were fixed at 1.5m and 10m ducats respectively and the 
Principalities and Silistria were to be occupied until they were paid. This occupation allowed 
Russia full liberty to reform the administrative system of the Principalities according to its 
own wishes. (19)
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At the beginning of September OS, as yet unsure of the outcome of the Adrianople
negotiations, Nicholas and his advisers in St Petersburg were considering their response to
all possible eventualities. Bolstered by diplomatic reports from London that Wellington’s
Cabinet was resigned to the fall of Constantinople, Nicholas was in confident mood. (20) On
1 September OS (the final date which Diebitsch was prepared to await a Turkish response)
Nicholas instructed his General to occupy the Dardanelles and march on the capital if peace
had not been signed. Knowing well that Diebitsch regarded this course of action as
unfeasible, the Tsar urged, ‘ne faites pas attention a votre peu de force numerique, elle est
plus que compense par votre force morale’. Suspecting that Britain and France were
considering sending part of their fleet to Constantinople, Diebitsch was again instructed to
ensure that this passage through the Dardanelles was not permitted. (21) In fact, unknown to
Nicholas, both Wellington and Polignac had, after some consideration, already refused this
option. However, Sir Robert Gordon, die new Turcophile British ambassador to the Porte
had, quite independently, already brought the British fleet to the mouth of the Dardanelles (it
arrived on 19 August OS). Two days earlier he proposed to the Sultan that it should also pass
the Straits ‘for the preservation of tranquillity’.(22)
Had the Sultan accepted Gordon’s offer and, buttressed by this show of British
support, refused to sign a peace, how great was the possibility of Anglo-Russian hostilities?
A clash at the Straits may certainly be ruled out, as prior to mid-September OS, Diebitsch
was in no position to prevent its passage by the British fleet.(23) The latter would have
arrived at Constantinople unmolested, but what then? Gordon’s idea was to ‘prevent the fall
of this capital’, but was himself unsure how this was to occur:
If the Russians had possession of the Dardanelles and our seven sail of 
the line were in the Archipelago, then they might have remained there 
without a chance of being able to interfere.
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In retrospect, he admitted that the whole plan to have been ‘worse than useless’.(24) 
Aberdeen, expressed similar sentiments, hypothesising that once in the Sea of Marmora, the 
British ships would be in a ‘rat trap’, from which it would have been, ‘difficult to extricate 
themselves without the good pleasure of Zabalkanski’.(25) Thus it seems clear that the 
British fleet would have remained at Constantinople as a mere demonstration but certainly 
not have undertaken any hostilities.
The question that has occupied most minds, however, is whether Diebitsch and his
25,000 man force were in fact in a position to capture Constantinople at all. The official 
Tsarist version is that he undoubtedly could - the implication being that the Sultan was 
henceforth eternally indebted to the Tsar for the existence of his Empire.(26) The most 
detailed enquiry on the subject, however, has cast great doubt on Diebitsch’s chances.(27) 
Diebitsch himself believed that a storming of the capital was impossible and that his only 
(faint) chance was to bluff an attack on Constantinople in the hope of precipitating a panic- 
stricken revolution.(28)
Whatever the truth, Russia had to be prepared for any outcome and to this end an 
Extraordinary Committee was established by Nicholas. Convened on 4 September 1829 
OS its members were Counts V. P. Kochubei, P, A. Tolstoi, Nesselrode and A. I. 
Chernyshev, Prince A. N. Golitsyn and Russia’s foremost expert on Turkish affairs D. V. 
Dashkov.(29) The committee considered the options available to Russia should 
Constantinople fall (news of the treaty of Adrianople had not yet arrived). Since Russia did 
not require more territory, large unilateral annexations as well as a partition were ruled out - 
the latter being more advantageous to the other Powers than Russia.(30) The creation of a 
Balkan confederation, tied to Russia through religious and ethnic affinity, seemed the only 
solution.(31) The dominant issue, however, was not the future political organisation of the 
Balkan Christians but the ownership of the Straits.
First and foremost Russia required security - that the war ships of no Power could 
pass the Straits. This, in fact, was the current regime, as affirmed in article XI of the 1809 
Anglo-Turkish Treaty. It was believed that as long as it remained in force, the treaty 
answered Russia’s most basic security interest - to keep the Straits (especially the 
Bosphorus) closed to Britain, Russia’s most powerful rival.(32) If Russia could gain the 
unilateral right for her war ships to pass the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles then she would, 
of course, acquire a great strategic advantage over Britain. However, such a regime had 
essentially offensive implications and would make Britain Russia’s implacable enemy. This 
did not worry some Russian diplomats such as M. N. Bulgari, who, in a hawkish report to
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the committee, forwarded a number of proposals designed to precipitate ‘la decadence de 
l’Angleterre’. Constantinople (with the Straits) was be transformed into a free city under 
Russian patronage. Russia would then use her influence to gain control of the Straits, throw 
them open to her war ships and, together with an enlarged and pro-Russian Greece, offer a 
direct challenge to Britain’s naval supremacy in the Mediterranean.(33) The more sober 
Dashkov, however, was sure that if Russia gained exclusive control over the Straits she 
would face a war with Europe(34) and thus Bulgari’s idea was rejected by the committee.
An alternative idea of placing the Straits under the control of a newly-created Balkan 
confederation was also considered by the committee but ultimately rejected. Such a state 
would not be strong enough to resist the influence of other Powers and, as it would be 
continually at war with the Asiatic remnants of the Ottoman Empire, there was no guarantee 
that it hold on to the Straits indefinitely. Transforming Constantinople into a truly 
independent free city was likewise unsatisfactory as it would become the permanent focus of 
all the intrigues of the European powers. (35) The final solution was for Russia to annex or 
assume a protectorate over the Straits by the consent of the other Powers. This was also 
rejected as their agreement was most unlikely and the price Russia would pay enormous - for 
Austria, France and Britain would demand as compensation the entire Ottoman Empire in 
Europe.(36) Unable to find a viable alternative solution, the committee reaffirmed the status 
quo - as Dashkov argued, the Straits, ‘if not under the Russian sceptre, should remain under 
the control of the Muslim’.(37) For all the Porte’s stubbornness, the fact remained that 
Turkey was an ‘Etat faible’,(38) over which Russia could exercise great control and ensure 
that the 1809 regime remained in force. The final verdict was thus: Tes avantages du 
maintien de l’Empire Ottoman en Europe sont superieurs aux inconvenients qu’il 
presente’.(39) To this end, Diebitsch was to be ordered to continue to seek negotiation with 
the Sultan even if he had already fled the capital to Asia Minor. Should this still fail to 
produce a treaty, a European Congress was to be held in St Petersburg to determine the fate 
of the Ottoman Empire. (40) Russia would not seek to determine this question unilaterally as 
this would almost certainly lead to ‘une guerre generate en Europe’.(41) However, in order 
to strengthen Russia’s position at the negotiating table, the committee was bold enough to 
agree that Diebitsch should occupy Constantinople, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus until 
the powers arrived at a final solution to the crisis.(42)
It should be clear that the decision taken by the September Committee in no sense 
constituted a ‘new policy’, as Kemer and others believed.(43) Almost thirty years after 
forming his idea of the ‘weak neighbour’ policy under Alexander I, Kochubei witnessed its
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reaffirmation by the new Tsar.(44) Thus when news of the peace of Adrianople arrived in St
Petersburg the sense of euphoria was understandable. (45) The treaty - through its strategic
annexations and extension of Russia’s commercial and political rights - served to weaken the
Ottoman Empire whilst preserving its existence, thus complementing perfectly the
committee’s decision.
As for the consequences of Adrianople for European diplomacy, Heytesbury correctly
predicted that ‘we must be prepared ere long to see the Emperor of Russia assume the novel
character of Friend, Ally, and Protector of the Ottoman Empire’. His reasoning was that:
From all that has occurred during the present war, the Russian 
Government has acquired the clearest conviction, that under the present 
circumstances of the world, the conquest of Turkey is impossible. That 
the attempt would be followed by a war with the whole of Europe, which 
war [sic] it would be impossible for Russia to sustain...it is evident that 
the next most advantageous arrangement for Russia must be a state so 
weak and impotent, as to be entirely in her dependence. This dependence 
is effectively seemed by the Treaty of Adrianople. The Turkish Sultan 
will probably be as submissive hereafter to the orders of the Czar, as any 
of the Princes of India to those of the Company, and the Russian Minister 
be as powerful at Constantinople, as the Russian Minister was at Warsaw 
before the partitioa(46)
In London, Wellington shared Heytesbury’s fear that the Ottoman Empire was now a Russian
protectorate and would have preferred Diebitsch to have actually taken Constantinople. (47)
However, both Europe and the Russian Government itself overestimated Russia’s long-term
ability to control the Porte. The latter saw compromise and agreement with Russia, both in
1829 and more spectacularly in 1833, as nothing other than a short-term expediency to ensure
survival. The key premise of the ‘weak neighbour’ policy - that Russia could displace
permanently Britain as the Sultan’s most favoured partner and ally - was in fact highly
contentious. F. P. Fonton, one of Diebitsch’s diplomatic aides at Adrianople, believed like
many that Russia could never achieve this aim, and, as a result, there could be no guarantee of
keeping the Straits closed to Britain:
We flatter ourselves with the hope that the Porte will become more 
obedient and submissive as it becomes weaker. One cannot acquire 
friendship through fear....Do you think that one can rely on the Porte not 
to open the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus if England promises to return 
her the Crimea?(48)
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Fonton’s point had much validity. The 1809 regime only obliged the Porte to keep die Straits
closed if she remained neutral. There was nothing to prevent her from joining Britain in
alliance against Russia and then opening them.
This flaw in the ‘weak neighbour’ policy had grave implications for Russian military
strategy. For the army’s successes in 1828-29 had been made possible only through the
absence of Austrian and in particular, British political and military support for the Porte.
Gordon had been musing over this very point since his arrival at Constantinople in the
summer of 1829. He correctly surmised that, for reasons of supply alone, a Balkan crossing
was dependent upon Russia’s naval mastery of the Black Sea (he considered it impossible to
stretch a magazine chain across the mountains). The implications this was to have for British
strategy were as follows:
In truth it was but the want of a vestige of support that originally 
disheartened the Turks and opened up the passes of the Balkans. Sir 
Malcolm [the British admiral] would have with ease passed into the 
Black Sea and destroyed Greig’s fleet and perhaps occupied Burgas and 
Sizopol....The communication and supplies with Odessa and in fact with 
Russia would have been cut off and I am ready to maintain that no 
foreign army can exist long in Rumelia without communication from the 
sea....It is my opinion that should England at any time go to war with 
Russia and the seat of war is to be in Turkey, you ought to take to have a 
British fleet on this side of the Dardanelles. This alone can save and 
effectually will save the Porte from utter destruction whilst Russia will be 
attacked in the only quarter in which She is...vulnerable.(49)
Gordon’s thesis, which so closely prefigured British strategy during the Crimean War, was 
thus Britain’s answer to Russia’s innovative new strategy of the Balkan crossing.(50) 
Britain’s counter-strategy came however as no great surprise to the Russians. A year earlier, 
Pozzo had confidently predicted that in a future war with Britain, the latter would concentrate 
its attacks on the Crimea and Sevastopol.(51) The obvious means of pre-empting this was by 
the permanent closure of the Straits. Having rejected the option of the latter’s annexation or 
internationalisation, the means chosen to achieve this was a perpetual alliance with the Porte. 
It was presumed that this alliance would be firm enough to preclude the need for future 
Russo-Turkish hostilities and thus, by consequence, the threat of British intervention. Should 
an Anglo-Russian war nevertheless break out, Russia’s dominance over its weakened Eastern 
neighbour would be sufficient to ensure its neutrality and the closure of the Straits. British 
diplomats disputed both these premises and thus the scene was set for a decades-long Anglo- 
Russian struggle for influence at Constantinople.
T he E xecution and R evision  o f  Adrianople, 1830-32
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Although Diebitsch had forced upon the Porte the acceptance of the principle of allied 
mediation in Greek affairs, the precise arrangements regarding the establishment of a Greek 
state were still to be determined. The first significant development was a call by Wellington 
to establish a fully independent Greece, as opposed to mere autonomy under Turkish 
suzerainty. He feared the latter would place Greece under the perpetual patronage of Russia. 
In return, Greece was to be awarded the less favourable Aspropotamus-Zeitoun border.
Faced with Britain’s growing antagonism towards the gradual dismantling of the Ottoman 
Empire, Nicholas agreed and, in addition, gave Britain first choice on the question of 
Greece’s first sovereign.(52)
Wellington’s fears were in fact well founded. In the instructions given to Russia’s 
new diplomatic representative to Greece, L. Pototskii, the aim of transforming Greece into a 
de facto Russian protectorate was made clear. Russia was to take a leading role in the 
establishment of the key institutions of the Greek state to secure her own influence there and 
combat the designs of Britain. An independent Greek national Church was to be established 
by the assistance of Greek ecclesiastical leaders currently residing in Russia. The new 
sovereign was to be persuaded to adopt the Greek faith so tempering then severing his 
possible allegiance to other Powers. These two measures would ‘lay and then strengthen the 
foundation of the religious influence of Russia’. Commercial ties between the two states 
were to be strengthened by the use of Greek shipping for the transportation of Novorossiia’s 
grain exports. In foreign affairs, Russia would act as the patron of Greece in its future 
disputes with the Porte. (53) Finally, Greeks in the Russian military service were to assist in 
the formation of Greece’s first regular army.(54) Ultimately, Greece - whether autonomous 
(as Russia initially favoured) or independent - was, in Sturdza’s words, to become Russia’s 
‘useful ally’ in the Mediterranean.
Russian attempts to allay British suspicions by accommodating some of her demands, 
were, however, increasingly disturbed by Capodistrias, who urged Nicholas to adopt an even 
more forward policy. He requested that Russia demand the inclusion of Crete and Samos into 
the Greek state and, under the guise of an allied guarantee of these islands, devised a plan to 
Tegitimer une station navale russe dans l’Archipel’.(55) He opposed Britain’s nominee for 
sovereign, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, deeming him Tinstrument passif de la politique du 
cabinet de St James’(56) and schemed successfully to dissuade Leopold from accepting the 
throne. (57)
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A final settlement was however postponed for over two years as the attention of 
Europe was dominated by the revolutionary events of 1830/31. When the allied conferences 
over Greece renewed in 1832 the political landscape had changed greatly. The fall of 
Wellington in November 1830 and the assassination of Capodistrias a year later, had removed 
the two greatest obstacles to a compromise settlement. The previous proposal of the Arta- 
Volo boundary was now accepted and by the Convention of London (7 May 1832) the 
modem Greek state was brought into existence. (58)
It would take but a few years to the observe the validity of Wellington’s and 
Mettemich’s thesis that an independent Greece would be less prone to Russian influence. 
Following Capodistrias’ assassination, the power of the pro-Russian party in Greece became 
progressively undermined by pro-British and pro-French factions. When it was decided that a 
regency was to be created for the new seventeen-year-old sovereign, Otto of Bavaria, these 
latter factions were able to dominate nation’s political and administrative apparatus. Otto’s 
subsequent refusal to convert to the Orthodox religion was a symbolic assurance of Greece’s 
future pro-Western orientation. (59)
It was of some irony that the one aspect of the ‘weak neighbour’ policy that really did 
have validity - that Russian influence in the Balkans was better served by the emerging 
Balkan nations remaining under Turkish sovereignty - was, with disastrous results, discarded 
over Greece. Semi-autonomous Balkan states would be more dependent upon Russia, 
looking to her for assistance in their relations with the Porte. In contrast, fully independent 
Balkan states would, in Nesselrode’s fateful words, ‘not hesitate to compete with us for 
power, civilisation, industry and wealth’.(60) Freed from a dependency upon Russia, the 
latter were also more prone to fall under the influence of other powers. This was especially 
true with regard to Greece, which by virtue of its geographical position and maritime 
tradition, invited British influence. This threat was not unnoticed - as Pototskii’s instructions 
read, ‘Russia would prefer Greece to remain under the Ottoman yoke than be added to the 
long list of British colonies’.(61) Russia’s unwillingness to resist Wellington’s demand for 
Greek independence assured that the prophesy was, to a significant degree, fulfilled. This 
loss of influence and prestige in the Balkans was to be repeated later in the century following 
the creation of the independent Rumanian and Bulgarian nations. Even Serbia, the supposed 
of Russian influence in the Balkans, was often to find her national interests at odds with those 
of Russia once independent. (62) The ultimate irony was that Russia, in fulfilling her 
supposed ‘historical mission’ of liberating the Balkan Christians, succeeded in working 
against her own true interests. (63)
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The Russian attempt to revise the Adrianople Treaty began almost immediately upon 
its signature. Though pleased by the treaty as whole, Nicholas was dissatisfied on certain 
points of detail. These essentially came down to three inter-related issues - the war 
indemnity, the occupation of Ottoman territory and the Caucasian frontier.
As noted, Nicholas, having accepted Paskevich’s argument for more territorial 
annexations in the Caucasus, sought to secure the possession of Kars, Batum and Adzharia. 
Conveniently, however, the Sultan was in no position to pay the 10m ducats indemnity, and 
thus the Tsar proposed lowering the amount by four million in return for the aforementioned 
territory. To assure the payment of the remaining war indemnity, Diebitsch had secured at 
Adrianople the Porte’s assent to the occupation of the Principalities (which Diebitsch believed 
would continue for up to ten years). To this Nicholas was utterly opposed, as it would give 
Europe, Austria in particular, the false impression that Russia wished to eventually annex 
them. He ordered instead that the Principalities be occupied for a maximum of 18 months; 
for the long term, the army was to occupy Silistria and the coastal region of Dobrudja (up to 
the Trajans Wall), and, in the Caucasus, Kars and Bayezid.(64)
Diebitsch was not convinced by these proposals. He believed that by occupying the 
Black Sea coast, the army would assume a position more ‘offensive in character’, and thus 
more likely to arose the suspicions of the European Powers. In addition, this region had an 
unhealthy climate, and the quartering troops here would be more expensive than in the 
Principalities. In contrast, the occupation of the latter would allow Russia to appropriate 
some of its (not insignificant) income as part of the indemnity. As for the Asiatic border, 
Diebitsch again opposed annexation and even occupation, citing Kars as insignificant as 
forward post and Batum useless as a trading port due to its poor harbour.(65)
Diebitsch was, however, overruled, primarily because the occupation of the 
Principalities would obstruct the mending of relations with Austria. (66) In November A. F. 
Orlov was despatched to Constantinople to secure Nicholas’ proposals. His primary aim was 
to secure Paskevich’s demand for the annexation of the Pashalik of Kars along the border 
drawn up by the Caucasus Commander himself. Nominally, the region was merely to be 
occupied for up to ten years, as a guarantee of the war indemnity. However, a secret treaty 
was to state that should the Turks renege on payments, the region was to be annexed in 
return for two million ducats - an eventuality deemed almost inevitable due to the 
bankruptcy of the Porte. After ten years of occupation the Pashalik ‘seroit incorpore 
tranquillement dans nos provinces, et pendant ce terns la on auroit prepare le system et le
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mode de colonisation et fortifications’. The Principalities would only be occupied until the 
remaining lm ducats of the trade indemnity was paid (in 18 months).(67) This proposal as 
well as another aiming at the cession of Adzharia, was, however refused, and Orlov’s 
mission, as Diebitsch predicted, ended in failure.(68)
In the Spring of 1830 negotiations were transferred to St Petersburg. Nesselrode’s 
negotiations however proved no more successful than Orlov’s . The resulting St Petersburg 
Convention of 14 April 1830 OS was a disappointment for Russia.(69) The war indemnity 
was reduced by two million ducats unconditionally (as Diebitsch had earlier proposed),(70) 
with a further reduction of one million, under the condition of the Sultan’s acceptance of a 
new allied Protocol (3 February 1830) concerning Greece. The remaining 7m would be 
paid in annual instalments. As regards the occupation of Ottoman territory, the Russian 
army was to withdraw to the Danube, and then to the Pruth, following the payment of each 
half of the remaining one million trade indemnity. Silistria was to be permanently occupied 
until the full payment of the war indemnity, whilst Russia reserved the right to prolong her 
occupation of the Principalities if the Sultan failed to keep to the timetable for the 
repayment of the war indemnity. Although Nesselrode failed to secure the annexation of 
territory,(71) some benefit to Russia was gained by the mere occupation of Ottoman 
territory. For one, it allowed the army to organise the resettlement of Ottoman Christians 
into Russia - the right to which Diebitsch had secured in article XIII of Adrianople.(72) 
More importantly, the occupation of the Principalities (which continued to 1834) allowed 
for its political system to be reformed and so ensure that its ‘instititions futures’ complied 
with the ‘avantages strategiques de la Russie’.(73) This was to be an important 
implementation of the ‘weak neighbour’ policy - to strengthen Russian influence in a 
strategically important province, whilst retaining the overall sovereignty of the Porte.
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IX. THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES: OCCUPATION AND REFORM 1828-34
Russia and the Principalities: Relations to 1828
Russia’s first meaningful contact with the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia 
was established following the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war in 1711. Though Peter the 
Great had not sought this conflict (it was engineered by Charles XII of Sweden) he was 
nevertheless attracted by the prospect of defeating the Turks and furthering Russian 
expansion towards the Black Sea. His interest was doubly increased following an offer of 
alliance from the Hospodars - the indigenous rulers of the Principalities who sought to break 
from the Sultan’s suzerainty. Peter instinctively understood the great advantages that close 
political ties with the Principalities presented to Russia - the latter occupied a highly strategic 
position on the northern frontier of the Ottoman’s European Empire and, with their great 
potential in agricultural produce, could serve as both an operational base and supply depot for 
an invading Russian army. Moreover, due to the semi-independent status, homogeneous 
population and defined territorial limits of each Principality, they were more readily 
detachable from the Sultan’s control and transformed into, alternatively, a demilitarised buffer 
state, a Russian protectorate or incorporated into the Russian Empire outright. (1) Thus, in 
1711a treaty was concluded with the Hospodar of Moldavia (D. Cantemir), by which that 
Principality was to assume the character of a protectorate and render assistance to the Russian 
army. Although the Russian forces subsequently crossed the Pruth and entered Jassy, they 
found themselves heavily outnumbered by the enemy and peace was concluded almost 
immediately. Despite this military disappointment, Peter had laid the foundation for the 
development of Russo-Rumanian relations.(2) Under his successors, the Principalities were 
to become a significant factor in the continuing Russo-Turkish diplomatic and military 
struggle.
Russia’s major advance in the region came following Catherine D’s first Turkish war 
of 1768-74. By the terms of Kutchuk-Kainardji Russia not only extended her frontier 
towards the Principalities, but legitimised a right of interference in their internal affairs. By 
article XVI, Russia was now able to ‘parler en leur faveur’, with regard to their newly 
acquired rights of the freedom of religion, restoration of monastery lands and fixing of the 
tribute to the Porte. Not satisfied with these gains, Catherine schemed with Austria to 
partition European Turkey. The Empress now envisaged, in addition to the creation of a neo- 
Byzantium Empire, the unification and independence of the Principalities (to be called 
‘Dacia’) and its transformation into a pro-Russian buffer state. With this latter aim in mind, 
Russia embarked on another Turkish war in 1787. Although the outbreak of the French
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Revolution and the declaration of war by Sweden in 1788, made its achievement impossible, 
Russia was able to annex lands up to the Dniester and for the first time became the neighbour 
of Moldavia. Catherine’s death in 1796 was, however, ultmately to mark the end to Russia’s 
ambitious schemes of conquest and policy under her successor, Paul I, was directed towards 
the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. (3)
Alexander I’s policy towards the Principalities was marked by that inconsistency that 
characterised Russia’s Eastern policy as a whole during the first years of his reign. On one 
hand, it is clear from his dealings with Napoleon in 1807 that the Tsar considered a return to 
Catherine’s idea of the partition of Ottoman lands, with Russia annexing the Principalities. 
This, intermittently, was Russian policy during the 1806-12 Turkish War, though it was often 
compromised by the increasingly complicated international situation. (4) Somewhat 
contradictorily, the Tsar was, at the very same time, attracted by his father’s pro-Turkish 
policy and Kochubei’s idea of preserving Turkey as a weak neighbour. After much 
vacillation this latter foreign policy course was to emerge victorious. With regard to the 
Principalities, the ‘weak neighbour* idea entailed the retention of Ottoman suzerainty but an 
increase in Russia’s influence over the province’s domestic affairs. This policy was initiated 
as early as 1802 with the Russian inspired Hatti-Sherif of that year. (5) The guiding principle 
of this and other important measures such as the introduction of the 1804 finance reglement, 
was to limit the powers of both the Porte and the Hospodars over the Boyars and their 
Divans.(6) For following Peter’s campaign of 1711, the Sultan decreed that in future, 
Hospodars were to be selected from amongst the solidly pro-Turkish Greek Phanariots and 
not, as previously, from the native Boyars who had demonstrated their disloyalty through 
scheming with the Russians. The resulting Phanariot period proved to be one of extreme 
misrule, during which, the Principalities were deprived of many of their ancient privileges and 
were increasingly exploited by the Hospodars and the Porte alike. Although many Boyars 
collaborated with the corrupt Phanariot regimes, others resented the usurpation of their 
former position and looked to Russia for support. (7) It was through the patronage of these 
Boyars that Russia sought to further its influence in the Principalities. Thus, following the 
end of the 1806-12 Turkish war and the resulting Treaty of Bucharest, Russia further limited 
the powers of the Hospodars and consolidated its own influence in the region, especially 
amongst the Moldavian Boyars, through the annexation of the northern part of their 
Principality (subsequently called ‘Bessarabia’). Many Boyar lands were now under Russian 
sovereignty and Bessarabia was to become the centre of the pro-Russian faction of the 
Moldavian Boyars. (8)
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Russia’s attempts to control the Principalities’ domestic affairs were, however, 
greatly disrupted by the Hospodars who continued to raise vast sums of revenue through 
illegal taxation, much of which was embezzled. (9) Thus one of the main points of G. A. 
Stroganov’s mission to the Porte (1816-21) was to ensure the observance of the fiscal 
constraints of 1802 and 1804 and pass more power over finances to the Divans. Following 
the outbreak of Vladimirescu’s anti-Phanariot revolt in 1821, the Porte made several hasty 
concessions in this direction in order to appease the insurgents. Any hope of their 
implementation was, however, scuppered by the subsequent outbreak of Ypsilantis* revolt, in 
which the Porte suspected a Russian involvement(lO)
The Porte’s response to the insurrection was to occupy the Principalities, remove the 
Hospodars and impose military rule. In an attempt to solve the crisis, in April 1822, the 
Boyars sent a commission to the Porte requesting that the Phanariot rule be brought to an end 
and that in future, Hospodars be selected from amongst the native Boyars. As the Sultan had 
already lost all faith in the Phanariots (M Sutzo, the Hospodar of Moldavia had supported 
Ypsilantis in 1821) the request was granted and G. Ghika and L Sturdza were elevated to the 
rank of Hospodar.(ll) The formal aid to the Phanariot era was seen by many Boyars as 
opening the way for a more general reform of the Principalities and throughout the 1820s a 
multitude of proposals were drawn up. Though varying in detail, there were many common 
points - restriction of office-holding to native Boyars, increased power of the Divan, the 
freeing of internal and external trade and the creation of a national militia The main 
disagreements concerned the political and economic rights assigned to each of the respective 
Boyar classes - with the first-class Boyars seeking to retain and even increase their exclusive 
powers and privileges and with the second and third-class striving for parity with the 
former. (12)
Any hope of reform however rested on the mutual consent of Russia and Turkey, but 
the disputed issue of the Turks’ continued occupation of Principalities and other related 
matters precluded an agreement. In 1822-24, Lord Strangford (the British ambassador at 
Constantinople) attempted to mediate between the two sides but ultimately it was only after 
Nicholas’ ultimatum of March 1826 that the Porte was forced to agree to Russian demands. 
This led to the Convention of Akkerman (and Separate Act),(13) which further increased the 
autonomy of the Principalities and empowered the Hospodars and Divans to begin 
preparations for the eventual adoption of a ‘reglement general’ for each Principality.
Although the Porte subsequently authorised the establishment of the necessaiy committees, 
the unresolved Russo-Turkish disputes over Greece always threatened to derail the whole
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process. Events were ultimately to lead in October 1827 to the Battle of Navarino, after 
which the Sultan disbanded the committees and began preparations for war.(14) This push 
to war was, however, to hold great advantages for Russia. Taking advantage of the 
Principalities’ impending occupation by the Second Army, Russia could now dominate the 
process of reform and restructure the province’s political, economic and military system as 
it wished.
The Second Army and the Principalities
As the Russian army always intended to use the Principalities as its principal 
operational base in a future Turkish war, Kiselev had, in the early 1820s, instructed his 
General Staff to research into previous attempts at the wartime administration of the 
province. He was predominantly interested in the experience of the 1806-12 war, during 
which Russian commanders had experimented with a number of methods in order to 
increase the ability of the Principalities’ rudimentary administrative structure to furnish the 
Russian army with provisions, wood and other supplies. After some years the study was 
completed and included into part V of the General Staff’s overall work on the history of 
Russo-Turkish wars.(15)
The study began by stressing the key importance of supplies in Turkish wars.
Unlike other parts of Europe, the Balkans were characterised by a scarcity of population, 
cultivated land and agricultural surplus. As this precluded an invading force from merely, in 
an ad hoc manner, gathering supplies along its operational line, the organisation and 
collection of supplies from all available sources had to be the ‘first task of the government’. 
The successful management of this task was the ‘truest guarantee’ of any military success. 
Unfortunately, this had not been achieved in 1806-12, leading to the slow movement of the 
army and the inconclusive outcome of the war.(16).
The only important source of supplies in Balkan theatre were to be found in the 
Principalities. Through the purchase and requisition of the population’s produce, as well as 
through Russia’s appropriation or control of the state budget, the province could make a 
potentially substantial contribution to the Russian war effort. Russia’s prolonged 
occupation of the province 1806-12, had, however, revealed great defects in the province’s 
political, economic and administrative system, all of which greatly diminished its ability to 
assist the Russian cause.
One of the greatest problems was said to be the ‘unlimited power’ of the 
Hospodars, who had a vested interest in maintaining the province’s great levels of 
corruption. They created and raised taxes at will, embezzled state income and sold all
positions in the administrative system. Other state officials likewise used their positions 
purely for self-gratification, especially the local tax collectors [ispravniki] whose 
corruptibility was legendary. During the last Turkish war, the latter had been commissioned 
to conduct requisitions for the army, though for obvious reasons, very few supplies actually 
reached their intended destination.(17) The Hospodars secured the Boyars’ acceptance of 
their rule by granting them important privileges. The latter paid no taxes whatsoever and 
were allowed to employ skutel ’niJci, Brelashi and poslushniki - various names for peasants 
who had voluntarily become enserfed to noblemen. These peasants were freed entirely 
from state taxation, paying instead corvee or rent exclusively to the landholder. All this 
deprived the Treasury of funds and its ability to subsidise a war effort. Other privileged 
classes were likewise of limited value to Russia. The monasteries, though extremely rich, 
were fearful of requisitions and always concealed their produce in time of war. Acquiring 
supplies through the mercantile class was also problematic as almost all of the 
Principalities’ trade was in the hands of Austrian merchants, who were hostile to 
Russia.(18) This state of affairs meant that almost the entire burden of supplying the army 
fell upon the peasantry. Already exploited by the landowner and the state they were loathe 
to part with any surplus they retained.(19)
During the first phase of the Russian occupation (1806-08), the army operated under 
the above-mentioned conditions.(20) Assured by the then Hospodar of Wallachia, 
Constantine Ypsilantis, that the Principalities alone could fully support a 50,000-man force, 
the Russians took no measures to assert any control over the administrative system. The 
results were disastrous and in 1808 Ypsilantis was relieved of his post and sent to 
Russia.(21) He was replaced by a Russian official, S. S. Kushnikov, who, though awarded 
the title of President of both Divans, remained in fact a prisoner to the local bureaucracy. 
The Russian Commander-in-Chief A. A. Prozorovskii believed that only the wholesale 
reform of the Principalities by the President and the introduction of Russian governmental 
practices, the codification of laws and measures designed to improve the corrupted morals 
of the population would improve the situation. The Tsar, however, was unready for such 
measures and restricted the President’s role to the collection of supplies. This task was 
however impossible without reform and Kushnikov, though introducing certain piecemeal 
reforms into the administrative structure, failed in his task and was himself replaced in 
1810. He was succeeded by V. I. Krasno-Milashevich, who fared no better.(22) Modem 
research has confirmed the conclusions of Kiselev’s General Staff - ‘the lessons of 
occupation were clear for all to see. Whether under Ypsilantis or Kushnikov, the Divan
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system would serve the will of no master’. (23) It was clear that the army required the 
‘establishment of a dependable administration’ in the province(24) and according to the 
General Staffs report there was but one solution:
It is essential that both Divans be placed under the direct control of the
Commander-in-Chief and operate under the instruction of persons
appointed by the Russian Government. (25)
Control of the Divans would allow control of the budget The huge proportion of state 
income wasted on ‘unnecessary expenditure’, such as the wages of the bureaucracy, could 
thus be diverted towards the maintenance of the occupying forces. (26) Russian control over 
the equally important local state apparatus would limit the amount of gathered supplies lost to 
corruption and ‘save the inhabitants from ruin* by curbing its officials’ propensity to exact 
illegal requisitions.(27) Interestingly, the report also considered, as a means of both winning 
over the population and increasing their agricultural surplus, the easing of the burden on the 
peasantry by defining their obligations to state and landlord.(28) This measure was certainly 
needed, as, in 1809, the Commander-in-Chief P.L Bagration had noted that the peasantry 
blamed illegal requisitions not upon their state officials, but the Russians. (29) Both on the 
question of peasant obligations and with regard to the report’s opposition to the institution of 
skutel ’niki et al., ‘which brought the land not the slightest benefit’(30) one certainly senses 
the influence of Kiselev and the germ of his later agrarian reforms in the Principalities (1829- 
34). He had in fact long believed in the economic advantages of improving the lot of the 
peasantry and in 1816 had proposed the abolition of serfdom in Russia, primarily on these 
grounds.(31) His tenure as President of the Divans confirmed his belief and later, as Russia’s 
Minister for State Properties (1836-56), introduced reforms which greatly increased the 
income derived from the state peasantry. (32) The motivation behind his reforms was thus 
primarily that of raison d ’etat rather than philanthropy (though the latter was not entirely 
absent). In the case of the Principalities, increased production served Russia’s interest in the 
event of their annexation or their use as a source of supplies in a future war.
Overall, the General Staff s report, though calling for greatly increased control over 
the Divans, fell short of Prozrovskii’s demand for its abolition and replacement by a Russian 
administrative model. There is no doubt that this was the army’s preferred option, 
though as the whole issue was inexorably bound up with Russo-Turkish diplomatic 
relations, the report avoided discussion of the long-term status of the Principalities - a 
subject that was properly the prerogative of the Foreign Ministry. Fortunately, the 1826
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Convention of Akkerman had already made plain the latter* s commitment to the wholesale 
reform of the province and the interests of the military on this issue were later to be formally 
secured in 1829 with the entrusting of its execution to Kiselev.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Parallel to the research of the General Staff, Liprandi spent much of the 1820s
investigating the Principalities. He first visited Moldavia in 1821 to investigate the origins of
the Hetaria revolt(33) and in 1823 was commissioned by M  S. Vorontsov to write historical
works on lands bordering the Russo-Turkish frontier.(34) During the negotiations at
Akkerman in mid-1826 Liprandi was dispatched to the Danube to ascertain the best place for
a crossing and investigate the activities of the Cossack setdements of its delta.(35) In
October 1826, following reports that Turkish forces were secretly entering the
Principalities,(36) Nicholas ordered Kiselev to dispatch agents there to establish Tetat actuel
de choses\(37) Though the ratification of Akkerman temporarily allayed Russian fears,(38)
soon after the signature of the July 1827 Treaty of London, (which made allied intervention
over Greece a distinct possibility) Liprandi was sent on a mission to Moldavia He was
commissioned to gather intelligence and establish links with pro-Russian factions, for which
he was assigned 1,000 roubles and 1,000 chervontsy [ducats].(39) Despite two assassination
attempts(40) Liprandi was able to create an embryonic intelligence network which amassed a
great amount of information on all manner of relevant subjects.(41)
The most interesting reports related to the political affinities of die native Boyars and
the level of Russian influence in the province. They were to serve as an indictment on
Russian policy towards the Principalities and debunked the belief that Russia had successfully
usurped Austro-Turirish influence over the Boyars. There were two main reasons for this -
the first concerned Russia’s diplomatic representatives in the region:
The transfer of [the Boyars’] allegiance from Russia to Austria began in 
1812. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest, Jassy did not have 
one Russian amongst its consuls. The peraty{42) who occupied these 
positions, were of a nature completely alien to that of Russians. Almost 
all of them were bom as Turkish subjects and receiving Phanariot-style 
upbringing, they could not instil in the Boyars an allegiance and gratitude 
to Russia. Their property, relatives and friends all resided in 
Constantinople and [thus] their own well-being was dependent upon the 
well-being of the Turkish Empire. (43)
The same was true in Wallachia. Thus, whilst in 1812 the Russian consuls could be 
regarded ‘the second Prince’ of the Principalities, after this date the Austrian mission
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increasingly became the most powerful. (44) Austrian influence received a great fillip after
1821 by giving refuge to Boyars fleeing Ypsilantis’ revolt. The latter were given special
privileges in Habsburg lands and on their return to the Principalities they formed themselves
into a powerful pro-Austrian faction. In addition, due to the economic privileges granted to
Austrians by the Porte:
...all the capital of the Boyars of Moldavia and Wallachia is in the hands 
of Austrian bankers. On the first signal of any trouble all valuables and 
other moveable possessions are dispatched to Austria. (45)
Austria’s hold over the Moldavian Boyars in particular was further strengthened by Russia’s 
1812 annexation of Bessarabia. Far from increasing its influence over the landowners, Russia 
succeeded only in alienating diem by introducing reforms by which the Boyars were 
‘deprived of all their barbarous rights and customs over the peasantry [poselentsy]’.(46) As 
evidence of this Liprandi submitted a further report on the specific political allegiances of 
thirty six of the most powerful Moldavian Boyars. Nine were said to be pro-Austrian, seven 
pro-Turk and twelve were opportunists, not attached to any specific factioa Only eight could 
be considered solidly pro-Russian. Ion Sturdza, the current Hospodar, was considered ‘timid, 
self-seeking, unable to maintain a constant train of thought and disliked’. He was devoted to 
no one but ‘his own interests, which he himself does not understand’. He could easily be 
‘seduced and used by us...but due to his character it would be harmful for him to occupy any 
position’.(47)
The decline of Russian influence after 1812 was however not solely attributable to the
character of the Russian mission and Austrian intrigues. It was as much was due to the
intrinsically corruptible nature of the Boyars themselves:
Moldavians, generally, are alien to all the noble ideas of enlightened 
reason and all the precepts of a pure morality; virtue, conscience, honour, 
embarrassment and praise of others - are for them all words without 
meaning - only physical fear can restrain their passions. In a word, they 
have been inured to the spirit of Turkish rule - they love it and they are 
worthy of it (48)
Their passion for intrigue had increased since 1822, with the Sultan’s decision (later 
confirmed at Akkerman) to nominate future Hospodars from amongst the native Boyars. This 
set in motion a power struggle amongst the first-class Boyars to attain this post and use its 
powers against their rivals. For example, L Sturdza, on becoming Hospodar in 1822, sought 
to curtail the influence of other first-class Boyars through the creation of a rival power base 
comprised of newly-entitled Boyars. Up to 800 new third-class Boyars were eventually 
created through the sale of titles for as little as 500 piastres. Moreover, the
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continued Russo-Turkish disputes over Greece, which greatly reduced Russian interference in 
the Principalities’ internal affairs (1821-28), allowed the Boyars free rein to exploit the 
population as it wished The majority of them thus hoped for the ‘continuation of the present 
chaos in the administration* as any reappearance of the forces of order ‘restricted their 
arbitrary rule and robbery’.(49)
It was the above bleak picture that confronted the Russian authorities on the eve of 
war. It was clear that drastic measures were required both to impose at least a semblance of 
order into the Principalities for the duration of the war and, in the longer term, introduce more 
profound reforms in order to restore fully Russia’s influence in the region
The Wartime Occupation of the Principalities. 1828-29
The findings of the Second Army were to have a significant impact on official 
Russian policy towards the wartime administration of the Principalities. One of the most 
important suggestions accepted by Nicholas was to remove the current Hospodars and 
replace them with Russian representatives.(50) The Tsar agreed to place the Divans under 
the control of the Russian Commander-in-Chief and entrusted the day to day administration of 
the province to F. P. Pahlen, who received the title ‘President of the Divans’.(51) Pahlen was 
informed of Russia’s perilous position in the region and sent Liprandi’s reports on the 
problems of its consuls and the suspect loyalties of the Boyars. (52) As a means of assisting 
Pahlen’s task of keep the latter* s intrigues in check,(53) Liprandi proposed the establishment 
of a permanent and expanded intelligence network in the regioa At present his existing 
network of agents and informers (which he called korrespondenty) in Galatz, Bucharest and 
Fokiian operated in a somewhat haphazard fashion, as there were no permanent Russian 
military staff to systemise and organise their reports. Once institutionalised, the network 
could be expanded to gather intelligence in Bulgaria and even Austria. (54) With the backing 
of Wittgenstein, the proposal was accepted by the Tsar. Liprandi was made head of the 
intelligence network or ‘external military police’ and awarded a salary of 2,000 roubles 
p.a.(55)
The main task assigned to Pahlen however was to ensure the efficient collection of 
provisions and other supplies. (56) Fortunately, only modest expectations were placed on the 
amount of supplies that could actually be procured from this source. Following its research 
into the 1806-12 war(57) (later confirmed in Liprandi’s reports)(58), the Second
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Army believed that the Principalities alone were in no position to fulfil the army 
requirements.(59) Instead, the army was to be self-sufficient in almost all supplies 
(gathered in Russia) and receive only supplementary supplies from the Principalities 
(predominantly meat and hay).(60) This idea of transporting most supplies into the theatre 
from Russia was facilitated by the army’s research into General N. M. Kamenskii’s 1810 
experiment with ‘mobile magazines’. The army was convinced that, if expanded, this 
system could handle huge quantities of supplies.(61) In addition, Kiselev’s idea of a coastal 
operational line and insistence on the capture of Varna and Burgas opened the possibility 
for the ferrying of supplies from Novorossiia directly to the theatre of war.(62) All this 
served to avoid a repeat of the folly of 1806-08 and greatly increased the mobility of the 
army.
As regards the precise means of procuring supplies, the military command were 
keen not to forget the experience of 1806-12, during which the local population had blamed 
the Russian army for the unrestrained requisitions earned out by the Divan’s officials. 
Liprandi, for instance, was certain that if the army did not this time win the trust of the 
peasantry, they would flee their villages to the mountains and so deprive the army of all 
supplies and the hands needed to man the transport and magazine network.(63)
Wittgenstein proceeded by imposing a ban on all requisitions, not only to protect the 
country from the ravages of officialdom but also so as not to ‘accustom the army to 
arbitrary and indisciplined actions [svoevolie] from which it will be difficult to protect the 
local population’. If requisitions proved essential, they were to be organised by the central 
military authorities with the total amount taken per year not exceeding two years worth of 
peasantry’s obligations [povinnost']. The optimum solution however was to dispense with 
requisitions altogether and either purchase supplies or procure them in lieu of peasant taxes 
\podat’].{6A) Nicholas fully agreed with the importance of maintaining the goodwill of the 
population and ordered a strict supervision over both the collection of supplies and the 
behaviour of the occupying Russian forces.(65)
On the question of the reform or otherwise of the Divan system, Wittgenstein 
proved to be more conservative than Nicholas, proposing that, whilst the Hospodars were to 
be removed, the state apparatus was to be retained intact for the duration of the war.(66) 
The Tsar, however, was not so quick to rule out the possibility of reform. In addition to the 
power to appoint and dismiss ministers and full control over the budget, Pahlen was 
informed that ‘status quo antebellum de lois, formes de gouvemement et prerogatives des 
classes pourra et devra meme subir certaines modifications essentielles’. As regards the
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long-term future of the Principalities, Nicholas made his future intent clear - the wartime 
occupation was only:
...une transition, un acheminement necessaire vers le systeme 
conservateur qui fixera...leurs rapports permanents avec l’Etat suzerain, 
ceux qui les uniront avec la puissance protectrice, de meme que leur 
regime interieur.(67)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Despite all the attempts of the Russian authorities to avoid the problems associated
with the occupation of 1806-12, Pahlen’s tenure as President (April 1828-January 1829) was
marked by a near complete failure in the gathering of supplies and the development of a
strong local opposition to the growing demands for an increasing contribution to the war
effort. (68) The initial demands imposed on die province were, in fact, not great. The
population was to pay its usual obligations to the state (which were to be used to fund the war
effort) and provide, free of charge, both hay and carts. (69) Unfortunately, Pahlen was unable
to gather supplies without the use of the ispravniki, who proceeded to exploit and alienate
the peasantry. In addition, die Russians succeeded in also alienating the powerful Boyars and
monasteries. The latter had traditionally been freed of all obligations to the state and gready
resented Russian demands for supplies.(70)
Demands on the Principalities were to increase gready following the realisation that
Wittgenstein’s aim of ensuring the army’s self-sufficiency in supplies had not been achieved.
The initial underfunding of the war, the inability to collect sufficient supplies in Russia,(71)
added to the unexpected prolongation of the war and the failure to take Varna until October
1828, all forced the Russians to seek ever greater supplies in the Principalities. The latter
were thus requested to contribute sufficient quantities of flour, groats and oats for the supply
of a 100,000-man army for three months. This proved to be an impossible burden.(72)
Although the peasantry were nominally to be paid for their produce in the form of IOUs
[kvitantsii] - they were gready distrusted as Russia had already failed to pay off previous
IOUs issued during the 1806-12 war. (73) Thus eventually requisitions had to be imposed,
with the consequences that Liprandi had feared. By the end of the first campaign, the British
consul in Wallachia E. L. Blutte could write:
The resources of the Principalities approach rapidly to the state of 
exhaustion in consequence of the unmitigated military requisitions, for 
which no payment is made. The greater number of the peasants of 
Moldavia have already thrown up their leases, refusing any longer to 
cultivate the ground, and the is litde doubt that their example will shortly 
be followed by those of Wallachia, and that a considerable emigration 
will take place into Transylvania, and the western part of Bulgaria. (74)
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Over the winter of 1828-29, the Russia authorities again turned to the Divans, this time
requesting three months of provisions, forage and firewood from the Boyars. This was
refused and steps were taken to lodge a formal complaint to the Tsar.(75) As a result, over
the winter, part of the army was stranded at Silistria ‘without a bridge, without rusks,
without oats, without hay, without anything’.(76) When, in the spring, the Russians
redoubled their efforts to prise supplies from the Boyars (in this instance, horses) they were
met with strong resistance:
The Boyars, who had looked with great indifference upon the sufferings 
and ruin of the peasantry, are extremely indignant at this measure, 
which it seems they were not prepared to expect at the hands of those 
whom they were fond of calling their liberators.(77)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Pahlen’s rule had thus brought nothing but failure. Whilst the President was correct 
to attribute part of this failure to forces beyond his control - the ravaging of the 
Principalities by Turkish troops after 1821, the requisitions made by Turks on the eve of 
war, the natural disasters that hit the province in 1828(78) - it was clear that the policy of 
merely substituting the Hospodars for Russian officials had failed. The state apparatus itself 
required reform, for it was still the Divan’s officials on the ground who decided the quantity 
of supplies available, handled their procurement and delivered them to the army. Moreover, 
the unification of administrative and judicial powers in the Divan system meant that it 
proved almost impossible to detect corruption amongst the ispravniki.
Although as early as April 1828 Nicholas had authorised change this power was not 
used until December 1828 when a committee, including Kiselev, Diebitsch, Wittgenstein 
and Dashkov, was established to consider short-term wartime reforms. Its main proposal 
was to call for the separation of the Divans’ executive and judicial powers. The former, 
which supervised the collection of supplies, was to come under the direct control of Russia, 
thus curbing the arbitrary rule of the ispravniki. In May 1829, the new system was 
introduced.(79)
As regards the Presidency, it was clear that the refined and mild-mannered Pahlen 
had not proved up to the task and he was replaced by the fearsome General P. F.
Zheltukhin. Having already acquired the epithet Groznyi for his forthright rule as Militaiy- 
Govemer of Kiev, Zheltukhin was the ideal choice for enforcing future compliance with 
Russian demands.(80)
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One of the new President’s main tasks was to force the peasantry to sow their fields 
and ensure a harvest for 1829.(81) This was to prove most difficult as ‘the Russians...by 
their improvident method of levying requisitions [in 1828], have not left the peasantry either 
grain or oxen sufficient to perform this task’.(82) Zheltukhin thus enlisted the assistance of 
the Boyars who were to supervise the peasants’ work and despatch to those in need grain 
and animals (from the stores of the Divan). Any Boyars suspected of corruption were 
subjected to court martials and force was used against peasants still unwilling to work. 
These measures appear to have met with much success.(83)
In addition to increasing agricultural production Zheltulkhin aimed to bolster state 
finances through the raising of direct taxation. By the end of 1829 state income had been 
doubled compared to the preceding year. The President expected the Boyars to make a 
significant contribution to the war effort and those opposing him, or fleeing to Austrian 
Transylvania, were threatened with exile, removal from state office and confiscation of 
property.(84)
Kiselev and the Reform of the Principalities, 1829-34
Whilst the stricter measures introduced during the second campaign rectified many 
of the problems of the state apparatus of the Principalities, the question of the long-term 
status of the province was still to be answered. For even in 1829 the political system of the 
Principalities remained highly ambiguous - Phanariot rule had come to an end but no new 
and stable political order had replaced it What was clear was that any reform had to serve 
the interests of Russia, under whose auspices it was to be executed. One of the key issues 
of any reform - the relationship between Russia and the Principalities, had been decided 
before the onset of war. Annexation, though favoured by Zheltukhin, Kiselev(85) and 
probably Diebitsch(86) was ruled out, and instead the idea of protectorate adopted.
Russian officials began work on the precise details of a new reglement or 
constitution for Principalities sometime in 1828.(87) This resulted in various plans by A. S. 
Sturdza and D. V. Dashkov, which, though differing in detail, established the general 
direction of reform - towards the creation of an aristocratic constitution, weighted heavily in 
favour of the first-class Boyars upon whom Russia hoped to base its influence in the region. 
The Boyars political power was to be greatly increased through the transformation of the 
Divan from an advisory body to the Hospodar into to a legislative assembly with control 
over the budget. Nicholas agreed with these ideas and in June 1829 ordered the 
establishment of two special committees of Boyar representatives (one for each Principality,
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both chaired by the Russian diplomat M. L. Minciaky) to begin discussion for the drafting of 
a new r£glement.(88) At Adrianople, Diebitsch secured in article V the Porte’s acquiescence 
of the reform process and the granting of ‘une administration nationale independance* to the 
province.(89) The treaty, in legitimising Russia’s occupation of the Principalities, secured her 
preeminence in the formation of this new administration and transformed the Principalities 
into a Russian protectorate.(90)
At Nicholas’ own behest, the important task of administering the Principalities and 
supervising the introduction of reforms and the eventual reglement, was to be entrusted to 
Kiselev. (91) Though, ostensibly on grounds of health, Kiselev appears to have initially 
declined the offer, he finally accepted, on condition that he retained the title ‘Commander of 
the forces of the right flank* [the occupying Russian forces] in addition to the new one of 
President of the Divans. (92) Kiselev thus combined in his hands full political and military 
control within the Principalities.
Whilst many of the precise details of reform were to emanate from St Petersburg, 
Kiselev’s own influence on its overall character was highly significant Almost immediately 
upon his assumption of office, the Principalities were hit by a series of tremendous 
earthquakes - a sure portent from the Gods of the revolution that awaited them. (93) At root 
his idea was simple - to conduct, as Prozorovskii had once demanded, a thorough 
Russification of the province. He hoped that ‘by means of our education and the introduction 
of our customs and morals’ to make far closer the Principalities’ political, economic, social 
and military ties with Russia Thus, without actually annexing the Principalities (which in fact 
Kiselev favoured), St Petersburg could nevertheless be assured that ‘our border will be on the 
Danube’.(94) Like Liprandi, Kiselev understood that the greatest barrier to aligning the 
Principalities to a pro-Russian orientation was the pervasive influence of a Turkish political 
culture. This imbued the Boyar class with entirely ‘patrimonial’ ideas of government, by 
which political power existed solely for the self-gratification of the ruling classes and state 
office-holders.(95) To detatch fully the province from its oriental past, the Boyars needed 
re-education and an introduction to the Russian (or rather European) concepts of 
statehood and enlightened rule. As for the reforms’ ultimate end, Kiselev declared to the 
Wallachian Boyars in his inaugural speech to its Assembly in 1831, that the province’s 
future was to join ‘la grande famille Europeenne’.(96) These were certainly no empty 
words and indeed Kiselev was guided by Russia’s own experience as a nation having 
itself undergone Westernisation. There is evidence that he perhaps even considered 
himself as a latter-day Peter the Great. This was to express itself in many ways,
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ranging from the enlistment of the Boyars into the Principalities’ new regular-style standing 
militia to the demand that the latter ‘shave their beards and adopt the European 
costume ’.(97)
Thus far, Kiselev’s ideas were certainly shared in St Petersburg. However, still
faithful to the liberal dreams of his youth, Kiselev went further than many in wishing to
extend the benefits of Russian patronage to the lower orders, even to the extent of limiting
the prerogatives of the ruling classes and imposing upon them a noblesse oblige towards the
peasantry. There has even been a long-held view that Kiselev’s primary aim was in fact to
win over the peasantry, dismissing the possibility of ever forcing the Boyars away from the
old order and the arms of Austria.(98) There is certainly some truth to this. Kiselev was
certainly distrustful of the Boyars. In 1827, he had accused them of a plot to invite
Austria’s occupation of the province(99) and even towards the end of his rule in 1833
complained bitterly of Boyars continued attachment to the ‘old order’.(100) His sympathy
for the toiling masses was certainly sincere; characterising the Phanariot period he wrote:
The Hospodar and a few Boyars who constituted the government, 
exploited it for their own ends...the middle class and peasantry, 
enslaved by the corrupt actions of the aristocracy, were dragged down 
into poverty and ignorance.(lOl)
Furthermore, in his own account of his rule 1829-34, Kiselev stated that since the Boyars 
and clergy had a vested interest in the continuation of the old order, he had aimed to ‘win 
the favour of public opinion [obshchestvennoe mnenie] for the new reglement ’.(102) His 
idea was thus to ensure the longevity of the reforms by making it as popular as 
possible.(103) He thus fought against the raising of peasant obligations(104) and insisted 
that dues be paid in money, not in kind (which caused corruption), complaining that ‘I alone 
must defend these defenceless people against a violent and greedy oligarchy’.(105) Kiselev 
was, however, neither a radical nor a democrat and did not challenge the political power of 
the Boyars or aim for a transformation of the province’s social structure. His aim was to 
enlist all classes in the task of building the new state by demonstrating the benefits of the 
reform to all - as he stated in his speech to the Wallachian assembly, the reforms were 
intended to secure ‘le bien-etre de leurs habitans en general" .(106) By this means Russia 
would demonstrate to all classes the benefits of her patronage thus restoring and cementing 
its influence in the region. This, in turn, would serve Russia well throughout the Balkans as 
it would ‘give the Eastern Christian peoples a moral demonstration of the magnanimous 
patronage of Russia and support her influence over them*.(107)
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Kiselev’s immediate task upon becoming President was to adopt strict measures to 
restrict the spread of a recent outbreak of plague which, during the course of 1829, had 
claimed nearly 25,000 victims in the Principalities. Through the creation of impromptu 
hospitals and a cordon sanitaire the effects were quickly reduced and by April 1830 it had 
ceased altogether.(108) For the remainder of 1830 Kiselev was unable to undertake any 
serious reforms as he awaited the formulation of a draft project of the new reglement. The 
committees of Boyar representatives established in 1829 had finished their work in early 
1830 and prepared to leave for St Petersburg for consultations.(109) At this early stage, 
however, the germ of future disagreements between the Boyars and their Russian patrons 
was clear for the Russian chairman, Minciaky, had proposed the lessening of peasant 
obligations and the abolishment of the skultel ’niki - the very symbol of the subjugation of 
state interest to Boyar privilege.(llO)
The Boyars were, of course, furiously opposed and redoubled their conspiratorial 
contacts with the British consul. Blutte faithfully presented the Boyars case, arguing that 
the proposal was ‘dictated by a spirit of philanthropy, than as having been studiously 
calculated’. The lowering of peasant obligations would only encourage the natural laziness 
of the peasantry, thus ‘reducing to almost nothing the superfluous produce of the 
Principalities’.( I l l)  In fact, the Boyars, headed by M. Sturdza were already involved in an 
anti-Russian plot with Blutte. The former was one of the leading Moldavian Boyars, a 
member of the reform committee and, from 1834, Hospodar of Moldavia. Sturdza 
expressed the Boyars’ fears that, instead of receiving true independence, the Principalities 
were merely to be transformed into a Russian satellite or annexed outright. His idea was for 
the Boyar committees to send a ‘memorial’ to Nicholas requesting the unification of the 
Principalities and the creation of an independent Kingdom ruled by ‘one of the dynasties of 
Europe’. The state was to be guaranteed by all the European Powers. In return for 
supporting the independence of the Principalities, Europe would gain ‘an additional bulwark 
for the security of the remainder of European Turkey...on the line of the Danube’. It could 
ultimately be united in a confederation with Serbia and Bosnia. Sturdza declared his 
‘unbounded devotion’ to Britain and hoped she would support this idea. Blutte was most 
interested but, not having sufficient authority to proceed alone, passed on Sturdza’s request 
to Heytesbury in St Petersburg,(112) where, significantly, it was handed to the British 
ambassador by his Austrian counterpart.(113) Heytesbury, who was noted for his 
Russophile views, would however have none of it and lodged a complaint to
2 5 5
Aberdeen.(114) The plot was thus foiled at birth, but the idea of a collective European
guarantee of Ottoman’s European provinces remained prevalent amongst Russophobe
diplomats and was again raised during the Crimean War.
By the beginning of 1831, St Petersburg had agreed on a draft for a reglement and it
despatched for review and acceptance by specially created assemblies composed of
predominantly first-class Boyars. Discussions began in March 1831 and Kiselev was able to
force it through assemblies with only modest amendments. (115) The resulting Reglement
organique, especially its political aspects, was closely based on A. S. Sturdza’s and D. V.
Dashkov’s aforementioned projects of 1828 and 1829. It was finally promulgated in
Wallachia on 1 July 1831 OS and in Moldavia on 1 January 1832 OS.
Perhaps the reglement’s most striking feature was its reform of the political system.
In essence, it transplanted to the Principalities some of the most advanced European norms of
constitutional practice. The laws were now codified and political power was divided between
the mutually-independent agencies of the executive, legislature and judiciary. The Hospodar
was now the head of the executive and its ministerial system. The Divan was transformed
into a proto-parliament, voting on bills and controlling the budget. In the event of anti-
constitutional action by the Hospodars, the legislature could appeal directly to Turkey and
Russia, thus guaranteeing the perpetuity of the latter’s interference.(I16) It is quite correct to
state that the Principalities now had a ‘Boyar constitution’, as the new legislative assemblies,
which passed laws and elected the Hospodar, was filled almost wholly by Boyars, with the
first-class in predominance.(117) On the other hand, the reglement enshrined principles such
as equality before the law and trial by due process, as well as upholding the ban of serfdom -
all measures clearly designed for the benefit the population at large.(118) It was perhaps not
surprising that the Russian officer-noblemen of the occupying army could only look at these
advantages with envy. As Blutte reported:
The Russian officers here have been not a little scandalized at the 
apparent predilection shown by the government of St Petersburg towards 
the Wallachians, (in general despised by them) who are to a certain 
degree assimilated with nations enjoying a constitutional and 
representative government, while themselves and their countrymen 
continue to be ruled by an administration of a different character. (119)
The most controversial aspect of the reglement was its definition of peasant obligations. 
The initial Russian draft incensed the Boyars as it abolished the skutel'nild and did not 
increase peasant obligations. Boyars demand an increase which Kiselev unsuccessfully 
opposed. (120) The most detailed investigation of this highly complicated issue has
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concluded that the final reglement increased peasant obligations to the Boyars but reduced
them to the state. Although, as a result, the peasants’ total obligations were lessened,
others measures reducing the amount of land rented out to them, meant that, overall, the
peasantry were de jure worse off.(121) However, as Kiselev pointed out, the very fact that
the obligations were to be paid in money and defined by statute liberated the peasantry from
the imposition of additional ad hoc and illegal obligations (as was previously common
practice).(122) It is thus possible that, de facto, the peasantry’s position was improved.
This certainly seems to have been the initial perception of Blutte:
The great majority of the Boyards [s/c] not in the Russian interest are 
highly dissatisfied with a reform, which, although calculated for the 
benefit of the country at large, and of the lower orders in particular, 
deprives them of the power of increasing their riches, as heretofore, by 
rapice and extortion.
Blutte even suggested that this ban on Boyar extortion will:
...reduce them at no distant period to a state of comparative 
insignificance, which latter result may have been for its own future 
views, the principal motive of the Russian Govt, in pressing the measure 
forward.(123)
He thus concluded that:
[it appears] to be the aim of the protecting power [Russia] to captivate 
the good will of the peasantry in particular, who form the bulk of the 
population and for whose almost exclusive benefit the reforms seems to 
have been calculated.(124)
Blutte believed Kiselev to be closely implicated with this policy. Moreover, he also 
believed in the existence of a Russian plot whereby some pro-Russian Moldavian Boyars, 
were to offer Kiselev a landed estate in the province, ostensibly as a token of gratitude for 
the implementation of reforms. Kiselev would thus receive the privilege of naturalisation 
and be elevated to the rank of a first-class Boyar, gaining him ‘eligibility to the dignity o f  
Hospodar\{ 125) For Blutte, Russian aims were thus clear - to subjugate the power of the 
largely anti-Russian Boyars by extending economic privileges to the peasantry and reducing 
to nil the Boyars’ new political powers by ‘raising General Kiselev to the dignity of 
Hospodar’.(126)
Blutte was, of course, wrong and his views may be taken as a mere repetition of the 
beliefs of the over-sensitive Boyars themselves. Blutte was later forced to admit that the 
reform ‘appears to have added rather than taken from the burthen of the lower orders’.(127) 
As already stated, Kiselev hoped to win the peasantry’s support for the reforms but did not
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favour them exclusively, as shown by political privileges assigned to the Boyars. 
Unfortunately for the Russians, the peasantry shared Blutte’s mistaken beliefs. Following the 
publication of the Wallachian reglement in July 1831, its peasantry, who clearly did not read 
or understand its terms, rapidly fell into ‘a state of complete insubordination’ believing that 
the reform fully liberated them from ‘subjugation to the existing authorities’ and declared that 
they would only follow orders from the Tsar himself.(128) Similar to the Russian peasantry, 
the Wallachians seem to have had the delusion that their miserable existence was entirely 
attributable to the landowning class and that the Tsar, should he discover this state of affairs, 
would not hesitate to liberate them.
The peasantry were quick to vent their revenge on the hated Boyars, making use of 
the opportunity offered to them in the reform of the appointment in each village of ‘three 
sworn men’ or ‘jurats’ - lay judges charged with dealing with minor offences. These 
positions were soon filled by peasants (or, in Blutte’s words, ‘illiterate clowns unable to read 
or write’) who preceded to use their new magisterial powers to arrest local Boyars. They 
were usually charged with making illegal requisitions from the peasantry in order to supply 
the Russian army during the war. ‘With fetters of their feet and after a mock trial carried on 
at the wine house of the village’, the Boyars were finally sentenced to various punishments, 
including ‘decapitation’, amid cries from onlookers of ‘long live the Russians who have made 
us Lords and Judges over our former masters*.(129) The reform did indeed provide for the 
employment of such judges and Kiselev, after a failed attempt to re-educate the peasants, was 
force to retract the measure and return to the pre-reform system of district courts. (130) This 
was to be in fact the second time Kiselev’s perhaps idealised notion of the peasantry had been 
shattered, the first had come some months earlier, during the recruitment for the new militia
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Kiselev had outlined his proposals for the creation of a ‘land militia’ [zemskaia 
strazha] in the first days of 1830.(131) As the Boyars and local authorities had insufficient 
experience in the ‘formation and training of military units and the instilling in them of the 
necessary discipline’, these tasks were to be performed by Russian officers. Kiselev thus 
proposed that 150 officers from the (now former) Second Army under the direction of 
General-Major Starov (the former commander of 33rd Chasseurs) ‘train and clothe’ the 
Wallachian force. Major Dobizho (a Moldavian serving in the Bug Uhlans) and twenty five 
other officers were to train the Moldavian militia.(132) The Wallachian force was to consist of
258
three regiments (each consisting of two infantry battalions and cavalry squadrons). The chain 
of command was to follow standard European practice (colonels for regiments, majors for 
battalions etc.) and its fighting force consist of 3,378 infantry and 1,111 cavalry men (soldiers 
and officers). With non-combatants, the total force was 4,677 mem The existing Pandour 
battalions of Lesser Wallachia (half of whom had already deserted) were to be used as cadres 
for this force. The Moldavian militia was to consist of only one regiment - a total of 1,564 
men. The initial formation of this 6,000 man militia was estimated to cost 3.3m piastres, with 
an annual upkeep of 3. lm  Due to the financial difficulties of the Principalities all weapons 
were to be supplied by the Russian army. All the points received imperial approval and in 
May 1830 the search for recruits began.(133)
It is clear that Kiselev and military authorities in St Petersburg from the very 
beginning envisaged the ‘militia* to be as close to a regular force as possible. This was 
reflected in the subsequent reglement militaire which governed the functions and conduct of 
the militia.(134) Recruits were to able to form line, column, square and learn a vast amount 
of detailed regulations relating to the execution of drill. (135) Their main function was to 
guard the frontiers, though they were assigned additional tasks such as the manning of the 
cordon sanitaire, the maintenance o f‘bon ordre and repos public* and the collection of 
taxes.(136) The soldiers were to subjected to the strictest discipline and ‘even the impression 
of obstinacy’ was liable to result in a court martial. (137) Military courts were established to 
administer punishments ranging from the reduction of rations to bread and water, to floggings 
of up to 300 blows. (138)
As a means of inducing recruitment (which was voluntary), the length of service was 
fixed at six years and privileges, such as exemption of the recruit’s family from state taxation, 
were awarded.(139) Such inducements notwithstanding, the chances of recruiting sufficient 
numbers without the need for coercive measures was slim. Aside from the Pandours, there 
was no tradition of military service in the Principalities and certainly not in a regular-type 
force. The Moldavians, in particular, were noted for their timidity and, in Bessarabia, the 
Russian authorities refused to introduce recruitment as they were ‘not susceptible to even 
gradual training*.(140)
In the Principalities, the aim of voluntary recruitment failed almost completely and 
Kiselev was forced to resort to the services of the press gang. In September 1830 Blutte 
reported that:
The Wallachians are absolutely averse to the new military service, from 
which some hundreds, who had been enrolled, have already deserted, 
recourse is now had to force in order to compel them to enlist.(141)
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Later in the month, a revolt broke out in the town of Buseo amongst ‘four to five hundred 
Wallachian peasants, who had been collected for the purpose of being drafted into the new 
militia’:
Having armed themselves with clubs and stones they declared...their 
resolution to have recourse to every extremity rather than become 
soldiers, accompanying their words with such a commencement of 
violence as rendered it necessaiy for the opposite party [of Russians] to 
take refuge in a house.
Only the arrival of Russian soldiers and the threat to open fire diffused the situation.(142) 
Forced enlistment continued but, even by November, recruitment was ‘not yet half 
completed owing to continual desertions’.(143) The success in recruiting Boyars and their 
sons as officers proved no more satisfactory. Kiselev had hoped that service in the militia 
would afford them an ‘honourable profession’ and instil in them the idea of service to the 
state.(144) However, the Boyars, like the peasantry, were ‘unaccustomed to the restraint 
inseparable from military service’ and were ‘in general disgusted’ with the militia, even 
though officers served for only three years.(145) Those Boyars who did enlist, did so only 
‘with the view of gaining the favour or avoiding the disfavour of their protectors’.(146) 
Suspecting that the main barrier to recruitment was the local population’s fear that they 
would be used as troops in a future Russo-Turkish war, Kiselev was eventually forced to 
declare that no recruit would ever be called ‘into warlike service* and that the militia’s role 
was purely ‘the maintenance of the police of this country’.(147) This seems to have had 
some effect and by mid-December, Kiselev conducted a successful review of 250 infantry 
and 50 cavalry men. They were immediately called into service alongside the Russian 
occupying forces, which had dwindled to no more than 7,000 men.(148)
The problems of recruitment in Wallachia were however soon eclipsed by events in 
Moldavia. In March/April 1831 a revolt broke out amongst the ‘naturalised Hungarians’ of 
the mountainous regions of Western Moldavia. These disturbances spread to the 
Moldavian population leading to ‘a state of open insurrection against the measure of 
enrolment for the new militia’.(149) This revolt could not have come at a worst time for 
Russia. Many troops had been dispatched to assist Diebitsch in his campaign against the 
Polish rebels, leaving an ‘exceedingly small’ Russian force in the Principalities.(150) 
Fearing that the disturbances could spread to Bessarabia(151) Kiselev decided to use force, 
ordering some Cossacks, already despatched from Silistria to Poland, to quell the revolt en 
route.( 152)
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By the time the latter had reached Moldavia in mid-May, up to 9,000 peasants were 
in revolt.(153) The largest single concentration of rebels gathered in the town of Roman, 
where 1,500 men had shut themselves up in a local monastery. Attempts at a negotiation 
failed and eventually the Cossacks opened fire killing 72 and wounding 48. The peasants 
were thus forced to give up a quota of men and their villages were then ‘plundered of every 
removable article’.(154)
What could have forced the Moldavians, who in Liprandi’s words, were so timid 
that ‘did not dare...even with fifty men to attack one robber’, to take up arms against the 
Russian army?(155) The Soviet view is that the revolts, though ostensibly about service in 
the militia, were in reality anti-Boyar movements.(156) There is insufficient evidence for 
this. Rok Fukc, one of Liprandi’s secret agents, reported that prior to the revolt the 
Moldavians had sent a deputation to Jassy in protest against enforced enlistment. This, 
however, had been ignored.(157) The peasantry’s aversion to service appears to have 
based on two main reasons; firstly, they feared ‘entering a regular army, whose strictness 
scared them from the very beginning’(158); secondly, due to ‘their not unreasonable belief, 
that in the event of a future invasion of Turkey by the Russians, their own destination would 
be to serve as auxiliary troops’.(159) Thus, though the peasantry certainly despised the 
Boyars, the April-May revolts in Moldavia were nevertheless caused by forced enlistment 
into the militia and were in fact a continuation of the similar disturbances in Wallachia in 
1830.(160)
Fortunately for Kiselev, the use of force had salutary effects. By June all 
disturbances in Moldavia had ceased(161) and by July 1831, a total of 5,024 men had been 
gathered and recruitment was declared to be at an end. The following month the militia 
entered service.(162) The latter history of the militia during the period of Russian rule was 
unremarkable. It numbers, as well as its annual cost, were subject to only relatively minor 
fluctuations.(163) In 1833, the Russian authorities entertained the idea of increasing the 
militia to 10,000 men, to meet the potential threat posed by Mohammed Ali’s rebellion.
The plan was, however, ultimately discarded due to the problems of finding sufficient 
recruits, as well as due to the extra cost to the Principalities.(164)
What conclusions can be drawn from the Russian experiment? It has been correctly 
stated that Russia’s foremost aim was to create an ‘army’ of sufficient size and ability as to 
disrupt a Turkish attack and offer tangible support to Russian forces in a future Turkish 
war.(165) This was to account for the two defining characteristics of the militia. The first 
was its almost complete Russification - the militia’s organisation and training was based on
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the Russian model, it was instructed by Russian officers, armed with Russian weapons and 
even clothed in Russian uniforms.(166) The second defining feature was the instilling of a 
strong regular element into the force. Though the ‘irregular’ Pandours and the other 
volunteers of 1828-29 had certainly proved their worth in war, they were never truly trusted 
by the Russian military authorities. Militarily and indeed politically, a disciplined regular-type 
force was considered more reliable.(167) Unfortunately, due to the province’s lack of martial 
spirit and to aversion to ‘regular’ discipline, recruitment for such a force met with almost 
insurmountable difficulties. Far from being reliable, the militia was plagued by desertions up 
to 1832 and, no doubt, beyond.(168)
One interesting question is why Kiselev, whose reformist credentials were self- 
evident, did not try to oppose the Gatchina instincts of St Petersburg and adapt the militia’s 
organisation to suit the ‘irregular’ traditions of the province, or, at least, lessen the emphasis 
on harsh discipline and drill. Though the evidence is incomplete, one suspects that Kiselev 
favoured a regular force, not so much for reasons military as political. For the general thrust 
of Russian reforms were towards the development of statehood and ultimately nationhood in 
the Principalities. The creation of a ‘national army* could thus serve the wider role as an 
institution embodying and promoting the idea of service to the state and even in developing 
national self-consciousness. The existence of such an aim was perhaps evident in the 
subsequent awarding to the militia of its own ‘odes, hymns, marches...national flags and 
orchestral bands’. (169) There is some evidence that Kiselev was so taken with the idea of the 
‘national army’ that he favoured supplementing the militiai with a ‘Landwehr on the Prussian 
system...to initiate the greater part of the male population in the practice of bearing 
arms’.(170) This system of universal short-term conscription, if successfully executed, may 
have provided the answer to all his aims. For, firstly, short-term service may have lessened 
the peasants unwillingness to serve, secondly, the system would have created large number of 
reservists, thus increasing the support to Russian forces in a future war and, thirdly, universal 
service may have helped instil in the population at large the idea of service to the nation.
On the other hand, it could be argued that such ideas were naive and idealistic and 
would have only contributed to the difficulties already encountered in the attempt to introduce 
European militaiy ideas to a province still accustomed to ‘Asiatic* ways. This was 
certainly the view of Liprandi, who, being a great believer in partisan/irregular warfare, 
was one of the harshest critics of the introduction of westem-style regular elements into 
the militia. Liprandi argued that the Russians succeeded only in creating a force that was
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totally alien to a population that feared all ‘new innovations’ and was unaccustomed to 
strict discipline. He believed that the militia was despised by almost all who served in it 
and that, as a consequence, Russia’s prestige in the region was greatly compromised.(171)
It is difficult to disagree with this view.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The final aspects of Kiselev’s reforms worthy of attention are those relating to the 
economy of the Principalities. In contrast to the political reforms, here Kiselev’s influence 
on policy was very apparent.(172) His underlying aim was to increase the province’s 
agricultural production through the liberalisation of internal and external trade, the definition 
of taxation rates and through improvements to the region’s infrastructure, especially its 
roads and ports. The motives behind these reforms were threefold. First, to improve the 
‘well-being of the population’, thus demonstrating the benefits of Russian rule and ensuring 
the longevity of the overall reform package.(173) Second, to increase the level of trade 
between the Principalities and Russia.(174) For Kiselev realised at an early stage that, 
whilst after Adrianople Russia had become politically dominant in the Principalities, 
economically her influence remained insignificant compared to Austria’s. Kiselev aimed to 
redress this imbalance by removing the many privileges foreign merchants (who were 
predominantly Austrian) enjoyed in the province.(175) Finally, an undeniable motive, was 
to improve the Principalities’ worth as an operational base in a future Turkish war through 
the increase in its grain production and improvement in its road network.
One of Kiselev’s first actions upon assuming the Presidency was to remove the 
many ‘feudal’ baniers to domestic trade. He abolished the system of internal customs and 
tariffs which existed within each Principality, lowered taxes on agricultural products sold in 
towns, allowed total free trade in salt, replaced the payment of state taxes in kind (a source 
of great corruption) with fixed levels of tax paid in piastres, stabilised the exchange rate of 
the local currency by fixing it to the Dutch guilder and banned the circulation of low-grade 
Turkish currency.(176) An ambitious programme of town improvements was then 
undertaken, resulting it the building of bridges, creation of a postal system and the laying of 
(hitherto non-existent) roads. The greatest achievement was perhaps the building of the 
Jassy-Bucharest-Silistria highway, which, aside from its benefits to the economy, was 
designed with an eye to a future military use.(177)
With regards to external trade, Kiselev’s primary aim was to wrest its domination 
by foreign powers and increase the lucrative export of grain. Prior to 1829, the Porte had
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regulated all the Principalities’ foreign trade and demanded that all grain be imported to 
Ottoman lands at fixed prices. The incentive to produce grain was thus greatly lowered and 
most of the Principalities’ traders concentrated on the more profitable export of 
livestock.(178) Whilst the aforementioned Separate Act of the Adrianople Treaty had 
removed all barriers to the free trade of the Principalities with other Ottoman lands, the 
problem of Austria remained. The latter had seemed privileges within the Principalities 
akin to that of a colonial Power. Her imports were subjected to a paltry three per cent tariff 
and she had secured the right to export all goods out of the Principalities free of any 
tariff.(179) In order to avoid competition from the Principalities’ own merchants, the 
Austrians had persuaded the Hospodars to place high tariffs on their exports to Habsburg 
lands.(180) Kiselev thus took a range of measures designed to ‘repel...the influence of 
foreigners’. Tariffs were changed to give local traders parity or even advantages over their 
foreign counterparts. In addition, the right to export all goods was extended to local traders 
in order break up the monopolies of foreign merchants.(181) Such reforms would however 
have meant little without the improvement to the Principalities’ transport system. A great 
barrier to all trade had been the absence of ports on the Danube. Moldavia had only Galatz 
whilst Wallachia had none at all. Kiselev thus turned his attention to transforming Brailov 
(returned to Wallachian control at Adrianople) into a premier port. This opened up the 
Danube to trade and in the period 1831-33, imports to Brailov increased from 0.57m 
piastres to 1.94m and exports from lm to 9.68m.(182)
The results of Kiselev’s economic reforms were certainly impressive. Despite the 
losses to the Treasury resulting from the abolition of many tariffs, Kiselev’s war on 
corruption and embezzlement by officials allowed for state income to increase 
significantly.(I83) The freeing of foreign trade likewise had important results. The total 
volume of trade increased from 54.7m piastres in 1831 to 118.8m in 1833 with the trade 
balance in favour of the Principalities rising from 11.2m to 23.3m.(184) Trade continued to 
expand over the next decade and by 1844 it was worth around 150m piastres.(185) The 
defining feature of this new trade was the volume of grain now being exported. Taking 
advantage of its communications with the Danube and the Black Sea, as well as the 
abolition of the Com Laws in Britain, by the mid-1840s, the Principalities had become one 
of Europe’s largest exporters of grain.(186)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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Following the Russo-Turkish Convention of 17 January 1834 OS, Kiselev’s forces 
began their evacuation of Principalities and, within months, the period of Russian 
occupation had come to a close.(187) Although Kiselev relinquished his post as President, 
Russia hoped to ensure its continued influence over the province by electing its new 
Hospodars (afterwhich future Hospodars were to be elected by an extraordinary Boyar 
assembly). The Russian nominations - A. Ghika for Wallachia and M. Sturdza for 
Moldavia were duly accepted by the Porte and they entered service that year. The accepted 
wisdom, both amongst Russian and foreign observers, was that the Hospodars would be 
‘deprived of all power of self-agency’ and be at the command of the Russian consuls(188) 
who had already ‘been invested by the Treaty of Akkerman with nearly dictatorial powers 
over the Hospodars’.(189) It was even suggested by some that ‘Russia had now even a 
stronger hold of the Provinces than whilst she actually occupied their territory’.(190) Only 
time would tell the accuracy of such a prediction.
Conclusions on Kiselev’s Reforms
The reforms undertaken by Kiselev were inspired by the desire to transform the 
Principalities into a secure Russian protectorate. This aim, of course, was not new and can 
indeed be may be traced back to the times of Peter. What was new, however, was the 
method adopted to achieve this end, as well as the scale of its ambition. Hitherto, Russia 
had, by incremental steps, extended her influence over the province predominantly by 
limiting the power of the Porte to interfere in its domestic affairs. Whilst Russia had also 
attempted some piecemeal, ad hoc, reform of the Principalities’ administration - in order 
limit the power of the pro-Ottoman Phanariot Hospodars and win the favour of the native 
Boyars - prior to the 1820s, Russia had no concrete plans for the wholesale remodeling of 
the province’s internal administration. In contrast, the reforms of 1829-34 aimed at nothing 
less than the liquidation of the Divan administrative system and the remnants of the century- 
old Phanariot regime, as well as the almost complete separation of the Principalities from 
her Ottoman suzerain.
The role of the Second Army in the origins and development of this new policy 
direction was of much significance. The investigations of its General Staff in the 1820s 
had, firstly, amply demonstrated the great potential value the Principalities as a forward 
base of operations in a future Turkish war. The substantial benefits of such a base, 
especially as a source of supplies, was, however, hindered by the inefficient and corrupt 
Divan system and it was considered that only its replacement (under Russian auspices) by a 
modem, rational, administration could alleviate this state of affairs. Secondly, Liprandi’s
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research had shown conclusively that despite Russia’s diplomatic activity in the region and
her efforts to patronise the Boyars, the latter still looked to Vienna and even Constantinople
rather than to St Petersburg.
These conclusions, added to Russia’s natural desire for more influence over the
Ottoman Empire, made certain the enactment of a far-reaching reform of the Principalities
following the end of the Turkish war in 1829. The guiding principle of reform was to
impart to the province the precepts of European statecraft - enlightened rule within a
conservative political and social framework, to bring the benefits of civilisation to all
classes. In this fashion, the province was to be transformed into a prosperous, half-
Westemised statelet and Russia’s prestige assured amongst the whole population.
How successful were the reforms? The historiographical debates have been
dominated by the extent to which the reforms corresponded to the interests of the
Principalities themselves and assisted their development towards nationhood. Whilst this
question has of course much interest,(191) we are primarily interested in another - how
successful was Russia in strengthening its influence over its protectorate and, even without
annexation, ensuring that, in Kiselev’s words, ‘without revolution in Europe and the
expense of maintaining our military forces here, our border will be on the Danube’.(192)
Certain perceptive observers, such as Liprandi, had, even before the withdrawal of
Russian forces in 1834, already become exceedingly pessimistic of the durability of the
reforms.(193) His argument was that the reforms were overly quixotic in design. They
were far too enlightened for the native population and, far from strengthening her influence,
Russia succeeded only in alienating every class. The first-class Boyars remained utterly
opposed to the destruction of the Phanariot regime and the resulting loss of their means of
corruption and exploitation. The second-class Boyars, who were traditionally more pro-
Russian, resented the new political system as it was weighted heavily in favour of the first
class. Finally, the peasantry, hitherto ‘always devoted to Russia’, feared all new
innovations and especially service in the new militia:
Such were the fruits of the imprudent and ill-conceived actions of the 
administration of the Principalities after the peace of Adrianople; an 
administration which paid attention neither to the mentality of the 
population nor future political relations nor to keeping the opinion of at 
least one class favourable to Russia, which is guided by the purest of 
intentions towards the well-being of all peoples...In a word, there, 
where not one class has matured sufficiently to accept any European 
institution whatsoever, even those of the most salutary of design...in this 
land...it is almost impossible, without exceptional effort, to introduce 
such institutions and even more difficult to implant them securely for 
ever. Does not Greece, which has received the constitution of the 
educated Swiss, serve as an example to this?(194)
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Whilst Liprandi was ultimately proved wrong in his belief that the reforms would last only
as long as the Russian occupation, his thesis has much to recommend it. The Boyars,
forced into accepting the new reglement in 1831, far from becoming reconciled, proceeded
only to ‘persist more strongly than ever’ in opposing them.(195) Russia appears to have
contributed to her own difficulties by the choice of the new Hospodars in 1834.(196)
Despite warnings from Liprandi and others that M. Sturdza was an untrustworthy intrigant,
for reasons unclear, the latter was nominated as Moldavian Hospodar. Though certainly
‘little attached to Russia’ Sturdza was nevertheless hated by the Moldavian Boyars(197)
and his rule was marked by corruption and continued contacts with other powers.(198) The
choice of A. Ghika as Wallachian Hospodar was, on the surface, somewhat better as he was
a ‘devoted slave to the Russian Government’.(199) Ghika had already been entrusted with
the command of the Wallachian militia, 1831-34,(200) and the Russians seemed to have
used this period to groom the future Hospodar, transforming him into a Wallachian
counterpart of Nicholas I. Blutte could speak of ‘his Russian military mania, which induces
him to be continually playing at soldiers with his militia, under the inspection of a General
Starov, acting as his adjutant-General’.(201) Thus aside from being despised by the Boyars
for his subservience to Russia, Ghika’s popularity also suffered from his association with
the militia and his growing reputation as a martinet. He was deeply unpopular with the
peasantry, primarily:
...from a dislike to a military chief: they saying [sic] that they had 
expected to be at length rid of the...Muscovites, whereas they now 
perceive that they are still destined to be governed by a Russian 
General.(202)
Thus, as Liprandi had predicted in 1831, the reforms left no one content and Russia’s 
prestige greatly damaged.
The explosion, when it came in 1848, arrived however not from the pre-reform 
generation of Boyars, as Liprandi believed, but the following one. For, as the Tsarist 
historian S. S. Tatishchev correctly surmised, the underlying contradiction in the reforms 
was that Russia, in awarding its protectorate the foundation of Westem-style representative 
government, pushed the province towards the liberal West and away from autocratic 
Russia.(203) Moreover, in liberating the province from a semi-Asiatic past and awarding it 
the foundation of statehood, Russia sowed the seeds of Rumanian nationalism. Its 
development was assisted especially by the younger generation of post-reform Boyars who, 
far more than their fathers, were fascinated by the political and cultural life of developed
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European states. In increasing numbers they travelled to France for their education, where 
they fell under the spell of the contemporary Romantic nationalism.(204) Increased 
consciousness of their Latin heritage ultimately led the Boyars to dream of national 
liberation from not only the Turks but the Russians as well. In 1848, the Principalities 
joined the forces of revolution and rebelled against their patrons.(205)
Russia’s economic reforms in the Principalities were to prove no more beneficial to 
her than the political ones. For whilst the reforms greatly expanded the province’s 
economy, the backwardness of Russian manufacturing meant that Kiselev proved unable to 
oppose Austrian dominance and failed, as he had hoped, to ‘replace Austrian goods with 
Russian’.(206) In 1832, (after the abolition of privileges to Austrian merchants), barely six 
per cent of the Principalities’ trade was conducted with Russia, whilst Austria accounted for 
nearly forty per cent and Turkey over half.(207) Even more disturbing was the growth of 
the Principalities’ grain production. Kiselev’s reforms were so successful that by the late 
1830s the Principalities came in fact to compete with Novorossiia as exporters of grain to 
European markets.(208)
Given the ultimately unsuccessful nature of the Russian reforms, one should ask 
whether there had been any alternative to the destruction of the Phanariot regime and the 
creation of an autonomous statelet? The most obvious was that of annexation. This was 
favoured by both Zheltukhin and Kiselev, primarily due to their accurate prediction that the 
Principalities were a latent competitor to Russia in agricultural exports.(209) In keeping 
with the anti-annexationist ‘weak neighbour’ policy Nicholas ruled out this option. The 
outright independence of the Principalities was likewise dismissed, as it would almost 
certainly have resulted in a reduction of Russian influence and the increase of that of 
Austria. This left autonomy as the sole remaining option. One could argue, as did Liprandi, 
that the precise form of autonomy should have been styled less on the European model, or 
at least introduced in stages,(210) however this would probably have only delayed the 
problems inherent in the granting of any form of increased independence. For a 
contradiction in the ‘weak neighbour’ policy was that, in wresting Ottoman control from the 
European Christian provinces by the granting of domestic autonomy, Russia fostered the 
development of nationalism. This was as true in the Principalities as it had been in Greece 
and Serbia. Whilst Balkan nationalism could be advantageous to Russian interests 
(especially a conservative variety stressing pan-Orthodoxy or pan-Slavicism), the doctrine 
in its more revolutionary form - stressing national self-determination, was obviously 
damaging to Russia’s aim of turning the emerging Balkan states into willing protectorates.
For two reasons, Rumanian nationalism was an especially dangerous breed. Firstly, the 
Rumanians’ Latin origin, though hitherto long forgotten and resurrected only in the 1830s 
and 1840s in a somewhat contrived manner, weakened any allegiance to Mother 
Russia.(211). Secondly, the ideas of national self-determination inevitably raised the 
territorial question and ultimately the quest to gather the historical Rumanian lands - 
Transylvania from Austria and Bessarabia from Russia. This latent problem was exposed 
following Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War and the forced cession of Southern 
Bessarabia to Moldavia in 1856. Russian diplomacy worked ceaselessly to reverse this 
decision and Bessarabia was destined to remain a key area of dispute in Russo-Rumanian 
relations well into the twentieth century. Thus, we may repeat our earlier remark that 
Russia, in fulfilling her ‘historical mission’ and laying the foundation for the national 
independence of the Ottoman Christians, succeeded in working against her own true 
interests.
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X. PRESERVING THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1830-33
The policy adopted by the September 1829 Committee seemed clear enough - to 
support the continued existence of both the Sultan’s dynasty and his empire. In one sense, 
however, the policy proved to be something of an abstraction - a broad aspiration rather 
than a practical guide for action. Did, for instance, Russia’s support entail a guarantee of 
the territorial integrity, either whole or in part, of Ottoman lands? If so, to what extent and 
by which means was she prepared to uphold it? How would Russia respond to a Persian 
attack in Asia minor, a French expedition to North Africa, or a domestic revolt by a 
rebellious Pasha? There were no premeditated answers to such quandaries and it would be 
left for circumstances to impose a policy as and when they developed.
The first months of 1830 were in this respect to provide four noteworthy events.
The first was the attempted revolt in Rumelia by Mamarchev.(l) His enterprise was cut 
short by the speedy intervention of the Russian army and thus the principle was laid that 
Russia would actively seek to thwart new revolutionary movements amongst the Ottoman 
Christians. A second potential crisis arose with the planned French expedition to Algiers. 
Since 1826 at least, France had schemed with the Egyptian Pasha Mohammed Ali to 
conquer jointly the North African Beys. Fearing French expansion around the 
Mediterranean Britain strenuously opposed this alliance and ensured that the Franco- 
Egyptian negotiations broke down in March 1830.(2) France now resolved to attack 
Algiers alone and enquired as to Russia’s position on the matter. Nesselrode agreed; 
ostensibly French action would suppress the Algerians’ appetite for piracy,(3) though the 
probable underlying Russian motive was in fact to sour Anglo-French relations.(4) 
Whatever the truth, Nesselrode laid the precedent that Russia did not consider the Ottoman 
African territories as an inviolable part of the Sultan’s domains and was prepared to barter 
them away if her own interests so dictated. Thus when Wellington’s government made 
successive proposals for a collective guarantee of the Ottoman Empire, the Russian 
response was predictable. Though committed to preserving this empire, Russia would not 
undertake to defend her territory in toto. She supported the French expedition and in fact 
had herself certain territorial ambitions in the Caucasus.(5) In any case, a collective 
guarantee would interfere in Russo-Turkish relations and compromise the hold Russia had 
gained over the Porte over the preceding fifty years. As Nesselrode put it, Russia would 
not enter ‘dans une coalition contre nous memes\(6)
The fourth event of importance was the onset of the Sultan’s Albanian campaigns in 
May 1830. Mahmud n, true to his reformist tendencies, had long sought to curtail the
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‘feudal’ powers of the Pashas and had already liquidated the southern Albanian Pashalik of
Jannina in 1822. The outbreak of the Greek revolt had temporarily halted this process but
now, with peace, the Albanian campaigns could continue.(7) The warlords of southern
Albania were, however, determined to preserve their traditional powers and their hastily
assembled forces inflicted a defeat on the Vizier in June. The Albanian uprising was of
obvious concern to the neigbouring Russian forces in occupation of the the Principalities
and thus a certain Captain Lambrovich was despatched to Shumla to establish the true state
of affairs. There he met the commandant, a Galim-Pasha, who spoke of the perilous
position of the Turkish army and enquired as to whether the Russian army would be
prepared to assist them in their campaign.(8) Diebitsch was opposed to any intervention(9)
but the matter was forwarded to Nicholas for a final verdict:
His Majesty is, in no event, willing to take an active participation in the 
internal affairs of Turkey, or, in her disputes with her subjects; 
therefore, any movement of our army, which has the aim of supporting 
the actions of the Grand Vizier, is completely forbidden.(lO)
The only concession offered was for the Russian forces to occupy temporarily the fortresses 
of Widdin and Rustchuk, should the Turks wish to use their garrisons in their campaign.
The southern Albanians were eventually overcome but the real challenge lay in the 
north where the unpredictable Mustapha ruled over the powerful Pashalik of Skodra. 
Informed in January 1831 that his rule was terminated, Mustapha decided to fight. His idea 
was to construct a broad alliance of all the Balkan Muslims who opposed the Sultan’s 
European-style reforms as well as the Serbs, whom he offered the town of Nish as an 
incentive to fight. The Russian response was again that the revolt of a Pasha was none of 
their concern and a policy of non-intervention was adopted. Fortunately for the Sultan, 
outside assistance was not ultimately required and his regular troops scored an decisive 
victory over Mustapha. The last Albanian Pashalik was liquidated in late 1831 .(11)
The great event challenging Russia’s somewhat guarded commitment to the 
preservation the Ottoman Empire came in 1832-33 with the onset of the Mohammed Ali 
crisis. The ambitious Pasha of Egypt dreamed of conquering the Middle East to create an 
Arab Empire and, like Mustapha, sought as his allies Muslims discontented by the Sultan’s 
reforms.(12) War broke out between the Sultan and his nominal vassal in November 
1831 .(13) The Egyptian forces, under the impressive leadership of Ibrahim, scored a series 
of victories and, by the following June, Damasacus and much of Syria and Palestine were 
under their control. In August, their offensive ceased and Mohammed sought a negotiated 
settlement to legitimise his conquests. The Sultan however refused to treat and sought
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assistance from the European Powers. His initial hope rested on Britain, but the new 
government of Earl Grey was opposed to any interventioa Unlike die Tories, the Whigs were 
at this stage generally uninterested in Turkish affairs and did not consider the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire as damaging to British vital interests. With France supporting Muhammed, 
the Sultan had little choice but to turn to Russia (14)
The Russian Response
The ambitions of Mohammed Ali caused Russia to reverse its previous policy of non­
intervention in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. In November 1832 Nesselrode 
announced that Russia would be willing to send military assistance upon the Sultan’s 
request. (15) This turnaround had two main causes. First, the Russians were suitably 
impressed by the prowess of the Egyptian army, especially after Ibrahim’s decisive victory at 
Koniah in December 1832. After the battle Russian intelligence reported that ‘the army of 
the Sultan already no longer exists’ and that Ibrahim had 50,000 men and is ‘everywhere 
gathering new followers’.(16) Russian military opinion now had it that the Egyptian forces 
posed a genuine threat to Constantinople.(17) Ibrahim could either take the city outright or 
cause a revolt merely by approaching it. Whatever the case, the consequences for the 
Ottoman Empire would be fatal as:
The opinion of Muslims in Rumelia, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Albania and 
throughout European Turkey is totally against the Sultan. Any success of 
Ibrahim is awaited with delight and impatience and a revolt could break 
out anywhere and cause a general uprising as soon as the capital gives the 
example. (18)
Second, the Russians believed that, unless stopped, Mohammed would aim at nothing less 
than the ‘conquest of all Asia Minor’ and the establishment of an Arabic or Islamic Empire 
rivalling or, even superseding, the Ottoman. (19) Thus instead of current weak southern 
neighbour, Russia could be faced with a new and ambitious rival, possessing a dangerous 
social and political dynamic to its expansioa According to Russian reports, Ibrahim had 
announced that:
...he wants to resurrect the former greatness of the Muslim people, 
moreover, he will remove for the Turks the disadvantageous peace 
concluded by the Porte with Russia [the Treaty of Adrianople], promising 
to gain revenge on the Russians and declares that he will free die people 
from the...regular forces of the Sultan.(20)
Mohammed aimed to unite, in a broad alliance, all groups who, for various reasons, opposed 
the Sultan’s secularising policy - onetime Jannissaries still in hiding in die oudying imperial 
provinces, local chieftains deprived of their ‘feudal’ privileges, clergymen opposed
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to European innovations and the lower orders fearing enforced service in the much-despised
regular army. At root, Mohammed played on the Ottoman Muslims’ humiliation following
the unsuccessful 1828-29 war and the independence of Greece and the sense that their
empire was doomed to an irreversible decline.(21)
Naturally, the supposed aim of reversing the Adrianople treaty was of no little
concern to G. V. Rosen and the Caucasus Corps;(22) the possibility that Mohammed was
merely bluffing in order to win popular support was scant consolation:
In all probability, such rumours have been spread by him in order to 
draw towards him a people imbued with fanaticism and hate towards 
infidels, especially Russians; however, in order to maintain his influence 
in the provinces that are being annexed [Syria and Palestine], the 
Egyptian Pasha will, out of necessity, have to act in accordance with the 
popular mood.(23)
According to Rosen, the Pasha could pursue two strategies against Russia in the Caucasus. 
The first was a direct invasion. Lest this be thought too fantastic, Rosen cited the example 
of the Persian attack of 1826. Though it had no real chance of victory, ‘personal ambition 
and the recklessness of its people enticed the Persian Government towards this ill- 
conceived enterprise’. It was not impossible that Mohammed would make the same 
mistake. The second option was for the latter to inflame the anti-Russian sentiment of the 
Muslim tribes and create a general levee en masse throughout the region. This would result 
in an:
...invasion into our borders by the frontier tribes - the Kurds, 
Adzharians, Laz and others; in addition, disturbances could arise in the 
mountains, in Abkhasia and Dagestan, which are populated, for the 
most part, by Muslims of the Sunnite sect which dominates in Asia 
Minor. (24)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  * * * * * * *
Clearly, if the Sultan were to be saved and the Russian Caucasus be protected, 
resolute measures were required. Three forms of action were envisaged - a naval squadron 
to the Bosphorus, the reinforcement of land forces in the Balkans and a pre-emptive strike 
, against Ibrahim from the Caucasus. The first had been proposed by Russia as early as 
November 1832(25) and specific preparations were made the following month. A Black 
Sea naval squadron was readied to sail to Constantinople upon demand, possibly with a 
expeditionary land force. As a result, the 3rd brigade of the 26th Infantry Division 
(currently occupying Bessarabia) was transferred to Odessa.(26) Following news of the 
defeat at Koniah, the rest of the division was ordered to that port and was replaced in
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Bessarabia by the 25th Infantry Division. The latter was to be prepared ‘in the event of 
extreme necessity’ to cross the Pruth and enter the Principalities.(27)
On 21 January 1833 OS, with Ibrahim’s forces within two hundred miles of his 
capital, the Sultan made a formal request for Russian assistance.(28) Bolstered by the 
arrival of a naval squadron on 8 February OS,(29) the Sultan refused a recent Egyptian offer 
of peace treaty (dependent upon the cession of Syria and Adana) and Ibrahim prepared to 
continue his march.(30)
Meanwhile, in the Principalities, Kiselev had been ordered on 5 January OS to 
prepare his forces.(31) Silistria was therefore put on a war footing and the occupying 
forces readied to march at twenty four hours notice.(32) Kiselev, however, had at his 
disposal only 12,000 men, (almost half of whom were from the Wallachian and Moldavian 
militias) - a number considered insufficient for anything beyond the defence of the 
Principalities’ borders. He planned, therefore, to place half of the Russian infantry in 
Silistria (c.3000 men), man the Danubian frontier with half of the militia and Cossacks 
(c.4000), leaving the remaining forces as a reserve in the interior. By way of 
reinforcements, Kiselev requested the immediate calling of the 25th Infantry Division and 
the despatch of 8000 muskets and other weapons.(33)
Events were to take a different turn following Kiselev’s receipt on 2 February OS of 
a letter from A. P. Butenev, the Russian ambassador at Constantinople, passing on the 
Sultan’s request for the despatch of 25,000-30,000 troops.(34) Kiselev immediately 
formulated an operational plan. Russian forces were to march from Silistria to Adrianople, 
occupying Rustchuk and Shumla en route in order to use these fortresses as supply depots. 
Due however to the flooding of the Danube in the Spring, this movement could begin only 
in May and take twenty days to complete. Less understandable was that Kiselev proposed 
crossing the Balkans with five infantry divisions and 15,000 cavalry - a total of around
65,000 men. No explanation was offered then, or, subsequently; no doubt Kiselev 
overestimated the strength of the Egyptians.(35)
Nicholas agreed with the occupation of the fortresses (as long as the Sultan gave 
permission) but neither the proposed size of the force nor the timetable was accepted. The 
former was to be restricted to the 25th Infantry Division, one brigade of the 17th, the 4th 
Uhlan Cavalry Division, seven Cossack regiments (subsequently reduced to four), sappers 
and 44 guns.(36) Nominally, the force comprised 28,200 men,(37) though only 19,200 
were soldiers and NCOs.(38) It was to be commanded by Kiselev himself and be ready for 
action by 1 April OS.(39)
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Meanwhile, in the Caucasus, Rosen was formulating his own strategy against 
Mohammed.(40) As noted, he feared an attack on the Russian Caucasus. In such an event, 
nothing could be worse than for the Caucasus Corps to adopt a ‘totally defensive position’, 
as this would be seen by the local Muslim population as a ‘sign of weakness’ and spur them 
to rebellion. Instead, ‘it would be better for ourselves to undertake offensive action...in 
order to maintain the moral superiority which we currently enjoy’. Thus, as soon as the 
Egyptians advanced to Erzerum, Russia was to take Ardahan and Kars and, with this show 
of force, enter into communication with Adzharia and the Pashalik of Bayezid. The leaders 
of these Muslim provinces on the Russian frontier could thus hopefully be persuaded not to 
join Mohammed.
In this way [our offensive action, will]...secure our present border, 
maintain in the local tribes an acceptance of our might, keep in check 
those able to cause disturbances within our borders...and, finally, in the 
event of the separation of Asia Minor from European Turkey, Kars,
Ardahan and Batum may enter into our possession - conquests which 
my predecessor, the Prince of Warsaw [Paskevich], found essential for 
our final consolidation beyond the Caucasus.(41)
In addition, Rosen believed that Russia could use the crisis as an opportunity to impose a 
protectorate over the Pashalik of Bayezid. The region was ‘almost the sole form of 
communication between Asia Minor and Persia and [its control by Russia] would restrict so 
much of its [Persia’s] trade, that our manufacturing would receive a great advantage in the 
Asiatic markets’. (42)
The Tsar was impressed with Rosen’s argument and agreed on all points, with the 
exception of the request to despatch the 20th Infantry Division for reinforcement. Nicholas 
believed Rosen could raise 18 battalions from his existing forces - a number considered 
sufficient for offensive action.(43)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
By the end of February OS 1833 preparations for Russian military intervention were 
well under way.(44) At around this time, Mohammed had just issued the Porte with an 
ultimatum. Unlike his son Ibrahim, who demanded the cession of much of North Africa, 
Asia Minor as well as Crete, Mohammed proved to be more cautious and limited his 
demands to Syria and Adana. The Egyptian Pasha was however still prepared to attack 
Constantinople in the event of a Turkish refusal. Fearing the consequences of the 
continuation of the war and with it, the spectre of Russian intervention, France and Britain 
urged the Sultan to accept the Egyptian terms.(45)
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The Porte was, however, not quite yet prepared to concede defeat and on 11 March 
OS, staff talks held were between the Russian military representative General N. N. 
Murav’ev and Khozrev-Pasha, the Turkish Seraskier. Murav’ev reported that without 
Russian assistance, the Turkish army was doomed. It could put, at most, 20,000 troops in 
the field, though he was ‘almost completely convinced that the total lack of spirit in this 
army prohibits any successful military action’. The only hope was for a Russian force to 
arrive at Constantinople and, together with the Turks, attack Ibrahim at Kutiah. If, instead, 
the Russians remained in a defensive position on the European bank of the capital, the city 
would fall to an internal revolt ‘upon the first appearance of Ibrahim’. In addition, 
Murav’ev passed on the Seraskier’s formal request for the despatch of a Russian 
expeditionary force, by sea, to Constantinople.(46)
Unfortunately for the Turks, Russian assistance could not hope to arrive in time to 
prevent an assault from Ibrahim, whose force was but 150 miles from Constantinople.(47) 
The expeditionary force,(48) which departed Odessa on 17 March OS,(49) could only 
arrive in the first days of April OS(50) whilst Kiselev’s force could leave Silistria only from 
1 April OS.
Thus, on 18 March OS, the Porte was forced to open negotiations with Ibrahim.(51) 
Though a settlement was ultimately reached a month later, the Russians had little faith in 
Ibrahim’s fidelity to any written agreement and so Paskevich, now the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Russian army, formulated the following contingency plan.(52) If the Egyptians 
resumed their offensive, the Russian expeditionary force and the remnants of the Turkish 
army were to seek out Ibrahim and give battle, probably at the river Sikaria. Should 
Ibrahim succeed in causing a general revolt in Asia Minor, Rosen’s plan of capturing Kars 
and Ardahan was to be accepted.(53) In addition, Russia was to ‘send agents to Persia in 
order to incite this power to begin a war with the Turks’ - for which they were to be 
rewarded with the cession of Bagdad. Persia’s entrance into the war would also ‘restrain 
them from a war with us at a time when we will be occupied with the affairs of Turkey’. If 
Persia remained as neutral onlooker then ‘the English would surely try to persuade them to 
use this opportunity against us’.(54) As regards Kiselev’s force, Paskevich proposed it be 
used to occupy the fortresses of the European bank of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. 
This would protect the Russian fleet and Constantinople, prevent Ibrahim from crossing 
over to Europe and bar the entrance of the Egyptian fleet in the Black Sea.(55) If, against 
all expectation, Ibrahim managed to capture Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire 
collapsed, the Russian forces were, if possible, to remain in occupation of the Straits.(56)
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Paskevich’s plan was destined never to be enacted as Mohammed, now under great 
pressure from France and Britain, was resolved to reach an agreement. The Porte appears 
to have believed strongly in the chances of a negotiated settlement and, on 19 March OS, 
wrote to Kiselev requesting the indefinite postponement of the despatch of his force.(57) It 
was however impossible to prevent the despatch of other Russian forces as, two day 
previously, the Russian expeditionary force had already left for Constantinople where it 
arrived on 24 March OS.(58) A second such force arrived on 12 April OS(59) and three 
days later the Sultan conducted a joint review of all the Russian and Turkish troops in the 
capital.(60) The review was attended by various foreign dignitaries, though the British and 
French ambassadors were conspicuous by their absence.(61) Their governments, through 
their indifference to the Porte, had pushed her into the arms of Russia. Increasingly 
conscious of this error they were now incensed by its consequence - the arrival of Russian 
forces. Developments over the coming months were to prove no less disturbing.
The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi and its Consequences
In late April, the Russian diplomat A. F. Orlov arrived in Constantinople, carrying 
with him a draft for a defensive pact with the Porte. Though it remains somewhat unclear 
which power formally instigated negotiations for an alliance, both clearly sought it(62) and, 
on 8 July 1833 NS, a treaty was duly signed.(63) At first glance, it was a very modest- 
looking document. It provided, for a period of eight years, mutual assistance in the event of 
external aggression towards either state (without a guarantee of territory). In a ‘secret’ 
article, Russia declared that, if she herself were attacked, she would not request Turkish 
military aid, only that the Porte close the Dardanelles to all foreign warships. This 
stipulation did not alter the existing regime of the Straits; it merely reaffirmed the obligation 
undertaken by the Porte in article XI of the 1809 Anglo-Russian treaty.(64)
The resulting diplomatic furore was grounded in two issues. The first was 
Palmerston’s (mistaken) idea that now that Russia and Turkey were allies, the Porte might 
open (or even be obliged to open) the Straits to Russian warships.(65) The second issue 
was more abstract - that the treaty transformed Turkey into a Russian vassal and destroyed 
the European Balance of Power. Palmerston believed that, though in name, defensive, the 
treaty was ‘in essence offensive also and it bears therefore a hostile character as it regards 
other Powers’. Moreover, it allowed Russia a ‘claim to constant interference by means of 
her military force in the internal affairs...and to confer upon her a kind of protectorate over 
Turkey’. As a result, the Sultan, in his foreign relations, ‘binds himself to adopt the
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quarrels of Russia’ and, at home, is ‘taught to look to the Russian army for the maintenance 
of his domestic authority’. Britain had always seen the Ottoman Empire as an ‘important 
element of the general Balance of Power’ but now it was ‘obvious that the Sultan ceases to 
be independent either at home or abroad’.(66)
Though Palmerston was wrong to consider the treaty ‘offensive’, he was correct in 
his conclusion that Russia’s aim was to acquire a de facto protectorate over Turkey.(67) 
This was the logical conclusion of the ‘weak neighbour’ policy and the fact that this 
protectorate ultimately proved to be an illusion should not be used to belittle Palmerston’s 
genuine concern in 1833.(68) On a more profound level, Palmerston’s declaration that 
Britain would in future act ‘as if the treaty above-mentioned were not in existence*(69) 
marked a new phase in the Anglo-Russian struggle over the Eastern Question.
In Britain, Unkiar-Skelessi proved to be ‘the true turning point in the attitude of 
English statesmen towards Russia’.(70) The Canningite idea of co-operation with the Tsar 
was rejected and even the Whigs, long derisive of the Russian bogey, now adopted the 
traditional Tory policy of resistance to Russia. Whipped into a frenzy by the increasingly 
jingoistic British press, public opinion also become resolutely anti-Russian. From 1833, 
Britain, already Russia’s premier rival in in Asia Minor,(71) formally replaced Austria as 
the main antagonist of Russia in European Turkey.(72) Whilst over the following two 
decades Anglo-Russian relations did not ( as many expected) deteriorate in any progressive 
and uniform manner, Palmerston’s belief that Russia aimed at the ‘annexation of large and 
important portions of the Turkish dominions’(73) contributed greatly to the deeper origins 
of the Crimean War.
In Russia, Britain’s growing displeasure was sensed veiy acutely and for the 
remainder of Nicholas’ reign the threat of war with Britain (possibly allied with France) was 
to dominate Russian strategy towards the Eastern Question.(74) In fact, as early as 
December 1832 (in anticipation of the European powers hostile reaction to Russia’s 
proposed intervention in the Mohammed Ali crisis), Nicholas had drawn up a war plan to 
counter an Anglo-French coalition. It placed five infantry and four reserve cavalry corps 
(172 battalions, 416 cavalry squadrons and 792 guns) on a war footing. They were to be 
readied to march into Europe in two months.(75) A recent analysis of the implications of 
this plan has concluded that, in committing 350,000 men to a war in Europe (against 
France), Russia was left with sparce defensive capabilitites - two infantry corps holding 
Poland, one on the Pruth facing Austria and the Ottoman Empire and with no significant 
forces on the Baltic and Black Sea littorals.(76)
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Aware that Russia had insufficient forces to both fight an offensive war in Europe 
and protect herself against a British amphibious landing, the Russians were forced to adopt 
a defensive plan in December 1833. Four of her eight infantry corps were now to be 
committed to the defence of her northern and southern shores, two were to hold Poland, one 
was to face Austria and one was to be held in reserve. Unfortunately, in attempting to 
cover her entire European borders, the disjointed Russian army would thereby be threatened 
by a localised defeat at almost every point.(77) Russia’s problem was not simply that too 
few of her 850,000-man army could be committed to a European war(78) - it was graver 
than this. Geography dictated that the naval powers of Britain and France had an inherent 
strategic advantage over Russia in that they could attack her at any position on her vast 
coastline. Russia could neither be strong everywhere nor, due to the distances involved, 
send reinforcements quickly to the theatre of war. Although the threat of war in 1832/33 
did not materialise, Nicholas ‘had all the information to enable him to foresee the possibility 
of a Crimean War and to predict the likeliest result’.(79)
This growing concern at Russia’s military vunerability placed in turn ever more 
importance on her diplomacy. Two crucial tasks were placed before the Russian Foreign 
Ministry. Firstly, to resurrect the Holy Alliance and bring Austria back into the Russian 
fold - for if Austria joined forces with Britain and France over the Eastern Question, then 
there could be little hope for Russia. Thus from 1833 onwards Russia began to re­
emphasise its common interests with the Habsburgs (the struggle against revolution) and, at 
Miinchengratz, she swept away the main cause of their antagonism by agreeing to co­
operate over Turkish affairs. The second task of Russian diplomacy was to secure and 
maintain the pro-Russian, or, at least neutral orientation of the Porte - the surest means of 
baning the passage of the British fleet into the Black Sea and thus removing the single 
greatest military threat to the Russian empire. In 1833 the outlook for such a policy was 
good, for, by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, Russia had already secured a pre-eminent 
position at Constantinople by posing as the friend and ally of the Sultan. Her mission for 
the forseable future was to counter all British attempts to disrupt this, the most unholy of 
affiances.
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In essence, this dissertation has focused on two sets of issues. The first consisted of 
the relationship between war planning, diplomacy and the conduct of military operations 
during the Eastern Crisis of 1821-33. Whilst there are a number of good books on isolated 
aspects of the crisis, this work has sought to combine military and diplomatic factors to 
present a more complete understanding of the period. It has been argued that the key to the 
period was Kiselev’s decision to integrate the idea of a Balkan crossing into Russian war 
planning. This gave the army the realistic prospect of abandoning its slow, ‘methodical’ 
Turkish campaigns of the past and achieving a decisive result in a single campaign by striking 
directly at Constantinople. This new military strategy did not contradict Russia’s diplomatic 
strategy (the preservation of the Ottoman Empire as a ‘weak neighbour’) but complemented 
it, for there was no better way of keeping Turkey weak and submissive than die fear that her 
capital was vulnerable. A submissive Turkey suited Russian interests in two main ways; first, 
it secured the closure of the straits to the fleets of the naval powers and, second, it allowed 
Russia to exert and extend her influence in the Balkans through her rights of patronage over 
the Balkan Christians.
The 1828-29 Russo-Turlrish war brought to the fore the important questions 
concerning the future political status of the Balkan Christians. Russia had to decide whether 
to pursue the aggrandisement and even independence of Serbia by using her military forces. 
At the eventual negotiations a decision was needed as to whether to annex the Principalities or 
make them semi-independent and whether to persuade Britain and France that ‘Greece’ 
should be large or small, independent or autonomous. It has been shown that, in the 1820s, 
Russian diplomacy was directed towards keeping the emerging Balkan nations as 
autonomous regions within the Ottoman Empire. It is for this reason that the idea of using of 
Balkan partisans was so problematic - it was feared that such policy could lead to more 
national liberation movements and even the destruction of Ottoman rule in Europe. In 1828- 
29 Russia did all she could to prevent levee en masse in the Balkans but, had she been forced 
into a third campaign, would have probably given the Bulgars and Serbs the signal to rise.
The idea that Russian interests were best served by the Balkan populations receiving 
only autonomy was put to test by Kiselev and his reform of the Principalities. Russia’s 
extensive treaty rights meant that this reform could be carried out without the interference o f 
other powers (this would not have been possible if the Principalities were independent). 
Kiselev’s aim was to turn the province into a Russian protectorate. That such
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a reform was administered by a Russian general is not surprising when one considers that for 
many years the army had viewed the Principalities as nothing other than an operational base 
for its Turkish campaigns. This base was, however, underdeveloped and Kiselev aimed at 
rectifying this state of affairs by increasing grain production and creating a militia that would 
support the Russian forces in future Turkish wars. The problem with the reform was that 
some of its features were too advanced, the period of occupation too short and that the 
consequences of certain measures (such as the increase of grain exports) were too dimly 
perceived. However critical one is of the Russian experiment in the Principalities, it was far 
superior to the policy adopted over Greece, which saw the granting of independence and the 
resulting loss of Russian influence.
The second set of issues examined in this dissertation was the impact of the Eastern 
Question on the military, political and diplomatic ideas of the Russian High Command with 
reference to the internal divisions that characterised the Russian ruling elite after 1815 - 
namely, the struggle between ‘progressives’ and ‘conservatives’ and between ‘Russians’ and 
‘foreigners* (especially Germans). A traditional explanation of Soviet historians was that the 
‘progressives’ (by which they essentially meant Decembrists) opposed both Russia’s 
Prussified military system and passive Eastern policy. Instead, they are said to have favoured 
the resurrection of the native military school and the pursuit of an anti-Ottoman foreign policy 
with the aim of liberating the Balkan population. In this they were opposed by Tsarist 
establishment figures, especially German careerists such as Nesselrode and Diebitsch.
To a degree, this dichotomy is justified. The main opposition to the Gatchina military 
system was found in the Second Army where the progressively-minded Kiselev filled his 
General Staff with Decembrist officers. Pestel’, M  F. Orlov and others aimed at humanising 
military service and introducing reforms gleaned from their knowledge of French 
revolutionary practices and the more innovative Russian commanders. The Decembrists 
genuinely opposed Tsarist Eastern policy and had a great sympathy for the Balkan 
revolutionary movements. This picture, however, is not nearly as simple as has been 
presented by Soviet writers. The Second Army’s research into previous Russo-Turkish wars 
was inspired, not by the greatness of the Russian military tradition, but by its relative 
failure. These wars had taken too long, cost too much and offered in return scant rewards.
Its research led not to the glorification of the campaigns of the great commanders, but to 
the understanding that knowledge of the theatre of war and the enemy’s military forces 
was the key to success. As a result there developed in Kiselev’s General Staff an
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empirical school of military thought. This ‘school5 had, in fact, little connection with the 
Russian military tradition, for in the eighteenth century this type of staff work was almost 
unknown. The pioneering nature of Liprandi5s research proves the Soviet contention that 
all military innovation in the period was the work of Decembrists to be false.
Whilst Soviet writers have correctly exposed the many negative features of Russia's 
post-1815 military system, they have misunderstood entirely the attitude of the military 
establishment at St Petersburg and Mogilev to military theory. The establishment's 
strategic outlook was dominated by the ideas of Jomini, who, despite Soviet attempts at 
misrepresentation, advocated an essentially ‘progressive' doctrine - to dispense with the 
precepts of ‘methodical' war and to seek victory through one general and decisive 
encounter with the enemy. The problem with Jomini's theory was that it could not cope 
with the specific nature of Turkish wars, which were characterised by an inhospitable 
theatre of war and, in more recent times, by the Turks’ inclination to remain in their 
imposing fortresses and reluctance to give battle. The 1828 campaign failed, not because of 
the High Command's adherence to ‘methodical' doctrines, but precisely because Diebitsch 
(following Jomini) refused to push southwards without first defeating the main Ottoman 
force at Shumla. Had not the Turks chosen to give battle in 1829 then Diebitsch, left to his 
own devices, would have remained north of the Balkans.
As regards the army’s ideas on Russia’ Eastern foreign policy, it undoubtedly 
favoured a forward policy. The majority of generals accepted the logic behind the ‘weak 
neighbour’ policy though favoured a more forceful application of it through the annexation 
of certain territories (especially in the Caucasus) and through a greater readiness to support 
Russian demands with military action. There still, however, existed a smaller group of 
officers who dreamt of a return to the more ambitious days of Catherine the Great. These 
included Pestel' and other Decembrists who revived the idea of the Catherine’s ‘Greek 
Project’. Although the former’s ideas have been presented in Soviet historiography as 
progressive, it has been shown that his foreign policy programme was in fact very 
traditional.
As regards the level of influence leading generals acquired over the conduct of 
diplomacy it has been shown to be of some significance. In the past, Russian commanders 
had often conducted diplomatic negotiations with both Turkey and Persia and this was true 
after 1815. Ermolov was fully involved in the diplomacy of the Caucasian border disputes 
with Turkey and Persia, Paskevich negotiated the Russo-Persian Treaty of Turcomanchai in 
1828 and Diebitsch led the negotiations at Adrianople in 1829. The most important impact 
on foreign policy was, however, made by Kiselev. His progressive reform of the
Principalities resulted, for a time at least, in an almost unparalleled level of Russian 
influence in Balkans and provided a model for future Russian activity in the region. 
Moreover, by his plan for a Balkan crossing, Kiselev created the strategic foundation upon 
which the Tsar and the Foreign Ministry constructed Russia’s policy towards the Eastern 
Question as a whole.
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